Iftheclaimantsbecitizensofdifferentstates，thecourttakesjurisdictionforthatreason。Still，therightofthestatetograntistheessentialpointindispute；andinthatpointthestateisdeeplyinterested。Ifthatinterestconvertsthestateintoaparty，thereisanendofthecause；
andtheconstitutionwillbeconstruedtoforbidthecircuitcourtstotakecognizanceofquestions，towhichitwasthoughtnecessaryexpresslytoextendtheirjurisdiction，evenwhenthecontroversyarosebetweencitizensofthesamestate。
\"Weareaware，thattheapplicationofthesecasesmaybedenied，becausethetitleoftheStatecomesonincidentally，andtheappellantsadmitthejurisdictionofthecourt，whereitsjudgmentdoesnotactdirectlyuponthepropertyorinterestsofthestate；butwedeemeditofsomeimportancetoshow，thattheframersoftheconstitutioncontemplatedthedistinctionbetweencases，inwhichastatewasinterested，andthose，inwhichitwasaparty，andmadenoprovisionforacaseofinterest，withoutbeingapartyontherecord。Incases，whereastateisapartyontherecord，thequestionofjurisdictionisdecidedbyinspection。Ifjurisdictiondepend，notonthisplainfact，butontheinterestofthestate，whatrulehastheconstitutiongiven，bywhichthisinterestistobemeasured？
Ifnorulebegiven，isittobesettledbythecourt？Ifso，thecuriousanomalyispresentedofacourtexaminingthewholetestimonyofacause，inquiringinto，anddecidingon，theextentofastate’sinterest，withouthavingarighttoexerciseanyjurisdictioninthecase。Canthisinquirybemadewithouttheexerciseofjurisdiction？
\"Thenextintheenumerationisacontroversybetweenastateandthecitizensofanotherstate。Canthiscasearise，ifthestatebenota[*3：555]
partyontherecord？Ifitcan，thequestionrecurs，whatdegreeofinterestshallbesufficienttochangetheparties，andarresttheproceedingsagainsttheindividual？ControversiesrespectingboundaryhavelatelyexistedbetweenVirginiaandTennessee，betweenKentuckyandTennessee，andnowexistbetweenNewYorkandNewJersey。Suppose，whilesuchacontroversyispending，thecollectingofficerofonestateshouldseizepropertyfortaxesbelongingtoaman，whosupposeshimselftoresideintheotherstate，andwhoseeksredressinthefederalcourtofthatstate，inwhichtheofficerresides。
Theinterestofthestateisobvious。Yetitisadmitted，thatinsuchacasetheactionwouldlie，becausetheofficermightbetreatedasatrespasser，andtheverdictandjudgmentagainsthimwouldnotactdirectlyonthepropertyofthestate。Thatitwouldnotsoact，may，perhaps，dependoncircumstances。Theofficermayretaintheamountofthetaxesinhishands，and，ontheproceedingsofthestateagainsthim，maypleadinbarthejudgmentofacourtofcompetentjurisdiction。Ifthispleaoughttobesustained，anditisfarfrombeingcertain，thatitoughtnot，thejudgmentsopleadedwouldhaveacteddirectlyontherevenueofthestateinthehandsofitsofficer。Andyettheargumentadmits，thattheaction，insuchacase，wouldbesustained。But，suppose，insuchacase，thepartyconceivinghimselftobeinjured，insteadofbringinganactionsoundingindamages，shouldsueforthespecificthing，whileyetinpossessionoftheseizingofficer。Itbeingadmittedinargument，thattheactionsoundingindamageswouldlie，weareunabletoperceivethelineofdistinctionbetweenthatandtheactionofdetinue。Yetthelatteractionwouldclaimthespecificarticleseizedforthetax，andwouldobtainit，shouldtheseizurebedeemedunlawful。
\"Itwouldbetedioustopursuethispartoftheinquiryfarther，anditwouldbeuseless，becauseeverypersonwillperceive，thatthesamereasoningisapplicabletoalltheotherenumeratedcontroversies，towhichastatemaybeaparty。Theprinciplemaybeillustratedbyareferencetothoseothercontroversies，wherejurisdictiondependsontheparty。
But，beforewereviewthem，wewillnoticeone，wherethenatureofthecontroversyis，insomedegree，blendedwiththecharacteroftheparty。
\"Ifasuitbebroughtagainstaforeignminister，theSupremeCourtalonehasoriginaljurisdiction，andthisisshownontherecord。But，supposeasuittobebrought，whichaffectstheinterestofaforeignminister，orbywhichthepersonofhissecretary，orofhisservant，is[*3：556]
arrested。Theministerdoesnot，bythemerearrestofhissecretary，orhisservant，becomeapartytothissuit，buttheactualdefendantpleadstothejurisdictionofthecourt，andassertsthisprivilege。Ifthesuitaffectsaforeignminister，itmustbedismissed，notbecauseheisapartytoit，butbecauseitaffectshim。ThelanguageoftheconstitutioninthetwocasesisdifferentThiscourtcar。takecognizanceofallcues’affecting’foreignministers；and，therefore，jurisdictiondoesnotdependonthepartynamedintherecord。Butthislanguagechanges，whentheenumerationproceedstostates。Whythischange？Theanswerisobvious。Inthecaseofforeignministers，itwasintended，forreasons，whichallcomprehend，togivethenationalcourtsjurisdictionoverallcases，bywhichtheywereinanymanneraffected。InthecueofStates，whoseimmediateorremoteinterestsweremixedupwithamultitudeofcases，andwhomightbeaffectedinanalmostinfinitevarietyofways，itwasintendedtogivejurisdictioninthosecuesonly，towhichtheywereactualparties。
\"Inproceedingwiththecues，inwhichjurisdictiondependsonthecharacteroftheparty，thefirstintheenumerationis，’controversiestowhichtheUnitedStatedshallbeaparty。’Does’thisprovisionextendtothecases，wheretheUnitedStatesarenotnamedintherecord，butclaimandareactuallyentitledto，thewholesubjectincontroversy？Letusexaminethisquestion。SuitsbroughtbythepostmastergeneralareformoneyduntotheUnitedStates。Thenominalplaintiffhasnointerestinthecontroversy，andtheUnitedStatesaretheonlyrealparty。Yet，thesesuitscouldnotbeinstitutedinthecourtsoftheUnion，underthatclause，whichgivesjurisdictioninallcases，towhichtheUnitedStatesareaparty；anditwasfoundnecessarytogivethecourtjurisdictionoverthem，asbeingcasesarisingunderalawoftheUnitedStates。
\"ThejudicialpoweroftheUnionisalsoextendedtocontroversiesbetweencitizensofdifferentStates；andithasbeendecided，thatthecharacterofthepartiesmustbeshownontherecord。Doesthisprovisiondependonthecharacterofthose，whoseinterestislitigated，orofthose，whoarepartiesontherecord？Inasuit，forexample，broughtbyoragainstanexecutor，thecreditorsorlegateesorhistestatorare[*3：557]thepersonsreallyconcernedininterest；butithasneverbeensuspected，that，iftheexecutorbearesidentofanotherstate，thejurisdictionofthefederalcourtscouldbeoustedbythefact，thatthecreditorsorlegateeswerecitizensofthesamestatewiththeoppositeparty。Theuniversallyreceivedconstructioninthiscaseis，thatjurisdictionisneither。givennoroustedbytherelativesituationofthepartiesconcernedininterest，butbytherelativesituationofthepartiesnamedontherecord。Whyisthisconstructionuniversal？Nocasecanbeimagined，inwhichtheexistenceofaninterestoutofthepartyontherecordismoreunequivocal，thaninthat，whichhasbeenjuststated。Why，then，isituniversallyadmitted，thatthisinterestinnomanneraffectsthejurisdictionofthecourt？
Theplainandobviousansweris，becausethejurisdictionofthecourtdepends，notuponthisinterest，butupontheactualpartyontherecord。
Wereastatetobethesolelegatee，itwillnot，wepresume，bealleged，thatthejurisdictionofthecourt，inasuitagainsttheexecutor，wouldbemoreaffectedbythisfact，thanbythefact，thatanyotherperson，notsuableinthecourtsoftheUnion，wasthesolelegatee。Yet，insuchacase，thecourtwoulddecidedirectlyandimmediatelyontheinterestofthestate。
\"Thisprinciplemightbefurtherillustratedbyshowing，thatjurisdiction，whereitdependsonthecharacteroftheparty，isneverconferredinconsequenceoftheexistenceofaninterestinapartynotnamed；andbyshowingthat，underthedistributiveclauseofthe2dsectionofthe3darticle，theSupremeCourtcouldnevertakeoriginaljurisdiction，inconsequenceofaninterestinapartynotnamedintherecord。
\"Buttheprincipleseemstoowellestablishedtorequire，thatmoretimeshouldbedevotedtoit。Itmay，wethink，belaiddownasarule，whichadmitsofnoexception，that，inallcaseswherejurisdictiondependsontheparty，itisthepartynamedintherecord。Consequently，the11thamendment，whichrestrainsthejurisdictiongrantedbytheconstitutionoversuitsagainststates，is，ofnecessity，limitedtothosesuits，inwhichastateisapartyontherecord。Theamendmenthasitsfulleffect，iftheconstitutionbeconstrued，asitwouldhavebeenconstrued，hadthejurisdictionofthecourtneverbeenextendedtosuitsbroughtagainstastate，bythecitizensofanotherstate，orbyaliens。Thestatenotbeingapartyontherecord，andthecourthavingjurisdictionoverthose，whoarepartiesontherecord，thetruequestionis，notoneofjurisdiction，butwhether，intheexerciseofitsjurisdiction，thecourtoughttomakeadecreeagainstthedefendants；whethertheyaretobeconsideredashavingarealinterest，orasbeingonlynominalparties。\"[*3：552]Sec。1680。Thesameprincipleappliestocases，whereastatehasaninterestinacorporation；aswhenitisastockholderinanincorporatedhank，thecorporationisstillsuable，althoughthestate，assuch，is[*3：553]exemptedfromanyaction。Thestatedoesnot，bybecomingacorporator，identifyitselfwiththecorporation。Thebank，insuchacase，isnotthestate，althoughthestateholdsaninterestinit。Norwillit[*3：554]
makeanydifferenceinthecase，thatthestatehasthesoleinterestinthecorporation，ifinfactitcreatesotherpersonscorporators。Ananalogouscasewillbefoundintheauthority，givenbyanactofcongress[*3：555]
tothepostmastergeneral，tobringsuitsinhisofficialcapacity。InsuchsuitstheUnitedStatesarenotunderstoodtobeaparty，althoughthesuitssolelyregardtheirinterests。Thepostmastergeneraldoes[*3：556]
not，insuchcases，sueundertheclausegivingjurisdiction，\"incontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；\"butundertheclauseextendingthejurisdictiontocasesarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。
[*3：557]Sec。1681。Thereasoning，bywhichthegeneraldoctrineismaintained，istothefollowingeffect。Itisasoundprinciple，that，whenagovernmentbecomesapartnerinanytradingcompany，itdivestsitself，sofar[*3：558]asconcernsthetransactionsofthatcompany，ofitssovereigncharacter，andtakesthatofaprivatecitizen。Insteadofcommunicatingtothecompanyitsprivilegesandprerogatives，itdescendstoalevelwiththose，withwhomitassociatesitself，andtakesthecharacter，whichbelongstoitsassociates，andtothebusiness，whichistransacted。
Thus，manystatesintheUnion，whichhaveaninterestinbanks，arenotsuableevenintheirowncourts。Astate，whichestablishesabank，andbecomesastockholderinit，andgivesitacapacitytosueandbesued，stripsitselfofitssovereigncharacter，sofarasrespectsthetransactionsofthebank，andwaivesalltheprivilegesofthatcharacter。Asamemberofacorporation，agovernmentneverexercisesitssovereignty。Itactsmerely，asacorporator；andexercisesnootherpowerinthemanagementoftheaffairsofthecorporation，thanareexpresslygivenbytheincorporatingact。TheUnitedStatesheldsharesintheoldbankoftheUnitedStates；
buttheprivilegesofthegovernmentwerenotimpartedbythatcircumstancetothebank。TheUnitedStateswerenotapartytosuits，broughtbyoragainstthebank，inthesenseoftheconstitution。So，withrespecttothepresentbank，suitsbroughtbyoragainstitarenotunderstoodtobebroughtbyoragainsttheUnitedStates。Thegovernment，bybecomingacorporator，laysdownitssovereignty，sofarasrespectsthetransactionsofthecorporation；andexercisesnopowerorprivilege，whichisnotderivedfromthecharter。Thereasoningadmitsoffurtherillustration。Acorporationisitself，inlegalcontemplation，anartificialperson，havingadistinct[*3：559]andindependentexistencefromthatofthepersonscomposingit。
Itisthispersonal，political，andartificialexistence，whichgivesitthecharacterofabodypoliticorcorporate，inwhichmaybevestedpeculiarpowersandattributes，distinctanddifferentfromthosebelongingtothenaturalpersonscomposingit。Thus，thecorporationmaybeperpetual，althoughtheindividualscomposingitmayinsuccessiondie。Itmayhaveprivileges，andimmunities，andfunctions，whichdonot，andcannotlawfullybelongtoindividuals。Itmayexercisefranchises，andtransactbusinessprohibitedtoitsmembers，asindividuals。Thecapacitytosueandbesuedbelongstoeverycorporation；and，indeed，isafunctionincidenttoit，independentofanyspecialgrant，becausenecessarytoitsexistence。Itsuesandissued，however，notinthenamesofitsmembers，butinitsownname，asadistinctperson。Itacts，indeed，byandthroughitsmembers，orotherproperfunctionaries；butstilltheactsareitsown，andnottheprivateactsofsuchmembersorfunctionaries。Themembersarenotonlynotpartiestoitssuitsinanylegalsense，buttheymaysueit，orbesuedbyit，inanyaction，exactlyasanystrangermaysueit，orbesuedbyit。A
statemaysueabank，inwhichitisastockholder，justasanyotherstockholdermaysuethesamebank。TheUnitedStatesmaysuethebankoftheUnitedStates，andentitlethemselvestoajudgmentforanydebtduetothem；
andtheymaysatisfytheexecution，issuingonsuchajudgment，outofanypropertyofthebank。Nowitisplain，thatthiscouldnotbedone，ifthestate，ortheUnitedStates，oranyotherstockholder[*3：560]weredeemedapartytotherecord。Itwouldbepastalllegalcomprehension，thatapartymightsuehimself，andbeonbothsidesofthecontroversy。
So，thatanyattempttodeemastateapartytoasuit，simplybecauseithasaninterestinasuit，orisastockholderinacorporationontherecord，wouldbetorenounceallordinarydoctrinesoflawapplicabletosuchcases。Theframersoftheconstitutionmustbepresumed，intreatingofthejudicialdepartment，tohaveusedlanguageinthesense，andwiththelimitationsbelongingtoitinjudicialusage。Theymusthavespokenaccordingtoknowndistinctions，andsettledrulesofinterpretation，incorporatedintotheveryelementsofthejurisprudenceofeverystateintheUnion。
Sec。1682。Itmay，then，belaiddown，asarule，whichadmitsofnoexception，thatinallcasesundertheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，wherejurisdictiondependsupontheparty，itisthepartynamedontherecord。Consequentlytheamendmentabovereferredto，whichrestrainsthejurisdictiongrantedbytheconstitutionoversuitsagainststates，isofnecessitylimitedtothosesuits，inwhichastateisapartyontherecord。Theamendmenthasitsfulleffect，iftheconstitutionisconstrued，asitwouldhavebeenconstrued，hadthejurisdictionneverbeenextendedtosuitsbroughtagainstastatebythecitizensofanotherstate，orbyaliens。**Astatemaybeproperlydeemedaparty，whenitsues，orissuedbyprocess，byoragainstthegovernorofthestateinhisofficialcapacity。Sec。1683。Ithasbeendoubted，whetherthisamendmentextendstocasesofadmiraltyandmaritime[*3：561]jurisdiction，wheretheproceedingisinrein，andnotinpersonam，There，thejurisdictionofthecourtisfoundeduponthepossessionofthething；andifthestateshouldinterposeaclaimfortheproperty，itdoesnotactmerelyinthecharacterofadefendant，butasanactor。Besides；thelanguageoftheamendmentis，that\"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaworequity。\"Butasuitintheadmiraltyisnot，correctlyspeaking，asuitinlaw，orinequity；butisoftenspokenofincontradistinctiontoboth。
Sec。1684。Next。\"Controversiesbetweencitizensofdifferentstates。
\"Althoughthenecessityofthispowermaynotstandupongroundsquiteasstrong，assomeofthepreceding，therearehighmotivesofstatepolicyandpublicjustice，bywhichitcanbeclearlyvindicated。Therearemanycases，inwhichsuchapowermaybeindispensable，orinthehighestdegreeexpedient，tocarryintoeffectsomeoftheprivilegesandimmunitiesconferred，andsomeoftheprohibitionsuponstatesexpresslydeclared，intheconstitution。
Forexample；itisdeclared，thatthecitizensofeachstateshallbeentitledtoalltheprivilegesandimmunitiesofcitizensoftheseveralstates。
Supposeanattemptismadetoevade，orwithholdtheseprivilegesandimmunities，woulditnotberighttoallowthepartyaggrievedanopportunityofclaimingthem，inacontestwithacitizenofthestate，beforeatribunal，atoncenationalandimpartial？Supposeastateshouldpassatenderlaw，[*3：562]
orlawimpairingtheobligationofprivatecontracts，orshouldinthecourseofitslegislationgrantunconstitutionalpreferencestoitsowncitizens，isitnotclear，thatthejurisdictiontoenforcetheobligationsoftheconstitutioninsuchcasesoughttobeconfidedtothenationaltribunals？Thesecasesarenotpurelyimaginary。Theyhaveactuallyoccurred；
andmayagainoccur，underpeculiarcircumstances，inthecourseofstatelegislation。Whatwasthefactundertheconfederation？Eachstatewasobligedtoacquiesceinthedegreeofjustice，whichanotherstatemightchoosetoyieldtoitscitizens。Therewasnotonlydangerofanimositiesgrowingupfromthissource；but，inpointoffact，theredidgrowupretaliatorylegislation，tomeet’suchrealorimaginedgrievances。
Sec。1685。Nothingcanconducemoretogeneralharmonyandconfidenceamongallthestates，thanaconsciousness，thatcontroversiesarenotexclusivelytobedecidedbythestatetribunals；butmay，attheelectionoftheparty，bebroughtbeforethenationaltribunals。Besides；itcannotescapeobservation，thatthejudgesindifferentstatesholdtheirofficesbyaverydifferenttenure。Someholdduringgoodbehaviour；someforatermofyears；someforasingleyear；someareirremovable，exceptuponimpeachment；andothersmayberemoveduponaddressofthelegislature。
Undersuchcircumstancesitcannotbutbepresumed，thattheremayariseacourseofstatepolicy，orstatelegislation，exceedinglyinjurioustotheinterestsofthe[*3：563]citizensofotherstates，bothastorealandpersonalproperty。Itwouldrequireanuncommonexerciseofcandourorcredulitytoaffirm，thatincasesofthissortallthestatetribunalswouldbewhollywithoutstateprejudice，orstatefeelings；or，thattheywouldbeasearnestinresistingtheencroachmentsofstateauthorityuponthejustrights，andinterestsofthecitizensofotherstates，asatribunaldifferentlyconstituted，andwhollyindependentofstateauthority。Andifjusticeshouldbeasfairlyandasfirmlyadministeredintheformer，asinthelatter，stillthemischiefswouldbemostserious，ifthepublicopiniondidnotindulgesuchabelief。Justice，incasesofthissort，shouldnotonlybeaboveallreproach，butaboveallsuspicion。Thesourcesofstateirritationsandstatejealousiesaresufficientlynumerous，withoutleavingopenonesocopiousandconstant，asthebelief，orthedreadofwrongintheadministrationofstatejustice。iBesides；ifthepublicconfidenceshouldcontinuetofollowthestatetribunals，asinmanycasesitdoubtlesswill，theprovisionwillbecomeinertandharmless；for，asthepartywillhavehiselectionoftheforum，hewillnotbeinclinedtodesertthestatecourts，unlessforsomesoundreason，foundedeitherinthenatureofhiscause，orintheinfluenceofstateprejudices。Ontheotherhand，therecanbenorealdangerofinjusticetotheothersideinthedecisionsofthenationaltribunals；becausethecausemuststillbedecideduponthetrueprinciplesofthelocallaw，andnotbyanyforeignjurisprudence。
[*3：564]Thereisanothercircumstanceofnosmallimportance，asamatterofpolicy；andthatis，thetendencyofsuchapowertoincreasetheconfidenceandcreditbetweenthecommercialandagriculturalstates。Nomancanbeinsensibletothevalue，inpromotingcredit，ofthebeliefoftherebeingaprompt，efficient，andimpartialadministrationofjusticeinenforcingcontracts。
Sec。1686。Sucharesomeofthereasons，whicharesupposedtohaveinfluencedtheconventionindelegatingjurisdictiontothecourtsoftheUnitedStatesincasesbetweencitizensofdifferentstates。ProbablynopartofthejudicialpoweroftheUnionhasbeenofmorepracticalbenefit，orhasgivenmorelastingsatisfactiontothepeople。Thereisnotasinglestate，whichhasnotatsometimefelttheinfluenceofthisconservativepower；andthegeneralharmony，whichexistsbetweenthestatecourtsandthenationalcourts，intheconcurrentexerciseoftheirjurisdictionincasesbetweencitizensofdifferentstates，demonstratestheutility，aswellasthesafetyofthepower。Indeed；itisnotimprobable，thattheexistenceofthepowerhasoperated，asasilent，butirresistiblechecktounduestatelegislation；atthesametime，thatithascherishedamutualrespectandconfidencebetweenthestateandnationalcourts，ashonourable，asithasbeenbeneficent。
Sec。1687。Thenextinquirygrowingoutofthispartoftheclauseis，whoaretobedeemedcitizensofdifferentstateswithinthemeaningofit。Areallpersonsbornwithinastatetobealwaysdeemedcitizensofthatstate，notwithstandinganychangeofdomicil；ordoestheircitizenshipchangewiththeirchangeof[*3：565]domicil？Theanswertothisinquiryisequallyplainandsatisfactory。Theconstitutionhavingdeclared，thatthecitizensofeachstateshallbeentitledtoallprivilegesandimmunitiesofcitizensintheseveralstates，everyperson，whoisacitizenofonestate，andremovesintoanother，withtheintentionoftakinguphisresidenceandinhabitancythere，becomesipsofactoacitizenofthestate，whereheresides；andhethenceasestobeacitizenofthestate，fromwhichhehasremovedhisresidence。Ofcourse，whenhegivesuphisnewresidenceordomicil，andreturnstohisnative，orotherstateresidenceordomicil，hereacquiresthecharacterofthelatter。Whatcircumstancesshallconstitutesuchachangeofresidenceordomicil，isaninquiry，moreproperlybelongingtoatreatiseuponpublicormunicipallaw，thantocommentariesuponconstitutionallaw。Ingeneral，however，itmaybesaid，thataremovalfromonestateintoanother，animomanendi，orwithadesignofbecominganinhabitant，constitutesachangeofdomicil，andofcourseachangeofcitizenship。
Butaperson，whoisanativecitizenofonestate，neverceasestobeacitizenthereof，untilhehasacquiredanewcitizenshipelsewhere。Residenceinaforeigncountryhasnooperationuponhischaracter，asacitizen，althoughitmay，forpurposesoftradeandcommerce，impresshimwiththecharacterofthecountry。Tochangeallegianceisonething；tochangeinhabitancyisquiteanotherthing。Therightandthepowerarenotcoextensiveineachcase。EverycitizenofastateisipsofactoacitizenoftheUnitedStates。
[*3：566]Sec。1688。Andaperson，WhoisanaturalizedcitizenoftheUnitedStates，byalikeresidenceinanystateintheUnion，becomesipsofactoacitizenofthatstate。SoacitizenofaterritoryoftheUnionbyalikeresidenceacquiresthecharacterofthestate，whereheresides。
ButanaturalizedcitizenoftheUnitedStates，oracitizenofaterritory，isnotacitizenofastate，entitledtosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesinvirtueofthatcharacter，whileheresidesinanysuchterritory，noruntilhehasacquiredaresidenceordomicilintheparticularstate。
Sec。1689。Acorporation，assuch，isnotacitizenofastateinthesenseoftheconstitution。But，ifallthemembersofthecorporationarecitizens，theircharacterwillconferjurisdiction；forthenitissubstantiallyasuitbycitizenssuingintheircorporatename。Andacitizenofastateisentitledtosue，assuch，notwithstandingheisatrusteeforothers，orsuesinautredroit，asitistechnicallycalled；thatis，asrepresentativeofanother。Thus，acitizenmaysue，whoisatrusteeatlaw，forthebenefitofthepersonentitledtothetrust。Andanadministrator，andexecutormaysueforthebenefitoftheestate，whichtheyrepresent；forineachofthesecasesitistheirpersonalsuit。Butifcitizens，whoarepartiestoasuit，aremerelynominallyso；as，forinstance，ifmagistratesareofficiallyrequiredto[*3：567]allowsuitstobebroughtintheirnamesfortheuseorbenefitofacitizenoralien，thelatteraredeemedthesubstantialpartiesentitledtosue。
Sec。1690。Next。\"Controversiesbetweencitizensofthesamestate，claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates。\"Thisclausewasnotinthefirstdraftoftheconstitution，butwasaddedwithoutanyknownobjectiontoitspropriety。Itistheonlyinstance，inwhichtheconstitutiondirectlycontemplatesthecognizanceofdisputesbetweencitizensofthesamestate；
butcertainlynottheonlyone，inwhichtheymayindirectlyuponconstitutionalquestionshavethebenefitofthejudicialpoweroftheUnion。TheFederalisthasremarked，thatthereasonablenessoftheagencyofthenationalcourtsincases，inwhichthestatetribunalscannotbesupposedtobeimpartial，speaksforitself。Nomanoughtcertainlytobeajudgeinhisowncause，orinanycause，inrespecttowhichhehastheleastinterestorbias。
\"Thisprinciplehasnoinconsiderableweightindesignatingthefederalcourts，asthepropertribunalsforthedeterminationofcontroversiesbetweendifferentstatesandtheircitizens。Anditoughttohavethesameoperationinregardtosomecasesbetweencitizensofthesamestate。Claimstolandundergrantsofdifferentstates，foundeduponadversepretensionsofboundary，areofthisdescription。Thecourtsofneitherofthegrantingstatescouldbeexpectedtobeunbiassed。Thelawsmayhaveevenprejudgedthequestion；andtiedthecourtsdowntodecisionsinfavourofthegrantsofthestate，towhichtheybelonged。[*3：568]Andwherethishasnotbeendone，itwouldbenatural，thatthejudges，asmen，shouldfeelastrongpredilectionfortheclaimsoftheirowngovernment。And，atallevents，theprovidingofatribunal，havingnopossibleinterestontheoneside，morethantheother，wouldhaveamostsalutarytendencyinquietingthejealousies，anddisarmingtheresentmentsofthestate，whosegrantshouldbeheldinvalid。Thisjurisdictionattachesnotonlytograntsmadebydifferentstates，whichwereneverunited；butalsotograntsmadebydifferentstates，whichwereoriginallyunitedunderonejurisdiction，ifmadesincetheseparation，althoughtheoriginofthetitlemaybetracedbacktoanantecedentperiod。
Sec。1691。Next。\"Controversiesbetweenastate，orthecitizensthereof，andforeignstates，citizens，orsubjects。\"TheFederalisthasvindicatedthisprovisioninthefollowingbrief，butpowerfulmanner：\"Thepeaceofthewholeoughtnottobeleftatthedisposalofapart。TheUnionwillundoubtedlybeanswerabletoforeignpowersfortheconductofitsmembers。Andtheresponsibilityforaninjuryoughtevertobeaccompaniedwiththefacultyofpreventingit。Asthedenialorperversionofjusticebythesentencesofcourtsiswithreasonclassedamongthejustcausesofwar，itwillfollow，thatthefederaljudiciaryoughttohavecognizanceofallcauses，inwhichthecitizensofothercountriesareconcerned。
Thisisnotlessessentialtothepreservationofthepublicfaith，thantothe[*3：569]securityofthepublictranquillity。Adistinctionmayperhapsbeimaginedbetweencasesarisingupontreatiesandthelawsofnations，andthose，whichmaystandmerelyonthefootingofthemunicipallaw。Theformerkindmaybesupposedproperforthefederaljurisdiction；
thelatterfortimofthestates。Butitisatleastproblematical，whetheranunjustsentenceagainstaforeigner，wherethesubjectofcontroversywaswhollyrelativetothelexloci，wouldnot，ifunredressed，beanaggressionuponhissovereignaswellasone，whichviolatedthestipulationsofatreaty，orthegenerallawofnations。Andastillgreaterobjectiontothedistinctionwouldresultfromtheimmensedifficulty，ifnotimpossibility，ofapracticaldiscriminationbetweenthecasesofonecomplexion，andthoseoftheother。Sogreataproportionofthecontroversies，inwhichforeignersareparties，involvenationalquestions，thatitisbyfarthemostsafe，andmostexpedient，toreferallthose，inwhichtheyareconcerned，tothenationaltribunals。\"
Sec。1692。Inadditiontothesesuggestions，itmayberemarked，thatitisofgreatnationalimportancetoadvancepublic，aswellasprivatecredit，inourintercoursewithforeignnationsandtheirsubjects。Nothingcanbemorebeneficialinthisrespect，thantocreateanimpartial。tribunal，towhichtheymayhaveresortuponalloccasions，whenitmaybenecessarytoascertain，orenforcetheirrights。*Besides；itisnot[*3：570]whollyimmaterial，thatthelawtobeadministeredincasesofforeignersisoftenverydistinctfromthemeremunicipalcodeofastate，anddependentuponthelawmerchant，orthemoreenlargedconsiderationofinternationalrightsandduties，inacaseofconflictoftheforeignanddomesticlaws。Anditmayfairlybepresumed，thatthenationaltribunalswill，fromthenatureoftheirordinaryfunctions，becomebetteracquaintedwiththegeneralprinciples，whichregulatesubjectsofthisnature，thanother，courts，howeverenlightened，whicharerarelyrequiredtodiscussthem。*[*3：569]Itisnotorious，thatthisjurisdictionhasbeenverysatisfactorytoforeignnationsandtheirsubjects。Norhavethedangersofstateprejudice，andstateattachmenttolocalinterests，totheinjuryofforeigners，beenwhollyimaginary。Ithasbeenalreadystatedinanotherplace，thatthedebtsduetoBritishsubjectsbeforetherevolution，wereneverrecovered，untilafterthe[*3：570]adoptionoftheconstitution，bysuitsbroughtinthenationalcourts。Sec。1693。InregardtocontroversiesbetweenanAmericanandaforeignstate，itisobvious，thatthesuitmust，ononesideatleast，bewhollyvoluntary。Noforeignstatecanbecompelledtobecomeaparty，plaintiffordefendant，inanyofourtribunals。If，therefore，itchoosestoconsenttotheinstitutionofanysuit，itisitsconsentalone，whichcargiveeffecttothejurisdictionofthecourt。Itiscertainlydesirabletofurnishsomepeaceablemodeofappealincases，whereanycontroversymayexistbetweenanAmericanandaforeignstate，sufficientlyimportanttorequirethegrievancetoberedressedbyanyothermode，thanthroughtheinstrumentalityofnegotiations。
Sec。1694。Theinquirymayherebemade，whoaretobedeemedaliensentitledtosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Thegeneralansweris，anyperson，whoisnotacitizenoftheUnitedStates。Aforeigner，whoisnaturalized，isnolongerentitledtothecharacter[*3：571]ofanalien。*Andwhenanalienisthesubstantialparty，itmattersnot，whetherheisasuitorinhisownright；orwhetherheacts，asatrustee，orpersonalrepresentative；orwhetherheiscompellablebythelocallawtosuethroughsomeofficialorgan。Aforeigncorporation，establishedinaforeigncountry，allofwhosemembersarealiens，isentitledtosueinthesamemanner，thatanalienmaypersonallysueinthecourtsoftheUnion。Itisnotsufficienttovestthejurisdiction，thatanalienisaparty。tothesuit，unlesstheotherpartybeacitizen。Britishsubjects，bornbeforetheAmericanrevolution，aretobedeemedaliens；andmaysueAmericancitizens，bornbeforetherevolution，aswellasthoseborn，sincethatperiod。Therevolutionseveredthetiesofallegiance；andmadetheinhabitantsofeachcountryalienstoeachother。Inrelationtoaliens，however，itshouldbestated，thattheyhavearighttosueonly，whilepeaceexistsbetweentheircountryandourown。Forifawarbreaksout，andtheytherebybecomealienenemies，theirrighttosueissuspended，untilthereturnofpeace。*Mr。Tuckersupposes，thattheseveralstatesstillretainthepowerofadmittingalienstobecomedenizensofthestate；butthattheydonottherebybecomecitizens。Whathemeansbydenizens，hehasnotexplained。
Ifbemeans，thatthestatesmaynaturalize，sofarastomakeanalienacitizenofthestate，thatmaybewellquestioned。Ifhemeansonly，thattheymayenablealienstoholdlands，andenjoycertainotherqualifiedprivilegeswithinthestate，thatwillnotbedenied。[*3：572]Sec。1695。Wehavenowfinishedourreviewoftheclassesofcases，towhichthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesextends。Thenextinquirynaturallypresentedis，inwhatmodeitistobeexercised，andinwhatcourtsitistobevested。Thesucceedingclauseoftheconstitutionanswersthisinquiry。Itisinthefollowingwords。\"Inallcasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls，andthose，inwhichastateshallbeaparty，theSupremeCourtshallhaveoriginaljurisdiction。Inalltheothercasesbeforementioned，theSupremeCourtshallhaveappellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，withsuchexceptionsandundersuchregulations，asthecongressshallmake。\"**Inthefirstdraftoftheconstitution，thewordsstoodthus。\"Incasesofimpeachment，easesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls，andthose，inwhichastateshallbeaparty，thisjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtshallbeoriginal。Inallothercasesbeforementioned，itshallbeappellate，withsuchexceptionsandundersuchregulations，asthelegislaturemaymake。Thelegislaturemayassignanypartofthejurisdictionabovementioned，exceptthetrialofthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesinthemannerandunderthelimitations，whichitshallthinkproper，tosuchinferiorcourts，asitshallconstitutefromtimetotime。\"Itwasvariedtoitspresentformbysuccessivevotes，inwhichtherewassomedifferenceofopinion。Sec。1696。Thefirstremarkarisingoutofthisclauseis，that，asthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesextendstoallthecasesenumeratedintheconstitution，itmayextendto。allsuchcasesinanyform，inwhichjudicialpowermaybeexercised。Itmay，therefore，extendtothemintheshapeoforiginal，orappellatejurisdiction，orboth；forthereisnothinginthenatureofthecases，whichbindstotheexerciseoftheonein[*3：573]
preferencetotheother。Butitisclear，fromthelanguageoftheconstitution，that，inoneformortheother，itisabsolutelyobligatoryuponcongress，tovestallthejurisdictioninthenationalcourts，inthatclassofcasesatleast，whereithasdeclared，thatitshallextendto\"allcases。\"**Uponthissubjectthereisconsiderablediscussion，inthecaseofMartinv。Hunter。Sec。1697。Inthenextplace，thejurisdiction，whichisbytheconstitutiontobeexercisedbytheSupremeCourtinanoriginalform，isverylimited，andextendsonlytocasesaffectingambassadors，andotherpublicministers，andconsuls，andcases，whereastateisaparty。Andcongresscannotconstitutionallyconferonitanyother，orfurtheroriginaljurisdiction。Thisisoneoftheappropriateillustrationsoftherule，thattheaffirmationofapowerinparticularcases，excludesitinallothers。theclauseitselfwouldotherwisebewhollyinoperativeandnugatory。Ifithadbeenintendedtoleaveittothediscretionofcongress，toapportionthejudicialpowerbetweenthesupremeandinferiorcourts，accordingtothewillofthatbody，itwouldhavebeenuselesstohaveproceededfurther，thantodefinethejudicialpower，andthetribunals，inwhichitshouldbevested。Affirmativewordsoften，intheiroperation，implyanegativeofotherobjects，thanthoseaffirmed；andinthiscaseanegative，orexclusivesense，mustbegiventothewords，ortheyhavenooperationatall。Ifthesolicitudeoftheconvention，respectingourpeacewithforeignpowers，mightinduceaprovisiontobemade，thattheSupremeCourtshouldhaveoriginaljurisdictionincases，whichmight[*3：574]besupposedtoaffectthem；yettheclausewouldhaveproceedednofurther，thantoprovideforsuchcases，unlesssomefurtherrestrictionuponthepowersofcongresshadbeenintended。
Thedirection，thattheSupremeCourtshallhaveappellatejurisdictioninallcases，withsuchexceptions，ascongressshallmake，willbenorestriction，unlessthewordsaretobedeemedexclusiveoforiginaljurisdiction。
Andaccordingly，thedoctrineisfirmlyestablished，thattheSupremeCourtcannotconstitutionallyexerciseanyoriginaljurisdiction，exceptintheenumeratedcases。Ifcongressshouldconferit，itwouldbeamerenullity。**Congress，bythejudiciaryactof1789，didconferontheSupremeCourttheauthoritytoissuewritsofmandamus，incaseswarrantedbytheprinciplesandusagesoflawtopersonsholdingofficeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。ButtheSupremeCourt，in1801，heldthedelegationofpowertobeamerenullity。Marburyv。Madison。Sec。1698。ButalthoughtheSupremeCourtcannotexerciseoriginaljurisdictioninanycases，exceptthose’speciallyenumerated，itiscertainlycompetentforcongresstovestinanyinferiorcourtsoftheUnitedStatesoriginaljurisdictionofallothercases，notthusspeciallyassignedtotheSupremeCourt；forthereisnothingintheconstitution，whichexcludessuchinferiorcourtsfromtheexerciseofsuchoriginaljurisdiction。Originaljurisdiction，sofarastheconstitutiongivesarule，iscoextensivewiththejudicialpower；andexcept，sofarastheconstitutionhasmadeanydistributionofitamongthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，itremains[*3：575]tobeexercisedinanoriginal，orappellateform，orboth，ascongressmayintheirwisdomdeemfit。Now，theconstitutionhasmadenodistribution，exceptoftheoriginalandappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt。
Ithasnowhereinsinuated，thattheinferiortribunalsshallhavenooriginaljurisdiction。Ithasnowhereaffirmed，thattheyshallhaveappellatejurisdiction。Bothareleftunrestrictedandundefined。Ofcourse，asthejudicialpoweristobevestedinthesupremeandinferiorcourtsoftheUnion，bothareundertheentirecontrolandregulationofcongress。
Sec。1699。Indeed，ithasbeenamatterofmuchquestion，whetherthegrantoforiginaljurisdictiontotheSupremeCourt，intheenumeratedcases，oughttobeconstruedtogivetothatcourtexclusiveoriginaljurisdiction，evenofthosecases。Andithasbeencontended，thatthereisnothingintheconstitution，whichwarrantstheconclusion，thatitwasintendedtoexcludetheinferiorcourtsoftheUnionfromaconcurrentoriginaljurisdiction。
Thejudiciaryactof1789，ch。20，Sec。11，13，hasmanifestlyproceededuponthesupposition，thatthejurisdictionwasnotexclusive；but，thatconcurrentoriginaljurisdictioninthosecasesmightbevestedbycongressininferiorcourts。Ithasbeenstronglyintimated，indeed，bythehighesttribunal，onmorethanoneoccasion，thattheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtinthosecasesisexclusive；but[*3：576]thequestionremainstothishourWithoutanyauthoritativedecision。
Sec。1700。Anotherquestionofaverydifferentnatureis，whethertheSupremeCourtcanexerciseappellatejurisdictionintheclassofcases，ofwhichoriginaljurisdictionisdelegatedtoitbytheconstitution；
inotherwords，whethertheoriginaljurisdictionexcludestheappellate；
andso，econverso，thelatterimpliesanegativeoftheformer。Ithasbeensaid，thattheverydistinctiontakenintheconstitution，betweenoriginalandappellatejurisdiction，presupposes，thatwheretheonecanbeexercised，theothercannot。Forexample，sincetheoriginaljurisdictionextendstocases，whereastateisaparty，thisistheproperform，inwhichsuchcasesaretobebroughtbeforetheSupremeCourt；and，therefore，acase，whereastateisaparty，cannotbebroughtbeforethecourt，intheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdiction；fortheaffirmativehere，aswellasinthecasesoforiginaljurisdiction，includesanegativeofthecasesnotenumerated。
Sec。1701。Ifthecorrectnessofthisreasoningwereadmitted，itwouldestablishnomore，thanthattheSupremeCourtcouldnotexerciseappellatejurisdictionincases，whereastateisaparty。Butitwouldbynomeansestablishthedoctrine，thatthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesdidnotextend，inanappellateform，tosuchcases。Theexerciseofappellatejurisdictionisfarfrombeinglimited，bythetermsoftheconstitution，totheSupremeCourt。Therecanbeno[*3：577]doubt，thatcongressmaycreateasuccessionofinferiortribunals，ineachofwhichitmayvestappellate，aswellasoriginaljurisdiction。Thisresultsfromtheverynatureofthedelegationofthejudicialpowerintheconstitution。Itisdelegatedinthemostgeneralterms；andmay，therefore，beexercisedundertheauthorityofcongress，undereveryvarietyofformoforiginalandappellatejurisdiction。Thereisnothingintheinstrument，whichrestrains，orlimitsthepower；anditmust，consequently，subsistintheutmostlatitude，ofwhichitisinitsnaturesusceptible。Theresultthenwouldbe，that，iftheappellatejurisdictionovercases，towhichastateisaparty，couldnot，accordingtothetermsoftheconstitution，beexercisedbytheSupremeCourt，itmightbeexercisedexclusivelybyaninferiortribunal。
Thesoundnessofanyreasoning，whichwouldleadustosuchaconclusion，maywellbequestioned。**TheFederalist，No。82，hasspokenoftherightofcongresstovestappellatejurisdictionintheinferiorcourtsoftheUnitedStatesfromstatecourts，forithadbeforeexpresslyaffirmedthatoftheSupremeCourtinsuchcasesinthefollowingterms。\"Butcouldanappealbemadetoliefromthestatecourtstothesubordinatefederaljudicatories？Thisisanotherofthequestions，whichhavebeenraised，andofgreaterdifficulty，thantheformer。Thefollowingconsiderationscountenancetheaffirmative。
Theplanoftheconvention，inthefirstplace，authorizesthe，nationallegislaturetoconstitutetribunals，inferiortotheSupremeCourt。Itdeclares，inthenextplace，that’thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferiorcourts，ascongressshallordainandestablish；’anditthenproceedstoenumeratethecases，towhichthisjudicialpowershallextend。ItafterwardsdividesthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtintooriginalandappellate，butgivesnodefinitionofthatofthesubordinatecourts。Theonlyoutlinesdescribedforthemare，thattheyshall[*3：578]be’inferiortotheSupremeCourt，’andthattheyshallnotexceedthespecifiedlimitsofthefederaljudiciary。Whethertheirauthorityshallbeoriginal，orappellate，orboth，isnotdeclared。
Allthisseemstobelefttothediscretionofthelegislature。Andthisbeingthecase，Iperceiveatpresentnoimpedimenttotheestablishmentofanappealfromthestatecourtstothesubordinatenationaltribunals；
andmanyadvantages，attendingthepowerofdoingit，maybeimagined。
Itwoulddiminishthemotivestothemultiplicationoffederalcourts，andwouldadmitofarrangements，calculatedtocontracttheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt。Thestatetribunalsmaythenbeleftwithamoreentirechargeoffederalcauses；andappeals，inmostcases，inwhichtheymaybedeemedproper，insteadofbeingcarriedtotheSupremeCourt，maybemadetoliefromthestatecourtstodistrict。courtsoftheUnion。\"Sec。1702。Butthereasoningitselfisnotwellfounded。Itproceedsupontheground，that，becausethecharacterofthepartyalone，insomeinstances，entitlestheSupremeCourttomaintainoriginaljurisdiction，withoutanyreferencetothenatureofthecase，therefore，thecharacterofthecase，whichinotherinstancesismadetheveryfoundationofappellatejurisdiction，cannotattach。Now，thatistheverypointofcontroversy。Itisnotonlynotadmitted，butitissolemnlydenied。Theargumentmightjustaswell，andwithquiteasmuchforce，bepressedintheoppositedirection。Itmightbesaid，thattheappellatejurisdictionisexpresslyextendedbytheconstitutiontoallcasesinlawandequity，arisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，and，therefore，innosuchcasescouldtheSupremeCourtexerciseoriginaljurisdiction，eventhoughastatewereaparty。
Sec。1703。ButthissubjecthasbeenexpoundedinsomasterlyamannerbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，indeliveringtheopinionoftheSupremeCourtinaverycelebratedcase，thatitwillbemoresatisfactoryto[*3：579]
givethewholeargumentinhisownlanguage。\"Theconstitution\"sayshe，
\"givestheSupremeCourtoriginaljurisdictionincertainenumeratedcases，andgivesitappellatejurisdictioninallothers。Amongthose，inwhichjurisdictionmustbeexercisedintheappellateform，arecasesarisingundertheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates。Theseprovisionsoftheconstitutionareequallyobligatory，andaretobeequallyrespected。
Ifastatebeaparty，thejurisdictionofthiscourtisoriginal；ifthecaseariseundertheconstitution，oralaw，thejurisdictionisappellate。
Butacase，towhichastateisaparty，mayariseundertheconstitution，oralawoftheUnitedStates。Whatruleisapplicabletosuchacase？
What，then，becomesthedutyofthecourt？Certainly，wethink，sotoconstruetheconstitution，astogiveeffecttobothprovisions，asfarasitispossibletoreconcilethem，andnottopermittheirseemingrepugnancytodestroyeachother。Wemustendeavoursotoconstruethem，astopreservethetrueintentandmeaningoftheinstrument。
Sec。1704。\"Inonedescriptionofcases，thejurisdictionofthecourtisfoundedentirelyonthecharacteroftheparties；andthenatureofthecontroversyisnotcontemplatedbytheconstitution。Thecharacterofthepartiesiseverything，thenatureofthecasenothing。Intheotherdescriptionofcases，thejurisdictionisfoundedentirelyonthecharacterofthecase，andthepartiesarenotcontemplatedbytheconstitution。
Inthese，thenatureofthecaseiseverything，thecharacterofthepartiesnothing。When，then，theconstitutiondeclaresthejurisdictionincases，whereastateshallbeaparty，tobeoriginal，andinallcasesarisingundertheconstitution，oralaw，tobeappellate，the[*3：580]conclusionseemsirresistible，thatitsframersdesignedtoincludeinthefirstclassthosecases，inwhichjurisdictionisgiven，becauseastateisaparty；
andtoincludeinthesecondthose，inwhichjurisdictionisgiven，becausethecasearisesundertheconstitution，oralaw。Thisreasonableconstructionisrenderednecessarybyotherconsiderations。Thattheconstitution，oralawoftheUnitedStates，isinvolvedinacase，andmakesapartofit，mayappearintheprogressofacause，inwhichthecourtsoftheUnion，butforthatcircumstance，wouldhavenojurisdiction，andwhichofconsequencecouldnotoriginateintheSupremeCourt。Insuchacase，thejurisdictioncanbeexercisedonlyinitsappellateform。Todenyitsexerciseinthisformistodenyitsexistence，andwouldbetoconstrueaclause，dividingthepoweroftheSupremeCourt，insuchmanner，asinaconsiderabledegreetodefeatthepoweritself。Allmustperceive，thatthisconstructioncanbejustified，onlywhereitisabsolutelynecessary。Wedonotthinkthearticleunderconsiderationpresentsthatnecessity。
Sec。1705。\"Itisobservable，thatinthisdistributiveclausenonegativewordsareintroduced。Thisobservationisnotmadeforthepurposeofcontending，thatthelegislaturemay’apportionthejudicialpowerbetweenthesupremeandinferiorcourts，accordingtoitswill。’Thatwouldbe，aswassaidb。ythiscourtinthecaseofMarburyv。Madison，torenderthedistributiveclause’meresurplusage，’tomakeit’formwithoutsubstance。’Thiscannot，therefore，bethetrueconstructionofthearticle。Butalthoughtheabsenceofnegativewordswillnotauthorizethelegislaturetodisregardthedistributionofthepowerpreviouslygranted，theirabsencewilljustifyasound[*3：581]
constructionofthewholearticle，soastogiveeverypartitsintendedeffect。Itisadmitted，that’affirmativewordsareoften，intheiroperation，negativeofotherobjects，thanthoseaffirmed；’andthatwhere’anegativeorexclusivesense，mustbegiventothem，ortheyhavenooperationatall，’theymustreceivethatnegative，orexclusivesense。Butwheretheyhavefulloperationwithoutit；whereitwoulddestroysomeofthemostimportantobjects，forwhichthepowerwascreated；then，wethink，affirmativewordsoughtnottobeconstruednegatively。
Sec。1706。\"Theconstitutiondeclares，thatincases，whereastateisaparty，theSupremeCourtshallhaveoriginaljurisdiction；butdoesnotsay，thatitsappellatejurisdictionshallnotbeexercisedincases，where，fromtheirnature，appellatejurisdictionisgiven，whetherastatebe，orbenotaparty。Itmaybeconceded，thatwherethecaseisofsuchanature，astoadmitofitsoriginatingintheSupremeCourt，itoughttooriginatethere；butwhere，fromitsnature，itcannotoriginateinthatcourt，thesewordsoughtnottobesoconstrued，astorequireit。
Therearemanycases，inwhichitwouldbefoundextremelydifficult，andsubversiveofthespiritoftheconstitution，tomaintaintheconstruction，thatappellatejurisdictioncannotbeexercised，whereoneofthepartiesmightsue，orbesuedinthiscourt。TheconstitutiondefinesthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，butdoesnotdefinethatoftheinferiorcourts。
Canitbeaffirmed，thatastatemightnotsuethecitizenofanotherstateinaCircuitCourt？ShouldtheCircuitCourtdecidefor，oragainstitsjurisdiction，shoulditdismissthesuit，orgivejudgment[*3：582]againstthestate，mightnotitsdecisionberevisedintheSupremeCourt？Theargumentis，thatitcouldnot；andtheveryclause，whichisurgedtoprove，thattheCircuitCourtcouldgivenojudgmentinthecase，isalsourgedtoprove，thatitsjudgmentisirreversible。Asupervisingcourt，whosepeculiarprovinceitistocorrecttheerrorsofaninferiorcourt，hasnopowertocorrectajudgmentgivenwithoutjurisdiction，because，inthesamecase，thatsupervisingcourthasoriginaljurisdiction。Hadnegativewordsbeenemployed，itwouldbedifficulttogivethemthisconstruction，iftheywouldadmitofanyother。But，withoutnegativewords，thisirrationalconstructioncanneverbemaintained。
Sec。1707。\"So，too，inthesameclause，thejurisdictionofthecourtisdeclaredtobeoriginal，’incasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls。’Thereis，perhaps，nopartofthearticleunderconsiderationsomuchrequiredbynationalpolicy，asthis；unlessitbethatpart，whichextendsthejudicialpower’toallcasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。’Ithasbeengenerallyheld，thatthestatecourtshaveaconcurrentjurisdictionwiththefederalcourtsincases，towhichthejudicialpowerisextended，unlessthejurisdictionofthefederalcourtsberenderedexclusivebythewordsofthethirdarticle。Ifthewords，’toallcases，’giveexclusivejurisdictionincasesaffectingforeignministers，theymayalsogiveexclusivejurisdiction，ifsuchbethewillofcongress，incasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。Now，supposeanindividualweretosueaforeignministerinastatecourt，andthatcourtweretomaintainitsjurisdiction，andrenderjudgmentagainsttheminister，could[*3：583]
itbecontended，thatthiscourtwouldbeincapableofrevisingsuchjudgment，becausetheconstitutionhadgivenitoriginaljurisdictioninthecase？
Ifthiscouldbemaintained，thenaclauseinsertedforthepurposeofexcludingthejurisdictionofallothercourts，thanthis，inaparticularcase，wouldhavetheeffectofexcludingthejurisdictionofthiscourtinthatverycase，ifthesuitweretobebroughtinanothercourt，andthatcourtweretoassertjurisdiction。Thistribunal，accordingtotheargument，whichhasbeenurged，couldneitherrevisethejudgmentofsuchothercourt，norsuspenditsproceedings；forawritofprohibition，oranyothersimilarwrit，isinthenatureofappellateprocess。
Sec。1708。\"Foreignconsulsfrequentlyassert，inourprizecourts，theclaimsoftheirfellowsubjects。Thesesuitsaremaintainedbythem，asconsuls。Theappellatepowerofthiscourthasbeenfrequentlyexercisedinsuchcases，andhasneverbeenquestioned。Itwouldbeextremelymischievoustowithholditsexercise。Yettheconsulisapartyontherecord。Thetruthis，that，wherethewordsconferonlyappellatejurisdiction，originaljurisdictionismostclearlynotgiven；butwherethewordsadmitofappellatejurisdiction，thepowertotakecognizanceofthesuitoriginallydoesnotnecessarilynegativethepowertodecideuponitonanappeal，ifitmayoriginateinadifferentcourt。Itis，wethink，apparent，thattogivethisdistributiveclausetheinterpretationcontendedfor，togivetoitsaffirmativewordsanegativeoperation，ineverypossiblecase，would，insomeinstances，defeattheobviousintentionofthearticle。
Suchaninterpretationwouldnotconsistwiththoserules，which，fromtimeimmemorial，haveguidedcourtsintheirconstructionof[*3：584]instrumentsbroughtundertheirconsideration。Itmust，therefore，bediscarded。Everypartofthearticlemustbetakenintoview，andthatconstructionadopted，whichwillconsistwithitswords，andpromoteitsgeneralintention。Thecourtmayimplyanegativefromaffirmativewords，wheretheimplicationpromotes，notwhereitdefeats，theintention。
Sec。1709。\"Ifweapplythisprinciple，thecorrectnessofwhichwebelievewillnotbecontroverted，tothedistributiveclauseunderconsideration，theresult，wethink，wouldbethis；theoriginaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtincases，whereastateisaparty，referstothosecases，inwhich，accordingtothegrantofpowermadeintheprecedingclause，jurisdictionmightbeexercisedinconsequenceofthecharacteroftheparty，andanoriginalsuitmightbeinstitutedinanyofthefederalcourts；nottothosecases，inwhichanoriginalsuitmightnotbeinstitutedinafederalcourt。Ofthelastdescriptioniseverycasebetweenastateanditscitizens，and，perhaps，everycase，inwhichastateisenforcingitspenallaws。
Insuchcases，therefore，theSupremeCourtcannottakeoriginaljurisdiction。
Ineveryothercase，thatis，ineverycase，towhichthejudicialpowerextends，andinwhichoriginaljurisdictionisnotexpresslygiven，thatjudicialpowershallbeexercisedintheappellate，andonlyintheappellateform。Theoriginaljurisdictionofthiscourtcannotbeenlarged，butitsappellatejurisdictionmaybeexercisedineverycase，cognizableunderthethirdarticleoftheconstitutioninthefederalcourts，inwhichoriginaljurisdictioncannotbeexercised；andtheextentofthisjudicialpoweristobemeasured，notbygivingtheaffirmativewordsofthedistributiveclauseanegativeoperationineverypossiblecase，butbygivingtheir[*3：585]truemeaningtothewords，whichdefineitsextent。Thecounselforthedefendantinerrorurge，inoppositiontothisruleofconstruction，somedictaofthecourt，inthecaseofMarburyv。Madison。
Sec。1710。\"Itisamaximnottobedisregarded，thatgeneralexpressions，ineveryopinion，aretobetakeninconnectionwiththecase，inwhichthoseexpressionsareused。Iftheygobeyondthecase，theymayberespected，butoughtnottocontrolthejudgmentinasubsequentsuit，whentheverypointispresentedfordecision。Thereasonofthismaximisobvious。Thequestionactuallybeforethecourtisinvestigatedwithcare，andconsideredinitsfullextent。Otherprinciples，whichmayservetoillustrateit，areconsideredintheirrelationtothecasedecided，buttheirpossiblebearingonallothercasesisseldomcompletelyinvestigated。InthecaseofMarburyv。Madison，thesinglequestionbeforethecourt，sofarasthatcasecanbeappliedtothis，was，whetherthelegislaturecouldgivethiscourtoriginaljurisdictioninacase，inwhichtheconstitutionhadclearlynotgivenit，andinwhichnodoubtrespectingtheconstructionofthearticlecouldpossiblyberaised。Thecourtdecided，andwethinkveryproperly，thatthelegislaturecouldnotgiveoriginaljurisdictioninsuchacase。But，inthereasoningofthecourtinsupportofthisdecision，someexpressionsareused，whichgofarbeyondit。ThecounselforMarburyhadinsistedontheunlimiteddiscretionofthelegislatureintheapportionmentofthejudicialpower；anditisagainstthisargument，thatthereasoningofthecourtisdirected。Theysay，that，ifsuchhadbeentheintentionofthearticle，’itwouldcertainlyhavebeenuselessto[*3：586]proceedfarther，thantodefinethejudicialpower，andthetribunals，inwhichitshouldbevested。’Thecourtsays，thatsuchaconstructionwouldrendertheclause，dividingthejurisdictionofthecourtintooriginalandappellate，totallyuseless；that’affirmativewordsareoften，intheiroperation，negativeofotherobjects，thanthosewhichareaffirmed；and，inthiscase，inthecaseofMarburyv。Madison，anegativeorexclusivesensemustbegiventothem，ortheyhavenooperationatall。’’Itcannotbepresumed，’addsthecourt，’thatanyclauseintheconstitutionisintendedtobewithouteffect；and，therefore，suchaconstructionisinadmissible，unlessthewordsrequireit。’
Sec。1711。\"Thewholereasoningofthecourtproceedsupontheidea，thattheaffirmativewordsoftheclause，givingonesortofjurisdiction，mustimplyanegativeofanyothersortofjurisdiction，becauseotherwisethewordswouldbetotallyinoperative；andthisreasoningisadvancedinacase，towhichitwasstrictlyapplicable。Ifinthatcaseoriginaljurisdictioncouldhavebeenexercised，theclauseunderconsiderationwouldhavebeenentirelyuseless。Havingsuchcasesonlyinitsview，thecourtlaysdownaprinciple，whichisgenerallycorrect，intermsmuchbroader，thanthedecision，andnotonlymuchbroader，thanthereasoning，withwhichthatdecisionissupported，butinsomeinstancescontradictorytoitsprinciple。Thereasoningsustainsthenegativeoperationofthewordsinthatcase，becauseotherwisetheclausewouldhavenomeaningwhatever，andbecausesuchoperation，wasnecessarytogiveeffecttotheintentionofthearticle。Theeffortnowmadeis，toapplytheconclusion，towhichthecourtwasconductedbythatreasoningintheparticularcase，toone，inwhichthewordshavetheir[*3：587]fulloperation，whenunderstoodaffirmatively，andinwhichthenegative，orexclusivesenseistobesoused，astodefeatsomeofthegreatobjectsofthearticle。Tothisconstructionthecourtcannotgiveitsassent。ThegeneralexpressionsinthecaseorMarburyv。Madisonmustbeunderstoodwiththelimitations，whicharegiventotheminthisopinion；limitations，whichinnodegreeaffectthedecisioninthatcase，orthetenorofitsreasoning。Thecounsel，whoclosedtheargument，putseveralcasesforthepurposeofillustration，whichhesupposedtoariseundertheconstitution，andyettobe，apparently，withoutthejurisdictionofthecourt。Wereastatetolayadutyonexports，tocollectthemoneyandplaceitinhertreasury，couldthecitizen，whopaidit，heasks，maintainasuitinthiscourtagainstsuchstate，torecoverbackthemoney？Perhapsnot。Without，however，decidingsuchsupposedcase，wemaysay，thatitisentirelyunlikethatunderconsideration。
Sec。1712。\"Thecitizen，whohadpaidhismoneytohisstate，underalawthatisvoid，isinthesamesituationwitheveryotherperson，whohaspaidmoneybymistake。Thelawraisesanassumpsittoreturnthemoney，anditisuponthatassumpsit，thattheactionistobemaintained。Torefusetocomplywiththisassumpsitmaybenomoreaviolationoftheconstitution，thantorefusetocomplywithanyother；andasthefederalcourtsneverhadjurisdictionovercontractsbetweenastateanditscitizens，theymayhavenoneoverthis。Butletussovarythesupposedcase，astogiveitarealresemblancetothatunderconsideration。Supposeacitizentorefusetopaythisexportduty，andasuittobeinstitutedforthepurposeofcompellinghimtopayit。HepleadstheconstitutionoftheUnited。Statesinbaroftheaction，notwithstandingwhichthe[*3：588]
courtgivesjudgmentagainsthim。Thiswouldbeacasearisingundertheconstitution，andwouldbetheverycasenowbeforethecourt。
Sec。1713。\"Wearealsoasked，ifastateshouldconfiscatepropertysecuredbyatreaty，whethertheindividualcouldmaintainanactionforthatproperty？Ifthepropertyconfiscatedbedebts，ourownexperienceinformsus，thattheremedyofthecreditoragainsthisdebtorremains。
Ifitbeland，whichissecuredbyatreaty，andafterwardsconfiscatedbyastate，theargumentdoesnotassume，thatthistitle，thussecured，couldbeextinguishedbyanactofconfiscation。Theinjuredparty，therefore，hashisremedyagainsttheoccupantofthelandforthat，whichthetreatysecurestohim；notagainstthestateformoney，whichisnotsecuredtohim。
Sec。1714。\"Thecaseofastate，whichpaysoffitsowndebtswithpapermoney，nomoreresemblesthis，thandothose，towhichwehavealreadyadverted。Thecourtshavenojurisdictionoverthecontract。Theycannotenforceit，norjudgeofitsviolation。Letitbe，thattheactdischargingthedebtisamerenullity，andthatitisstilldue。Yet。thefederalcourtshavenocognizanceofthecase。Butsupposeastatetoinstituteproceedingsagainstanindividual，whichdependedonthevalidityofanactemittingbillsofcredit：supposeastatetoprosecuteoneofitscitizensforrefusingpapermoney，whoshouldpleadtheconstitutioninbarofsuchprosecution。Ifhispleashouldbeoverruled，andjudgmentrenderedagainsthim，hiscasewouldresemblethis；and，unlessthejurisdictionofthiscourtmightbeexercisedoverit，theconstitutionwouldbeviolated，andtheinjuredpartybeunabletobringhiscasebeforethattribunal，towhichthepeopleoftheUnitedStates[*3：589]haveassignedallsuchcases。
Itismosttrue，thatthiscourtwillnottakejurisdiction，ifitshouldnot：butitisequallytrue，thatitmusttakejurisdiction，ifitshould。
Thejudiciarycannot，asthelegislaturemay，avoidameasure，becauseitapproachestheconfinesoftheconstitution。Wecannotpassitby，becauseitisdoubtful。Withwhateverdoubts，withwhateverdifficulties，acasemaybeattended，wemustdecideit，ifitbebroughtbeforeus。Wehavenomorerighttodeclinetheexerciseofjurisdiction，whichisgiven，thantousurpthat，whichisnotgiven。Theoneortheotherwouldbetreasontotheconstitution。Questionsmayoccurwhichwewouldgladlyavoid；butwecannotavoidthem。Allwecandois，toexerciseourbestjudgment，andconscientiouslytoperformourduty。Indoingthis，onthepresentoccasion，wefindthistribunalinvestedwithappellatejurisdictioninallcases，arisingundertheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates。
Wefindnoexceptiontothisgrant，andwecannotinsertone。
Sec。1715。\"Toescapetheoperationofthesecomprehensivewords，thecounselforthedefendanthasmentionedinstances，inwhichtheconstitutionmightbeviolatedwithoutgivingjurisdictiontothiscourt。Thesewords，therefore，howeveruniversalintheirexpression，must，hecontends，belimited，andcontrolledintheirconstructionbycircumstances。Oneoftheseinstancesis，thegrantbyastateofapatentofnobility。Thecourt，hesays，cannotannulthisgrant。Thismaybeverytrue；butbynomeansjustifiestheinferencedrawnfromit。Thearticledoesnotextendthejudicialpowertoeveryviolationoftheconstitution，whichmaypossiblytakeplace；butto’acaseinlaworequity，’inwhicharight，undersuchlaw，isasserted[*3：590]inacourtofjustice。Ifthequestioncannotbebroughtintoacourt，thenthereisnocaseinlaworequity，andnojurisdictionisgivenbythewordsofthearticle。Butif，inanycontroversydependinginacourt，thecauseshoulddependonthevalidityofsuchalaw，thatwouldbeacasearisingundertheconstitution，towhichthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStateswouldextend。Thesameobservationappliestotheotherinstances，withwhichthecounsel，whoopenedthecause，hasillustratedthisargument。Althoughtheyshow，thattheremaybeviolationsoftheconstitution，ofwhichthecourtscantakenocognizance，theydonotshow，thataninterpretationmorerestrictive，thanthewordsthemselvesimport，oughttobegiventothisarticle。Theydonotshow，thattherecanbe’acaseinlaworequity，’arisingundertheconstitution，towhichthejudicialpowerdoesnotextend。Wethink，then，that，astheconstitutionoriginallystood，theappellatejurisdictionofthiscourt，inalleasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnitedStates，wasnotarrestedbythecircumstance，thatastatewasaparty。\"**MuchreliancehasoccasionallybeenlaiduponparticularexpressionsoftheSupremeCourt，usedincidentallyinargument，tosupportthereasoning，whichisheresoablyanswered。ThereasoninginMarburyv。Madisonhasbeencited，asespeciallyinpoint。ButtheSupremeCourt，inCohensv。
Virginia，explaineditinasatisfactorymanner。So，inothercases，itissaidbytheSupremeCourt，that\"appellatejurisdictionisgiventotheSupremeCourtinallcases，whereithasnotoriginaljurisdiction；\"
andthat\"itmaybeexercisedbytheSupremeCourtinallothercases，thanthose，ofwhichithasoriginalcognizance。\"Andagain，\"inthosecases，inwhichtheoriginaljurisdictionisgiventotheSupremeCourtsthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatescannotbeexercisedin[*3：591]
itsappellateform，’*Now，theseexpression，iftakeninconnectionwiththecontext，andthegeneralscopeoftheargument，inwhichtheyaretobefound，areperfectlyaccurate。Itisonlybydetachingthemfromthisconnection，thattheyaresupposedtospeakalanguage，inconsistentwiththatinCohen，v。Virginia。Thecourt，ineachofthecases，wherethelanguageabovecitedisused，werereferringtothoseclassesofcases，inwhichoriginaljurisdictionisgivensolelybythecharacteroftheparty，i。e。astate，aforeignambassador，orotherpublicminister，oraconsul。Insuchcases，iftherewouldbenojurisdictionatall，foundeduponanyotherpartoftheconstitutionaldelegationofjudicialpower，exceptthatapplicabletoparties，thecourtheld，thattheappellatejurisdictionwouldnotattach。Why？Plainly，becauseoriginaljurisdictiononlywasgiveninsuchcases。Butwheretheconstitutionextendedtheappellatejurisdictiontoaclassofcases，embracingtheparticularsuit，withoutanyreferencetothepoint，whowereparties，therethesamereasoningwouldnotapply。Sec。1716。Thenextinquiryis，whethertheeleventhamendmenttotheconstitutionhaseffectedanychangeofthejurisdiction，thusconfidedtothe，judicialpoweroftheUnitedStates。Andhereagainthemostsatisfactoryanswer，whichcanbegiven，willbefoundinthelanguageofthesameopinion。