Afterquotingthewordsoftheamendment，whichare，\"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaworequity，commencedorprosecutedagainstoneofthestatesbycitizensofanotherstate，orbycitizensorsubjectsofanyforeignstate，\"theopinionproceeds：\"Itisapartofourhistory，that，attheadoptionoftheconstitution，allthestatesweregreatlyindebted；andtheapprehension，thatthesedebtsmightbeprosecutedinthefederalcourts，formedaveryseriousobjectiontothatinstrument。Suitswereinstituted；andthecourtmaintaineditsjurisdiction。Thealarmwasgeneral；and，toquietthe[*3：592]
apprehensions，thatweresoextensivelyentertained，thisamendmentwasproposedinCongress，andadoptedbythestatelegislatures。Thatitsmotivewasnottomaintainthesovereigntyofastatefromthedegradation，supposedtoattendacompulsoryappearancebeforethetribunalofthenation，maybeinferredfromthetermsoftheamendment。Itdoesnotcomprehendcontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates，orbetweenastateandaforeignstate。Thejurisdictionofthecourtstillextendstothesecases；andintheseastatemaystillbesued。Wemustascribetheamendment，then，tosomeothercause，thanthedignityofastate。Thereisnodifficultyinfindingthiscause。Those，whowereinhibitedfromcommencingasuitagainstastate，orfromprosecutingone，whichmightbecommencedbeforetheadoptionoftheamendment，werepersons，whomightprobablybeitscreditors。Therewasnotmuchreasontofear，thatforeignorsisterstateswouldbecreditorstoanyconsiderableamount；andtherewasreasontoretainthejurisdictionofthecourtinthosecases，becauseitmightbeessentialtothepreservationofpeace。Theamendment，therefore，extendedtosuitscommenced，orprosecutedbyindividuals，butnottothosebroughtbystates。
Sec。1717。\"Thefirstimpressionmadeonthemindbythisamendmentis，thatitwasintendedforthosecases，andforthoseonly，inwhichsomedemandagainstastateismadebyanindividualinthecourtsoftheUnion。Ifweconsiderthecauses，towhichitistobetraced，weareconductedtothesameconclusion。Ageneralinterestmightwellbefeltinleavingtoastatethefullpowerofconsultingitsconvenienceintheadjustmentofitsdebts，orof[*3：593]otherclaimsuponit；butnointerestcouldbefeltinsochangingtherelationsbetweenthewholeanditsparts，astostripthegovernmentofthemeansofprotecting，bytheinstrumentalityofitscourts，theconstitutionandlawsfromactiveviolation。
Sec。1718。\"Thewordsoftheamendmentappeartothecourttojustifyandrequirethisconstruction。Thejudicialpowerisnot’toextendtoanysuitinlaworequity，commenced，orprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnitedStatesbycitizensofanotherstate，etc。’
Sec。1719。\"Whatisasuit？Weunderstandittobetheprosecution，orpursuit，ofsomeclaim，demand，orrequest。Inlawlanguage，itistheprosecutionofsomedemandinacourtofjustice。Theremedyforeveryspeciesofwrongis，saysJudgeBlackstone，’thebeingputinpossessionofthatrightwhereofthepartyinjuredisdeprived。’’Theinstruments，wherebythisremedyisobtained，areadiversityofsuitsandactions，whicharedefinedbytheMirrortobe\"thelawfuldemandofone’sright；\"
or，asBraetonandFletaexpressit，inthewordsofJustinian，jusprosequendiinjudicio，quodalicuidebetur。Blackstonethenproceedstodescribeeveryspeciesofremedybysuit；andtheyareallcases，wherethepartysuingclaimstoobtainsomething，towhichhehasaright。
Sec。1720。\"Tocommenceasuitistodemandsomethingbytheinstitutionofprocessinacourtofjustice；andtoprosecutethesuit，is，accordingtothecommonacceptationoflanguage，tocontinuethatdemand。Byasuitcommencedbyanindividualagainstastate，weshouldunderstandprocesssuedoutbythatindividualagainstthestate，forthepurposeofestablishingsomeclaimagainstitbythejudgmentof[*3：594]acourt；andtheprosecutionofthatsuitisitscontinuance。Whatevermaybethestagesofitsprogress，theactorisstillthesame。SuitshadbeencommencedintheSupremeCourtagainstsomeofthestatesbeforethisamendmentwasintroducedintoCongress，andothersmightbecommenced，beforeitshouldbeadoptedbythestatelegislatures，andmightbedependingatthetimeofitsadoption。Theobjectoftheamendmentwas，notonlytopreventthecommencementoffuturesuits，buttoarresttheprosecutionofthose，whichmightbecommenced，whenthisarticleshouldformapartoftheconstitution。Itthereforeembracesbothobjects；anditsmeaningis，thatthejudicialpowershallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuit，whichmaybecommenced，orwhich，ifalreadycommenced，maybeprosecutedagainstastatebythecitizenofanotherstate。Ifasuit，broughtinonecourt，andcarriedbylegalprocesstoasupervisingcourt，beacontinuationofthesamesuit，thenthissuitisnotcommencednorprosecutedagainstastate。Itisclearlyinitscommencementthesuitofastateagainstanindividual，whichsuitistransferredtothiscourt，notforthepurposeofassertinganyclaimagainstthestate，but’forthepurposeofassertingaconstitutionaldefenceagainstaclaimmadebyastate。
Sec。1794。\"Awritoferrorisdefinedtobeacommission，bywhichthejudgesofonecourtareauthorizedtoexaminearecord，uponwhichajudgmentwasgiveninanothercourt，and，onsuchexamination，toaffirm，orreversethesameaccordingtolaw。If，saysmyLordCoke，bythewritoferrortheplaintiffmayrecover，orberestoredtoanything，itmaybereleasedbythenameofanaction。InBacon’s[*3：595]Abridgment，itislaiddown，that’wherebyawritoferrortheplaintiffshallrecover，orberestoredtoanypersonalthing，asdebt，damage，orthelike，areleaseofallactionspersonalisagoodplea。Andwhenlandistoberecovered，orrestoredinawritoferror，areleaseofactionsrealisagoodbar。
Butwherebyawritoferrortheplaintiffshallnotberestoredtoanypersonalorrealthing，areleaseofallactionsrealorpersonalisnobar。’AndforthiswehavetheauthorityofLordCoke，bothinhisCommentaryonLittletonandinhisReports。Awritoferror，then，isinthenatureofasuitoraction，whenitistorestoretheparty，whoobtainsittothepossessionofanything，whichiswithheldfromhim，notwhenitsoperationisentirelydefensive。ThisrulewillapplytowritsoferrorfromtheCourtsoftheUnitedStates，aswellastothosewritsinEngland。
Sec。1722。\"Underthejudiciaryact，theeffectofawritoferrorissimplytobringtherecordintoCourt，andsubmitthejudgmentoftheinferiortribunaltoreexamination。Itdoesnotinanymanneractupontheparties；
itactsonlyontherecord。Itremovestherecordintothesupervisingtribunal。Where，then，astateobtainsajudgmentagainstanindividual，andthecourt，renderingsuchjudgment，overrulesadefence，setupundertheconstitution，orlawsoftheUnitedStates，thetransferofthisrecordintotheSupremeCourt，forthesolepurposeofinquiring，whetherthejudgmentviolatestheconstitutionorlawsoftheUnitedStates，can，withnopropriety，wethink，bedenominatedasuitcommenced，orprosecutedagainstthestate，whosejudgmentissofarreexamined。Nothingisdemandedfromthestate。Noclaimagainstit，[*3：596]ofanydescription，isassertedorprosecuted。Thepartyisnottoberestoredtothepossessionofanything。Essentially，itisanappealonasinglepoint；andthedefendant，whoappealsfromajudgmentrenderedagainsthim，isneversaidtocommence，orprosecuteasuitagainsttheplaintiff，whohasobtainedthejudgment。
Thewritoferrorisgiven，ratherthananappeal，becauseitisthemoreusualmodeofremovingsuitsatcommonlaw；andbecause，perhaps，itismoretechnicallyproper，whereasinglepointoflaw，andnotthewholecase，istobereexamined。Butanappealmightbegiven，andmightbesoregulated，astoeffecteverypurposeofawritoferror。Themodeofremovalisform，andnotsubstance。Whetheritbebywritoferror，orappeal，noclaimisasserted，nodemandismadebytheoriginaldefendant。Heonlyassertstheconstitutionalright，tohavehisdefenceexaminedbythattribunal，whoseprovinceitistoconstruetheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnion。
Sec。1723。\"Theonlypartoftheproceeding，whichisinanymannerpersonal，isthecitation。Andwhatisthecitation？Itissimplynoticetotheoppositeparty，thattherecordistransferredintoanothercourt，wherehemayappear，ordeclinetoappear，ashisjudgment，orinclinationmaydetermine。Astheparty，whohasobtainedajudgmentisoutofcourt，andmay，therefore，notknow，thathiscauseisremoved，commonjusticerequires，thatnoticeofthefactshouldbegivenhim。Butthisnoticeisnotasuit，norhasittheeffectofprocess。Ifthepartydoesnotchoosetoappear，hecannotbebroughtintocourt，norishisfailuretoappearconsideredasadefault。Judgmentcannotbegivenagainsthimforhisnon—appearance；butthejudgmentistobereexamined，andreversed，oraffirmed，inlike[*3：597]manner，asifthepartyhadappeared，andarguedhiscause。
Sec。1724。\"Thepointofview，inwhichthiswritoferror，withitscitation，hasbeenconsidereduniformlyinthecourtsoftheUnion，hasbeenwellillustratedbyareferencetothecourseofthiscourtinsuitsinstitutedbytheUnitedStates。Theuniversallyreceivedopinionis，thatnosuitcanbecommenced，orprosecutedagainsttheUnitedStates；thatthejudiciaryactdoesnotauthorizesuchsuits。Yetwritsoferror，accompaniedwithcitations，haveuniformlyissuedfortheremovalofjudgmentsinfavouroftheUnitedStatesintoasuperiorcourt，wheretheyhave，likethoseinfavourofanindividual，beenreexamined，andaffirmed，orreversed。
Ithasneverbeensuggested，thatsuchwritoferrorwasasuitagainsttheUnitedStates，and，therefore，notwithinthejurisdictionoftheappellatecourt。Itis，then，theopinionofthecourt，thatthedefendant，whoremovesajudgment，renderedagainsthimbyastatecourt，intothiscourt，forthepurposeofreexaminingthequestion，whetherthatjudgmentbeinviolationoftheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates，doesnotcommence，orprosecuteasuitagainstthestate，whatevermaybeitsopinion，wheretheeffectofthewritmaybetorestorethepartytothepossessionofathing，whichhedemands。\"
Sec。1725。Anotherinquiry，touchingtheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，ofastillmoregeneralcharacter，is，whetheritextendsonlytotheinferiorcourtsoftheUnion，constitutedbycongress，orreachestocasesdecidedinthestatecourts。Thisquestion[*3：598]hasbeenmadeonseveraloccasions；andhasbeenmostdeliberatelyweighed，andsolemnlydecidedintheSupremeCourt。ThereasoningofthecourtinMartinv。Hunter，whichwasthefirsttime，inwhichthequestionwasdirectlypresentedforjudgment，willbeheregiven，asithasbeenaffirmedonmorerecentdiscussions。
Sec。1726。\"Thisleadsus，\"saysthecourt\"totheconsiderationofthegreatquestion，astothenatureandextentoftheappellatejurisdictionoftheUnitedStates。Wehavealreadyseen，thatappellatejurisdictionisgivenbytheconstitutiontotheSupremeCourtinallcases，whereithasnotoriginaljurisdiction；subject，however，tosuchexceptionsandregulations，ascongressmayprescribe。Itis，therefore，capableofembracingeverycaseenumeratedintheconstitution，whichisnotexclusivelytobedecidedbywayoforiginaljurisdiction。ButtheexerciseofappellatejurisdictionisfarfrombeinglimitedbythetermsoftheconstitutiontotheSupremeCourt。Therecanbenodoubt，thatcongressmaycreateasuccessionofinferiortribunals，ineachofwhichitmayvestappellate，aswellasoriginaljurisdiction。Thejudicialpowerisdelegatedbytheconstitutioninthemostgeneralterms，andmay，therefore，beexercisedbycongress，undereveryvarietyofformofappellate，ororiginaljurisdiction。
Andasthereisnothingintheconstitution，whichrestrains，orlimitsthispower，itmust，therefore，inallthesecases，subsistintheutmostlatitude，ofwhich，initsownnature，itissusceptible。
Sec。1797。\"As，then，bythetermsoftheconstitution，[*3：599]theappellatejurisdictionisnotlimited，astotheSupremeCourt，andastothiscourtitmaybeexercisedinallothercases，thanthose，ofwhichithasoriginalcognizance，whatistheretorestrainitsexerciseoverstatetribunalsintheenumeratedcases？Theappellatepowerisnotlimitedbythetermsofthethirdarticletoanyparticularcourts。Thewordsare，’thejudicialpowerwhichincludesappellatepower，shallextendtoallcases，’etc。，and’inallothercasesbeforementioned，theSupremeCourtshallhaveappellatejurisdiction。’Itisthecase，then，andnotthecourt，thatgivesthejurisdiction。Ifthejudicialpowerextendstothecase，itwillbeinvaintosearchintheletteroftheconstitutionforanyqualification，astothetribunal，whereitdepends。Itisincumbent，then，uponthose，whoassertsuchaqualification，toshowitsexistencebynecessaryimplication。Ifthetextbeclearanddistinct，norestrictionuponitsplainandobviousimportoughttobeadmitted，unlesstheinferencebeirresistible。
Sec。1728。\"IftheconstitutionmeanttolimittheappellatejurisdictiontoeasespendinginthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，itwouldnecessarilyfollow，thatthejurisdictionofthesecourtswould，inallthecasesenumeratedintheconstitution，beexclusiveofstatetribunals。How，otherwise，couldthejurisdictionextendtoallcases，arisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，or，toallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction？Ifsomeofthesecasesmightbeentertainedbystatetribunals，andnoappellatejurisdiction，astothem，shouldexist，thentheappellatepowerwouldnotextendtoall，buttosome，cases。Ifstatetribunalsmightexerciseconcurrentjurisdictionoverall，orsomeoftheother[*3：600]
classesofcasesintheconstitution，withoutcontrol，thentheappellatejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesmight，astosuchcases，havenorealexistence，contrarytothemanifestintentoftheconstitution。Undersuchcircumstances，togiveeffecttothejudicialpower，itmustbeconstruedtobeexclusive；andthis，notonlywhenthecasusfaederisshouldarisedirectly，butwhenitshouldariseincidentallyincasespendinginstatecourts。Thisconstructionwouldabridgethejurisdictionofsuchcourtsfarmore，thanhasbeenevercontemplatedinanyactofcongress。
Sec。1729。\"Ontheotherhand，if，ashasbeencontended，adiscretionbevestedincongresstoestablish，ornottoestablish，inferiorcourtsattheirownpleasure，andcongressshouldnotestablishsuchcourts，theappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtwouldhavenothingtoactupon，unlessitcouldactuponcasespendinginthestatecourts。Undersuchcircumstancesitmustbeheld，thattheappellatepowerwouldextendtostatecourts；fortheconstitutionisperemptory，thatitshallextendtocertainenumeratedcases，whichcasescouldexistinnoothercourts。
Anyotherconstruction，uponthissupposition，wouldinvolvethisstrangecontradiction，thatadiscretionarypower，vestedincongress，andwhichtheymightrightfullyomittoexercise，Woulddefeattheabsoluteinjunctionsoftheconstitutioninrelationtothewholeappellatepower。
Sec。1730。\"Butitisplain，thattheframersoftheconstitutiondidcontemplate，thatcaseswithinthejudicialcognizanceoftheUnitedStates，notonlymight，butwouldariseinthestatecourtsintheexerciseoftheirordinaryjurisdiction。Withthisview，thesixtharticledeclares，that’thisconstitution，and[*3：601]thelawsoftheUnitedStates，whichshallbemadeinpursuancethereof，andalltreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemade，undertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，shallbethesupremelawoftheland，andthejudges，ineverystate，shallbeboundthereby，anything，intheconstitutionorlawsofanystate，tothecontrarynotwithstanding。’
Itisobvious，thatthisobligationisimperativeuponthestatejudgesintheirofficial，andnotmerelyintheirprivatecapacities。Fromtheverynatureoftheirjudicialduties，theywouldbecalledupontopronouncethelaw，applicabletothecaseinjudgment。Theywerenot。todecide，merelyaccordingtothelaws，orconstitutionofthestate，butaccordingtotheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，—’thesupremelawoftheland。’
Sec。1731。\"Amoment’sconsiderationwillshowusthenecessityandproprietyofthisprovisionincases，wherethejurisdictionofthestatecourtsisunquestionable。Supposeacontract，forthepaymentofmoney，ismadebetweencitizensofthesamestate，andperformancethereofissoughtinthecourtsofthatstate；nopersoncandoubt，thatthejurisdictioncompletelyandexclusivelyattaches，inthefirstinstance，tosuchcourts。
Supposeatthetrial，thedefendantsetsup，inhisdefence，atenderunderastatelaw，makingpapermoneyagoodtender，orastatelaw，impairingtheobligationofsuchcontract，whichlaw，ifbinding，woulddefeatthesuit。TheconstitutionoftheUnitedStateshasdeclared，thatnostateshallmakeanythingbutgoldorsilvercoinatenderinpaymentofdebts，orpassalawimpairingtheobligationofcontracts。Ifcongressshallnothavepassedalaw，providingfortheremovalofsuchasuit[*3：602]
tothecourtsoftheUnitedStates，mustnotthestatecourtproceedtohear，anddetermineit？Canamerepleaindefencebe，ofitself，abartofurtherproceedings，soastoprohibitaninquiryintoitstruth，orlegalpropriety，whennoothertribunalexists，towhomjudicialcognizanceofsuchcasesisconfided？Supposeanindictmentforacrimeinastatecourt，andthedefendantshouldallegeinhisdefence，thatthecrimewascreatedbyanexpostfactoactofthestate，mustnotthestatecourt，intheexerciseofajurisdiction，whichhasalreadyrightfullyattached，havearighttopronounceonthevalidity，andsufficiencyofthedefence？
Itwouldbeextremelydifficult，uponanylegalprinciples，togiveanegativeanswertotheseinquiries。Innumerableinstancesofthesamesortmightbestated，inillustrationoftheposition；andunlessthestatecourtscouldsustainjurisdictioninsuchcases，thisclauseofthesixtharticlewouldbewithoutmeaningoreffect；andpublicmischiefs，ofamostenormousmagnitude，wouldinevitablyensue。
Sec。1732。\"Itmust，therefore，beconceded，thattheconstitution，notonlycontemplated，butmeanttoprovideforcaseswithinthescopeofthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates，whichmightyetdependbeforestatetribunals。Itwasforeseen，that，intheexerciseoftheirordinaryjurisdiction；statecourtswould，incidentally，takecognizanceofcasesarisingundertheconstitution，thelaws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。
Yettoallthesecasesthejudicialpower，bytheverytermsoftheconstitution，istoextend。Itcannotextendbyoriginaljurisdiction，ifthathasalreadyrightfullyandexclusivelyattachedinthestatecourts，whichashasbeenalreadyshown[*3：603]mayoccur；itmust，therefore，extendbyappellatejurisdiction，ornotatall。Itwouldseemtofollow，thattheappellatepoweroftheUnitedStatesmust，insuchcases，extendtostatetribunals；
and，ifinsuchcases，thereisnoreason，whyitshouldnotequallyattachuponallotherswithinthepurviewoftheconstitution。Ithasbeenargued，thatsuchanappellatejurisdictionoverstatecourtsisinconsistentwiththegeniusofourgovernments，andthespiritoftheconstitution。Thatthelatterwasneverdesignedtoactuponstatesovereignties，butonlyuponthepeople；andthat，ifthepowerexists，itwillmateriallyimpairthesovereigntyofthestates，andtheindependenceoftheircourts。Wecannotyieldtotheforceofthisreasoning；itassumesprinciples，whichwecannotadmit，anddrawsconclusions，towhichwedonotyieldourassent。
Sec。1733。\"Itisamistake，thattheconstitutionwasnotdesignedtooperateuponstatesintheircorporatecapacities。Itiscrowdedwithprovisions，whichrestrain，orannulthesovereigntyofthestates，insomeofthehighestbranchesoftheirprerogatives。Thetenthsectionofthefirstarticlecontainsalonglistofdisabilitiesandprohibitionsimposeduponthestates。Surely，whensuchessentialportionsofstatesovereigntyaretakenaway，orprohibitedtobeexercised，itcannotbecorrectlyasserted，thattheconstitutiondoesnotactuponthestates。
Thelanguageoftheconstitutionisalsoimperativeuponthestates，astotheperformanceofmanyduties。Itisimperativeuponthestatelegislaturestomakelawsprescribingthetime，places，andmannerofholdingelectionsforsenatorsandrepresentatives，andforelectorsofpresidentandvicepresident。Andinthese，aswell[*3：604]assomeothercases，congresshavearighttorevise，amend，orsupercedethelaws，whichmaybepassedbystatelegislatures。When，therefore，thestatesarestrippedofsomeofthehighestattributesofsovereignty，andthesamearegiventotheUnitedStates；whenthelegislaturesofthestatesare，insomerespects，underthecontrolofcongress，and，ineverycase，are，undertheconstitution，boundbytheparamountauthorityoftheUnitedStates；itiscertainlydifficulttosupporttheargument，thattheappellatepoweroverthedecisionsofstatecourtsiscontrarytothegeniusofourinstitutions。ThecourtsoftheUnitedStatescan，withoutquestion，revisetheproceedingsoftheexecutiveandlegislativeauthoritiesofthestates；and，iftheyarefoundtobecontrarytotheconstitution，maydeclarethemtobeofnolegalvalidity。Surely，theexerciseofthesamerightoverjudicialtribunalsisnotahigher，ormoredangerousactofsovereignpower。
Sec。1734。\"Norcansucharightbedeemedtoimpairtheindependenceofstatejudges。Itisassumingtheverygroundincontroversytoassert，thattheypossessanabsoluteindependenceoftheUnitedStates。InrespecttothepowersgrantedtotheUnitedStates，theyarenotindependent；theyareexpresslyboundtoobediencebytheletteroftheconstitution；and，iftheyshouldunintentionallytranscendtheirauthority，ormisconstruetheconstitution，thereisnomorereasonforgivingtheirjudgmentsanabsoluteandirresistibleforce，thanforgivingittotheactsoftheothercoordinatedepartmentsofstatesovereignty。Theargumenturgedfromthepossibilityoftheabuseoftherevisingpowerisequallyunsatisfactory。
Itisalwaysadoubtful[*3：605]coursetoargueagainsttheuse，orexistenceofapower，fromthepossibilityofitsabuse。Itisstillmoredifficult，bysuchanargument，toingraftuponageneralpowerarestriction，whichisnottobefoundintheterms，inwhichitisgiven。Fromtheverynatureofthings，theabsoluterightofdecision，inthelastresort，mustrestsomewhere。Whereveritmaybevested，itissusceptibleofabuse。Inallquestionsofjurisdiction，theinferior，orappellatecourt，mustpronouncethefinaljudgment；andcommonsense，aswellaslegalreasoning，hasconferredituponthelatter。
Sec。1735。\"Ithasbeenfurtherarguedagainsttheexistenceofthisappellatepower，thatitwouldformanoveltyinourjudicialinstitutions。
Thisiscertainlyamistake。Inthearticlesofconfederation，aninstrumentframedwithinfinitelymoredeferencetostaterights，andstatejealousies，apowerwasgiventocongress，toestablish’courtsforrevisinganddetermining，finally，appealsinallcasesofcaptures。’Itisremarkable，thatnopowerwasgiventoentertainoriginaljurisdictioninsuchcases；and，consequently，theappellatepower，althoughnotsoexpressedinterms，wasaltogethertobeexercisedinrevisingthedecisionsofstatetribunals。Thiswas，undoubtedly，sofarasurrenderofstatesovereignty。Butitneverwassupposedtobeapowerfraughtwithpublicdanger，ordestructiveoftheindependenceofstatejudges。Onthecontrary，itwassupposedtobeapowerindispensabletothepublicsafety，inasmuchasournationalrightsmightotherwisebecompromitted，andournationalpeacebeendangered。
Underthepresentconstitution，theprizejurisdictionisconfinedtothecourtsoftheUnitedStates；andapowerto[*3：606]revisethedecisionsofstatecourts，iftheyshouldassertjurisdictionoverprizecauses，cannotbelessimportant，orlessuseful，thanitwasundertheconfederation。
Inthisconnection，weareledagaintotheconstructionofthewordsoftheconstitution，’thejudicialpowershallextend，’etc。If，ashasbeencontendedatthebar，theterm’extend’havearelativesignification，andmeantowidenanexistingpower，itwillthenfollow，that，astheconfederationgaveanappellatepoweroverstatetribunals，theconstitutionenlarged，orwidenedthatappellatepowertoalltheothercases，inwhichjurisdictionisgiventothecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Itisnotpresumed，thatthelearnedcounselwouldchoosetoadoptsuchaconclusion。
Sec。1736。\"Itisfurtherargued，thatnogreatpublicmischiefcanresultfromaconstruction，whichshalllimittheappellatepoweroftheUnitedStatestocasesintheirowncourts：first，becausestatejudgesareboundbyanoath，tosupporttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，andmustbepresumedtobemenoflearningandintegrity；and，secondly，becausecongressmusthaveanunquestionablerighttoremoveallcases，withinthescopeofthejudicialpower，fromthestatecourts，tothecourtsoftheUnitedStates，atanytimebeforefinaljudgment，thoughnotafterfinaljudgment。Astothefirstreason，—admittingthatthejudgesofthestatecourtsare，andalwayswillbe，ofasmuchlearning，integrity，andwisdom，asthoseofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，whichweverycheerfullyadmit，itdoesnotaidtheargument。Itismanifest，thattheconstitutionhasproceededuponatheoryofitsown，andgiven，andwithheldpowersaccordingtothejudgmentofthe[*3：607]Americanpeople，bywhomitwasadopted。Wecanonlyconstrueitspowers，andcannotinquireintothepolicy，orprinciples，whichinducedthegrantofthem。Theconstitutionhaspresumedwhetherrightlyorwrongly，wedonotinquirethatstateattachments，stateprejudices，statejealousies，andstateinterests，mightsometimesobstruct，orcontrol，orbesupposedtoobstruct，orcontrol，theregularadministrationofjustice。Hence，incontroversiesbetweenstates；betweencitizensofdifferentstates；betweencitizens，claiminggrantsunderdifferentstates；betweenastateanditscitizens，orforeigners；
andbetweencitizensandforeigners；itenablestheparties，undertheauthorityofcongress，tohavethecontroversiesheard，tried，anddeterminedbeforethenationaltribunals。Nootherreason，thanthat，whichhasbeenstated，canbeassigned，whysome，atleast，ofthesecasesshouldnothavebeenlefttothecognizanceofthestatecourts。Inrespecttotheotherenumeratedcases，thecasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；casesaffectingambassadorsandotherpublicministers；andcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，—reasonsofahigherandmoreextensivenature，touchingthesafety，peace，andsovereigntyofthenation，mightwelljustifyagrantofexclusivejurisdiction。
Sec。1737。\"Thisisnotall。Amotiveofanotherkind，perfectlycompatiblewiththemostsincererespectforstatetribunals，mightinducethegrantofappellatepowerovertheirdecisions。Thatmotiveistheimportance，andevennecessity，ofuniformityofdecisionsthroughoutthewholeUnitedStatesuponallsubjectswithinthepurviewoftheconstitution。Judgesofequallearningandintegrity，indifferent[*3：608]states，mightdifferentlyinterpretastatute，oratreatyoftheUnitedStates，oreventheconstitutionitself。Iftherewerenorevisingauthoritytocontrolthesejarringanddiscordantjudgments，andharmoniesthemintouniformity，thelaws，thetreaties，andtheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，wouldbedifferentindifferentstates；andmight，perhaps，neverhavepreciselythesameconstruction，obligation，orefficacy，inanytwostates。Thepublicmischiefs，whichwouldattendsuchastateofthings，wouldbetrulydeplorable；anditcannotbebelieved，thattheycouldhaveescapedtheenlightenedconvention，whichformedtheconstitution。What，indeed，mightthenhavebeenonlyprophecy，hasnowbecomefact；andtheappellatejurisdictionmustcontinuetobetheonlyadequateremedyforsuchevils。
Sec。1738。\"Thereisanadditionalconsideration，whichisentitledtogreatweight。TheconstitutionoftheUnitedStateswasdesignedforthecommonandequalbenefitofallthepeopleoftheUnitedStates。Thejudicialpowerwasgrantedforthesamebenignandsalutarypurposes。Itwasnottobeexercisedexclusivelyforthebenefitofparties，whomightbeplaintiffs，andwouldelectthenationalforum；butalsofortheprotectionofdefendants，whomightbeentitledtotrytheirrights，orasserttheirprivileges，beforethesameforum。Yet，iftheconstructioncontendedforbecorrect，itwillfollow，that，astheplaintiffmayalwayselectthestatecourts，thedefendantmaybedeprivedofallthesecurity，whichtheconstitutionintendedinaidofhisrights。Suchastateofthingscan，innorespect，beconsidered，asgivingequalrights。Toobviatethisdifficulty，wearereferredtothepower，whichitisadmitted，congress[*3：609]possesstoremovesuitsfromstatecourts，tothenationalcourts；
andthisformsthesecondground，uponwhichtheargument，weareconsidering，hasbeenattemptedtobesustained。
Sec。1739。\"Thispowerofremovalisnottobefoundinexpresstermsinanypartoftheconstitution；ifitbegiven，itisonlygivenbyimplication，asapowernecessaryandpropertocarryintoeffectsomeexpresspower。
Thepowerofremovaliscertainlynot，instrictnessoflanguage，anexerciseoforiginaljurisdiction；itpresupposesanexerciseoforiginaljurisdictiontohaveattachedelsewhere。Theexistenceofthispowerofremovalisfamiliarincourts，actingaccordingtothecourseofthecommonlaw，incriminal，aswellasincivilcases；anditisexercisedbefore，aswellasafterjudgment。Butthisisalwaysdeemed，inbothcases，anexerciseofappellate，andnotoforiginaljurisdiction。If，then，therightofremovalbeincludedintheappellatejurisdiction，itisonly，becauseitisonemodeofexercisingthatpower；andascongressisnotlimitedbytheconstitutiontoanyparticularmode，ortimeofexercisingit，itmayauthorizearemoval，eitherbefore，orafterjudgment。Thetime，theprocess，andthemanner，mustbesubjecttoitsabsolutelegislativecontrol。Awritoferroris，indeed，butaprocess，whichremovestherecordofonecourttothepossessionofanothercourt，andenablesthelattertoinspecttheproceedings，andgivesuchjudgment，asitsownopinionofthelawandjusticeofthecasemaywarrant。
Thereisnothinginthenatureoftheprocess，whichforbidsitfrombeingappliedbythelegislaturetointerlocutory，aswellasfinaljudgments。
Andiftherightofremovalfromstatecourtsexistbeforejudgment，becauseitis[*3：610]includedintheappellatepower，itmust，forthesamereason，existafterjudgment。Andiftheappellatepower，bytheconstitution，doesnotincludecasespendinginstatecourts，therightofremoval，whichisbutamodeofexercisingthatpower，cannotbeappliedtothem。Preciselythesameobjections，therefore，existastotherightofremovalbeforejudgment，asafter；andbothmuststand，orfalltogether。Nor，indeed，wouldtheforceoftheargumentsoneithersidemateriallyvary，iftherightofremovalwereanexerciseoforiginaljurisdiction。Itwouldequallytrenchuponthejurisdiction，andindependenceofstatetribunals。
Sec。1740。\"Theremedy，too，ofremovalofsuitswouldbeutterlyinadequatetothepurposesoftheconstitution，ifitcouldactonlyontheparties，andnotuponthestatecourts。Inrespecttocriminalprosecutions，thedifficultyseemsadmittedtobeinsurmountable；andinrespecttocivilsuits，therewould，inmanycases，berightswithoutcorrespondingremedies。
Ifstatecourtsshoulddenytheconstitutionalityoftheauthoritytoremovesuitsfromtheircognizance，inwhatmannercouldtheybecompelledtorelinquishthejurisdiction？Inrespecttocriminalcases，therewouldatoncebeanendofallcontrol；andthestatedecisionswouldbeparamounttotheconstitution。Andthough，incivilsuits，thecourtsoftheUnitedStatesmightactupontheparties；yetthestatecourtsmightactinthesameway；andthisconflictofjurisdictionswouldnotonlyjeopardprivaterights，butbringintoimminentperilthepublicinterests。Onthewhole，thecourtareofopinion，thattheappellatepoweroftheUnitedStatesdoesextendtocasespendinginthestatecourts；andthatthe25thsectionofthejudiciaryact，whichauthorizestheexerciseofthisJurisdictioninthe[*3：611]specifiedcases，byawritoferror，issupportedbytheletterandspiritoftheconstitution。Wefindnoclauseinthatinstrument，whichlimitsthispower；andwedarenotinterposealimitation，wherethepeoplehavenotbeendisposedtocreateone。
Sec。1741。\"Strongasthisconclusionstandsuponthegenerallanguageoftheconstitution，itmaystillderivesupportfromothersources。Itisanhistoricalfact，thatthisexpositionoftheconstitution，extendingitsappellatepowertostatecourts，was，previoustoitsadoption，uniformlyandpubliclyavowedbyitsfriends，andadmittedbyitsenemies，asthebasisoftheirrespectivereasonings，bothinandoutofthestateconventions。
Itisanhistoricalfact，that，atthetime，whenthejudiciaryactwassubmittedtothedeliberationsofthefirstcongress，composed，asitwas，notonlyofmenofgreatlearningandability，butofmen，whohadactedaprincipalpartinframing，supporting，oropposingthatconstitution，thesameexpositionwasexplicitlydeclared，andadmittedbythefriends，andbytheopponentsofthatsystem。Itisanhistoricalfact，thattheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateshave，fromtimetotime，sustainedthisappellatejurisdictioninagreatvarietyofcases，broughtfromthetribunalsof，manyofthemostimportantstatesintheUnion；andthatnostatetribunalhaseverbreathedajudicialdoubtonthesubject，ordeclinedtoobeythemandateoftheSupremeCourt，untilthepresentoccasion。Thisweightofcontemporaneousexpositionbyallparties，thisacquiescenceofenlightenedstatecourts，andthesejudicialdecisionsoftheSupremeCourt，throughsolongaperiod，do，aswethink，placethedoctrineuponafoundationofauthority，whichcannotbeshaken，[*3：612]withoutdeliveringoverthesubjecttoperpetual，andirremediabledoubts。\"**ThesamesubjectismostelaboratelyconsideredinCohensv。Virginia，fromwhichthefollowingextractistaken。Afteradvertingtothenatureofthenationalgovernment，anditspowersandcapacities，Mr。ChiefJusticeMarshallproceedsasfollows。\"Inagovernmentsoconstituted，isitunreasonable，thatthejudicialpowershouldbecompetenttogiveefficacytotheconstitutionallawsofthelegislature？Thatdepartmentcandecideonthevalidityoftheconstitution，orlawofastate，ifitberepugnanttotheconstitution，ortoalawoftheUnitedStates。Isitunreasonable，thatitshouldalsobeempoweredtodecideonthejudgmentofastatetribunal，enforcingsuchunconstitutionallaw？Isitsoveryunreasonable，astofurnishajustificationforcontrollingthewordsoftheconstitution？
\"Wethinkitisnot。Wethinkthatinagovernment，acknowledgedlysupremewithrespecttoobjectsofvitalinteresttothenation，thereisnothinginconsistentwithsoundreason，nothingincompatiblewiththenatureofgovernment，inmakingallitsdepartmentssupreme，sofarasrespectsthoseobjects，andsofarasisnecessarytotheirattainment。Theexerciseoftheappellatepower，everthesejudgmentsofthestatetribunals，whichmaycontravenetheconstitution，orlawsoftheUnitedStates，is，webelieve，essentialtotheattainmentofthoseobjects。
\"Theproprietyofentrustingtheconstructionoftheconstitution，andlawsmadeinpursuancethereof，tothejudiciaryoftheUnion，hasnot，webelieve，asyetbeendrawnintoquestion。Itseemstobeacorollaryfromthispoliticalaxiom，thatthefederalcourtsshouldeitherpossessexclusivejurisdictioninsuchcases，orapowertorevisethejudgmentrenderedinthembythestatetribunals。Ifthefederalandstatecourtshaveconcurrentjurisdictioninallcasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；and，ifacaseofthisdescription，broughtinastatecourt，cannotberemovedbeforejudgment，norrevisedafterjudgment，thentheconstructionoftheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，isnot。confidedparticularlytotheirjudicialdepartment；
butisconfidedequallytothatdepartment，andtothestatecourts，howevertheymaybeconstituted。’Thirteenindependentcourts，’saysaverycelebratedstatesman。andwehavenow，morethantwentysuchcourts，’offinaljurisdictionoverthesamecauses，arisinguponthesamelaws，isahydraingovernment，fromwhich，nothingbutcontradictionandconfusioncanproceed。’
\"Dismissingtheunpleasantsuggestion，thatanymotives，whichmaynotbefairlyavowed，orwhichoughtnottoexist，caneverinfluenceastate，oritscourts，thenecessityofuniformity，aswellascorrectness，inexpoundingtheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates，woulditself[*3：613]suggesttheproprietyofvestinginsomesingletribunalthepowerofdeciding，inthelastresort，allcases，inwhichtheyareinvolved。
\"Wearenotrestrained，then，bythepoliticalrelationbetweenthegeneralandstategovernments，fromconstruingthewordsoftheconstitution，definingthejudicialpower，intheirtruesense。Wearenotboundtoconstruethemmorerestrictivelythantheynaturallyimport。
\"TheygivetotheSupremeCourtappellatejurisdictioninallcases，arisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。
Thewordsarebroadenoughtocomprehendallcasesofthisdescription，inwhatevercourttheymaybedecided。Inexpoundingthem，wemaybepermittedtotakeintoviewthoseconsiderations，towhichcourtshavealwaysallowedgreatweightintheexpositionoflaws。
\"Theframersoftheconstitutionwouldnaturallyexaminethestateofthings，existingatthetime；andtheirworksufficientlyattests，thattheydidso。Allacknowledge，thattheywereconvenedforthepurposeofstrengtheningtheconfederation，byenlargingthepowersofthegovernment，andbygivingefficacytothose，whichitbeforepossessed，butcouldnotexercise。Theyinformus，themselves，intheinstrumenttheypresentedtotheAmericanpublic，thatoneofitsobjectswastoformamoreperfectUnion。Undersuchcircumstances，wecertainlyshouldnotexpecttofind，inthatinstrument，adiminutionofthepowersoftheactualgovernment。
\"Previoustotheadoptionoftheconfederation，congressestablishedcourts，whichreceivedappealsinprizecauses，decidedinthecourtsoftherespectivestates。Thispowerofthegovernment，toestablishtribunalsfortheseappeals，wasthoughtconsistentwith，andwasfoundedon，itspoliticalrelationswiththestates。Thesecourtsdidexerciseappellatejurisdictionoverthosecases，decidedinthestatecourts，towhichthejudicialpowerofthefederalgovernmentextended。
\"Theconfederationgavetocongress，thepower’ofestablishingcourts，forreceivinganddetermining，finally，appealsinallcasesofcaptures。’
\"Thispowerwasuniformityconstruedtoauthorizethosecourtstoreceiveappealsfromthesentencesofstatecourts，andtoaffirmorreversethem。
Statetribunalsarenotmentioned；butthisclause，intheconfederation，necessarilycomprisesthem。Yettherelationbetweenthegeneralandstategovernmentswasmuchweaker，muchmorelax，undertheconfederation，thanunderthepresentconstitution；andthestatesbeingmuchmorecompletelysovereign，theirinstitutionsweremuchmoreindependent。
\"Theconvention，whichframedtheconstitution，onturningtheir[*3：614]
attentiontothejudicialpower，founditlimitedtoafewobjects，butexercised，withrespecttosomeofthoseobjects，initsappellateform，overthejudgmentsofthestatecourts。Theyextendit，amongotherobjects，toalleasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；andinasubsequentclausedeclare，thatinsuchcasestheSupremeCourtshallexerciseappellatejurisdiction。Nothingseemstobegiven，whichwouldjustifythewithdrawalofajudgmentrenderedinastatecourt，ontheconstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnitedStates，fromthisappellatejurisdiction。
\"Greatweighthasalwaysbeenattached，andveryrightlyattached，tocontemporaneousexposition。Noquestion，itisbelieved，hasarisen，towhichthisprincipleappliesmoreunequivocally，thantothatnowunderconsideration。
\"TheopinionoftheFederalisthasalwaysbeenconsidered，asof’greatauthority。Itisacompletecommentaryonourconstitution；andisappealedtobyallparties，inthequestions，towhichthatinstrumenthasgivenbirth。Itsintrinsicmeritentitlesittothishighrank；andthepart，twoofitsauthorsperformedinframingtheconstitution，putitverymuchintheirpowertoexplaintheviews，withwhichitwasframed。Theseessayshavingbeenpublished，whiletheconstitutionwasbeforethenation，foradoptionorrejection，andhavingbeenwritteninanswertoobjections，foundedentirelyontheextentofitspowers，andonitsdiminutionofstatesovereignty，areentitledtothemoreconsideration，wheretheyfranklyavow，thatthepowerobjectedtoisgiven，anddefendit。
\"Indiscussingtheextentofthejudicialpower，theFederalist*says，’Hereanotherquestionoccurs：whatrelationwouldsubsistbetweenthenationalandstatecourts，intheseinstancesofconcurrentjurisdiction？
Ianswer，thatanappealwouldcertainlyliefromtheletter，totheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。TheconstitutionindirecttermsgivesanappellatejurisdictiontotheSupremeCourt，inalltheenumeratedcasesoffederalcognizance，inwhichitisnottohaveanoriginalone，withoutasingleexpressiontoconfineitsoperationtotheinferiorfederalcourts。Theobjectsofappeal，notthetribunals，fromwhichitistobemade，arealonetohecontemplated。Fromthiscircumstance，andfromthereasonofthething，itoughttobeconstruedtoextendtothestatetribunals。Eitherthismustbethecase，orthelocalcourtsmustbeexcludedfromaconcurrentjurisdictioninmattersofnationalconcern，elsethejudicialauthorityoftheUnionmaybe[*3：615]eludedatthepleasureofeveryplaintiff，orprosecutor。Neitheroftheseconsequencesought，withoutevidentnecessity，tobeinvolved；thelatterwouldbeentirelyinadmissible，asitwoulddefeatsomeofthemostimportantandavowedpurposesoftheproposedgovernment，andwouldessentiallyembarrassitsmeasures。NordoIperceiveanyfoundationforsuchasupposition。Agreeablytotheremarkalreadymade，thenationalandstatesystemsaretoberegardedasonewhole。Thecourtsofthelatter，willofcoursebenaturalauxiliariestotheexecutionofthelawsoftheUnion；andanappealfromthemwillasnaturallylietothattribunal，whichisdestinedtounite，andassimilatetheprinciplesofnaturaljustice，andtherulesofnationaldecision。Theevidentaimoftheplanofthenationalconventionis，thatallthecausesofthespecifiedclassesshall，forweightypublicreasons，receivetheiroriginalorfinaldeterminationinthecourtsoftheUnion。Toconfine，therefore，thegeneralexpressions，whichgiveappellatejurisdictiontotheSupremeCourt，toappealsfromthesubordinatefederalcourts，insteadofallowingtheirextensiontothestatecourts，wouldbetoabridgethelatitudeoftheterms，insubversionoftheintent，contrarytoeverysoundruleofinterpretation。’
\"Acontemporaneousexpositionoftheconstitution，certainlyofnotlessauthority，thanthat，whichhasbeenjustcited，isthejudiciaryactitself。Weknowthatinthecongress，whichpassedthatact，weremanyeminentmembersoftheconvention，whichformedtheconstitution。Notasingleindividual，sofarasisknown，supposedthatpartoftheact，whichgivestheSupremeCourtappellatejurisdictionoverthejudgmentsofthestatecourts，inthecasesthereinspecified，tobeunauthorizedbytheconstitution。\"The25thsectionofthejudiciaryact，of1789，ch。20，herealludedto，ascontemporaneousconstructionoftheconstitution，iswhollyfoundeduponthedoctrine，thattheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtmayconstitutionallyextendovercausesinstatecourts。[*3：613]Sec。1742。Anotherinquiryis，whetherthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesinanycases，andifinany，in[*3：614]whatcases，isexclusiveinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，ormaybemadeexclusiveattheelectionof[*3：615]Congress。ThissubjectwasmuchdiscussedinthecaseofMartinv。Hunter。Onthatoccasionthecourtsaid，\"Itwillbeobserved，thattherearetwoclassesofcasesenumeratedintheconstitution，betweenwhichadistinctionseemstobedrawn。Thefirstclassincludescasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；cases[*3：616]affectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls；andcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction。Inthisclasstheexpressionis，thatthejudicialpowershallextendtoallcases。Butinthesubsequentpartoftheclause，whichembracesalltheothercasesofnationalcognizance，andformsthesecondclass，theword’all’isdropped，seeminglyexindustria。
Here，thejudicialauthorityistoextendtocontroversies，nottoallcontroversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty，etc。Fromthisdifferenceofphraseology，perhapsadifferenceofconstitutionalintentionmay，withpropriety，beinferred。Itishardlytobepresumed，thatthevariationinthelanguagecouldhavebeenaccidental。Itmusthavebeentheresultofsomedeterminatereason；anditisnotverydifficulttofindareason，sufficienttosupporttheapparentchangeofintention。
Inrespecttothefirstclass，itmaywellhavebeentheintentionoftheframersoftheconstitutionimperativelytoextendthejudicialpower，eitherinanoriginal，orappellateform，toallcases；and，inthelatterclass，toleaveittocongresstoqualifythejurisdiction，originalorappellate，insuchmanner，aspublicpolicymightdictate。
Sec。1743。\"Thevitalimportanceofallthecases，enumeratedinthefirstclass，tothenationalsovereignty，mightwarrantsuchadistinction。
Inthefirstplace，astocasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。Herethestatecourtscouldnotordinarilypossessadirectjurisdiction。Thejurisdictionoversuchcasescouldnotexistinthestatecourtsprevioustotheadoptionoftheconstitution。
Anditcouldnotafterwardsbedirectlyconferredonthem；fortheconstitutionexpresslyrequiresthejudicialpowertobevestedincourts[*3：617]ordainedandestablishedbytheUnitedStates。Thisclassofcaseswouldembracecivilaswellascriminaljurisdiction，andaffectnotonlyourinternalpolicy，butourforeignrelations。Itwould，therefore，beperiloustorestrainitinanymannerwhatsoever，inasmuchasitmighthazardthenationalsafety。Thesameremarksmaybeurgedastocasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls，whoareemphaticallyplacedundertheguardianshipofthelawofnations。Andastocasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，theadmiraltyjurisdictionembracesallquestionsofprizeandsalvage，inthecorrectadjudicationofwhichforeignnationsaredeeplyinterested；itembracesalsomaritimetorts，contracts，andoffences，inwhichtheprinciplesofthelawandcomityofnationsoftenformanessentialinquiry。Allthesecases，then；enterintothenationalpolicy，affectthenationalrights，andmaycompromitthenationalsovereignty。
Theoriginalorappellatejurisdictionoughtnot，therefore，toberestrained；
butshouldbecommensuratewiththemischiefsintendedtoberemedied，and，ofcourse，shouldextendtoallcaseswhatsoever。
Sec。1744。\"Adifferentpolicymightwellbeadoptedinreferencetothesecondclassofcases；foralthoughitmightbefit，thatthejudicialpowershouldextendtoallcontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshouldbeaparty；yetthispowermightnothavebeenimperativelygiven，lestitshouldimplyarighttotakecognizanceoforiginalsuitsbroughtagainsttheUnitedStates，asdefendantsintheirowncourts。ItmightnothavebeendeemedpropertosubmitthesovereigntyoftheUnitedStates，againsttheirownwill，tojudicialcognizance，eithertoenforcerights，[*3：618]
ortopreventwrongs。Andastotheothercasesofthesecondclass，theymightwellbelefttobeexercisedundertheexceptionsandregulations，whichcongressmight，intheirwisdom，choosetoapply。Itisalsoworthyofremark，thatcongressseem，inagooddegree，intheestablishmentofthepresentjudicialsystem，tohaveadoptedthisdistinction。Inthefirstclassofcases，thejurisdictionisnotlimited，exceptbythesubjectmatter；inthesecond，itismademateriallytodependuponthevalueincontroversy。
Sec。1745。\"Wedonot，however，professtoplaceanyimplicitrelianceuponthedistinction，whichhasherebeenstated，andendeavouredtobeillustrated。Ithastheratherbeenbroughtintoviewindeferencetothelegislativeopinion，whichhassolongactedupon，andenforced，thisdistinction。
Butthereis，certainly，vastweightintheargument，whichhasbeenurged，thattheconstitutionisimperativeuponCongresstovestallthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesintheshapeoforiginaljurisdictioninthesupremeandinferiorcourts，createdunderitsownauthority。Atallevents，whethertheoneconstructionortheotherprevail，itismanifest，thatthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesisunavoidably，insomecases，exclusiveofallstateauthority，andinallothers，maybemadesoattheelectionofcongress。NopartofthecriminaljurisdictionoftheUnitedStatescan，consistentlywiththeconstitution，bedelegatedtostatetribunals。
Theadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictionisofthesameexclusivecognizance；
anditcanonlybeinthosecases，where，previoustotheconstitution，statetribunalspossessedjurisdictionindependentofnationalauthority，thattheycannow[*3：619]constitutionallyexerciseaconcurrentjurisdiction。
Congress，throughoutthejudicialact，andparticularlyinthe9th，11th，and13thsections，havelegislateduponthesupposition，thatinallthecases，towhichtheJudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesextended，theymightrightfullyvestexclusivejurisdictionintheirowncourts。\"
Sec。1746。TheFederalisthasspokenuponthesamesubjectinthefollowingterms。\"Theonlythingintheproposedconstitution，whichwearstheappearanceofconfiningthecausesoffederalcognizancetothefederalcourts，iscontainedinthispassage；’ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinonesupremecourt，andinsuchinferiorcourtsasthecongressshallfromtimetotimeordainandestablish。’Thismighteitherbeconstruedtosignify，thatthesupremeandsubordinatecourtsoftheunionshouldalonehavethepowerofdecidingthosecauses，towhichtheirauthorityistoextend；orsimplytodenote，thattheorgansofthenationaljudiciaryshouldbeonesupremecourt，andasmanysubordinatecourts，ascongressshouldthinkpropertoappoint；inotherwords，thattheUnitedStatesshouldexercisethejudicialpower，withwhichtheyaretobeinvested，throughonesupremetribunal，andacertainnumberofinferiorones，tobeinstitutedbythem。Thefirstexcludes，thelastadmits，theconcurrentjurisdictionofthestatetribunals；andasthefirstwouldamounttoanalienationofstatepowerbyimplication，thelastappearstomethemostdefensibleconstruction。
Sec。1747。\"Butthisdoctrineofconcurrentjurisdiction，isonlyclearlyapplicabletothosedescriptionsofcauses，ofwhichthestatecourtshadpreviouscognizance。Itisnotequallyevidentinrelationtocases，[*3：620]
whichmaygrowoutof，andbepeculiarto，theconstitutiontobeestablished：
fornottoallowthestatecourtsarightofjurisdictioninsuchcases，canhardlybeconsideredastheabridgementofapreexistingauthority。
Imeannot，therefore，tocontend，thattheUnitedStates，inthecourseoflegislationupontheobjectsintrustedtotheirdirection，maynotcommitthedecisionofcausesarisinguponaparticularregulationtothefederalcourtssolely，ifsuchameasureshouldbedeemedexpedient；butIhold，thatthestatecourtswillfiedivestedofnopartoftheirprimitivejurisdictionfurtherthanmayrelatetoanappeal。AndIamevenofopinion，thatineverycase，inwhichtheywerenotexpresslyexcludedbythefutureactsofthenationallegislature，theywillofcoursetakecognizanceofthecauses，towhichthoseactsmaygivebirth。ThisIinferfromthenatureofjudiciarypower，andfromthegeneralgeniusofthesystem。Thejudiciarypowerofeverygovernmentlooksbeyonditsownlocalormunicipallaws，and，incivilcases，laysholdofallsubjectsoflitigationbetweenpartieswithinitsjurisdiction，thoughthecausesofdisputearerelativetothelawsofthemostdistantpartoftheglobe。ThoseofJapan，notjessthanofNewYork，mayfurnishtheobjectsoflegaldiscussiontoourcourts。
Wheninadditiontothisweconsiderthestategovernments，andthenationalgovernments，astheytrulyare，inthelightofkindredsystems，andaspartsofonewhole，theinferenceseemstobeconclusive，thatthestatecourtswouldhaveaconcurrentjurisdictioninalleasesarisingunderthelawsoftheunion，whereitwasnotexpresslyprohibited。\"
[*3：621]Sec。1748。itwouldbedifficult，andperhapsnotdesirable，tolaydownanygeneralrulesinrelationtothecases，inwhichthejudicialpowerofthecourtsoftimUnitedStatesisexclusiveofthestatecourts，orinwhichitmaybemadesobycongress，untiltheyshallbesettledbysomepositiveadjudicationoftheSupremeCourt。Thattherearesomecases，inwhichthatpowerisexclusive，cannotwellbedoubted；thatthereareothers，inwhichitmaybemadesobycongress，admitsofaslittledoubt；andthatinothercasesitisconcurrentinthestatecourts，atleastuntilcongressshallhavepassedsomeactexcludingtheconcurrentjurisdiction，willscarcelybedenied。Itseemstobeadmitted，thatthejurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesis，oratleastmaybe，madeexclusiveinallcasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；inallcasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministersandconsuls；inallcasesintheircharacterexclusiveofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction；incontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；incontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates；in[*3：622]
controversiesbetweenastateandcitizensofanotherstate；andincontroversiesbetweenastateandforeignstates，citizens，orsubjects。Anditisonlyinthosecases，where，previoustotheconstitution，statetribunalspossessedjurisdiction，independentofnationalauthority，thattheycannowconstitutionallyexerciseaconcurrentjurisdiction。Congress，indeed，intheJudiciaryActof1789，havemanifestlylegislateduponthesupposition，that；inallcases，towhichthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesextends，theymightrightfullyvestexclusivejurisdictionintheirowncourts。**Itwouldseem，uponthecommonprinciplesofthelawsofnations，asshipsofwarofagovernmentaredeemedtobeundertheexclusivedominionandsovereigntyoftheirowngovernment，wherevertheymaybe，andthusenjoyanextraterritorialimmunity，thatcrimescommittedonboardofshipsofwaroftheUnitedStates，inport，aswellasatsea，areexclusivelycognizable，andpunishablebytheUnitedStates。TheverypointaroseinUnitedStatesv。Beans；butitwasnotdecided。Theresultofthattrial，however，showedthegeneralopinion，thatthestatecourtshadnojurisdiction；
asthelawofofficersofthestatedeclinedtointerfere，afterthedecisionintheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。Sec。1749。Itisafarmoredifficultpoint，toaffirmtherightofcongresstovestinanystatecourtanypartofthejudicialpowerconfidedbytheconstitutiontothenationalgovernment。Congressmay，indeed，permitthestatecourtstoexerciseaconcurrentjurisdictioninmanycases；butthosecourtsthenderivenoauthorityfromcongressoverthesubjectmatter，butaresimplylefttotheexerciseofsuchjurisdiction，asisconferredonthembythestate[*3：623]constitutionandlaws。Thereare，indeed，manyactsofcongress，whichpermitjurisdictionovertheoffencesthereindescribed，tobeexercisedbystatemagistratesandcourts；butthisithasbeensaidbyalearnedjudge，isnot，becausesuchpermissionwasconsideredtobenecessary，undertheconstitution，tovestaconcurrentjurisdictioninthosetribunals；butbecausethejurisdictionwasexclusivelyvestedinthenationalcourtsbythejudiciaryact；andconsequentlycouldnotbeotherwiseexecutedbythestatecourts。But，hehasadded，\"forIholdittobeperfectlyclear，thatcongresscannotconferjurisdictionuponanycourts，butsuchasexistundertheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates；althoughthestatecourtsmayexercisejurisdictionincasesauthorizedbythelawsofthestate，andnotprohibitedbytheexclusivejurisdictionofthefederalcourts……\"ThislatterdoctrinewaspositivelyaffirmedbytheSupremeCourtinMartinv。Hunter；andindeedseems，upongeneralprinciples，indisputable。Inthatcase，thecourtsaid，\"congresscannotvestanyportionofthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates，exceptincourts，ordainedandestablishedbyitself。\"**TheFederalistNo。81seemsfaintlytocontend，thatcongressmightvestthejurisdictioninthestatecourts，\"toconferupontheexistingcourtsoftheseveralstatesthepowerofdeterminingsuchcauses，would，perhaps，beasmuchto’constitutetribunals，’astocreatenewcourtswiththelikepower。\"But，howisthisreconcileablewiththecontextoftheconstitution？\"ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferiorcourts，ascongressmay，[*3：624]
fromtimetotime，ordainandestablish。ThejudgesbothoftheSupremeandinferiorcourts，shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，\"etc。
Arenotthesejudgesoftheinferiorcourtsthesame，inwhomthejurisdictionistobevested？Whoaretoappointthem？Whoaretopaytheirsalaries？
Cantheircompensationbediminished？Allthesequestionsmustbeansweredwithreferencetothesamejudges，thatis，withreferencetojudgesoftheSupremeandinferiorcourtsoftheUnitedStates，andnotofstatecourts。SeealsoTheFederalist，No。45。Sec。1750。InregardtojurisdictionovercrimescommittedagainsttheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，ithasbeenheld，thatnopartofthisjurisdictioncan，consistentlywiththeconstitution，bedelegatedtostatetribunals。Itistrue，thatcongresshas，invariousacts，conferredtherighttoprosecuteforoffences，penalties，andforfeitures，inthestatecourts。Butthelatterhave，inmanyinstances，declinedthejurisdiction，andasserteditsunconstitutionality。AndCertainlythereis，atthepresenttime，adecidedpreponderanceofjudicialauthorityinthestate，courtsagainsttheauthorityofcongresstoconferthepower。
Sec。1751。Intheexerciseofthejurisdictionconfidedrespectivelytothestatecourts；andthosecourtsoftheUnitedStates，wherethelatterhavenotappellatejurisdiction，itisplain，thatneithercanhaveanyrighttointerferewith，orcontrol，theoperationsoftheother。
Ithasaccordinglybeensettled，thatnostatecourtcanissueaninjunctionuponanyjudgmentinacourtoftheUnitedStates；thelatterhavinganexclusive[*3：625]authorityoveritsownjudgmentsandproceedings。Norcananystatecourt，oranystatelegislature，annulthejudgmentsofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，ordestroytherightsacquiredunderthem；
norinanymannerdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsappellatejurisdiction；
norinanymannerinterferewith，orcontroltheprocesswhethermesneorfinalofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates；norprescribetherulesorformsofproceeding，noreffectofprocess，inthecourtsoftheUnitedStates；norissueamandamustoanofficeroftheUnitedstates，tocompelhimtoperformduties，devolvedonhimbythelawsoftheUnitedStates。
Andalthoughwritsofhabeascorpushavebeenissuedbystatejudges，andstatecourts，incases，wherethepartyhasbeenincustodyundertheauthorityofprocessofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，therehasbeenconsiderablediversityofopinion，whethersuchanexerciseofauthorityisconstitutional；
andityetremainstobedecided，whetheritcanbemaintained。
Sec。1752。Indeed，inallcases，wherethejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesistobeexercised，itisforcongressalonetofurnishtherulesofproceeding，to[*3：626]directtheprocess，todeclarethenatureandeffectoftheprocess，andthemode，inwhichthejudgments，consequentthereon，shallbeexecuted。Nostatelegislature，orstatecourt，canhavetheslightestrighttointerfere；andcongressarenotevencapableofdelegatingtherighttothem。Theymayauthorizenationalcourts。tomakegeneralrulesandorders，forthepurposeofamoreconvenientexerciseoftheirjurisdiction；buttheycannotdelegatetoanystateauthorityanycontroloverthenationalcourts。
Sec。1753。OntheotherhandthenationalcourtshavenoauthorityincasesnotwithintheappellatejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatestoissueinjunctionstojudgmentsinthestatecourts；orinanyothermannertointerferewiththeirjurisdictionorproceedings。
Sec。1754。Havingdisposedofthesepoints，wemayagainrecurtothelanguageoftheconstitutionforthepurposeofsomefartherillustrations。
Thelanguageis，that\"theSupremeCourtshallhaveappellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，withsuchexceptions，andundersuchregulations，asthecongressshallmake。\"
Sec。1755。Inthefirstplace，itmaynotbewithoutusetoascertain，whatisheremeantbyappellatejurisdiction；andwhatisthemode，inwhichitmaybeexercised。Theessentialcriterionofappellatejurisdictionis，thatitrevisesandcorrectstheproceedingsinacausealreadyinstituted，anddoesnotcreatethat[*3：627]cause。Inreferencetojudicialtribunals，anappellatejurisdiction，，therefore，necessarilyimplies，thatthesubjectmatterhasbeenalreadyinstitutedin，andactedupon，bysomeothercourt，whosejudgmentorproceedingsaretoberevised。Thisappellatejurisdictionmaybeexercisedinavarietyofforms，andindeedinanyform，whichthelegislaturemaychoosetoprescribe；but，still，thesubstancemustexist，beforetheformcanbeappliedtoit。Tooperateatall，then，undertheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，itisnotsufficient，thattherehasbeenadecisionbysomeofficer，ordepartmentoftheUnitedstates；itmightbebyoneclothedwithjudicialauthority，andactinginajudicialcapacity。Apower，therefore，conferredbycongressontheSupremeCourt，toissueamandamustopublicofficersoftheUnitedStatesgenerally，isnotwarrantedbytheconstitution；foritis，ineffect，undersuchcircumstances，anexerciseoforiginaljurisdiction。Butwheretheobjectistoreviseajudicialproceeding，themodeiswhollyimmaterial；andawritofhabeascorpus，ormandamus，awritoferror，oranappeal，maybeused，asthelegislaturemayprescribe。
Sec。1756。Themostusualmodesofexercisingappellatejurisdiction，atleastthose，whicharemostknownintheUnitedStates，arebyawritoferror，orbyanappeal，orbysomeprocessofremovalofasuitfromaninferiortribunal。Anappealisaprocessofcivillaworigin，andremovesacause，entirelysubjecting[*3：628]thefact，aswellasthelaw，toareviewandaretrial。Awritoferrorisaprocessofcommonlaworigin；
anditremovesnothingforreexamination，butthelaw。Theformermodeisusuallyadoptedincasesofequityandadmiraltyjurisdiction；thelatter，insuitsatcommonlawtriedbyajury。
Sec。1757。Itisobservable，thatthelanguageoftheconstitutionis，that\"theSupremeCourtshallhaveappellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact。\"Thisprovisionwasasubjectofnosmallalarmandmisconstructionatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheconstitution，asitwassupposedtoconferontheSupremeCourt，intheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdiction，thepowertoreviewthedecisionofajuryinmeremattersoffact；andthus，ineffect，todestroythevalidityoftheirverdict，andtoreducetoamereformtherightofatrialbyjuryincivilcases。Theobjectionwasatonceseizedholdofbytheenemiesoftheconstitution；anditwaspressedwithanurgencyandzeal，whichwerewellnighpreventingitsratification。
Thereiscertainlysomefoundation，intheambiguityofthelanguage，tojustifyaninterpretation，thatsuchareviewmightconstitutionallybewithinthereachoftheappellatepower，ifcongressshouldchoosetocarryittothatextremelatitude。But，practicallyspeaking，therewasnottheslightestdanger，thatcongresswouldeveradoptsuchacourse，evenifitwerewithintheir[*3：629]constitutionalauthority；sinceitwouldbeatvariancewithallthehabits，feelings，andinstitutionsofthewholecountry。Atleastitmightbeaffirmed，thatcongresswouldscarcelytakesuchastep，untilthepeoplewerepreparedtosurrenderallthegreatsecuritiesoftheircivil，aswellasoftheirpoliticalrightsandliberties；
andinsuchaneventtheretainingofthetrialbyjurywouldbeameremockery。Therealobjectoftheprovisionwastoretainthepowerofreviewingthefact，aswellasthelaw，incasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction。
Andthemanner，inwhichitisexpressed，wasprobablyoccasionedbythedesiretoavoidtheintroductionofthesubjectofatrialbyjuryincivilcases，uponwhichtheconventionweregreatlydividedinopinion。