\"DidthenameofWashingtonsanction，didthestatesdeliberatelyratifysuchananomalyinthehistoryoffundamentallegislation？No。Wewerenotmistaken。Theletterofthisgreatinstrumentisfreefromthisradicalfault：itslanguagedirectlycontradictstheimputation：itsspirit，itsevidentintent，contradictsit。No，wedidnoterr！Ourconstitutiondoesnotcontaintheabsurdityofgivingpowertomakelaws，antianotherpowertoresistthem。Thesages，whosememorywillalwaysbereverenced，havegivenusapractical，and，astheyhoped，apermanentconstitutionalcompact。Thefatherofhiscountrydidnotaffixhisreverednametosopalpableanabsurdity。Nordidthestates，whentheyseverallyratifiedit，dosoundertheimpression，thatavetoonthelawsoftheUnitedStateswasreservedtothem，orthattheycouldexerciseitbyimplication。Searchthedebatesinalltheirconventions，examinethespeechesofthemostzealousopposersoffederalauthority；lookattheamendments，thatwereproposed；theyareallsilent；notasyllableuttered，notavotegiven，notamotionmadetocorrecttheexplicitsupremacygiventothelawsoftheUnionoverthoseofthestates，ortoshowthatimplication，asisnowcontended，coulddefeatit。No；wehavenoterred！Theconstitutionisstilltheobjectofourreverence，thebondofourUnion，ourdefenceindanger，andthesourceofourprosperityinpeace。Itshalldescend，aswehavereceivedit，uncorruptedbysophisticalconstruction，toourposterity；andthesacrificesoflocalinterest，ofstateprejudices，ofpersonalanimosities，thatweremadetobringitintoexistence，willagainbepatrioticallyofferedforitssupport。
\"ThetworemainingobjectionsmadebytheOrdinancetotheselawsare，thatthesumsintendedtoberaisedbythemaregreater，thanarerequired，andthattheproceedswillbeunconstitutionallyemployed。
\"Theconstitutionhasgivenexpresslytocongresstherightofraisingrevenue，andofdeterminingthesumthepublicexigencieswillrequire。Thestateshavenocontrolovertheexerciseofthisright，otherthanthat，whichresultsfromthepowerofchangingtherepresentatives，whoabuseit，andthusprocureredress。Congressmayundoubtedlyabusethisdiscretionarypower，butthesamemaybesaidofothers，withwhichtheyarevested。Yetthediscretionmustexistsomewhere。Theconstitutionhasgivenittotherepresentativesofallthepeople，checkedbytherepresentativesofthestates，andbytheexecutivepower。TheSouth—Carolinaconstructiongivesittothelegislatureortheconventionofasinglestate，whereneitherthepeopleofthedifferentstates，northestatesintheirseparatecapacity，northechiefmagistrateelectedbythepeople，haveanyrepresentation。
Whichisthemostdiscreetdispositionofthepower？Idonotaskyou，fellowcitizens，whichistheconstitutionaldisposition；thatinstrumentspeaksalanguagenottobemisunderstood。Butifyouwereassembledingeneralconvention，whichwouldyouthinkthesafestdepositoryofthisdiscretionarypowerinthelastresort？Wouldyouaddaclause，givingittoeachorthestates，orwouldyousanctionthewiseprovisionsalreadymadebyyourconstitution？Ifthisshouldbetheresultofyourdeliberations，whenprovidingforthefuture，areyou，canyoubereadytoriskall，thatweholddear，toestablish，foratemporaryandalocalpurpose，that，whichyoumustacknowledgetobedestructiveandevenabsurd，asageneralprovision？Carryouttheconsequencesofthisrightvestedinthedifferentstates，andyesmustperceive，thatthecrisisyourconductpresentsatthisdaywouldrecur，wheneveranylawoftheUnitedStatesdispleasedanyofthestates，andthatweshouldsoonceasetobeanation。
\"TheOrdinance，withthesameknowledgeofthefuture，thatcharacterizesaformerobjection，tellsyou，thattheproceedsofthetaxwillbeunconstitutionallyapplied。Ifthiscouldbeascertainedwithcertainty，theobjectionwould，withmorepropriety，bereservedforthelawsoapplyingtheproceeds；butsurelycannotbeurgedagainstthelawslevyingtheduty。
\"ThesearetheallegationscontainedintheOrdinance。
Examinethemseriously，myfellowcitizens，？judgeforyourselves。Iappealtoyoutodetermine，whethertheyaresoclear，soconvincing，astoleavenodoubtoftheircorrectness；andevenifyoushouldcometothisconclusion，howfartheyjustifythereckless，destructivecourse，whichyouaredirectedtopursue。Reviewtheseobjections，andtheconclusionsdrawnfromthem，oncemore。Whatarethey？Everylaw，then，forraisingrevenue，accordingtotheSouth—CarolinaOrdinance，mayberightfullyannulled，unlessitbesoframed，asnolaweverwillorcanbeframed。Congresshavearighttopasslawforraisingrevenue，andeachstatehasarighttoopposetheirexecution，tworightsdirectlyopposedtoeachother；？andyetisthisabsurditysupposedtobecontainedinaninstrument，drawnfortheexpresspurposeofavoidingcollisionsbetweenthestatesandthegeneralgovernment，byanassemblyofthemostenlightenedstatesmenandpurest。patriotseverembodiedforasimilarpurpose。
\"Invainhavethesesagesdeclared，thatcongressshallhavepowertolayandcollecttaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises；invainhavetheyprovided，thattheyshallhavepowertopasslaws，whichshallbenecessaryandpropertocarrythosepowersintoexecution；thatthoselawsandthatconstitutionshallbethe’supremelawoftheland，andthatthejudgesineverystateshallbeboundthereby，anythingintheconstitutionandlaw，ofanystatetothecontrarynotwithstanding。’Invainhavethepeopleoftheseveralstatessolemnlysanctionedtheseprovisions，madethemtheirparamountlaw，Endindividuallysworntosupportthemwhenevertheywerecalledontoexecuteanyoffice。Vainprovisions！ineffectualrestrictions！vileprofanationsofoaths！miserablemockeryoflegislation！
ifthebaremajorityofthevotersinanyonestatemay，Onarealorsupposedknowledgeoftheintent，withwhichalawhasbeenpassed，declarethemselvesfreefromitsoperation，？sayhereitgivestoolittle，theretoomuch，andoperatesunequally，？hereitsuffersarticlestobefree，thatoughttobetaxed，。？thereittaxesthose，thatoughttobefreeinthiscasetheproceedsareintendedtobeappliedtopurposes，whichwedonotapprove，inthattheamountraisedismorethaniswanted。Congress，itistrue，areinvestedbytheconstitutionwiththerightordecidingthesequestionsaccordingtotheirsounddiscretion；congressiscomposedoftherepresentativesofallthestates，andofallthepeopleofallthestates；butwe，partofthepeopleofonestate，towhomtheconstitutionhasgivennopoweronthesubject，fromwhomithasexpresslytakenitaway，？we，whohavesolemnlyagreed，thatthisconstitutionshallbeourlaw，？we。mostofwhomhavesworntosupportit，？wenowabrogatethislaw，andswear，andforceotherstoswear，thatitshallnotbeobeyed；？andwedothis，notbecausecongresshavenorighttopasssuchlaws；thiswedonotallege；
butbecausetheyhavepassedthemwithimproperviews。Theyareunconstitutional，fromthemotivesofthose，whopassedthem。whichwecanneverwithcertaintyknow，fromtheirunequaloperation，althoughitisimpossible，fromthenatureofthings，thattheyshouldbeequal，andfromthedispositionwhichwepresumemaybemadeoftheirproceeds，althoughthatdispositionhasnotbeendeclared。Thisistheplainmeaningoftheordinanceinrelationtolaws，whichitabrogatesforallegedunconstitutionality。Butitdoesnotstopthere。Itrepeals，inexpressterms，animportantpartoftheconstitutionitself，andoflawspassedtogiveiteffect，whichhaveneverbeenallegedtobeunconstitutional。Theconstitutiondeclares，thatthejudicialpowersoftheUnitedStatesextendtocasesarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedState，andthatsuchlaws，theconstitutionandtreaties，shallbeparamounttothestateconstitutionsandlaws。Thejudiciaryactprescribesthemode，bywhichthecuemaybebroughtbeforeacourtoftheUnitedStatesbyappeal，whenastatetribunalshalldecideagainstthisprovisionoftheconstitution。Theordinancedeclares，thatthereshallbenoappeal？makesthestatelawparamounttotheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates？forcesjudgesandjurorstoswear，thattheywilldisregardtheirprovisions；andevenmakesitpenalinasuitortoattemptreliefbyappeal。Itfurtherdeclares，thatitshallnotbelawfulfortheauthoritiesoftheUnitedStates，orofthatstate，toenforcethepaymentofdutiesimposedbytherevenuelawswithinitslimits。
\"HereisalawoftheUnitedStates，notevenpretendedtobeunconstitutional，repealedbytheauthorityofasmallmajorityofthevotersofasinglestate。Hereisaprovisionoftheconstitution，whichissolemnlyabrogatedbythesameauthority。
\"Onsuchexpositionsandreasonings，theordinancegroundsnotonlyanassertionoftherighttoannulthelaws，ofwhichitcomplains，buttoenforceitbythreatofsecedingfromtheUnion，ifanyattemptismadetoexecutethem。
\"Thisrighttosecedeisdeducedfromthenatureoftheconstitution，whichtheysayisacompactbetweensovereignstates，whohavepreservedtheirwholesovereignty，andthereforearesubjecttonosuperior；thatbecausetheymadethecompact，theycanbreakit，when，intheiropinion，ithasbeendepartedfrombytheotherstates。Fallaciousasthiscourseofreasoningis，itenlistsstatepride，andfindsadvocatesinthehonestprejudicesofthose，whohavenotstudiedthenatureofourgovernmentsufficientlytoseetheradicalerror，onwhichitrests。
\"ThepeopleoftheUnitedStatesformedtheconstitution，actingthroughthestatelegislaturesinmakingthecompact，tomeetanddiscussitsprovisions，andactinginseparateconventions，whentheyratifiedthoseprovisions；butthetermsusedinitsconstruction，showittobeagovernment，inwhichthepeopleofallthestatescollectivelyarerepresented。
WeareonePeopleinthechoiceofpresidentandvice—president。Herethestateshavenootheragency，thantodirectthemode，inwhichthevotesshallbegiven。Thecandidateshavingthemajorityofall。thevotesarechosen。Theelectorsofamajorityofstatesmayhavegiventheirvotesforonecandidate，andyetanothermaybechosen。Thepeople，then，andnotthestates，arerepresentedintheexecutivebranch。
\"Inthehouseofrepresentativesthereisthisdifference，thatthepeopleofonestatedonot，asinthecaseofpresidentandvice—president，allvoteforthesameofficers。Thepeopleofallthestatesdonotvoteforallthemembers，eachstateelectingitsownrepresentatives。Butthiscreatesnomaterialdistinction。Whenchosen，theyareallrepresentativesortheUnitedStates，notrepresentativesoftheparticularstatefromwhencetheycome。TheyarepaidbytheUnitedStates，notbythestate；
noraretheyaccountabletoitforanyactdoneintheperformanceortheirlegislativefunctions；andhowevertheymayinpractice，asitistheirdutytodo，consultandprefertheinterestsoftheirparticularconstituents，whentheycomeinconflictwithanyotherpartialorlocalinterest，yetitistheirfirstandhighestduty，asrepresentativesoftheUnitedStates，topromotethegeneralgood。
\"TheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，then，formsagovernment，notaleague；andwhetheritbeformedbycompactbetweenthestatesorinanyothermanner，itscharacteristhesame。Itisagovernment，inwhichallthepeoplearerepresented，whichoperatesdirectlyonthepeopleindividually，notuponthestates；theyretainedallthepowertheydidnotgrant。Buteachstatehavingexpresslypartedwithsomanypowers，astoconstitutejointlywiththeotherstatesasinglenation，cannotfromthatperiodpossessanyrighttosecede，becausesuchsecessiondoesnotbreakaleague，butdestroystheunityofanation；andanyinjurytothatunityisnotonlyabreach，whichwouldresultfromthecontraventionofacompact；butitisanoffenceagainstthewholeUnionTosay，thatanystatemayatpleasuresecedefromtheUnion，istosay，thattheUnitedStateswerenotanation；becauseitwouldbeasolecismtocontend，thatanypartoranationmightdissolveitsconnexionwiththeotherparts，totheirinjuryorruin，withoutcommittinganyoffence。Secession，likeanyotherrevolutionaryact，maybemorallyjustifiedbytheextremityofoppression；buttocallitaconstitutionalright，isconfoundingthemeaningofterms；andcanonlybedonethroughgrosserror，ortodeceivethose，whoarewillingtoassertaright，butwouldpausebefore’theymadearevolution，orincurthepenaltiesconsequentonafailure。
\"BecausetheUnionwasformedbycompact，itissaidthepartiestothatcompactmay，whentheyfeelthemselvesaggrieved，departfromit；butitispreciselybecauseitisacompact，thattheycannot。
Acompactisanagreement，orbindingobligation。Itmay，byitsterms，haveasanctionorpenaltyforitsbreach，oritmaynot。Ifitcontainsnosanction，itmaybebrokenwithnootherconsequence，thanmoralguilt：
ifithaveasanction，thenthebreachincursthedesignatedorimpliedpenalty。Aleaguebetweenindependentnations，generally，hasnosanction，otherthanamoralone；or，ifitshouldcontainapenalty，asthereisnocommonsuperior，itcannotbeenforced。Agovernment，onthecontrary，alwayshasasanction，expressorimplied；andinourcase，itisbothnecessarilyimplied，andexpresslygiven。Anattemptbyforceofarmstodestroyagovernment，isanoffence，bywhatevermeanstheconstitutionalcompactmayhavebeenformed；andsuch。governmenthastheright，bythelawofself—defence，topassactsforpunishingtheoffender，unlessthatrightismodified，restrained，orresumedbytheconstitutionalact。Inoursystem，althoughitismodifiedinthecaseoftreason，yetauthorityisexpresslygiventopassalllawsnecessarytocarryitspowersintoeffect，andunderthisgrantprovisionhasbeenmadeforpunishingacts，whichobstructthedueadministrationorthelaws。
\"ItwouldseemsuperfluoustoaddanythingtoshowthenatureofthatUnion，whichconnectsus；butaserroneousopinionsonthissubjectarethefoundationofdoctrinesthemostdestructivetoourpeace，Imustgivesomefurtherdevelopmenttomyviewsonthissubject。Noone，fellowcitizens，hasahigherreverenceforthereservedrightsofthestates，thanthemagistrate，whonowaddressesyou。Noonewouldmakegreaterpersonalsacrifices，orofficialexertionstodefendthemfromviolation；
butequalcaremustbetakentoprevent，ontheirpert，animproperinterferencewith，orresumptionoftherightstheyhavevestedinthenation。Thelinehasnotbeensodistinctlydrawn，astoavoiddoubtsinsomecasesoftheexerciseofpower。Menofthebestintentions，andsoundestviewsmaydifferintheirconstructionofsomepartsoftheconstitution；butthereareothers，onwhichdispassionatereflectioncanleavenodoubt。Ofthisnatureappearstobetheassumedrightofsecession。Itrests，aswehaveseen，ontheallegedundividedsovereigntyofthestates，andontheirhavingformed，inthissovereigncapacity，acompact，whichiscalledtheconstitution。
Fromwhich，becausetheymadeit，theyhavetherighttosecede。Bothofthesepositionsareerroneous，andsomeoftheargumentstoprovethemsohavebeenanticipated。
\"Thestatesseverallyhavenotretainedtheirentiresovereignty。
Ithasbeenshown，that，inbecomingpartsofanation，notmembersofaleague，theysurrenderedmanyoftheiressentialpartsofsovereignty。
Therighttomaketreaties，declarewar，levytaxes，exerciseexclusivejudicialandlegislativepowers，wereallofthemfunctionsofsovereignpower。Thestates，then，foralltheseimportantpurposes，werenolongersovereign。Theallegianceoftheircitizenswastransferred，inthefirstinstance，tothegovernmentoftheUnitedStates；theybecameAmericancitizens，andowedobediencetotheconstitutionoftheUnitedStaten，andtolawsmadeinconformitywiththepowersitvestedincongress。Thislastpositionhasnotbeen，andcannotbedenied。How，then。canthatstatebesaidtobesovereignandindependent，whosecitizensoweobediencetolawsnotmadebyit，andwhosemagistratesaresworntodisregardthoselaws，whentheycomeinconflictwiththosepassedbyanother？Whatshowsconclusively。thatthestatescannotbesaidtohavereservedanundividedsovereignty，is，thattheyexpresslycededtherighttopunishtreason；
nottreasonagainsttheirseparatepower，buttreasonagainsttheUnitedStates。Treasonisanoffenceagainstsovereignty，andsovereigntymustresidewiththepowertopunishit。Butthereservedrightsofthestatesarenotlesssacred，becausetheyhave，fortheircommoninterest，madethegeneralgovernmentthedepositaryofthesepowers。
\"Theunityourpoliticalcharacter，ushasbeenshownforanotherpurposecommencedwithitsveryexistence。Undertheroyalgovernmentwehadnoseparatecharacter；ouroppositiontoitsoppressionsbeganasUnitedColonies。WeweretheUnitedStatesundertheconfederation，andthenamewasperpetuated，andtheUnionrenderedmoreperfectbytheFederalconstitution。Innoneofthesestagesdidweconsiderourselvesinanyotherlight，thanasformingonenation。Treatiesandalliancesweremadeinthenameofall。Troopswereraisedforthejointdefence。
How，then，withalltheseproofs，thatunderallchangesofourpositionwehad，fordesignatedpurposesandwithdefinedpowers，createdNationalgovernments；howisit，thatthemostperfectofthoseseveralmodesofUnionshouldnowbeconsideredasamereleague，thatmayhedissolvedatpleasure？Itisfromanabuseofterms。’Compact’isused，assynonymouswith’league，’althoughthetruetermisnotemployed，becauseitwouldatonceshowthefallacyofthereasoning。Itwouldnotdotosay，thatourconstitutionwasonlyaleague；butitislabouredtoproveitacompact，whichinonesenseitis，andthentoargue，that，asaleagueisacompact，everycompactbetweennationsmustofcoursehealeague，andthatfromsuchanengagementeverysovereignpowerhasarighttorecede。Butithasbeenshown，thatinthissensethestatesarenotsovereign，andthateveniftheywere，andthenationalconstitutionhadbeenformedbycompact，therewouldbenorightinanyonestatetoexonerateitselffromitsobligations。
\"Soobviousarethereasons，whichforbidthissecession，thatitisnecessaryonlytoalludetothem。TheUnionwasFormedforthebenefitofall。Itwasproducedbymutualsacrificesofinterestsandopinions。
Canthosesacrificesberecalled？Canthestates，whomagnanimouslysurrenderedtheirtitletotheterritoriesoftheWest，recallthegrant？Willtheinhabitantsoftheinlandstatesagreetopaytheduties，thatmaybeimposedwithouttheirassent，bythoseontheAtlanticortheGulf，fortheirownbenefit？Shalltherebeafreeportinonestate，andonerousdutiesinanother？Noonebelieves，thatanyrightexists，inasinglestate，toinvolvetheothersintheseandcountlessotherevils，contrarytotheengagementssolemnlymade。Everyonemustsee，thattheotherstates，inself—defence，mustopposeatallhazards。
\"Thesearethealternatives，thatarepresentedbytheconvention：Arepealofalltheactsforraisingrevenue，leavingthegovernmentwithoutthemeansofsupport；oranacquiescenceinthedissolutionofourUnionbythesecessionofoneofitsmembers。Whenthefirstwasproposed，itwasknown，thatitcouldnotbelistenedtoforamoment。Itwasknown，ifforcewasappliedtoopposetheexecutionofthelaws，thatitmustberepelledbyforce；thatcongresscouldnot，withoutinvolvingitselfindisgrace，andthecountryinruin，accedetotheproposition；andyet，ifthisisnotdoneonagivenday，orifanyattemptismadetoexecutethelaws，thestateis，bytheordinance，declaredtobeoutoftheUnion。
Themajorityofaconventionassembledforthepurposehavedictatedtheseterms，orratherthisrejectionofallterms，inthenameofthepeopleofSouthCarolina。Itistrue，thatthegovernorofthestatespeaksofthesubmissionoftheirgrievancestoaconventionofallthestates，which，hesays，they’sincerelyandanxiouslyseekanddesire。’Yetthisobviousandconstitutionalmodeofobtainingthesenseoftheotherstates，ontheconstructionofthefederalcompact，andamendingit，ifnecessary，hasneverbeenattemptedbythose，whohaveurgedthestateontothisdestructivemeasure。Thestaterighthaveproposedtocallforageneralconventiontotheotherstates；andcongress，ifasufficientnumberofthemconcurred，musthavecalledit。ButthefirstmagistrateofSouthCarolina，whenheexpressedahope，that，’onareviewbycongressandthefunctionariesofthegeneralgovernmentofthemeritsofthecontroversy，’
suchaconventionwillbeaccordedtothem，musthaveknown，thatneithercongress，noranyfunctionaryofthegeneralgovernment，hasauthoritytocallsuchaconvention，unlessitbedemandedbytwothirdsofthestates。
Thissuggestion，then，isanotherinstanceoftherecklessinattentiontotheprovisionsoftheconstitution，withwhichthiscrisishasbeenmadlyhurriedon；oroftheattempttopersuadethepeople，thataconstitutionalremedyhadbeensoughtandrefused。IfthelegislatureofSouthCarolina’anxiouslydesire’ageneralconventiontoconsidertheircomplaints，whyhavetheynotmadeapplicationforit，inthewaytheconstitutionpointsout？Theassertion，thatthey’earnestlyseek’it，iscompletelynegativedbytheomission。\"JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
Book3Chapter16CHAPTERXVI。POWEROVERNATURALIZATIONANDBANKRUPTCY。§；1097。Thenextclauseis，thatcongress\"shallhavepowertoestablishanuniformruleofnaturalization，anduniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptciesthroughouttheUnitedStates。\"
§；1098。Theproprietyofconfidingthepowertoestablishanuniformruleofnaturalizationtothenationalgovernmentseemsnottohaveoccasionedanydoubtorcontroversyintheconvention。
Foraughtthatappearsonthejournals，itwasconcededwithoutobjection。1Undertheconfederation，thestatespossessedthesoleauthoritytoexercisethepower；andthedissimilarityofthesystemindifferentstateswasgenerallyadmitted，asaprominentdefect，andlaidthefoundationofmanydelicateandintricatequestions。
Asthefreeinhabitantsofeachstatewereentitledtoalltheprivilegesandimmunitiesofcitizensinalltheotherstates，2itfollowed，thatasinglestatepossessedthepowerofforcingintoeveryotherstate，withtheenjoymentofeveryimmunityandprivilege，anyalien，whomitmightchoosetoincorporateintoitsownsociety，howeverrepugnantsuchadmissionmightbetotheirpolity，conveniences，andevenprejudices。
Ineffecteverystatepossessedthepowerofnaturalizingaliensineveryotherstate；apowerasmischievousinitsnature，asitwasindiscreetinitsactualexercise。Inonestate，residenceforashorttimemight，anddidconfertherightsofcitizenship。Inothers，qualificationsofgreaterimportancewererequired。Analien，therefore，incapacitatedforthepossessionofcertainrightsbythelawsofthelatter，might，byapreviousresidenceandnaturalizationintheformer，eludeatpleasurealltheirsalutaryregulationsforself—protection。Thusthelawsofasinglestatewerepreposterouslyrenderedparamounttothelawsofalltheothers，evenwithintheirownjurisdiction。3Andithasbeenremarkedwithequaltruthandjustice，thatitwasowingtomerecasualty，thattheexerciseofthispowerundertheconfederationdidnotinvolvetheUnioninthemostseriousembarrassments。4Thereisgreatwisdom，therefore，inconfidingtothenationalgovernmentthepowertoestablishauniformruleofnaturalizationthroughouttheUnitedStates。ItisofthedeepestinteresttothewholeUniontoknow，whoareentitledtoenjoytherightsofcitizensineachstate，sincetheythereby，ineffect，becomeentitledtotherightsofcitizensinallthestates。Ifaliensmightbeadmittedindiscriminatelytoenjoyalltherightsofcitizensatthewillofasinglestate，theUnionmightitselfbeendangeredbyaninfluxofforeigners，hostiletoitsinstitutions，ignorantofitspowers，andincapableofadueestimateofitsprivileges。
§；1099。Itfollows，fromtheverynatureofthepower，thattobeuseful，itmustbeexclusive；foraconcurrentpowerinthestateswouldbringbackalltheevilsandembarrassments，whichtheuniformruleoftheconstitutionwasdesignedtoremedy。And，accordingly，thoughtherewasamomentaryhesitation，whentheconstitutionfirstwentintooperation，whetherthepowermightnotstillbeexercisedbythestates，subjectonlytothecontrolofcongress，sofarasthelegislationofthelatterextended，asthesupremelaw；5yetthepowerisnowfirmlyestablishedtobeexclusive。6TheFederalist，indeed，introducedthisverycase，asentirelyclear，toillustratethedoctrineofanexclusivepowerbyimplication，arisingfromtherepugnancyofasimilarpowerinthestates。\"Thispowermustnecessarilybeexclusive，\"saytheauthors；\"because，ifeachstatehadpowertoprescribeadistinctrule，therecouldbenouniformrule。\"7
§；1100。Thepowertopasslawsonthesubjectofbankruptcieswasnotintheoriginaldraftoftheconstitution。
Theoriginalarticlewascommittedtoacommitteetogetherwiththefollowingproposition：\"toestablishuniformlawsuponthesubjectofbankruptcies，andrespectingthedamagesarisingontheprotestofforeignbillsorexchange。\"
Thecommitteesubsequentlymadeareportinfavourorincorporatingtheclauseonthesubjectorbankruptciesintotheconstitution；anditwasadoptedbyavoteorninestatesagainstone。8Thebrevity，withwhichthissubjectistreatedbytheFederalist，isquiteremarkable。Theonlypassageinthatelaboratecommentary，inwhichthesubjectistreated，isasfollows：\"Thepowerofestablishinguniformlawsorbankruptcyissointimatelyconnectedwiththeregulationofcommerce，andwillpreventsomanyfrauds，wherethepartiesortheirpropertymaylie，orberemovedintodifferentstates，thattheexpediencyofitseemsnotlikelytobedrawninquestion。\"9
§；1101。Thesubject，however，deservesamoreexactconsideration。Beforetheadoptionoftheconstitutionthestatesseverallypossessedtheexclusiverightasmatterbelongingtotheirgeneralsovereignty，topasslawsuponthesubjectofbankruptcyandinsolvency。10Withoutstoppingatpresenttoconsider，whatistheprecisemeaningofeachoftheseterms，ascontradistinguishedfromtheother；itmaybestated，thatthegeneralobjectofallbankruptandinsolventlawsis，ontheonehand，tosecuretocreditorsanappropriationofthepropertyoftheirdebtorsprotantotothedischargeoftheirdebts，wheneverthelatterareunabletodischargethewholeamount；and，ontheotherhand，torelieveunfortunateandhonestdebtorsfromperpetualbondagetotheircreditors，eitherintheshapeofunlimitedimprisonmenttocoercepaymentoftheirdebts，orofanabsoluterighttoappropriateandmonopolizealltheirfutureearnings。Thelattercourseobviouslydestroysallencouragementtoindustryandenterprizeonthepartoftheunfortunatedebtor，bytakingfromhimallthejustrewardsofhislabour，andleavinghimamiserablepittance，dependentuponthebountyorforbearanceofhiscreditors。Theformeris，ifpossible，moreharsh，severe，andindefensible。11Itmakespovertyandmisfortune，inthemselvessufficientlyheavyburthens，thesubjectortheoccasionofpenaltiesandpunishments。Imprisonment，asacivilremedy，admitsofnodefence，exceptasitisusedtocoercefraudulentdebtorstoyielduptheirpresentpropertytotheircreditors，indischargeoftheirengagements。
Butwhenthedebtorshavenoproperty，orhaveyieldedupthewholetotheircreditors，toallowthelatterattheirmerepleasuretoimprisonthem，isarefinementincruelty，andanindulgenceofprivatepassions，whichcouldhardlyfindapologyinanenlighteneddespotism；andareutterlyatwarwithalltherightsanddutiesoffreegovernments。Suchasystemoflegislationisasunjust，asitisunfeeling。ItisincompatiblewiththefirstpreceptsofChristianity；andisalivingreproachtothenationsofchristendom，carryingthembacktotheworstagesofpaganism。12Oneofthefirstdutiesoflegislation，whileitprovidesamplyforthesacredobligationofcontracts，andtheremediestoenforcethem，certainlyis，paripassu，torelievetheunfortunateandmeritoriousdebtorfromaslaveryofmindandbody，whichcutshimofffrom，afairenjoymentofthecommonbenefitsofsociety，androbshisfamilyofthefruitsofhislabour，andthebenefitsofhispaternalsuperintendence。Anationalgovernment，whichdidnotpossessthispoweroflegislation，wouldbelittleworthyoftheexaltedfunctionsofguardingthehappiness，andsupportingtherightsofafreepeople。Itmightguardagainstpoliticaloppressions，onlytorenderprivateoppressionsmoreintolerable，andmoreglaring。
§；1102。Buttherearepeculiarreasons，independentofthesegeneralconsiderations，whythegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesshouldbeentrustedwiththispower。Theyresultfromtheimportanceofpreservingharmony，promotingjustice，andsecuringequalityofrightsandremediesamongthecitizensofallthestates。Itisobvious，thatifthepowerisexclusivelyvestedinthestates，eachonewillbeatlibertytoframesuchasystemoflegislationuponthesubjectofbankruptcyandinsolvency，asbestsuitsitsownlocalinterests，andpursuits。Undersuchcircumstancesnouniformityofsystemoroperationscanbeexpected。
Onestatemayadoptasystemofgeneralinsolvency；another，alimitedortemporarysystem；onemayrelievefromtheobligationofcontracts；
anotheronlyfromimprisonment；anothermayadoptastillmorerestrictivecourseofoccasionalrelief；andanothermayrefusetoactinanymanneruponthesubject。Thelawsofonestatemaygiveunduepreferencestooneclassofcreditors，asforinstance，tocreditorsbybond，orjudgment；
anothermayprovideforanequalityofdebts，andadistributionproratâ；withoutdistinctionamongall。Onemayprefercreditorslivingwithinthestatetoalllivingwithout；securingtotheformeranentirepriorityofpaymentoutoftheassets。Anothermay，withamoreliberaljustice，providefortheequalpaymentofall，athomeandabroad，withoutfavourorpreference。Inshort，diversitiesofalmostinfinitevarietyandobjectmaybeintroducedintothelocalsystem，whichmayworkgrossinjusticeandinequality，andnourishfeudsanddiscontentsinneighbouringstates。Whatisherestated，isnotpurelyspeculative。IthasoccurredamongtheAmericanstatesinthemostoffensiveforms，withoutanyapparentreluctanceorcompunctiononthepartoftheoffendingstate。Therewillalwaysbefoundineverystatealargemassofpoliticians，whowilldeemitmoresafetoconsulttheirowntemporaryinterestsandpopularity，byanarrowsystemofpreferences，thantoenlargetheboundaries，soastogivetodistantcreditorsafairshareofthefortuneofaruineddebtor。
Therecanbenootheradequateremedy，thangivingapowertothegeneralgovernment，tointroduceandperpetuateauniformsystem。13
§；1103。Inthenextplaceitisclear，thatnostatecanintroduceanysystem，whichshallextendbeyonditsownterritoriallimits，andthepersons，whoaresubjecttoitsjurisdiction。
Creditorsresidinginotherstatescannotbeboundbyitslaws；anddebtscontractedinotherstatesarebeyondthereachofitslegislation。Itcanneitherdischargetheobligationofsuchcontracts，nortouchtheremedies，whichrelatetotheminanyotherjurisdiction。Sothatthemostmeritoriousinsolventdebtorwillbeharassedbynewsuits，andnewlitigations，asoftenashemovesoutofthestateboundaries。14Hiswholepropertymaybeabsorbedbyhiscreditorsresidinginasinglestate，andhemaybelefttothesevereretributionsofjudicialprocessineveryotherstateintheUnion。Amongapeople，whosegeneralandcommercialintercoursemustbesogreat，andsoconstantlyincreasing，asintheUnitedStates，thisalonewouldbeamostenormousevil，andbearwithpeculiarseverityuponallthecommercialstates。VeryfewpersonsengagedinactivebusinesswillbewithoutdebtorsorcreditorsinmanystatesintheUnion。
Theevilisincapableofbeingredressedbythestates。ItcanbeadequatelyredressedonlybythepoweroftheUnion。Oneofthemostpressinggrievances，bearinguponcommercial，manufacturing，andagriculturalinterestsatthepresentmoment，isthetotalwantofageneralsystemofbankruptcy。Itiswellknown，thatthepowerhaslaindormant，exceptforashortperiod，eversincetheconstitutionwasadopted；andtheexcellentsystem，thenputintooperation，wasrepealed，beforeithadanyfairtrial，upongroundsgenerallybelievedtobewhollybesideitsmerits，andfromcausesmoreeasilyunderstood，thandeliberatelyvindicated。15
§；1104。Inthenextplace，thepowerisimportantinregardtoforeigncountries，andtoourcommercialcreditsandintercoursewiththem。Unlessthegeneralgovernmentwereinvestedwithauthoritytopasssuitablelaws，whichshouldgivereciprocityandequalityincasesofbankruptcieshere，therewouldbedanger，thatthestatelegislationmight，byunduedomesticpreferencesandfavours，compelforeigncountriestoretaliate；andinsteadofallowingcreditorsintheUnitedStatestopartakeanequalityofbenefitsincasesofbankruptcies，topostponethemtoallothers。Theexistenceofthepoweris，therefore，eminentlyuseful；first，asacheckuponunduestatelegislation；andsecondly，asameansofredressinganygrievancessustainedbyforeignersincommercialtransactions。
§；1105。Itcannotbutbematterofregret，thatapowersosalutaryshouldhavehithertoremainedashasbeenalreadyintimatedameredeadletter。Itisextraordinary，thatacommercialnation，spreadingitsenterprisethroughthewholeworld，andpossessingsuchaninfinitelyvaried，internaltrade，reachingalmosttoeverycottageinthemostdistantstates，shouldvoluntarilysurrenderupasystem，whichhaselsewhereenjoyedsuchgeneralfavour，asthebestsecurityofcreditorsagainstfraud，andthebestprotectionofdebtorsagainstoppression。
§；1106。Whatlawsaretobedeemedbankruptlawswithinthemeaningoftheconstitutionhasbeenamatterofmuchforensicdiscussionandargument。Attemptshavebeenmadetodistinguishbetweenbankruptlawsandinsolventlaws。Forexample，ithasbeensaid，thatlaws，whichmerelyliberatethepersonofthedebtor，areinsolventlaws，andthose，whichdischargethecontract，arebankruptlaws。Butitwouldbeverydifficulttosustainthisdistinctionbyanyuniformityoflawsathomeorabroad。Insomeofthestates，laws，knownasinsolventlaws，dischargethepersononly；inothers，theydischargethecontract。Andifcongressweretopassabankruptact，whichshoulddischargethepersononlyofthebankrupt，andleavehisfutureacquisitionsliabletohiscreditors，therewouldbegreatdifficultyinsaying，thatsuchanactwasnotinthesenseoftheconstitutionabankruptact，andsowithinthepowerofcongress。16Again；ithasbeensaid，thatinsolventlawsactonimprisoneddebtorsonlyattheirowninstance；
andbankruptlawsonlyattheinstanceofcreditors。But，howevertruethismayhavebeeninpasttimes，astheactualcourseofEnglishlegislation，17itisnottrue，andneverwastrue，asadistinctionincoloniallegislation。InEnglanditwasanaccidentinthesystem，andnotamaterialgroundtodiscriminate，whoweretobedeemedinalegalsenseinsolvents，orbankrupts。Andifanactofcongressshouldbepassed，whichshouldauthorizeacommissionofbankruptcytoissueattheinstanceofthedebtor，nocourtwouldonthisaccountbewarrantedinsaying，thattheactwasunconstitutional，andthecommissionanullity。18Itisbelieved，thatnolawseverwerepassedinAmericabythecoloniesorstates，whichhadthetechnicaldenominationof\"bankruptlaws。\"Butinsolventlaws，quiteco—extensivewiththeEnglishbankruptsystemintheiroperationsandobjects，havenotbeenunfrequentincolonialandstatelegislation。Nodistinctionwaseverpractically，oreventheoreticallyattemptedtobemadebetweenbankruptciesandinsolvencies。Andanhistoricalreviewofthecolonialandstatelegislationwillabundantlyshow，thatabankruptlawmaycontainthoseregulations，whicharegenerallyfoundininsolventlaws；andthataninsolventlawmaycontainthose，whicharecommontobankruptlaws。19
§；1107。Thetruthis，thattheEnglishsystemofbankruptcy，aswellasthename，wasborrowedfromthecontinentaljurisprudence，andderivativelyfromtheRomanlaw。\"Wehavefetched，\"
saysLordCoke，\"aswellthename，asthewickednessofbankrupts，fromforeignnations；forbanqueintheFrenchismensa，andabanqueroreschangerismensarius；androuteisasignormark，aswesayacartrouteisthesignormark，wherethecarthathgone。
Metaphoricallyitistakenforhim，thathathwastedhisestate，andremovedhisbank，soasthereisleftbutamentionthereof。Somesayitshouldbederivedfrombanqueandrumpue，ashethathathbrokenhisbankorstate。20Mr。JusticeBlackstoneinclinesstronglytothislatterintimation，saying，thatthewordisderivedfromthewordbancus，orbanque，whichsignifiesthetableorcounterofatradesman，andruptus，broken；denotingtherebyone，whoseshoporplaceoftradeisbrokenandgone。Itisobservable，thatthefirststatuteagainstbankrupt，is’againstsuchpersons，asdomakebankrupt，’34Hen。8，ch。4，whichisaliteraltranslationoftheFrenchidiom，quifontbanqueroute。\"21
§；1108。Thesystemofdischargingpersons，whowereunabletopaytheirdebts，wastransferredfromtheRomanlawintocontinentaljurisprudenceatanearlyperiod。TothegloryofChristianityletitbesaid，thatthelawofcessioncessiobonorumwasintroducedbytheChristianemperorsofRome，whereby，ifadebtorceded；oryieldedupallhispropertytohiscreditors，hewassecuredfrombeingdraggedtogaol，omniquoquecorporalicruciatusemoto；forastheemperorJustinianjustlyobserved，inhumanumerstspoliatumfortunissuisinsolidumdamnari；22anobledeclaration，whichtheAmericanrepublicswoulddowelltofollow，andnotmerelytopraise。NeitherbytheRoman，northecontinentallaw，wasthecessiobonorumconfinedtotraders，butitextendedtoallpersons。
Itmaybeadded，thatthecessiobonorumoftheRomanlaw，andthat，whichatpresentprevailsinmostpartsofthecontinentofEurope，onlyexemptedthedebtorfromimprisonment。Itdidnotreleaseordischargethedebt，orexemptthefutureacquisitionsofthedebtorfromexecutionforthedebt。TheEnglishstatute，commonlycalledthe\"Lords’Act，\"wentnofarther，thantodischargethedebtor’sperson。Anditmaybelaiddown，asthelawofGermany，France，Holland，Scotland，andEngland，thattheirinsolventlawsarenotmoreextensiveintheiroperation，thanthecessiobonorumofthecivillaw。InsomepartsofGermany，weareinformedbyHuberusandHeineccius，acessiobonorumdoesnotevenworkadischargeofthedebtor’sperson，andmuchlessofhisfutureeffects。23Butwithaviewtotheadvancementofcommerce，andthebenefitofcreditors，thesystems，nowcommonlyknownbythenameof\"bankruptlaws，\"wereintroduced；andallowedaproceedingtobehadattheinstanceofthecreditorsagainstanunwillingdebtor，whenhedidnotchoosetoyielduphisproperty；or，asitisphrasedinourlaw，bankruptlawswereoriginallyproceedingsininvitum。IntheEnglishsystemthebankruptlawsarelimitedtopersons，whoaretraders，orconnectedwithmattersoftradeandcommerce，assuchpersonsarepeculiarlyliabletoaccidentallosses，andtoaninabilityofpayingtheirdebtswithoutanyfaultoftheirown。24Butthisisamerematterofpolicy，andbynomeansentersintothenatureofsuchlaws。Thereisnothinginthenature，orreasonofsuchlawstopreventtheirbeingappliedtoanyotherclassofunfortunateandmeritoriousdebtors。25
§；1109。Howfarthepowerofcongresstopassuniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptciessupersedestheauthorityofstatelegislationonthesamesubject，hasbeenamatterofmuchelaborateforensicdiscussion。Ithasbeenstrenuouslymaintainedbysomelearnedminds，thatthepowerincongressisexclusiveofthatofthestates；and，whetherexertedornot，itsupersedesstatelegislation。27Ontheotherhand，ithasbeenmaintained，thatthepowerincongressisnotexclusive；thatwhencongresshasacteduponthesubject，totheextentofthenationallegislationthepowerofthestatesiscontrolledandlimited；
butwhenunexerted，thestatesareatlibertytoexercisethepowerinitsfullextent，unlesssofarastheyarecontrolledbyotherconstitutionalprovisions。Andthislatteropinionisnowfirmlyestablishedbyjudicialdecisions。28Asthisdoctrineseemsnowtohaveobtainedageneralacquiescence，itdoesnotseemnecessarytoreviewthereasoning，onwhichthedifferentopinionsarefounded；although，asanewquestion，itisprobablyasmuchopentocontroversy，asanyone，whichhasevergivenrisetojudicialargumentation。Butuponallsuchsubjectsitseemsdesirabletoadoptthesoundpracticalmaxim，Interestreipublicæ；，utfinissitlitium。
§；1110。Itis，however，tobeunderstood，thatalthoughthestatesstillretainthepowertopassinsolventandbankruptlaws，thatpowerisnotunlimited，asitwasbeforetheconstitution。Itdoesnot，aswillbepresentlyseen，extendtothepassingofinsolventorbankruptacts，whichshalldischargetheobligationofantecedentcontracts。
Itcandischargesuchcontractsonly，asaremadesubsequentlytothepassingofsuchacts，andsuch，asaremadewithinthestatebetweencitizensofthesamestate。Itdoesnotextendtocontractsmadewithacitizenofanotherstatewithinthestate，nortoanycontractsmadeinotherstates。29
1。Journ。ofConvention，220，257。？
OneofthegrievancesstatedintheDeclarationofIndependencewas，thatthekinghadendeavouredtopreventthepopulationofthestatesbyobstructingthelawsfornaturalizationofforeigners。
2。TheConfederation，art。4。
3。TheFederalist，No。42。
4。Ibid。
5。Colletv。Collet，2Dall。
R。294；UnitedStatesv。Villato，2Dall。270；SergeantonConst。
Law，ch。28，[ch。30，2d。edit。]
6。SeeTheFederalist，No。32，42；Chiracv。Chirac，2Wheat。R。259，269；RawleontheConst。ch。9，p。84，85to88；Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。R。48，49；Goldenv。Prince，3Wash。Cir。Ct。R。313，322；1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。397；1Tuck。
Black。Comm。App。255to259；12Wheat。R。277，per。JohnsonJ。；butseeId。307，perThompsonJ。—Aquestionisoftendiscussedunderthishead，howfarapersonhasarighttothrowoffhisnationalallegiance，andtobecometimesubjectofanothercountry，withouttheconsentofhisnativecountry。Thisisusuallydenominatedtherightofexpatriation。ItisbesidethepurposeoftheseCommentariestoenterintoanyconsiderationofthissubject，asitdoesnotproperlybelongtoanyconstitutionalinquiry。
Itmaybestated，however，thatthereisnoauthority，whichhasaffirmativelymaintainedtheright，unlessprovidedforbythelawsoftheparticularcountry，andthereisaverystrongcurrentofreasoningontheotherside，independentoftheknownpracticeandclaimsofthenationsofmodernEurope。SeeRawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。85to101；SergeantonConst。Law，oh。98，[ch。30。]；2Kent’sComm。Lect。25，p。35to42。
7。TheFederalist，No。32。
8。Journ。ofConvention，220，305。320，321，357。
9。TheFederalistsNo。42。
10。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，203，204；RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。101，102。
11。See1Tuck。BlackComm。App。259。
12。See2Black。Comm。471，472，473。
Seealso1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。259。
13。SeeMr。JusticeJohnson’sOpinioninOgdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。R。274，275。
14。2Kent’sComm。Lect。37，p。323，324：SergeantonConst。Law，ch。28，[ch。30；]Mr。JusticeJohnsonin12
Wheat。R。273to275。
15。SeetheDebateontheBankruptBillintheHouseofRepresentativesinthewintersessionof1818；Webster’sSpeeches，p。510，&；c。？Itismatterofregret，thatthelearnedmindofMr。ChancellorKentshouldhaveattachedsomuchimportancetoahasty，ifnotapetulant，remarkofLordEldononthissubject。ThereisnocommercialstateinEurope，whichhasnot，foralongperiod，possessedasystemofbankruptorinsolventlaws。Englandhashadoneformorethanthreecenturies。
Andatnotimehavetheparliamentorpeopleshownanyintentiontoabandonthesystem。Onthecontrary，byrecentactsofparliament，increasedactivityandextenthavebeengiventothebankruptandinsolventlaws。Itiseasytoexaggeratetheabusesofthesystem，andpointoutitsdefectsinglowinglanguage。Butthesilentandpotentinfluencesofthesysteminitsbeneficentoperationsareapttobeoverlooked，andarerarelysufficientlystudied。
Whatsystemofhumanlegislationisnotnecessarilyimperfect？Yetwhowould，onthataccount，destroythefabricofsociety？？2Kent’sComm。
Lect。37，p。321to324，andnotebid。2dedit。p。391，392。
16。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，194，202。
17。ItwasnottrueinEnglandatthetimeoftheAmericanrevolution；forundertheinsolventact，commonlycalledthe\"Lords’Actof32Geo。2，ch。28，\"thecreditorsoftheinsolventwereequallywithhimselfentitledtoproceedtoprocurethebenefitoftheactexparte。See3Black。Comm。416，andnote3ofMr。Christian。
ThepresentsystemofbankruptcyinEnglandhasbeenenlarged，soasnowtoincludevoluntaryandconcertedcasesofbankruptcy。Andtheinsolventsystemisappliedtoallotherimprisoneddebtors，notwithinthebankruptlaws。SeePetersdorft’sAbridgment，titles，BankruptandInsolvent。
18。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，194。
19。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4WheatR。122，194，198，203；2Kent’sComm。Lect。37，p。321，&；c。；
20。4Inst。ch。63。
21。2Black。Comm。472，note；Cooke’sBankr。Laws，Introd。ch。1。？ThemodernFrenchphraseintheCodeofCommerceislabanqueroute。\"Toutcommerç；antfailli，&；c。estenetatdebanqueroute。\"Art。438。
22。2Black。Comm。472，473；Cod。Lib。
7，tit，71，pertotum，Ayliffe’sPandects，B。4tit。14。
23。1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。336；
1Domat，B。4，tit。5，§；1，2。
24。2Black。Comm。473，474。
25。SeeDebateontheBankr。BillintheHouseofRepresentatives，Feb。1818，4Elliot’sDebates，282to284。？Perhapsassatisfactoryadescriptionofabankruptlaw，ascanbeframed，is，thatitisalawforthebenefitandreliefofcreditorsandtheirdebtors，incases，inwhichthelatterareunable，orunwillingtopaytheirdebts。Andalawonthesubjectofbankruptcies，inthesenseoftheconstitution，isalawmakingprovisionsforcasesofpersonsfailingtopaytheirdebts。AnamendmentwasproposedbythestateofNew—Yorktotheconstitutionatthetimeofadoptingit，thatthepowerofpassinguniformbankruptlawsshouldextendonlytomerchantsandothertraders；
butitdidnotmeetgeneralfavour。26
26。JournalofConvention，Supplement，p。436。
27。SeeGoldenv。Prince，3Wash。
Circ。R。313；Ogdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。R。264，267to270，perWashingtonJ。Itiswellknown，thatMr。JusticeWashingtonwasnotaloneintheCourtinthisopinionintheoriginalcase，Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，inwhichitwasfirstdecided。
28Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，191to196；Id。198to202；Ogdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。R。273，275，280，306，310，314，335，369。
29。Ogdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。
R。122，369；Boylev。Zacharie，6Peters’sR。348；2Kent。Comm。
Lect。37，p。323，324；SergeantonConst。Law，ch。28，p。309，[。ch。30，p。322；]RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。101，102。
JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
Book3Chapter17CHAPTERXVII。POWERTOCOINMONEYANDFIXTHESTANDARDOFWEIGHTSANDMEASURES。§；1111。THEnextpowerofcongressis\"tocoinmoney，regulatethevaluethereof，andofforeigncoin，andfixthestandardofweightsandmeasures。\"
§；1112。Undertheconfederation，thecontinentalcongresshaddelegatedtothem，\"thesoleandexclusiverightandpowerofregulatingthealloyandvalueofcoinstruckbytheirownauthority，orbythatofthestates，\"and\"fixingthestandardofweightsandmeasuresthroughouttheUnitedStates。\"Itisobservable，that，undertheconfederation，therewasnopowergiventoregulatethevalueofforeigncoin，anomission，whichinagreatmeasurewoulddestroyanyuniformityinthevalueofthecurrentcoin，sincetherespectivestatesmight，bydifferentregulations，createadifferentvalueineach。1Theconstitutionhas，withgreatpropriety，curedthisdefect；and，indeed，thewholeclause，asitnowstands，doesnotseemtohaveattractedanydiscussionintheconvention。2Ithasbeenjustlyremarked，thatthepower\"tocoinmoney\"would，doubtless，includethatofregulatingitsvalue，hadthelatterpowernotbeenexpresslyinserted。Buttheconstitutionaboundswithpleonasmsandrepetitionsofthisnature。3
§；1113。Thegrounds，uponwhichthegeneralpowertocoinmoney，andregulatethevalueofforeignanddomesticcoin，isgrantedtothenationalgovernment，cannotrequiremuchillustrationinordertovindicateit。TheobjectofthepoweristoproduceuniformityofvaluethroughouttheUnion，andthustoprecludeusfromtheembarrassmentsofaperpetuallyfluctuatingandvariablecurrency。Moneyistheuniversalmediumorcommonstandard，byacomparisonwithwhichthevalueofallmerchandisemaybeascertained，or，itisasign，whichrepresentstherespectivevaluesofallcommodities。4Itis，therefore，indispensableforthewantsandconveniencesofcommerce，domesticaswellasforeign。Thepowertocoinmoneyisoneoftheordinaryprerogativesofsovereignty，andisalmostuniversallyexercisedinordertopreserveapropercirculationofgoodcoinofaknownvalueinthehomemarket。Inordertosecureitfromdebasementitisnecessary，thatitshouldbeexclusivelyunderthecontrolandregulationofthegovernment；
forifeveryindividualwerepermittedtomakeandcirculate，whatcoinheshouldplease，therewouldbeanopeningtothegrossestfraudsandimpositionsuponthepublic，bytheuseofbaseandfalsecoin。Andthesameremarkapplieswithequalforcetoforeigncoin，ifallowedtocirculatefreelyinacountrywithoutanycontrolbythegovernment。Everycivilizedgovernment，therefore，withaviewtopreventsuchabuses，tofacilitateexchanges，andtherebytoencourageallsortsofindustryandcommerce，aswellastoguarditselfagainsttheembarrassmentsofanunduescarcityofcurrency，injurioustoitsowninterestsandcredits，hasfounditnecessarytocoinmoney，andaffixtoitapublicstampandvalue，andtoregulatetheintroductionanduseofforeigncoins。5InEngland，thisprerogativebelongstothecrown；and，informerages，itwasgreatlyabused；forbasecoinwasoftencoinedandcirculatedbyitsauthority，atavaluefaraboveitsintrinsicworth；andthustaxesofaburthensomenaturewerelaidindirectlyuponthepeople。6Thereisgreatpropriety，therefore，inconfidingittothelegislature，notonlyasthemoreimmediaterepresentativesofthepublicinterests，butasthemoresafedepositariesofthepower。7
§；1114。Theonlyquestion，whichcouldproperlyariseunderourpoliticalinstitutions，is，whetheritshouldbeconfidedtothenational，ortothestategovernment。Itismanifest，thattheformercouldalonegiveitcompleteeffect，andsecureawholesomeanduniformcurrencythroughouttheUnion。Thevaryingstandardsandregulationsofthedifferentstateswouldintroduceinfiniteembarrassmentsandvexationsinthecourseoftrade；andoftensubjecttheinnocenttothegrossestfrauds。Theevilsofthisnatureweresoextensivelyfelt，thatthepowerwasunhesitatinglyconfidedbythearticlesofconfederationexclusivelytothegeneralgovernment，8notwithstandingtheextraordinaryjealousy，whichpervadeseveryclauseofthatinstrument。
Buttheconcurrentpowertherebyreservedtothestates，aswellasthewantofapowertoregulatethevalueofforeigncoin，was，underthatfeeblepageantofsovereignty，soonfoundtodestroythewholeimportanceofthegrant。Thefloodsofdepreciatedpapermoney，withwhichmostofthestatesoftheUnion，duringthelastwar，aswellastherevolutionarywarwithEngland，wereinundated，tothedismayofthetravellerandtheruinofcommerce，affordalivelyproofofthemischiefsofacurrencyexclusivelyunderthecontrolofthestates。9
§；1115。Itwillbehereafterseen，thatthisisanexclusivepowerincongress，thestatesbeingexpresslyprohibitedfromcoiningmoney。Andithasbeensaidbyaneminentstatesman，10thatitisdifficulttomaintain，onthefaceoftheconstitutionitselfandindependentoflongcontinuedpractice，thedoctrine，thatthestates，notbeingatlibertytocoinmoney，canauthorizethecirculationofbankpaper，ascurrency，atall。Hisreasoningdeservesgraveconsideration，andistothefollowingeffect。Thestatescannotcoinmoney。Canthey，then，cointhat，whichbecomestheactualandalmostuniversalsubstituteformoney？Isnottherightofissuingpaper，intendedforcirculationintheplace，andastherepresentativeofmetalliccurrency，derivedmerelyfromthepowerofcoiningandregulatingthemetalliccurrency？Couldcongress，ifitdidnotpossessthepowerofcoiningmoneyandregulatingthevalueofforeigncoins，createabankwiththepowertocirculatebills？Itwouldbedifficulttomakeitout。Where，then，dothestates，towhomallcontroloverthemetalliccurrencyisaltogetherprohibited，obtainthispower？
Itistrue，thatinothercountries，privatebankers，havingnolegalauthorityoverthecoin，issuenotesforcirculation。Butthistheydoalwayswiththeconsentofgovernment，expressorimplied；andgovernmentrestrainsandregulatesalltheiroperationsatitspleasure。Itwouldbeastartlingpropositioninanyotherpartoftheworld，thattheprerogativeofcoiningmoney，heldbygovernment，wasliabletobedefeated，counteracted，orimpededbyanotherprerogative，heldinotherhands，ofauthorizingapapercirculation。Itisfurthertobeobserved，thatthestatescannotissuebillsofcredit；notthattheycannotmakethemalegaltender；butthattheycannotissuethematall。Thisisadearindicationoftheintentoftheconstitutiontorestrainthestates，aswellfromestablishingapapercirculation，asfrominterferingwiththemetalliccirculation。Bankshavebeencreatedbystateswithnocapitalwhatever，theirnotesbeingputincirculationsimplyonthecreditofthestate。Whataretheissuesofsuchbanks，butbillsofcreditissuedbythestate？11
§；1116。Whatevermaybetheforceofthisreasoning，itisprobablytoolatetocorrecttheerror，iferrortherebe，intheassumptionofthispowerbythestates，sinceithasaninveteratepracticeinitsfavourthroughaverylongperiod，andindeedeversincetheadoptionoftheconstitution。
§；1117。Theotherpower，\"tofixthestandardofweightsandmeasures，\"was，doubtless，givenfromlikemotivesofpublicpolicy，forthesakeofuniformity，andtheconvenienceofcommerce。12Hitherto，however，ithasremainedadormantpower，fromthemanydifficultiesattendantuponthesubject，althoughithasbeenrepeatedlybroughttotheattentionofcongressinmostelaboratereports。13Untilcongressshallfixastandard，theunderstandingseemstobe，thatthestatespossessthepowertofixtheirownweightsandmeasures；14or，atleast，theexistingstandardsattheadoptionoftheconstitutionremaininfullforce。Undertheconfederation，congresspossessedthelikeexclusivepower。15InEngland，thepowertoregulateweightsandmeasuresissaidbyMr。JusticeBlackstonetobelongtotheroyalprerogative。16Butithasbeenremarkedbyalearnedcommentatoronhiswork，thatthepowercannot，withpropriety，bereferredtotheking’sprerogative；for，fromMagnaChartatothepresenttime，thereareabovetwentyactsofparliamenttofixandestablishthestandardanduniformityofweightsandmeasures。17
§；1118。Thenextpowerofcongressis，\"toprovideforthepunishmentofcounterfeitingthesecuritiesandcurrentcoinoftheUnitedStates。\"Thispowerwouldnaturallyflow，asanincident，fromtheantecedentpowerstoborrowmoney，andregulatethecoinage；and，indeed，withoutitthosepowerswouldbewithoutanyadequatesanction。
Thispowerwouldseemtobeexclusiveofthatofthestates，sinceitgrowsoutoftheconstitution，asanappropriatemeanstocarryintoeffectotherdelegatedpowers，notantecedentlyexistinginthestates。18
1。TheFederalist，No。42。
2。Journ。ofConvention，220，257，357。
3。Mr。Madison’sLettertoMr。Cabell，18thSept。1828。
4。1Black。Comm。276。
5。Smith’sWealthofNations，B。1，ch。4。
6。1Black。Comm。278；Christian’snote，21；Darien’sRep。48；1Hale’sPl。Cr。192to196。
7。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。261。
8。Art。9。
9。DuringthelatewarwithGreatBritain，1812to1814，inconsequenceofthebanksoftheMiddle，andSouthern，andWesternstateshavingsuspendedspeciepaymentsfortheirbanknotes，theydepreciatedaslowas95percent。discountfromtheirnominalvalue。
Thedutiesonimportswere，however，paidandreceivedinthelocalcurrency；
andtheconsequencewas，thatgoodsimportedatBaltimorepaid20percent。
lessduty，thanthesamegoodspaid，whenimportedintoBoston。Thiswasaplainpracticalviolationoftheprovisionoftheconstitution，thatallduties，imports，andexcisesshallbeuniform。
10。Mr。Webster’sSpeechontheBankoftheUnitedStates，25thand28thofMay，1832。
11。ThisopinionisnotpeculiartoMr。Webster。ItwasmaintainedbythelateHon。SamuelDexter，oneoftheableststatesmenandlawyers，whohaveadornedtheannalsofourcountry。
12。TheFederalist，No。49。
13。Amongthese。nonearemoreelaborateandexact，thanthatofMr。JeffersonandMr。J。Q。Adams，whiletheywererespectivelyattheheadofthedepartmentofstate。
14。RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。102。
15。Art。9。
16。1Black。Comm。276。
17。1Black。Comm。276；Christian’snote，16。
18。SeeRawleonConstitution，ch。9，p。103；TheFederalist，No。49。
JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
Book3Chapter18CHAPTERXVIII。POWERTOESTABLISHPOST—OFFICESANDPOST—ROADS。§；1119。Thenextpowerofconfessis，\"toestablishpost—officesandpost—roads。\"Thenatureandextentofthispower，boththeoreticallyandpractically，areofgreatimportance，andhavegivenrisetomuchardentcontroversy。Itdeserves，therefore，adeliberateexamination。
ItwaspassedoverbytheFederalistwithasingleremark，asapowernotlikelytobedisputedinitsexercise，ortobedeemeddangerousbyitsscope。The\"power，\"saystheFederalist，\"ofestablishingpost—roadsmust，ineveryview，beaharmlesspower；andmay，perhaps，byjudiciousmanagement，becomeproductiveofgreatpublicconveniency。Nothing，whichtendstofacilitatetheintercoursebetweenthestates，canbedeemedunworthyofthepubliccare。\"1Onecannotbutfeel，atthepresenttime，aninclinationtosmileattheguardedcautionoftheseexpressions，andthehesitatingavowaloftheimportanceofthepower。Itaffords，perhaps，oneofthemoststrikingproofs，howmuchthegrowthandprosperityofthecountryhaveoutstrippedthemostsanguineanticipationsofourmostenlightenedpatriots。
§；1120。Thepost—officeestablishmenthasalreadybecomeoneofthemostbeneficent，andusefulestablishmentsunderthenationalgovernment。2Itcirculatesintelligenceofacommercial，political，intellectual，andprivatenature，withincrediblespeedandregularity。Itthusadministers，inaveryhighdegree，tothecomfort，theinterests，andthenecessitiesofpersons，ineveryrankandstationoflife。Itbringsthemostdistantplacesandpersons，asitwere，incontactwitheachother；andthussoftenstheanxieties，increasestheenjoyments，andcheersthesolitudeofmillionsofhearts。Itimpartsanewinfluenceandimpulsetoprivateintercourse；
and，byawiderdiffusionofknowledge，enablespoliticalrightsanddutiestobeperformedwithmoreuniformityandsoundjudgment。Itisnotlesseffective，asaninstrumentofthegovernmentinitsownoperations。Inpeace，itenablesitwithoutostentationorexpensetosenditsorders，anddirectitsmeasuresforthepublicgood，andtransferitsfunds，andapplyitspowers，withafacilityandpromptitudewhich，comparedwiththetardyoperations，andimbecileexpedientsofformertimes，seemlikethewondersofmagic。Inwaritis，ifpossible，stillmoreimportantanduseful，communicatingintelligencevitaltothemovementsofarmiesandnavies，andtheoperationsanddutiesofwarfare，witharapidity，which，ifitdoesnotalwaysensurevictory，atleast，inmanyinstances，guardsagainstdefeatandruin。Thus，itsinfluenceshavebecome，inapublic，aswellasprivateview，ofincalculablevaluetothepermanentinterestsoftheUnion。Itisobviousatamoment’sglanceatthesubject，thattheestablishmentinthehandsofthestateswouldhavebeenwhollyinadequatetotheseobjects；andtheimpracticabilityofauniformityofsystemwouldhaveintroducedinfinitedelaysandinconveniences；andburthenedthemailswithanendlessvarietyofvexatioustaxations，andregulations。Noone，accustomedtotheretardationsofthepostinpassingthroughindependentstatesonthecontinentofEurope，canfailtoappreciatethebenefitsofapower，whichpervadestheUnion。Thenationalgovernmentisthatalone，whichcansafelyoreffectuallyexecuteit，withequalpromptitudeandcheapness，certaintyanduniformity。Alreadythepost—officeestablishmentrealizesarevenueexceedingtwomillionsofdollars，fromwhichitdefraysallitsownexpenses，andtransmitsmailsinvariousdirectionsovermorethanonehundredandtwentythousandmiles。Ittransmitsintelligenceinonedaytodistantplaces，which，whentheconstitutionwasfirstputintooperation，wasscarcelytransmittedthroughthesamedistanceinthecourseofaweek。3Therapidityofitsmovementshasbeeninageneralviewdoubledwithinthelasttwentyyears。Therearenowmorethaneightthousandfivehundredpost—officesintheUnitedStates；andateverysessionofthelegislaturenewroutesareconstantlyprovidedfor，andnewpost—officesestablished。Itmay，therefore，wellbedeemedamostbeneficentpower，whoseoperationscanscarcelyheapplied，exceptforgood，andaccomplishinaneminentdegreesomeofthehighpurposessetforthinthepreambleoftheconstitution，formingamoreperfectunion，providingforthecommondefence，andpromotingthegeneralwelfare。
§；1121。Undertheconfederation，art。
9，congresswasinvestedwiththesoleandexclusivepowerof\"establishingandregulatingpost—officesfromonestatetoanotherthroughouttheUnitedStates，andexactingsuchpostageonthepaperspassingthroughthesame，asmayberequisitetodefraytheexpensesofthesaidoffice。\"4Howlittlewasaccomplishedunderitwillbeatonceapparentfromthefact，thattherewerebutseventy—fivepost—officesestablishedinalltheUnitedStatesintheyear1789；thatthewholeamountofpostagein1790wasonly$37，935；andthenumberofmilestravelledbythemailsonly1875。5Thismaybeinpartattributabletothestateofthecountry，andthedepressionofallthecommercialandotherinterestsofthecountry。Butthepoweritselfwassocrippledbytheconfederation，thatitcouldaccomplishlittle。
Thenationalgovernmentdidnotpossessanypower，excepttoestablishpost—officesfromstatetostate，leavingperhaps，thoughnotintended，thewholeinteriorpost—officesineverystatetoitsownregulation，
andthepostage，thatcouldbetaken，wasnotallowedtobebeyondtheactualexpenses；thusshuttinguptheavenuetoallimprovements。Inshort，likeeveryotherpowerundertheconfederation，itperishedfromajealousy，whichrequiredittolive，andyetrefuseditappropriatenourishmentandsustenance。6
§；1122。Inthefirstdraftoftheconstitution，theclausestoodthus，\"Congressshallhavepowertoestablishpost—offices。\"
Itwassubsequentlyamendedbyaddingthewords\"andpost—roads，\"bythevoteofsixstatesagainstfive；andthen，asamended，itpassedwithoutopposition。7Itisobservable，thattheconfederationgaveonlythepowertoestablishandregulatepost—offices；
andthereforetheamendmentintroducedanewandsubstantivepower，unknownbeforeinthenationalgovernment。