Sec，1758。TheFederalistmettheobjection，pressedwithmuchearnestnessandzeal，inthefollowingmanner：\"Theproprietyofthisappellatejurisdictionhasbeenscarcelycalledinquestioninregardtomattersoflaw；buttheclamourshavebeenloudagainstit，asappliedtomattersoffact。Somewellintentionedmeninthisstate，derivingtheirnotionsfromthelanguageandforms，whichobtaininourcourts，havebeeninducedtoconsiderit，asanimpliedsupersedureofthetrialbyjury，infavourofthecivillawmodeoftrial，whichprevailsinourcourtsofadmiralty，probates，andchancery。Atechnicalsensehasbeenaffixedtotheterm’appellate，’
which，inourlawparlance，iscommonlyusedinreferencetoappealsinthecourseofthecivillaw。But，ifIamnotmisinformed，thesamemeaningwouldnotbegiventoitinanypartofNewEngland。There，anappealfromonejurytoanotherisfamiliar[*3：630]bothinlanguageandpractice，andisevenamatterofcourse，untiltherehavebeentwoverdictsononeside。Theword’appellate，’therefore，willnotbeunderstoodinthesamesenseinNewEngland，asinNewYork，whichshowstheimproprietyofatechnicalinterpretation，derivedfromthejurisprudenceofaparticularstate。Theexpression，takenintheabstract，denotesnothingmore，thanthepowerofonetribunaltoreviewtheproceedingsofanother，eitherastothelaw，orfact，orboth。Themodeofdoingitmaydependonancientcustom，orlegislativeprovision；inanewgovernmentitmustdependonthelatter，andmaybewith，orwithout，theaidofajury，asmaybejudgedadvisable。If，therefore，thereexaminationofafact，oncedeterminedbyajury，shouldinanycasebeadmittedundertheproposedconstitution，itmaybesoregulated，astobedonebyasecondjury，eitherbyremandingthecausetothecourtbelowforasecondtrialofthefact，orbydirectinganissueimmediatelyoutoftheSupremeCourt。
Sec。1759。\"Butitdoesnotfollow，thatthereexaminationofafact，onceascertainedbyajury，willbepermittedintheSupremeCourt。Whymayitnotbesaid，withthestrictestpropriety，whenawritoferrorisbroughtfromaninferiortoasuperiorcourtoflawinthisstate，thatthelatterhasjurisdictionofthefact，aswellasthelaw？Itistrue，itcannotinstituteanewinquiryconcerningthefact，butittakescognizanceofit，asitappearsupontherecord，andpronouncesthelawarisinguponit。Thisisjurisdictionofbothfactandlaw；norisitevenpossibletoseparatethem。Thoughthecommonlawcourtsofthisstateascertaindisputedfactsbyajury，yettheyunquestionablyhavejurisdictionofbothfactandlaw；andaccordingly，[*3：631]whentheformerisagreedinthepleadings，theyhavenorecoursetoajury，butproceedatoncetojudgment。Icontend，therefore，onthisground，thattheexpressions，’appellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，’donotnecessarilyimplyareexaminationintheSupremeCourtoffactsdecidedbyjuriesintheinferiorcourts。
Sec。1760。\"Thefollowingtrainofideasmaywellbeimaginedtohaveinfluencedtheconvention，inrelationtothisparticularprovision。TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，itmayhavebeenargued，will。
extendtocausesdeterminableindifferentmodes，someinthecourseofthecommonlaw，othersinthecourseofthecivillaw。Intheformer，therevisionofthelawonlywillbe，generallyspeaking，theproperprovinceoftheSupremeCourt；inthelatter，thereexaminationofthefactisagreeabletousage；andinsomecases，ofwhichprizecausesareanexample，mightbeessentialtothepreservationofthepublicpeace。Itisthereforenecessary，thattheappellatejurisdictionshould，incertaincases，extendinthebroadestsensetomattersoffact。Itwillnotanswertomakeanexpressexceptionofcases，whichshallhavebeenoriginallytriedbyajury，becauseinthecourtsofsomeofthestatesallcausesaretriedinthismode；
andsuchanexceptionwouldprecludetherevisionofmattersoffact，aswellwhereitmightbeproper，aswhereitmightbeimproper。Toavoidallinconveniences，itwillbesafesttodeclaregenerally，thattheSupremeCourtshallpossessappellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，andthatthisjurisdictionshallbesubjecttosuchexceptionsandregulations，asthenationallegislaturemayprescribe。Thiswillenablethegovernmenttomodifyitinsuchamanner，aswillbestanswertheendsofpublicjusticeandsecurity。
[*3：632]Sec。1761。\"Thisviewofthematter，atanyrate，putsitoutofalldoubt，thatthesupposedabolitionofthetrialbyjury，bytheoperationofthisprovision，isfallaciousanduntrue。ThelegislatureoftheUnitedStateswouldcertainlyhavefullpowertoprovide，thatinappealstotheSupremeCourtthereshouldbenoreexaminationoffacts，wheretheyhadbeentriedintheoriginalcausesbyjuries。Thiswouldcertainlybeanauthorizedexception；butif，forthereasonalreadyintimated，itshouldbethoughttooextensive，itmightbequalifiedwithalimitationtosuchcausesonly，asaredeterminableatcommonlawinthatmodeoftrial。\"
Sec。1762。Theseviews，howeverreasonabletheymayseemtoconsiderateminds，didnotwhollysatisfythepopularopinion；andastheobjectionhadavastinfluenceuponpublicopinion，andamendmentswereproposedbyvariousstateconventionsonthissubject，congressatitsfirstsession，undertheguidanceofthefriendsoftheconstitution，proposedanamendment，whichwasratifiedbythepeople，andisnowincorporatedintotheconstitution。
Itisinthesewords。\"Insuitsatcommonlaw，wherethevalueincontroversyshallexceedtwentydollars，therightofatrialbyjuryshallbepreserved。
AndnofacttriedbyajuryshallbeotherwisereexaminedinanycourtoftheUnitedStates，thanaccordingtotherulesofthecommonlaw。\"Thisamendmentcompletelystruckdowntheobjection；andhassecuredtherightofatrialbyjury，incivilcases，inthefullestlatitudeofthecommonlaw。Liketheotheramendments，proposedbythesamecongress，itwascoldlyreceivedbytheenemiesofthe[*3：633]constitution，andwaseitherdisapprovedbythem，ordrewfromthemareluctantacquiescence。Itweakenedtheoppositionbytakingawayoneofthestrongestpointsofattackupontheconstitution。
Stillitisamostimportantandvaluableamendment；andplacesuponthehighgroundofconstitutionalrighttheinestimableprivilegeofatrialbyjuryincivilcases，aprivilegescarcelyinferiortothatincriminalcases，whichisconcededbyalltobeessentialtopoliticalandcivilliberty。**Itisduetotheexcellentstatesmen，whoframedtheconstitution，togivetheirreasonsfortheomissionofanyprovisionintheconstitution，securingthetrialbyjuryincivilcases。Theywerenotinsensibletoitsvalue；butthediversityoftheinstitutionsofdifferentstatesonthissubjectcompelledthemtoacquiesceinleavingitentirelytothesounddiscretionofcongress。TheFederalist，No。83，hasgivenanelaboratepapertothesubject，whichistranscribedatlarge，asamonumentofadmirablereasoningandexaltedpatriotism。
\"Theobjectiontotheplanoftheconvention，whichhasmetwithmostsuccessinthisstate，isrelativetothewantofaconstitutionalprovisionforthetrialbyjuryincivilcases。Thedisingenuousform，inwhichthisobjectionisusuallystated，hasbeenrepeatedlyadvertedtoandexposed；
butcontinuestobepursuedinalltheconversationsandwritingsoftheopponentsoftheplan。Themeresilenceoftheconstitutioninregardtocivilcauses，isrepresented，asanabolitionofthetrial。byjury；andthedeclamations，towhichithasaffordedapretext，areartfullycalculatedtoinduceapersuasion，thatthispretendedabolitioniscompleteand。
universal；extendingnotonlytoeveryspeciesofcivil，buteventocriminalcauses。Toarguewithrespecttothelatter，wouldbeasvainandfruitless，astoattempttodemonstrateanyofthosepropositions，which，bytheirowninternalevidence，forceconviction，whenexpressedinlanguageadaptedtoconveytheirmeaning。
\"Withregardtocivilcauses，subtletiesalmosttoocontemptibleforrefutationhavebeenemployedtocountenancethesurmise，thatathing，whichisonlynotprovidedfor，isentirelyabolishedEverymanofdiscernmentmustatonceperceivethewidedifferencebetweensilenceandabolition。
But，astheinventorsofthisfallacyhaveattemptedtosupportitbycertainlegalmaximsofinterpretation，whichtheyhavepervertedfromtheirtruemeaning，itmaynotbewhollyuselesstoexplorethegroundtheyhavetaken。
\"Themaxims，onwhichtheyrely，areofthisnature：’A[*3：634]specificationofparticularsisanexclusionofgenerals；’or，’Theexpressionofonethingistheexclusionofanother。’Hence，saythey，astheconstitutionhasestablishedthetrialbyjuryincriminalcases，andissilentinrespecttocivil，thissilenceisanimpliedprohibitionoftrialbyjury，inregardtothelatter。
\"Therulesoflegalinterpretationarerulesofcommonsense，adoptedbythecourtsintheconstructionofthelaws。Thetruetest，therefore，ofajustapplicationofthem，isitsconformitytothesource，fromwhichtheyarederived。Thisbeingthecase，letmeask，ifitisconsistentwithcommonsensetosuppose，thataprovisionobligingthelegislativepowertocommitthetrialofcriminalcausestojuries，isaprivationofitsrighttoauthorize，orpermitthatmodeoftrialinothercases？
Isitnaturaltosuppose，thatacommandtodoonethingisaprohibitiontothedoingofanother，whichtherewasapreviouspowertodo，andwhichisnotincompatiblewiththethingcommandedtobedone？Ifsuchasuppositionwouldbeunnaturalandunreasonable，itcannotberationaltomaintain，thataninjunctionofthetrialbyjury，incertaincases，isaninterdictionofitinothers。
\"Apowertoconstitutecourtsisapowertoprescribethemodeoftrial；
andconsequently，ifnothingwassaidintheconstitutiononthesubjectofjuries，thelegislaturewouldbeatliberty，eithertoadoptthatinstitution，ortoletitalone。Thisdiscretion，inregardtocriminalcauses，isabridgedbyanexpressinjunction；butitisleftatlargeinrelationtocivilcauses，fortheveryreason，thatthereisatotalsilenceonthesubject。
Thespecificationofanobligationtotryallcriminalcausesinaparticularmode，excludesindeedtheobligationofemployingthesamemodeincivilcauses，butdoesnotabridgethepowerofthelegislaturetoappointthatmode，ifitshouldbethoughtproper。Thepretence，therefore，thatthenationallegislaturewouldnotbeatlibertytosubmitallthecivilcausesoffederalcognizancetothedeterminationofjuries，isapretencedestituteofallfoundation。
\"Fromtheseobservationsthisconclusionresults，thatthetrialbyjuryincivilcaseswouldnotbeabolished；andthattheuseattemptedtobemadeofthemaxims，whichhavebeenquoted，iscontrarytoreason，andthereforeinadmissible。Evenifthesemaximshadaprecisetechnicalsense，correspondingwiththeideasofthose，whoemploythemuponthepresentoccasion，which，however，isnotthecase，theywouldstillbeinapplicabletoaconstitutionofgovernment。Inrelationtosuchasubject，thenaturalandobvioussenseofitsprovisions，apartfromanytechnicalrules，isthetruecriterionofconstruction。
[*3：635]\"Havingnowseen，thatthemaximsrelieduponwillnotbeartheusemadeofthem，letusendeavourtoascertaintheirproperapplication。
Thiswillbebestdonebyexamples。Theplanoftheconventiondeclares，thatthepowerofcongress，or，inotherwords，ofthenationallegislature，shallextendtocertainenumeratedcases。Thisspecificationofparticularsevidentlyexcludesallpretensiontoagenerallegislativeauthority；becauseanaffirmativegrantofspecialpowerswouldbeabsurd，aswellasuseless，ifageneralauthoritywasintended。
\"Inlikemanner，theauthorityofthefederaljudicaturesisdeclaredbytheconstitutiontocomprehendcertaincasesparticularlyspecified。
Theexpressionofthosecasesmarksthepreciselimitsbeyondwhichthefederalcourtscannotextendtheirjurisdiction；becausetheobjectsoftheircognizancebeingenumerated，thespecificationwouldbenugatory，ifitdidnotexcludeallideasofmoreextensiveauthority。
\"Theseexamplesaresufficienttoelucidatethemaxims，whichhavebeenmentioned，andtodesignatethemanner，inwhichtheyshouldbeused。
\"Fromwhathasbeensaid，itmustappearunquestionablytrue，thattrialbyjuryisinnocaseabolishedbytheproposedconstitution；anditisequallytrue，thatinthosecontroversiesbetweenindividuals，inwhichthegreatbodyofthepeoplearelikelytobeinterested，thatinstitutionwillremainpreciselyinthesituation，inwhichitisplacedbythegrateconstitutions。Thefoundationofthisassertionis，thatthenationaljudiciarywillhavenocognizanceofthem，andofcoursetheywillremaindeterminable，asheretofore，bythestatecourtsonly，andinthemanner，whichthestateconstitutionsandlawsprescribe。Alllandcauses，exceptwhereclaimsunderthegrantsofdifferentstatencomeintoquestion，andallothercontroversiesbetweenthecitizensofthesamestate，unlesswheretheydependuponpositiveviolationsofthearticlesofunion，byactsofthestatelegislatures，willbelongexclusivelytothejurisdictionofthestatetribunals。Addtothis，thatadmiraltycauses，andalmostallthose，whichareofequityjurisdiction，aredeterminableunderourowngovernment，withouttheinterventionofajury；andtheinferencefromthewholewillbe，thatthisinstitution，asitexistswithusatpresent，cannotpossiblybeaffected，toanygreatextent，bytheproposedalterationinoursystemofgovernment。
\"Thefriendsandadversariesoftheplanoftheconvention，iftheyagreeinnothingelse，concuratleastinthevaluetheysetuponthetrialbyjury；or，ifthereisanydifferencebetweenthem，itconsistsinthis：
theformerregardit，asavaluablesafeguardtoliberty；thelatter[*3：636]
representit，astheverypalladiumoffreegovernment。Formyownpart，themoretheoperationoftheinstitutionhasfallenundermyobservation，themorereasonIhavediscoveredforholdingitinhighestimation；anditwouldbealtogethersuperfluoustoexamine，towhatextentitdeservestobeesteemeduseful，oressentialinarepresentativerepublic，orhowmuchmoremerititmaybeentitledto，asadefenceagainsttheoppressionsofanhereditarymonarch，thanasabarriertothetyrannyofpopularmagistratesinapopulargovernment。Discussionsofthiskindwouldbemorecurious，thanbeneficial，asallaresatisfiedoftheutilityoftheinstitution，andofitsfriendlyaspecttoliberty。ButImustacknowledge，thatIcannotreadilydiscerntheinseparableconnectionbetweentheexistenceofliberty，andthetrialbyjuryincivileasel。Arbitraryimpeachments，arbitrarymethodsofprosecutingpretendedoffences，arbitrarypunishmentsuponarbitraryconvictions，haveeverappearedtomethegreatenginesofjudicialdespotism；
andallthesehaverelationtocriminalproceedings。Thetrialbyjuryincriminalcases，aidedbythehabeascorpusact，seemsthereforetobealoneconcernedinthequestion。Andbothoftheseareprovidedfor，inthemostamplemanner，intheplanoftheconvention。
\"Ithasbeenobserved，thattrialbyjuryisasafeguardagainstanoppressiveexerciseofthepoweroftaxation。Thisobservationdeservestobecanvassed。
\"Itisevident，thatitcanhavenoinfluenceuponthelegislature，inregardtotheamountofthetaxestobelaid，totheobjects，uponwhichtheyeretobeimposed，ortotherule，bywhich’theyaretobeapportioned。
Ifitcanhaveanyinfluence，therefore，itmustbeuponthemodeofcollection，andtheconductoftheofficersentrustedwiththeexecutionoftherevenuelaws。
\"Astothemodeofcollectioninthisstate。underourownconstitution，thetrialbyjuryisinmustcasesoutofuse。Thetaxesareusuallyleviedbythemoresummaryproceedingofdistressandsale，asincasesofrent。
Anditisacknowledgedonallhands，thatthisisessentialtotheefficacyoftherevenuelaws。Thedilatorycourseofatrialatlawtorecoverthetaxesimposedonindividuals，wouldneithersuittheexigenciesorthepublic，norpromotetheconvenienceofthecitizens。Itwouldoftenoccasionanaccumulationofcostsmoreburdensome，thantheoriginalsumofthetaxtobelevied。
\"And，astotheconductoftheofficersoftherevenue，theprovisioninfavouroftrialbyjuryincriminalcases，willaffordthedesiredsecurity。
Wilfulabusesofapublicauthority，totheoppressionofthesubject，andeveryspeciesofofficialextortion，areoffencesagainstthe[*3：637]
government；forwhichthepersons，whocommitthem，maybeindictedandpunishedaccordingtothecircumstanceofthecase。
\"Theexcellenceofthetrialbyjuryincivilcasesappearstodependoncircumstances，foreigntothepreservationofliberty。Thestrongestargumentinitsfavouris，thatitisasecurityagainstcorruption。Asthereisalwaysmoretime，andbetteropportunity，totamperwithastandingbodyofmagistrates，thanwithajurysummonedfortheoccasion，thereisroomtosuppose，thatacorruptinfluencewouldmoreeasily。finditswaytotheformer，thantothelatter。Theforceofthisconsiderationis，however，diminishedbyothers。Thesheriff，whoisthesummonerofordinaryjuries，andtheclerksofcourts，whohavethenominationofspecialjuries，arethemselvesstandingofficers，and，actingindividually，maybesupposedmoreaccessibletothetouchofcorruption，thanthejudges，whoareacollectivebody。Itisnotdifficulttosee，thatitwouldbeinthepowerofthoseofficerstoselectjurors，whowouldservethepurposeoftheparty，aswellasacorruptedbench。Inthenextplace，itmayfairlybesupposed，thattherewouldbelessdifficultyingainingsomeofthejurorspromiscuouslytakenfromthepublicmass，thaningainingmen，whohadbeenchosenbythegovernmentfortheirprobityandgoodcharacter。
Butmakingeverydeductionfortheseconsiderations，thetrialbyjurymuststillbeavaluablecheckuponcorruption。Itgreatlymultipliestheimpedimentstoitssuccess。Asmattersnowstand，itwouldbenecessarytocorruptbothcourtandjury；forwherethejuryhavegoneevidentlywrong，thecourtwillgenerallygrantanewtrial，anditwouldbeinmostcasesoflittleusetopracticeuponthejury，unlessthecourtcouldbelikewisegained。Here，then，isadoublesecurity；anditwillreadilybeperceived，thatthiscomplicatedagencytendstopreservethepurityofbothinstitutions。Byincreasingtheobstaclestosuccess，itdiscouragesattemptstoseducetheintegrityofeither。Thetemptationstoprostitution，whichthejudgesmighthavetosurmount，mustcertainlybemuchfewer，whilethecooperationofajuryisnecessary，thantheymightbe，iftheyhadthemselvestheexclusivedeterminationofallcauses。
\"Notwithstanding，therefore，thedoubtsIhaveexpressed，astotheessentialityoftrialbyjuryincivilsuitstoliberty，Iadmit，thatitisinmostcases，underproperregulations，anexcellentmethodofdeterminingquestionsofproperty；andthatonthisaccountaloneitwouldbeentitledtoaconstitutionalprovisioninitsfavour，ifitwerepossibletofixwithaccuracythelimits，withinwhichitoughttobecomprehended。This，however，isinitsownnatureanaffairofmuchdifficulty；and[*3：638]
men，notblindedbyenthusiasm，mustbesensible，thatinafederalgovernment，whichisacompositionofsocieties，whoseideasandinstitutionsinrelationtothemattermateriallyvaryfromeachother，thedifficultymustbenotalittleaugmented。Formyownpart，ateverynearviewItakeofthesubjectIbecomemoreconvincedoftherealityoftheobstacles，whichweareauthoritativelyinformed，preventedtheinsertionofaprovisiononthisheadintheplanoftheconvention。
\"Thegreatdifferencebetweenthelimitsofthejurytrial，indifferentstates，isnotgenerallyunderstood。And，asitmusthaveconsiderableinfluenceonthesentence，weoughttopassupontheomissioncomplainedof，inregardtothispoint，anexplanationofitisnecessary。Inthisstate，ourjudicialestablishmentsresemblemorenearly，thaninanyother，thoseofGreatBritain。Wehavecourtsofcommonlaw，courtsofprobates，analogousincertainmatterstothespiritualcourtsinEngland，acourtofadmiralty，andacourtofchancery。Inthecourtsofcommonlawonlythetrialbyjuryprevails，andthiswithsomeexceptions。Inalltheothers，asinglejudgepresides，andproceedsingeneral，eitheraccordingtothecourseofthecanon，orcivillaw，withouttheaidofajury。InNewJerseythereisacourtofchancery，whichproceedslikeours，butneithercourtsofadmiralty，norofprobates，inthesense；inwhichtheselastareestablishedwithus。Inthatstate，thecourtsofcommonlawhavethecognizanceofthosecauses，whichwithusaredeterminableinthecourtsofadmiraltyandofprobates，andofcoursethejurytrialismoreextensiveinNewJersey，thaninNewYork。InPennsylvaniathisisperhapsstillmorethecase；forthereisnocourtofchanceryinthatstate，anditscommonlawcourtshaveequityjurisdiction。Ithasacourtofadmiralty，butnoneofprobates，atleastontheplanofours。DelawarehasintheserespectsimitatedPennsylvania。MarylandapproachesmorenearlytoNewYork，asdoesalsoVirginia，exceptthatthelatterhasapluralityofchancellors。
NorthCarolinabearsmostaffinitytoPennsylvania；SouthCarolinatoVirginia。
Ibelieve，however，thatinsomeofthosestates，whichhavedistinctcourtsofadmiralty，thecausesdependinginthemaretriablebyjuries。InGeorgiatherearenonebutcommonlawcourts，andartappealofcourseliesfromtheverdictofonejurytoanother，whichiscalledaspecialjury，andforwhichaparticularmodeofappointmentismarkedout。InConnecticuttheyhavenodistinctcourts，eitherofchancery，orofadmiralty，andtheircourtsofprobateshavenojurisdictionofcauses。Theircommonlawcourtshaveadmiralty，and，toacertainextent，equityjurisdiction。Incasesofimportance，their[*3：639]generalassemblyistheonlycourtofchancery。InConnecticut，therefore，thetrialbyjuryextendsinpracticefurther，thaninanyotherstateyetmentioned。RhodeIslandis，Ibelieve，inthisparticular，prettymuchinthesituationofConnecticut。MassachusettsandNewHampshire，inregardtotheblendingoflaw，equity，andadmiraltyjurisdictions，areinasimilarpredicament。Inthefoureasternstates，thetrialbyjurynotonlystandsuponabroaderfoundation，thanintheotherstates，butitisattendedwithapeculiarityunknown，initsFullextent，toanyofthem。ThereisanappealofcourseFromonejurytoanother，tilltherehavebeentwoverdictsoutofthreeononeside。
\"Fromthissketchitappears，thatthereisamaterialdiversity，uwellinthemodification，uintheextentoftheinstitutionof’trialbyjuryincivilcases，intheseveralstates；andfromthisfact，theseobviousreflectionsflow；first，thatnogeneralrulecouldhavebeenfixeduponbytheconvention，whichwouldhavecorrespondedwiththecircumstancesofallthestates；and，secondly，thatmore，oratleastumuchmighthavebeenhazarded，bytakingthesystemofanyonestateForastandard，asbyomittingaprovisionaltogether，andleavingthematter。ashasbeendone，tolegislativeregulation。
\"Thepropositions，whichhavebeenmadeforsupplyingtheomission，haveratherservedtoillustrate，thantoobviatethedifficultyofthething。TheminorityofPennsylvaniahaveproposedthismodeofexpressionforthepurpose，’Trialbyjuryshallbeasheretofore；’andthis，Imaintain，wouldbeinapplicableandindeterminate。TheUnitedStates，intheircollectivecapacity，aretheobject，towhichallgeneralprovisionsintheconstitutionmustbeunderstoodtorefer。Now，itisevident，thatthoughtrialbyjury，withvariouslimitations，isknownineachstateindividually，yetintheUnitedStates，assuch，itis，strictlyspeaking，unknown；becausethepresentfederal。governmenthasnojudiciarypowerwhatever；endconsequentlythereisnoantecedentestablishment，towhichtheterm’heretofore’couldproperlyrelate。Itwould，therefore，bedestituteofprecisemeaning，andinoperativefromitsuncertainty。
\"As，ontheonehand，theformoftheprovisionwouldnotfulfiltheintentofitsproposers；so，ontheether，ifIapprehendthatintentrightly，itwouldbeinitselfinexpedient。Ipresumeittobe，thatcausesintilefederalcourtsshouldbetriedbyjury，ifinthestatewherethecourtssat，thatmodeoftrialwouldobtaininasimilarcaseinthestatecourts；
thatistosay，admiraltycausesshouldbetriedinConnecticutbyajury，inNewYorkwithoutone。Thecapriciousoperationofso[*3：640]dissimilaramethodoftrialinthesamecases，underthesamegovernment，isofitselfsufficienttoindisposeeverywellregulatedjudgmenttowardsit。Whetherthecauseshouldbetriedwith，orwithoutajury，woulddepend，inagreatnumberofcases，ontheaccidentalsituationofthecourtandparties。
\"Butthisisnot，inmyestimation，thegreatestobjection。Ifeeladeepanddeliberateconviction，thattherearemanycases，inwhichthetrialbyjuryisanineligibleone。Ithinkitsoparticularlyinsuits，whichconcernthepublicpeacewithforeignnations；thatis，inmostcases，wherethequestionturnswhollyonthelawsofnations。Ofthisnature，amongothers，areallprizecauses。Juriescannotbesupposedcompetenttoinvestigations，thatrequirenthoroughknowledgeofthelawsandusagesofnations；andtheywillsometimesbeundertheinfluenceofimpressions，whichwillnotsufferthemtopaysufficientregardtothoseconsiderationsofpublicpolicy，whichoughttoguidetheirinquiries。Therewouldofcoursebealwaysdanger，thattherightsofothernationsmightbeinfringedbytheirdecisions，soastoaffordoccasionsofreprisalandwar。Thoughthetrueprovinceofjuriesbetodeterminemattersoffact，yet，inmostcases，legalconsequencesarecomplicatedwithfactinsuchamanner，astorenderaseparationimpracticable。
\"Itwilladdgreatweighttothisremark，inrelationtoprizecauses，tomention，thatthemethodofdeterminingthemhasbeenthoughtworthyofparticularregulation，invarioustreatiesbetweendifferentpowersofEurope，andthat，pursuanttosuchtreaties，theyarcdeterminableinGreatBritain，inthelastresort，beforethekinghimselfinhisprivycouncil，wherethelect，aswellasthelaw，undergoesareexamination。
Thisalonedemonstratestheimpolicyofinsertingafundamentalprovisionintheconstitution，whichwouldmakethestatesystemsastandardforthenationalgovernmentinthearticleunderconsideration，andthedangerofencumberingthegovernmentwithanyconstitutionalprovisions，theproprietyofwhichisnotindisputable。
\"Myconvictionsareequallystrong，that，greatadvantagesresultfromtheseparationoftheequityfromthelawjurisdiction；andthatthecauses，whichbelongtotheformer，wouldbeimproperlycommittedtojuries。Thegreatandprimaryuseofacourtofequityistogivereliefinextraordinarycases，whichareexceptionstogeneralrules。Tounitethejurisdictionofsuchcaseswiththeordinaryjurisdiction，musthaveatendencytounsettlethegeneralrules，andtosubjecteverycasethatarisestoaspecialdetermination；
whileaseparationbetweenthe[*3：641]jurisdictionshasthecontraryeffectofrenderingoneasentinelovertheother，andofkeepingeachwithintheexpedientlimits。Besidesthis，thecircumstances，thatconstitutecasesproperforcourtsofequity，areinmanyinstancessoniceandintricate，thattheyareincompatiblewiththegeniusoftrialsbyjury。Theyrequireoftensuchlongandcriticalinvestigation，aswouldbeimpracticabletomencalledoccasionallyfromtheiroccupations，andobligedtodecide，beforetheywerepermittedtoreturntothem。Thesimplicityandexpedition，whichformthedistinguishingcharactersofthismodeoftrial，require，thatthemattertobedecidedshouldbereducedtosomesingleandobviouspoint；whilethelitigations，usualinchancery，frequentlycomprehendlongtrainofminuteandindependentparticulars。
\"Itistrue，thattheseparationoftheequityfromthelegaljurisdictionispeculiartotheEnglishsystemofjurisprudence；themodel，whichhasbeenfollowedinseveralofthestates。Butitisequallytrue，thatthetrialbyjuryhasbeenunknownineveryinstance，inwhichtheyhavebeenunited。Andtheseparationisessentialtothepreservationofthatinstitutioninitspristinepurity。Thenatureofacourtofequitywillreadilypermittheextensionofitsjurisdictiontomattersoflaw；butitisnotalittletobesuspected，thattheattempttoextendthejurisdictionofthecourtsoflawtomattersofequitywillnotonlybeunproductiveoftheadvantages，whichmaybederivedfromcourtsofchanceryontheplan，uponwhichtheyareestablishedinthisstate；butwilltendgraduallytochangethenatureofthecourtsoflaw，andtounderminethetrialbyjury，byintroducingquestionstoocomplicatedforadecisioninthatmode。
\"Theseappeartobeconclusivereasonsagainstincorporatingthesystemsofallthestates，intheformationofthenationaljudiciary，accordingtowhatmaybeconjecturedtohavebeentheintentofthePennsylvaniaminority。Letusnowexamine，howfarthepropositionofMassachusettsiscalculatedtoremedythesupposeddefect。
\"Itisinthisform：’Incivilactionsbetweencitizensofdifferentstates，everyissueoffact，arisinginactionsatcommonlaw，maybetriedbyajury，iftheparties，oreitherofthem，requestit。’
\"This，atbest，isapropositionconfinedtoonedescriptionofceases；
andtheinferenceisfair，eitherthattheMassachusettsconventionconsideredthat，astheonlyclassoffederalcauses，inwhichthetrialbyjurywouldbeproper；or，that，ifdesirousofamoreextensiveprovision，theyfounditimpracticabletodeviseone，whichwouldproperlyanswertheend。Ifthefirst，theomissionofaregulation，respectingsopartialanobject，canneverbeconsidered。asamaterialimperfectioninthe[*3：642]system。
Ifthelast，itaffordsastrongcorroborationoftheextremedifficultyofthething。
\"Butthisisnotall。Ifweadverttotheobservationsalreadymaderespectingthecourts，thatsubsistintheseveralstatesoftheUnionsandthedifferentpowersexercisedbythemitwillappear，thatthereerenoexpressionsmorevagueandindeterminate，thanthosewhichhavebeenemployedtocharacterizethatspeciesofcauses，whichitisintendedshallbeentitledtoatrialbyjury。Inthisstate，theboundariesbetweenactionsatcommonlaw，andactionsofequitablejurisdiction，areascertainedinconformitytotherules，whichprevailinEnglanduponthatsubject。Inmanyoftheotherstates，theboundariesarelessprecise。Insomeofthemeverycauseistobetriedinacourtofcommonlaw；anduponthatfoundationeveryactionmaybeconsidered，asanactionatcommonlaw，tobedeterminedbyajury，iftheparties，oreitherofthem，chooseit。Hence，thesameirregularityandconfusionwouldbeintroducedbyacompliancewiththisproposition，thatIhavealreadynoticed，asresultingfromtheregulationproposedbythePennsylvaniaminority。Inonestateacausewouldreceiveitsdeterminationfromajury，iftheparties，oreitherofthem，requestedit；butinanotherstate，acauseexactlysimilartotheothermustbedecidedwithouttheinterventionofajury，becausethestatetribunalsvaried，astocommonlawjurisdiction。
\"Itisobvious，therefore，thattheMassachusettspropositioncannotoperate，asageneralregulation，untilsomeuniformplan，withrespecttothelimitsofcommonlawandequitablejurisdictions，shallbeadoptedbythedifferentstates。Todeviseaplanofthatkindisataskarduousinitself，andwhichitwouldrequiremuchtimeandreflectiontomature。
Itwouldbeextremelydifficult，ifnotimpossible，tosuggestanygeneralregulation，thatwould，beacceptabletoallthestatesintheUnion，orthatwouldperfectlyquadratewiththeseveralstateinstitutions。
\"Itmaybeasked，whycouldnotareferencehavebeenmadetotheconstitutionofthisstate，takingthat，whichisallowedbymetobeagoodone，asastandardfortheUnitedStates？Ianswer，thatitisnotveryprobabletheotherstatesshouldentertainthesameopinionofourinstitutions，whichwedoourselves。Itisnaturaltosuppose，thattheyaremoreattachedtotheirown，andthateachwouldstrugglefortimpreference。Iftheplanoftakingonestate，asamodelforthewhole，hadbeenthoughtofintheconvention，itistobepresumed，thattheadoptionofitinthatbodywouldhavebeenrendereddifficultbythepredilectionofeachrepresentationinfavourofitsowngovernment；anditmustbeuncertain，whichofthestateswouldhavebeentaken，[*3：643]asthemodel。Ithasbeenshown，thatmanyofthemwouldbeimproperones。AndIleaveittoconjecture，whether，underallcircumstances，itismostlikely，thatNewYork，orsomeotherstate，wouldhavebeenpreferred。Butadmit，thatajudiciousselectioncouldhavebeeneffectedintheconvention，stilltherewouldhavebeengreatdangerofjealousyanddisgustintheotherstates，atthepartiality，whichhadbeenshowntotheinstitutionsofone。Theenemiesoftheplanwouldhavebeenfurnishedwithafinepretextforraisingahostoflocalprejudicesagainstit，whichperhapsmighthavehazarded，innoinconsiderabledegree，itsfinalestablishment。
\"Toavoidtileembarrassmentsofadefinitionofthecases，whichthetrialbyjuryoughttoembrace，itissometimessuggestedbymenofenthusiastictempers，thataprovisionmighthavebeeninsertedforestablishingitinallcaseswhatsoever。Forthis，Ibelieve，noprecedentistobefoundinanymemberoftheUnion；andtheconsiderations，whichhavebeenstatedindiscussingthepropositionoftheminorityofPennsylvania，mustsatisfyeverysobermind，thattheestablishmentofthetrialbyjuryinalleaseswouldhavebeenanunpardonableerrorintheplan。
\"Inshort，themoreitisconsidered，themorearduouswillappearthetaskoffashioningaprovisioninsuchaform，asnottoexpresstoolittletoanswerthepurpose，ortoomuchtobeadvisable；orwhichmightnothaveopenedothersourcesofoppositiontothegreatandessentialobjectofintroducingafirmnationalgovernment。
\"Icannotbutpersuademyself，ontheotherhand，thatthedifferentlights，inwhichthesubjecthasbeenplacedinthecourseoftheseobservations，willgofartowardsremovingincandidmindstheapprehensionstheymayhaveentertainedonthepoint。Theyhavetendedtoshow，thatthesecurityoflibertyismateriallyconcernedonlyinthetrialbyjuryincriminalcases，whichisprovidedforinthemostamplemannerintileplanoftheconvention；that，eveninfarthegreatestproportionofcivilcases，those，inwhichthegreatbodyofthecommunityisinterested，thatmodeoftrialwillremaininfullforce，asestablishedinthestateconstitutions，untouchedandunaffectedbytheplanoftheconvention；thatitisinnocaseabolishedbythatplan；andthattherearegreat，ifnotinsurmountabledifficultiesinthewayofmakinganypreciseandproperprovisionforit，intheconstitutionfortheUnitedStates。
\"Theheatjudgesofthematterwillbetheleastanxiousforaconstitutionalestablishmentofthetrialbyjuryincivilcases，andwillbethemostreadytoadmit，thatthechanges，whicharecontinually[*3：644]happeningintheaffairsofsociety，mayrenderadifferentmodeofdeterminingquestionsofpropertypreferableinmanycases，inwhichthatmodeoftrialnowprevails。
Formyownpart，Iacknowledgemyselftobeconvinced，thateveninthisstateitmightbeadvantageouslyextendedtosomecases，towhichitdoesnotatpresentapply，andmightasadvantageouslybeabridgedinothers。
Itisconcededbyallreasonablemen，thatitoughtnottoobtaininallcases。Theexamplesofinnovations，whichcontractitsancientlimits，aswellinthesestates，asinGreatBritain，affordastrongpresumption，thatitsformerextenthasbeenfoundinconvenient；andgiveroomtosuppose，thatfutureexperiencemaydiscovertheproprietyandutilityofotherexceptions。Isuspectittobeimpossibleinthenatureofthethingtofixthesalutarypoint，atwhichtheoperationoftheinstitutionoughttostop；andthisiswithmeastrongargumentforleavingthemattertothediscretionofthelegislature。
\"ThisisnowclearlyunderstoodtobethecaseinGreatBritain，anditisequallysointhestateofConnecticut。Andyetitmaybesafelyaffirmed，thatmorenumerousencroachmentshavebeenmadeuponthetrialbyjuryinthisstatesincetherevolution，thoughprovidedforbyapositivearticleofourconstitution，thanhashappenedinthesametimeeitherinConnecticut，orGreatBritain。Itmaybeadded，thattheseencroachmentshavegenerallyoriginatedwiththemen，whoendeavourtopersuadethepeople，theyarethewarmestdefendersofpopularliberty，butwhohaverarelysufferedconstitutionalobstaclestoarresttheminafavouritecareer。
Thetruthis，thatthegeneralgeniusofagovernmentisall，thatcanbesubstantiallyrelieduponforpermanenteffects。Particularprovisions，thoughnotaltogetheruseless，havefarlessvirtueandefficacy，thanarecommonlyascribedtothem；andthewantofthemwillneverbewithmenofsounddiscernmentadecisiveobjectiontoanyplan，whichexhibitstheleadingcharactersofagoodgovernment。
\"Itcertainlysoundsnotalittleharshandextraordinarytoaffirm，thatthereisnosecurityforlibertyinaconstitution，whichexpresslyestablishesatrialbyjuryincriminalcases，becauseitdoesnotdoitincivilalso；whileitisanotoriousfact，thatConnecticut，whichhasbeenalwaysregarded，asthemostpopularstateintheUnion，canboastofnoconstitutionalprovisionforeither。\"TheFederalist，No。83。[*3：634]Sec。1763。UponaveryrecentoccasionthetrueinterpretationandextentofthisamendmentcamebeforetheSupremeCourtfordecision，inacasefrom[*3：635]Louisiana，wherethequestionwas，whethertheSupremeCourtcouldentertainamotionforanewtrial，andreexaminethefactstriedbyajury，thatbeing[*3：636]thepracticeunderthelocallaw，andtherebeinganactofcongress，authorizingthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesinLouisianatoadoptthelocalpractice，with[*3：637]certainlimitations。TheSupremeCourtheld，thatnoauthoritywasgivenbytheacttoreexaminethefacts；andifithadbeen，anopinionwasintimatedof[*3：638]themostseriousdoubtsofitsconstitutionality。Onthatoccasionthecourtsaid：\"ThetrialbyjuryisjustlydeartotheAmericanpeople。
Ithasalways[*3：639]beenanobjectofdeepinterestandsolicitude，andeveryencroachmentuponithasbeenwatchedwithgreatjealousy。Therighttosuchatrialis，itis[*3：640]believed，incorporatedinto，andsecuredineverystateconstitutionintheUnion；anditisfoundintheconstitutionofLouisiana。Oneofthestrongest[*3：641]objections，originallytakenagainsttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，wasthewantofanexpressprovisionsecuringtherightoftrialbyjuryincivilcases。As[*3：642]soonastheconstitutionWasadopted，thisrightwassecuredbytheseventhamendmentoftheconstitutionproposedbycongress；whichreceivedan[*3：643]assentofthepeoplesogeneral，astoestablishitsimportance，asafundamentalguaranteeoftherightsandlibertiesofthepeople。Thisamendment[*3：644]declares，that\"insuitsatcommonlaw，wherethevalueincontroversyshallexceedtwentydollars，therightoftrialbyjuryshallbepreserved；andnofact，oncetriedbyajury，shallbeotherwisereexaminedinanycourtoftheUnitedStates，thanaccordingtothe[*3：645]
rulesofthecommonlaw。\"
AtthistimetherewerenostatesintheUnion，thebasisofwhosejurisprudencewasnotessentiallythatofthecommonlawinitswidestmeaning；andprobablynostateswerecontemplated，inwhichitwouldnotexist。Thephrase，’commonlaw，’foundinthisclause，isusedincontradistinctiontoequity，andadmiralty，andmaritimejurisprudence。Theconstitutionhaddeclared，inthethirdarticle，’thatthejudicialpowershallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthisconstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStates，andtreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemadeundertheirauthority，’
etc。，and’toallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction。’Itiswellknown，thatincivilcauses，incourtsofequityandadmiralty，juriesdonotintervene；andthatcourtsofequityusethetrialbyjuryonlyinextraordinarycasestoinformtheconscienceofthecourt。When，therefore，wefind，thattheamendmentrequires，thattherightoftrialbyjuryshallbepreservedinsuitsatcommonlaw，thenaturalconclusionis，thatthisdistinctionwaspresenttothemindsoftheframersoftheamendment。Bycommonlawtheymeant，whattheconstitutiondenominatedinthethirdarticle’law；’notmerelysuits，whichthecommonlawrecognizedamongitsoldandsettledproceedings，butsuits，inwhichlegalrightsweretobeascertainedanddetermined，incontradistinctiontothose，inwhichequitablerightsalonewererecognized，andequitableremedieswereadministered；orinwhich，asintheadmiralty，amixtureofpubliclaw，andofmaritimelawandequity，wasoftenfoundinthesamesuit。Probablytherewerefew，ifany，statesintheUnion，inwhichsomenewlegalremediesdifferingfromtheoldcommonlawformswerenotinuse；butinwhich，however，the[*3：646]trialbyjuryintervened，andthegeneralregulationsinotherrespectswereaccordingtothecourseofthecommonlaw。Proceedingsincasesofpartition，andofforeignanddomesticattachment，mightbecited，asexamplesvariouslyadopted，andmodified。Inajustsense，theamendmentthenmaywellbeconstruedtoembraceallsuits，whicharenotofequityandadmiraltyjurisdiction，whatevermaybethepeculiarform，whichtheymayassumetosettlelegalrights。Andcongressseemtohaveactedwithreferencetothisexpositioninthejudiciaryactof1789，whichwascontemporaneouswiththeproposalofthisamendment；forintheninthsectionitisprovided，that’thetrialofissuesinfactinthedistrictcourtsinallcauses，exceptcivilcausesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，shallbebyjury；’andinthetwelfthsectionitisprovided，that’thetrialofissuesinfactinthecircuitcourtsshallinallsuits，exceptthoseofequity，andofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，bebyjury。’Andagain，inthethirteenthsection，itisprovided，that’thetrialofissuesinfactinthesupremecourt，inallactionsatlawagainstcitizensoftheUnitedStates，shallbebyjury。’
Sec。1764。\"Buttheotherclauseoftheamendmentisstillmoreimportant；
andwereadit，asasubstantialandindependentclause。’Nofacttriedbyajuryshallbeotherwisereexaminable，inanycourtoftheUnitedStates，thanaccordingtotherulesofthecommonlaw。’ThisisaprohibitiontothecourtsoftheUnitedStatestoreexamineanyfactstriedbyajuryinanyothermanner。Theonlymodes，knowntothecommonlaw，toreexaminesuchfacts，arethegrantingofanewtrialbythecourt，wheretheissuewastried，ortowhichtherecordwasproperlyreturnable；orthe[*3：647]
awardofavenirefaciasdenovebyanappellatecourt，forsomeerroroflaw，whichintervenedintheproceedings。Thejudiciaryactof1789，hasgiventoallthecourtsoftheUnitedStates’powertograntnewtrialsincases，wheretherehasbeenatrialbyjury，forreasons，forwhichnewtrialshaveusuallybeengrantedinthecourtsoflaw。’Andtheappellatejurisdictionhasalsobeenamplygivenbythesameactsec。22，24tothiscourt，toredresserrorsoflaw；andforsucherrorstoawardanewtrial’insuitsatlaw，whichhavebeentriedbyajury。
Sec。1765。\"Wasittheintentionofcongress，bythegenerallanguageoftheactof1824，toaltertheappellatejurisdictionofthiscourt，andtoconferonitthepowerofgrantinganewtrialbyareexaminationofthefactstriedbythejury？toenableit，aftertrialbyjury，todothatinrespecttothecourtsoftheUnitedStates，sittinginLouisiana，whichisdeniedtosuchcourts，sittinginalltheotherstatesintheUnion？Wethinknot。Nogeneralwords，purportingonlytoregulatethepracticeofaparticularcourt，toconformitsmodesofproceedingtothoseprescribedbythestatetoitsowncourts，ought，inourjudgment，toreceiveaninterpretation，whichwouldcreatesoimportantanalterationinthelawsoftheUnitedStates，securingthetrialbyjury。Especiallyoughtitnottoreceivesuchaninterpretation，whenthereisapowergiventotheinferiorcourtitselftopreventanydiscrepancybetweenthestatelaws，andthelawsoftheUnitedStates；sothatitwouldbelefttoitssolediscretiontosupersede，ortogiveconclusiveeffectintheappellatecourttotheverdictofthejury。
Sec。1766。\"If，indeed，theconstructioncontendedforatthebarweretobegiventotheactofcongress，we[*3：648]entertainthemostseriousdoubts，whetheritwouldnotbeunconstitutional。Nocourtought，unlessthetermsofanactrendereditunavoidable，togiveaconstructiontoit，whichshouldinvolveaviolation，howeverunintentional，oftheconstitution。
Thetermsofthepresentactmaywellbesatisfiedbylimitingitsoperationtomodesofpracticeandproceedinginthecourtbelow，withoutchangingtheeffectorconclusivenessoftheverdictofthejuryuponthefactslitigatedatthetrial。Noristhereanyinconveniencefromthisconstruction；
forthepartyhasstillhisremedy，bybillofexceptions，tobringthefactsinreviewbeforetheappellatecourt，lsofarasthosefactsbearuponanyquestionoflawarisingatthetrial；andiftherebeanymistakeofthefacts，thecourtbelowiscompetenttoredressit，bygrantinganewtrial。\"
Sec。1767。Theappellatejurisdictionistobe\"withsuchexceptions，andundersuchregulations，asthecongressshallprescribe。\"But，here，aquestionispresentedupontheconstructionoftheconstitution，whethertheappellatejurisdictionattachestotheSupremeCourt，subjecttobewithdrawnandmodifiedbycongress；or，whetheranactofcongressisnecessarytoconferthejurisdictionuponthecourt。Iftheformerbethetrueconstruction，thentheentireappellatejurisdiction，ifcongressshouldmakenoexceptionsorregulations，wouldattachpropriovigoretotheSupremeCourt。Ifthelatter，then，notwithstandingtheimperativelanguageoftheconstitution，theSupremeCourtislifeless，untilcongresshaveconferredpoweronit。
Andifcongressmayconferpower，theymayrepealit。Sothatthewholeefficiencyofthejudicialpowerisleftbytheconstitutionwhollyunprotectedandinert，ifcongressshallrefraintoact。Thereiscertainlyvery[*3：649]
stronggroundstomaintain，thatthelanguageoftheconstitutionmeanttoconfertheappellatejurisdictionabsolutelyontheSupremeCourt，independentofanyactionbycongress；andtorequirethisactiontodivestorregulateit。Thelanguage，astotheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，admitsofnodoubt。Itconfersitwithoutanyactionofcongress。Whyshouldnotthesamelanguage，astotheappellatejurisdiction，havethesameinterpretation？Itleavesthepowerofcongresscompletetomakeexceptionsandregulations；butitleavesnothingtotheirinaction。Thisconstructionwasassertedinargumentatanearlierperiod’oftheconstitution。Itwasatthattimedenied；anditwasheldbytheSupremeCourt，that，ifcongressshouldprovidenoruletoregulatetheproceedingsoftheSupremeCourt，itcouldnotexerciseanyappellatejurisdiction。Thatdoctrine，however，has，uponmorematuredeliberation，beensinceoverturned；andithasbeenassertedbytheSupremeCourt，that，ifthejudicialactof1789hadcreatedtheSupremeCourt，withoutdefining，orlimitingitsjurisdiction，itmusthavebeenconsidered，aspossessingallthejurisdiction，whichtheconstitutionassignstoit。ThelegislaturecouldhaveexercisedthepowerpossessedbyitofcreatingaSupremeCourt，asordainedbytheconstitution；and，inomittingtoexercisetherightofexceptingfromitsconstitutionalpowers，wouldhavenecessarilyleftthoseconstitutionalpowersundiminished。TheappellatepowersoftheSupremeCourtarenotgivenbythejudicialactof1789。Theyaregivenby[*3：650]theconstitution。
Buttheyarelimited，andregulatedbythatact，andotheractsonthesamesubject。Andwherearuleisprovided，allpersonswillagree，thatitcannotbedepartedfrom。
Sec。1768。Itshouldbeadded，that，whilethejurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesisalmostwhollyunderthecontroloftheregulatingpowerofcongress，therearecertainincidentalpowers，whicharesupposedtoattachtothem，incommonwithallothercourts，whendulyorganized，withoutanypositiveenactmentofthelegislature。Sucharethepowerofthecourtsovertheirownofficers，andthepowertoprotectthemandtheirmembersfrombeingdisturbedintheexerciseoftheirfunctions。
Sec。1769。Althoughthejudicialdepartmentundertheconstitutionwould，fromtheexposition，whichhasthusbeenmadeofitsgeneralpowersandfunctions，seemaboveallreasonableobjections，itwasassailedwithuncommonardourandpertinacityinthestateconventions，asdangeroustothelibertiesofthepeople，andtherightsofthestates；asunlimitedinitsextent，andundefinedinitsobjects；asinsomeportionsofitsjurisdictionwhollyunnecessary，andinothersvitallydefective。Inshort，theobjectionswereofthemostoppositecharacters；and，ifyieldedto，wouldhaveleftitwithoutashadowofpower，orefficiency。
[*3：651]Sec。1770。TheFederalisthasconcludeditsremarksonthejudicialdepartmentinthefollowingmanner：\"Theamountoftheobservationshithertomadeontheauthorityofthejudicialdepartmentisthis：Thatithasbeencarefullyrestrictedtothosecauses，whicharemanifestlyproperforthecognizanceofthenationaljudicature；that，inthepartitionofthisauthority，averysmallportionoforiginaljurisdictionhasbeenreservedtotheSupremeCourt，andtherestconsignedtothesubordinatetribunals；thattheSupremeCourtwillpossessanappellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，inallthecasesreferredtothem，butsubjecttoanyexceptionsandregulations，whichmaybethoughtadvisable；thatthisappellatejurisdictiondoes，innocase，abolishthetrialbyjury；
andthatanordinarydegreeofprudenceandintegrityinthenationalcouncils，willensureussolidadvantagesfromtheestablishmentoftheproposedjudiciary，withoutexposingustoanyoftheinconveniences，whichhavebeenpredictedfromthatsource。
Sec。1771。ThefunctionsofthejudgesofthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesarestrictlyandexclusivelyjudicial。Theycannot，therefore，becalledupontoadvisethepresidentinanyexecutivemeasures；ortogiveextrajudicialinterpretationsoflaw；ortoact，ascommissionersincasesofpensions，orotherlikeproceedings。
[*3：652]Sec。1772。Thenextclauseofthefirstsectionofthethirdarticleis：\"Thetrialofallcrimes，exceptincasesofimpeachment，shallbebyjury；andsuchtrialshallbeheldinthestate，wheresuchcrimesshallhavebeencommitted。Butwhennotcommittedwithinanystate，thetrialshallbeatsuchplaceorplaces，asthecongressmaybylawhavedirected。\"
Sec。1773。Itseemshardlynecessaryinthisplacetoexpatiateupontheantiquity，orimportanceofthetrialbyjuryincriminalcases。Itwasfromveryearlytimesinsistedonbyourancestorsintheparentcountry，asthegreatbulwarkoftheircivilandpoliticalliberties，andwatchedwithanunceasingjealousyandsolicitude。TherightconstitutesthefundamentalarticlesofMagnaCharta，inwhichitisdeclared，\"nullushomocapiatur，neeimprtsonetur，autexulet，autaliquomododestruatur，etc。；nisiperlegalejudiciumpariumsuorum，velperlegeraterrce；\"nomanshallbearrested，norimprisoned，norbanished，nordeprivedoflife，etc。butbythejudgmentofhispeers，orbythelawoftheland。Thejudgmentofhispeersherealludedto，andcommonlycalledinthequaintlanguageofformertimesatrialperpais，ortrialbythecountry，isthetrialbyajury，whoarecalledthepeersofthepartyaccused，beingofthelikeconditionandequalityinthestate。WhenourmoreimmediateancestorsremovedtoAmerica，theybroughtthisgreatprivilegewiththem，astheirbirth—rightandinheritance，asapartofthatadmirablecommonlaw，whichhadfencedround，andinterposedbarriersoneverysideagainstthe[*3：653]
approachesofarbitrarypower。Itisnowincorporatedintoallourstateconstitutions，asafundamentalright；andtheconstitutionoftheUnitedStateswouldhavebeenjustlyobnoxioustothemostconclusiveobjection，ifithadnotrecognised，andconfirmeditinthemostsolemnterms。
Sec。1774。Thegreatobjectofatrialbyjuryincriminalcasesis，toguardagainstaspiritofoppressionandtyrannyonthepartofrulers，andagainstaspiritofviolenceandvindictivenessonthepartofthepeople。Indeed，itisoftenmoreimportanttoguardagainstthelatter，thantheformer。Thesympathiesofallmankindareenlistedagainsttherevengeandfuryofasingledespot；andeveryattemptwillbemadetoscreenhisvictims。Buthowdifficultisittoescapefromthevengeanceofanindignantpeople，rousedintohatredbyunfoundedcalumnies，orstimulatedtocrueltybybitterpoliticalenmities，orunmeasuredjealousies？Theappealforsafetycan，undersuchcircumstances，scarcelybemadebyinnocenceinanyothermanner，thanbytheseverecontrolofcourtsofjustice，andbythefirmandimpartialverdictofajurysworntodoright，andguidedsolelybylegalevidenceandasenseofduty。Insuchacoursethereisadoublesecurityagainsttheprejudicesofjudges，whomaypartakeofthewishesandopinionsofthegovernment，andagainstthepassionsofthemultitude，whomaydemandtheirvictimwithaclamorousprecipitancy。
Solong，indeed，asthispalladiumremainssacredandinviolable，thelibertiesofafreegovernmentcannotwhollyfall。Buttogiveitrealefficiency，itmustbe[*3：654]preservedinitspurityanddignity；andnot，withaviewtoslightinconveniences，orimaginaryburdens，beputintothehandsofthose，whoareincapableofestimatingitsworth，oraretooinert，ortooignorant，ortooimbecile，towielditspotentarmour。Mr。JusticeBlackstone，withthewarmthandpridebecominganEnglishmanlivingunderitsblessedprotection，hassaid：AcelebratedFrenchwriter，whoconcludes，thatbecauseRome，Sparta，andCarthagehavelosttheirliberties，thereforethoseofEnglandintimemustperish，shouldhaverecollected，thatRome，Sparta，andCarthage，atthetime，whentheirlibertieswerelost，werestrangerstothetrialbyjury。\"**Icommendtothediligentperusalofeveryscholar，andeverylegislator，thenobleeulogiumofMr。JusticeBlackstoneonthetrialbyjury。Itisoneofthemostbeautiful，aswellasmostforcible，expositionsofthatclassicaljurist。Dr。Paley’schapterontheadministrationofjusticeisnottheleastvaluablepartofhisworkonMoralphilosophy。Sec。1775。Itisobservable，thatthetrialofallcrimesisnotonlytobebyjury，buttobeheldinthestate，wheretheyarecommitted。Theobjectofthisclauseistosecurethepartyaccusedfrombeingdraggedtoatrialinsomedistantstate，awayfromhisfriends，andwitnesses，andneighbourhood；andthustobesubjectedtotheverdictofmerestrangers，whomayfeelnocommonsympathy，orwhomayevencherishanimosities，orprejudicesagainsthim。Besidesthis；atrialinadistantstateorterritorymightsubjectthepartytothemostoppressiveexpenses，orperhapseventotheinabilityofprocuringtheproperwitnessestoestablishhisinnocence。
Thereislittledanger，indeed，that[*3：655]congresswouldeverexerttheirpowerinsuchanoppressive，andunjustifiableamanner。Butuponasubject，sovitaltothesecurityofthecitizen，itwasfittoleaveaslittleaspossibletomerediscretion。Bythecommonlaw，thetrialofallcrimesisrequiredtobeinthecounty，wheretheyarecommitted。
Nay，itoriginallycarrieditsjealousystillfarther，andrequired，thatthejuryitselfshouldcomefromthevicinageoftheplace，wherethecrimewasallegedtobecommitted。Thiswascertainlyaprecaution，which，howeverjustifiableinanearlyandbarbarousstateofsociety，islittlecommendableinitsmoreadvancedstages。Ithasbeenjustlyremarked，thatinsuchcasestosummonajury，labouringunderlocalprejudices，islayingasnarefortheirconsciences；andthoughtheyshouldhavevirtueandvigourofmindsufficienttokeepthemupright，thepartieswillgrowsuspicious，andindulgeotherdoubtsoftheimpartialityofthetrial。Itwasdoubtlessbyanalogytothisruleofthecommonlaw，thatallcriminaltrialsarerequiredtobeinthestate，wherecommitted。Butascrimesmaybecommittedonthehighseas，andelsewere，outoftheterritorialjurisdictionofastate，itwasindispensable，that，insuchcases，congressshouldbeenabledtoprovidetheplaceoftrial。
Sec。1776。But，althoughthisprovisionofatrialbyjuryincriminalcasesisthusconstitutionallypreservedtoallcitizens，thejealousiesandalarmsoftheopponentsoftheconstitutionwerenotquieted。Theyinsisted，thatabillofrightswasindispensableuponothersubjects，andthatuponthis，fartherauxiliary[*3：656]rightsoughttohavebeensecured。Theseobjectionsfoundtheirwayintothestateconventions，endwereurgedwithgreatzealagainsttheconstitution。Theydidnot，however，preventtheadoptionofthatinstrument。Buttheyproducedsuchastrongeffectuponthepublicmind，thatcongress，immediatelyaftertheirfirstmeeting，proposedcertainamendments，embracingallthesuggestions，whichappearedofmostforce；andtheseamendmentswereratifiedbytheseveralstates，andarenowbecomeapartoftheconstitution。Theyarecontainedinthefifthandsixtharticlesoftheamendments，andareasfollows：
\"Nopersonshallbeheldtoanswerforacapitalorotherwiseinfamouscrime，unlessonapresentmentorindictmentofagrandjury，exceptincasesarisinginthelandornavalforces，orinthemilitia，wheninactualservice，intimeofwar，orpublicdanger：norshallanypersonbesubject，forthesameoffence，tobetwiceputinjeopardyoflifeorlimb；norshallbecompelled，inanycriminalcase，tobeawitnessagainsthimself；
norbedeprivedoflife，liberty，orproperty，withoutdueprocessoflaw；
norshallprivatepropertybetakenforpublicuse，withoutjustcompensation。\"
\"Inallcriminalprosecutions，theaccusedshallenjoytherighttoaspeedyandpublictrial，byanimpartialjuryofthestateanddistrict，whereinthecrimeshallhavebeencommitted；whichdistrictshallhavebeenpreviouslyascertainedbylaw；andtobeinformedofthenatureandcauseoftheaccusation；tobeconfrontedwiththewitnessesagainsthim；
tohavecompulsoryprocessforobtaining[*3：657]witnessesinhisfavour；
andtohavetheassistanceofcounselforhisdefence。\"
Sec。1777。Uponthemainprovisionsofthesearticlesafewremarksonlywillbemade，sincetheyarealmostselfevident，andcanrequirefewillustrationstoestablishtheirutilityandimportance。
Sec。1778。Thefirstclauserequirestheinterpositionofagrandjury，bywayofpresentmentorindictment，beforethepartyaccusedcanberequiredtoanswertoanycapitalandinfamouscrime，chargedagainsthim。Andthisisregularlytrueatthecommonlawofalloffences，abovethegradeofcommonmisdemeanors。Agrandjury，itiswellknown，areselectedinthemannerprescribedbylaw，anddulysworntomakeinquiry，andpresentalloffencescommittedagainsttheauthorityofthestategovernment，withinthebodyofthecounty，forwhichtheyareimpannelled。Inthenationalcourts，theyaresworntoinquire，andpresentalloffencescommittedagainsttheauthorityofthenationalgovernmentwithinthestateordistrict，forwhichtheyareimpannelled，orelsewherewithinthejurisdictionofthenationalgovernment。Thegrandjurymayconsistofanynumber，notlessthantwelve，normorethantwenty—three；andtwelveatleastmustconcurineveryaccusation。Theysitinsecret，andexaminetheevidencelaidbeforethembythemselves。Apresentment，properlyspeaking，isanaccusationmadeexmeromotubyagrandjuryofanoffenceupontheirownobservationandknowledge，oruponevidencebeforethem，andwithoutanybillofindictmentlaidbeforethematthesuitofthegovernment。Anindictmentisawrittenaccusationofanoffence[*3：658]preferredto，andpresented，uponoath，astrue，byagrandjuryatthesuitofthegovernment。Uponapresentmenttheproperofficerofthecourtmustframeanindictment，beforethepartyaccusedcanbeputtoanswerit。Butanindictmentisusuallyinthefirstinstanceframedbytheofficersofthegovernment，andlaidbeforethegrandjury。Whenthegrandjuryhaveheardtheevidence，iftheyareofopinion，thattheindictmentisgroundless，ornotsupportedbyevidence，theyusedformerlytoendorseonthebackofthebill，\"ignoramus，\"
orweknownothingofit，Whencethebillwassaidtobeignored。ButnowtheyassertinplainEnglish，\"notatruebill，\"orwhichisabetterway，\"notfound；\"andthenthepartyisentitledtobedischarged，ifincustody，withoutfartheranswer。Butafreshbillmaybepreferredagainsthimbyanothergrandjury。Ifthegrandjuryaresatisfiedofthetruthoftheaccusation，thentheywriteontheback。ofthebill，\"atruebill，\"oranciently，\"billavera。\"Thebillisthensaidtobefound，andispubliclyreturnedintocourt；thepartystandsindicted，andmaythenberequiredtoanswerthematterschargedagainsthim。
Sec。1779。Fromthissummarystatementitisobvious，thatthegrandjuryperformmostimportantpublicfunctions；andareagreatsecuritytothecitizensagainstvindictiveprosecutions，eitherbythegovernment，orbypoliticalpartisans，orbyprivateenemies。Noristhisall；theindictmentmustchargethetime，andplace，andnature，andcircumstances，oftheoffence，withclearnessandcertainty；sothattheparty[*3：659]
mayhavefullnoticeofthecharge，andbeabletomakehisdefencewithallreasonableknowledgeandability。
Sec。1780。Thereisanothermodeofprosecution，whichexistsbythecommonlawinregardtomisdemeanors；thoughthesealsoareordinarilyprosecuteduponindictmentsfoundbyagrandjury。Themode，herespokenof，isbyaninformation，usuallyatthesuitofthegovernmentoritsofficers。Aninformationgenerallydiffersinnothingfromanindictmentinitsformandsubstance，exceptthatitisfiledatthemere。discretionoftheproperlawofficerofthegovernmentexofficio，withouttheinterventionorapprovalofagrandjury。ThisprocessisrarelyrecurredtoinAmerica；
andithasneveryetbeenformallyputintooperationbyanypositiveauthorityofcongress，underthenationalgovernment，inmerecasesofmisdemeanor；
thoughcommonenoughincivilprosecutionsforpenaltiesandforfeitures。
Sec。1781。Anotherclausedeclares，thatnopersonshallbesubject，\"forthesameoffence，tobetwiceput\"injeopardyoflifeandlimb。\"
This，again，isanothergreatprivilegesecuredbythecommonlaw。Themeaningofitis，thatapartyshallnotbetriedasecondtimeforthesameoffence，afterhehasoncebeenconvicted，oracquittedoftheoffencecharged，bytheverdictofajury，andjudgmenthaspassedthereonfororagainsthim。Butitdoesnotmean，thatheshallnotbetriedfortheoffenceasecondtime，ifthejuryhavebeendischargedwithoutgivinganyverdict；or，if，havinggivenaverdict，judgmenthasbeenarresteduponit，oranewtrialhasbeengrantedinhisfavour；[*3：660]for，insuchacase，hislifeorlimbcannotjudiciallybesaidtohavebeenputinjeopardy。
Sec。1782。Thenextclauseprohibitsanypersonfrombeingcompelled，inanycriminalcase，tobeawitnessagainsthimself，orbeingdeprivedoflife，liberty，orproperty，withoutdueprocessoflaw。Thisalsoisbutanaffirmanceofacommonlawprivilege。Butitisofinestimablevalue。
Itiswellknown，thatinsomecountries，notonlyarecriminalscompelledtogiveevidenceagainstthemselves，butaresubjectedtotherackortortureinordertoprocureaconfessionofguilt。Andwhatisworse，ithasbeenasifinmockeryorscornattemptedtoexcuse，orjustifyit，uponthescoreofmercyandhumanitytotheaccused。Ithasbeencontrived，itispretended，thatinnocenceshouldmanifestitselfbyastoutresistance，orguiltbyaplainconfession；asifaman’sinnocenceweretobetriedbythehardnessofhisconstitution，andhisguiltbythesensibilityofhisnerves。Cicero，manyagesago，thoughhelivedinastate，whereinitwasusualtoputslavestothetorture，inordertofurnishevidence，hasdenouncedtheabsurdityandwickednessofthemeasureintermsofglowingeloquence，asstriking，astheyarebrief。TheyareconceivedinthespiritofTacitus，andbreatheallhispregnantandindignantsarcasm。Ulpian，also，atastilllaterperiodinRomanjurisprudence，stampedthepracticewithseverereproof。
[*3：661]Sec。1783。Theotherpartoftheclauseisbutanenlargementofthelanguageofmagnacharta，\"necsupereumibimus，necsupereummittimus，nisiperlegalejudiciumpariumsuorum，vetperlegemterrae，\"neitherwillwepassuponhim，orcondemnhim，butbythelawfuljudgmentofhispeers，orbythelawoftheland。LordCokesays，thattheselatterwords，perlegemterraebythelawoftheland，meanbydueprocessoflaw，thatis，withoutduepresentmentorindictment，andbeingbroughtintoanswertheretobydueprocessofthecommonlaw。Sothatthisclauseineffectaffirmstherightoftrialaccordingtotheprocessandproceedingsofthecommonlaw。
Sec。1784。Theconcludingclauseis，thatprivatepropertyshallnotbetakenforpublicusewithoutjustcompensation。Thisisanaffirmanceofagreatdoctrineestablishedbythecommonlawfortheprotectionofprivateproperty。Itisfoundedinnaturalequity，andislaiddownbyjuristsasaprincipleofuniversallaw。Indeed，inafreegovernment，almostallotherrightswouldbecomeutterlyworthless，ifthegovernmentpossessedanuncontrollablepowerovertheprivatefortuneofeverycitizen。
Oneofthefundamentalobjectsofeverygoodgovernmentmustbethedueadministrationofjustice；andhowvainitwouldbetospeakofsuchanadministration，whenallpropertyissubjecttothewillorcapriceofthelegislature，andtherulers。