Ifcongress，inregulatingcommerce，shouldpassanyact，theobjectofwhichshouldbetocontrolstatelegislationoversuchnavigablestreamsorcreeks，therewouldbelittledifficultyinsaying，thatastatelawinconflictwithsuchanactwouldbevoid。Butifcongresshaspassednogeneralorspecialactonthesubject，theinvalidityofsuchastateactmustbeplacedentirelyuponitsrepugnancytothepowertoregulatecommerceinitsdormantMate。Undersuchcircumstances，itwouldbedifficulttoaffirm，thatthesovereigntyofastate，actingonsubjectswithinthereachofotherpowers，besidethatofregulatingcommerce，andwhichbelongedtoitsgeneralterritorialjurisdiction，wouldbeinterceptedbytheexclusivepowerofcommerce，unexercisedbycongress，overthesamesubjectmatter。
Thevalueofthepropertyonthebanksofsuchstreamsandcreeksmaybemateriallyenhancedbyexcludingthewatersfromthemandtheadjacentlowandmarshygrounds，andthehealthoftheinhabitantsbeimproved。
Measurescalculatedtoproducetheseobjects，providedtheydonotcomeintocollisionwiththepowerofthegeneralgovernment，areundoubtedlywithinthose，whicharereservedtothestates。43
§；1070。Inthenextplace，towhatextent，andforwhatobjectsandpurposesthepowertoregulatecommercemaybeconstitutionallyapplied。
§；1071。Andfirst，amongthestates。
Itisnotdoubted，thatitextendstotheregulationofnavigation，andtothecoastingtradeandfisheries，within，aswellaswithoutanystate，whereveritisconnectedwiththecommerceorintercoursewithanyotherstate，orwithforeignnations。44ItextendstotheregulationandgovernmentofseamenonboardofAmericanships；andtoconferringprivilegesuponshipsbuiltandownedintheUnitedStatesindomestic，aswellasforeigntrade。45Itextendstoquarantinelaws，andpilotagelaws，andwrecksofthesea。46Itextends，aswelltothenavigationofvesselsengagedincarryingpassengers，andwhethersteamvesselsorofanyotherdescription，astothenavigationofvesselsengagedintrafficandgeneralcoastingbusiness。47Itextendstothelayingofembargoes，aswellondomestic，asonforeignvoyages。48Itextendstotheconstructionoflight—houses，theplacingofbuoysandbeacons，theremovalofobstructionstonavigationincreeks，rivers，sounds，andbays，andtheestablishmentofsecuritiestonavigationagainsttheinroadsoftheocean。Itextendsalsotothedesignationofparticularportorportsofentryanddeliveryforthepurposesofforeigncommerce。49Thesepowershavebeenactuallyexertedbythenationalgovernmentunderasystemoflaws，manyofwhichcommencedwiththeearlyestablishmentoftheconstitution；andtheyhavecontinuedunquestioneduntoourday，ifnottotheutmostrangeoftheirreach，atleasttothatoftheirordinaryapplication。50
§；1072。Manyofthelikepowershavebeenappliedintheregulationofforeigncommerce。ThecommercialsystemoftheUnitedStateshasalsobeenemployedsometimesforthepurposeofrevenue；sometimesforthepurposeofprohibition；sometimesforthepurposeofretaliationandcommercialreciprocity；sometimestolayembargoes；51sometimestoencouragedomesticnavigation，andtheshippingandmercantileinterestbybounties，bydiscriminatingduties，andbyspecialpreferencesandprivileges；52andsometimestoregulateintercoursewithaviewtomerepoliticalobjects，suchastorepelaggressions，increasethepressureofwar，orvindicatetherightsofneutralsovereignty。Inallthesecases，therightanddutyhavebeenconcededtothenationalgovernmentbytheunequivocalvoiceofthepeople。
§；1073。Aquestionhasbeenrecentlymade，whethercongresshaveaconstitutionalauthoritytoapplythepowertoregulatecommerceforthepurposeofencouragingandprotectingdomesticmanufactures。Itisnotdenied，thatcongressmay，incidentally，initsarrangementsforrevenue，ortocountervailforeignrestrictions，encouragethegrowthofdomesticmanufactures。Butitisearnestlyandstrenuouslyinsisted，that，underthecolourofregulatingcommerce，congresshavenorightpermanentlytoprohibitanyimportations，ortotaxanyunreasonablyforthepurposeofsecuringthehomemarkettothedomesticmanufacturer，astheytherebydestroythecommerceentrustedtothemtoregulate，andfosteraninterest，withwhichtheyhavenoconstitutionalpowertointerfere。54ThisopinionconstitutestheleadingdoctrineofseveralstatesintheUnionatthepresentmoment；andismaintained，asvitaltotheexistenceoftheUnion。Ontheotherhand，itisasearnestlyandstrenuouslymaintained，thatcongressdoespossesstheconstitutionalpowertoencourageandprotectmanufacturesbyappropriateregulationsofcommerce；andthattheoppositeopinionisdestructiveofallthepurposesoftheUnion，andwouldannihilateitsvalue。
§；1074。Undersuchcircumstances，itbecomesindispensabletoreviewthegrounds，uponwhichthedoctrineofeachpartyismaintained，andtosiftthemtothebottom；sinceitcannotbedisguised，thatthecontroversystillagitatesallAmerica，andmarksthedivisionsofpartybythestrongestlines，bothgeographicalandpolitical，whichhaveeverbeenseensincetheestablishmentofthenationalgovernment。
§；1075。Thereasoning，bywhichthedoctrineismaintained，thatthepowertoregulatecommercecannotbeconstitutionallyapplied，asameans，directlytoencouragedomesticmanufactures，hasbeeninpartalreadyadvertedtoinconsideringtheextentofthepowertolaytaxes。Itisproper，however，topresentitentireinitspresentconnexion。
Itistothefollowingeffect。？Theconstitutionisoneoflimitedandenumeratedpowers；andnoneofthemcanberightfullyexercised。beyondthescopeoftheobjects，specifiedinthosepowers。Itisnotdisputed，that，whenthepowerisgiven，alltheappropriatemeanstocarryitintoeffectareincluded。Neitherisitdisputed，thatthelayingofdutiesis，ormaybeanappropriatemeansofregulatingcommerce。Butthequestionisaverydifferentone，whether，underpretenceofanexerciseofthepowertoregulatecommerce，congressmayinfactimposedutiesforobjectswhollydistinctfromcommerce。Thequestioncomestothis，whetherapower，exclusivelyfortheregulationofcommerce，isapowerfortheregulationofmanufactures？Thestatementofsuchaquestionwouldseemtoinvolveitsownanswer。Canapower，grantedforonepurpose，betransferredtoanother？Ifitcan，whereisthelimitationintheconstitution？Arenotcommerceandmanufacturesasdistinct，ascommerceandagriculture？Iftheyare，howcanapowertoregulateonearisefromapowertoregulatetheother？Itistrue，thatcommerceandmanufacturesare，ormaybe，intimatelyconnectedwitheachother。Aregulationofonemayinjuriouslyorbeneficiallyaffecttheother。Butthatisnotthepointincontroversy。Itis，whethercongresshasarighttoregulatethat，whichisnotcommittedtoit，underapower，whichiscommittedtoit，simplybecausethereis，ormaybeanintimateconnexionbetweenthepowers。Ifthiswereadmitted，theenumerationofthepowersofcongresswouldbewhollyunnecessaryandnugatory。Agriculture，colonies，capital，machinery，thewagesoflabour，theprofitsofstock，therentsofland，thepunctualperformanceofcontracts，andthediffusionofknowledgewouldallbewithinthescopeofthepower；forallofthembearanintimaterelationtocommerce。Theresultwouldbe，thatthepowersofcongresswouldembracethewidestextentoflegislativefunctions，totheutterdemolitionofallconstitutionalboundariesbetweenthestateandnationalgovernments。Whendutiesarelaid，notforpurposesofrevenue，butofretaliationandrestriction，tocountervailforeignrestrictions，theyarestrictlywithinthescopeofthepower，asaregulationofcommerce。
Butwhen。laidtoencouragemanufactures，theyhavenothingtodowithit。Thepowertoregulatemanufacturesisnomoreconfidedtocongress，thanthepowertointerferewiththesystemsofeducation，thepoorlaws，ortheroadlawsofthestates。Itisnotorious，that，intheconvention，anattemptwasmadetointroduceintotheconstitutionapowertoencouragemanufactures；butitwaswithheld。55Insteadofgrantingthepowertocongress，permissionwasgiventothestatestoimposeduties，withtheconsentofthatbody，toencouragetheirownmanufactures；andthus，inthetruespiritofjustice，imposingtheburthenonthose，whoweretobebenefited。Itistrue，thatcongressmay，incidentally，whenlayingdutiesforrevenue，consulttheotherinterestsofthecountry。Theymaysoarrangethedetails，asindirectlytoaidmanufactures。
Andthisisthewholeextent，towhichcongresshasevergoneuntil。thetariffs，whichhavegivenrisetothepresentcontroversy。Theformerprecedentsofcongressarenot，evenifadmittedtobeauthoritative，applicabletothequestionnowpresented。56
§；1076。Thereasoningofthose，whomaintainthedoctrine，thatcongresshasauthoritytoapplythepowertoregulatecommercetothepurposeofprotectingandencouragingdomesticmanufactures，istothefollowingeffect。Thepowertoregulatecommerce，beinginitstermsunlimited，includesallmeansappropriatetotheend，andallmeans，which，havebeenusuallyexertedunderthepower。Noonecandoubtordeny，thatapowertoregulatetradeinvolvesapowertotaxit。Itisafamiliarmode，recognisedinthepracticeofallnations，andwasknownandadmittedbytheUnitedStates，whiletheywerecolonies，andhaseversincebeenacteduponwithoutoppositionorquestion。TheAmericancolonieswhollydeniedtheauthorityoftheBritishparliamenttotaxthem，exceptasaregulationofcommerce；buttheyadmittedthisexerciseofpower，aslegitimateandunquestionable。Thedistinctionwaswithdifficultymaintainedinpracticebetweenlawsfortheregulationofcommercebywayoftaxation，andlaws，whichweremadeformeremonopoly，orrestriction，whentheyincidentallyproducedrevenue。57Anditiscertain，thatthemainandadmittedobjectofparliamentaryregulations。oftradewiththecolonieswastheencouragementofmanufacturesinGreat—Britain。
Othernationshave，inlikemanner，forlikepurposes，exercisedthelikepower。So，thatthereisnonoveltyintheuseofthepower，andnostretchintherangeofthepower。
§；1077。Indeed，theadvocatesoftheoppositedoctrineadmit，thatthepowermaybeapplied，soasincidentallytogiveprotectiontomanufactures，whenrevenueistheprincipaldesign；
andthatitmayalsobeappliedtocountervailtheinjuriousregulationsofForeignpowers，whenthereisnodesignofrevenue。Theseconcessionsadmit，then，thattheregulationsofcommercearenotwhollyforpurposesofrevenue，orwhollyconfinedtothepurposesofcommerce，consideredperse。Ifthisbetrue，thenotherobjectsmayenterintocommercialregulations；
andifso，whatrestraintisthere，astothenatureorextentoftheobjects，towhichtheymayreach，whichdoesnotresolveitselfintoaquestionofexpediencyandpolicy？Itmaybeadmitted，thatapower，givenforonepurpose，cannotbepervertedtopurposeswhollyopposite，orbesideitslegitimatescope。Butwhatperversionisthereinapplyingapowertotheverypurposes，towhichithasbeenusuallyapplied？Undersuchcircumstances，doesnotthegrantofthepowerwithoutrestrictionconcede，thatitmaybelegitimatelyappliedtosuchpurposes？Ifadifferentintenthadexisted，wouldnotthatintentbemanifestedbysomecorrespondinglimitation？
§；1078。Nowitiswellknown，thatincommercialandmanufacturingnations，thepowertoregulatecommercehasembracedpracticallytheencouragementofmanufactures。Itisbelieved，thatnotasingleexceptioncanbenamed。So，inanespecialmanner，thepowerhasalwaysbeenunderstoodinGreat—Britain，fromwhichwederiveourparentage，ourlaws，ourlanguage，andournotionsuponcommercialsubjects。SuchwasconfessedlythenotionofthedifferentstatesintheUnionundertheconfederation，andbeforetheformationofthepresentconstitution。Oneknownobjectofthepolicyofthemanufacturingstatesthenwas，theprotectionandencouragementoftheirmanufacturesbyregulationsofcommerce。58Andtheexerciseofthispowerwasasourceofconstantdifficultyanddiscontent；notbecauseimproperofitself；butbecauseitboreinjuriouslyuponthecommercialarrangementsofotherstates。Thewantofuniformityintheregulationsofcommercewasasourceofperpetualstrifeanddissatisfaction，ofinequalities，andrivalries，andretaliationsamongthestates。Whentheconstitutionwasframed，nooneeverimagined，thatthepowerofprotectionofmanufactureswastobetakenawayfromallthestates，andyetnotdelegatedtotheUnion。Theverysuggestionwouldofitselfhavebeenfataltotheadoptionoftheconstitution。Themanufacturingstateswouldneverhaveaccededtoituponanysuchterms；andtheynevercould，withoutthepower，havesafelyaccededtoit；foritwouldhavesealedtheirruin。Thesamereasoningwouldapplytotheagriculturalstates；fortheregulationofcommerce，withaviewtoencouragedomesticagriculture，isjustasimportant，andjustasvitaltotheinterestsofthenation，andjustasmuchanapplicationofthepower，astheprotectionorencouragementofmanufactures。Itwouldhavebeenstrangeindeed，ifthepeopleoftheUnitedStateshadbeensolicitoussolelytoadvanceandencouragecommerce，withatotaldisregardoftheinterestsofagricultureandmanufactures，whichhad，atthetimeoftheadoptionoftheconstitution，anunequivocalpreponderancethroughouttheUnion。Itismanifestfromcontemporaneousdocuments，thatoneobjectoftheconstitutionwas，toencouragemanufacturesandagriculturebythisveryuseofthepower。59
§；1079。Theterms，then，oftheconstitutionaresufficientlylargetoembracethepower；thepracticeofothernations，andespeciallyofGreat—BritainandoftheAmericanstates，hasbeentouseitinthismanner；andthisexerciseofitwasoneoftheverygrounds，uponwhichtheestablishmentoftheconstitutionwasurgedandvindicated。
Theargument，then，initsfavourwouldseemtobeabsolutelyirresistibleunderthisaspect。Butthereareotherveryweightyconsiderations，whichenforceit。
§；1080。Inthefirstplace，ifcongressdoesnotpossessthepowertoencouragedomesticmanufacturesbyregulationsofcommerce，thepowerisannihilatedforthewholenation。Thestatesaredeprivedofit。Theyhavemadeavoluntarysurrenderofit；andyetitexistsnotinthenationalgovernment。Itisthenamerenonentity。
Suchapolicy，voluntarilyadoptedbyafreepeople，insubversionofsomeoftheirdearestrightsandinterests，wouldbemostextraordinaryinitself，withoutanyassignablemotiveorreasonforsogreatasacrifice，andutterlywithoutexampleinthehistoryoftheworld。Nomancandoubt，thatdomesticagricultureandmanufacturesmaybemostessentiallypromotedandprotectedbyregulationsofcommerce。Nomancandoubt，thatitisthemostusual，andgenerallythemostefficientmeansofproducingthoseresults。Nomancanquestion，thatinthesegreatobjectsthedifferentstatesofAmericahaveasdeepastake，andasvitalinterests，asanyothernation。Why，then，shouldthepowerbesurrenderedandannihilated？Itwouldproducethemostseriousmischiefsathome；andwouldsecurethemostcompletetriumphoverusbyforeignnations。Itwouldintroduceandperpetuatenationaldebility，ifnotnationalruin。Aforeignnationmight，asaconqueror，imposeuponusthisrestraint，asabadgeofdependence，andasacrificeofsovereignty，tosubserveitsowninterests；butthatweshouldimposeituponourselves，isinconceivable。Theachievementofourindependencewasalmostworthless，ifsuchasystemwastobepursued。Itwouldbeineffectaperpetuationofthatverysystemofmonopoly，ofencouragementofforeignmanufactures，anddepressionofdomesticindustry，whichwassomuchcomplainedofduringourcolonialdependence；andwhichkeptallAmericainastateofpoverty，andslavishdevotiontoBritishinterests。
Undersuchcircumstances，theconstitutionwouldbeestablished，notforthepurposesavowedinthepreamble，butfortheexclusivebenefitandadvancementofforeignnations，toaidtheirmanufactures，andsustaintheiragriculture。Supposecotton，rice，tobacco，wheat，corn，sugar，andotherrawmaterialscouldbe，orshouldhereafterbe，abundantlyproducedinforeigncountries，underthefosteringhandsoftheirgovernments，bybountiesandcommercialregulations，soastobecomecheaperwithsuchaidsthanourown；areallourmarketstobeopenedtosuchproductswithoutanyrestraint，simplybecausewemaynotwantrevenue，totheruinofourproductsandindustry？IsAmericareadytogiveeverythingtoEurope，withoutanyequivalent；andtakeinreturnwhateverEuropemaychoosetogive，uponitsownterms？Themostservileprovincialdependencecouldnotdomoreevils。Ofwhatconsequencewoulditbe，thatthenational。
governmentcouldnottaxourexports，ifforeigngovernmentsmighttaxthemtoanunlimitedextent，soastofavourtheirown，andthustosupplyuswiththesamearticlesbytheoverwhelmingdepressionofourownbyforeigntaxation？Whenitisrecollected，withwhatextremediscontentandreluctantobediencetheBritishcolonialrestrictionswereenforcedinthemanufacturingandnavigatingstates，whiletheywerecolonies，itisincredible，thattheyshouldbewillingtoadoptagovernment，Whichshould，ormightentailuponthemequalevilsinperpetuity。Commerceitselfwouldultimatelybeasgreatasuffererbysuchasystem，astheotherdomesticinterests。Itwouldlanguish，ifitdidnotperish。Letanymanaskhimself，ifNew—England，ortheMiddlestateswouldeverhaveconsentedtoratifyaconstitution，whichwouldaffordnoprotectiontotheirmanufacturesorhomeindustry。Iftheconstitutionwasratifiedunderthebelief，sedulouslypropagatedonallsides，thatsuchprotectionwasafforded，woulditnotnowbeafrauduponthewholepeopletogiveadifferentconstructiontoitspowers？
§；1081。Itisidletosay，thatwiththeconsentofcongress，thestatesmaylaydutiesonimportsorexports，tofavourtheirowndomesticmanufactures。Inthefirstplace，ifcongresscouldconstitutionallygivesuchconsentforsuchapurpose，whichhasbeendoubted；60theywouldhaveafighttorefusesuchconsent，andwouldcertainlyrefuseit，iftheresultwouldbewhattheadvocatesoffreetradecontendfor。Inthenextplace，itwouldbeutterlyimpracticablewithsuchconsenttoprotecttheirmanufacturesbyanysuchlocalregulations。Tobeofanyvaluetheymustbegeneral，anduniformthroughthenation。Thisisnotamatteroftheory。Ourwholeexperienceundertheconfederationestablishedbeyondallcontroversytheutterlocalfutility，andeventhegeneralmischiefsofindependentstatelegislationuponsuchasubject。Itfurnishedoneofthestrongestgroundsfortheestablishmentoftheconstitution。61
§；1082。Inthenextplace，ifrevenuebethesolelegitimateobjectofanimpost，andtheencouragementofdomesticmanufacturesbenotwithinthescopeofthepowerofregulatingtrade，itwouldfollow，ashasbeenalreadyhinted，thatnomonopolizingorunequalregulationsofforeignnationscouldbecounteracted。Undersuchcircumstances，neitherthestaplearticlesofsubsistence，northeessentialimplementsforthepublicsafety，couldbeadequatelyensuredorprotectedathomebyourregulationsofcommerce。Thedutymightbewhollyunnecessaryforrevenue；andincidentally，itmightevencheckrevenue。But，ifcongressmay，inarrangementsforrevenue，incidentallyanddesignedlyprotectdomesticmanufactures，whatgroundistheretosuggest，thattheymaynotincorporatethisdesignthroughthewholesystemofduties，andselectandarrangethemaccordingly？Thereisnoconstitutionalmeasure，bywhichtograduate，howmuchshallbeassessedforrevenue，andhowmuchforencouragementofhomeindustry。Andnosystemeveryetadoptedhasattempted，andinallprobabilitynonehereafteradoptedwillattempt，whollytosevertheoneobjectfromtheother。Theconstitutionalobjectioninthisviewispurelyspeculative，regardingonlyfuturepossibilities。
§；1083。Butifitbeconceded，asitis，thatthepowertoregulatecommerceincludesthepoweroflayingdutiestocountervailtheregulationsandrestrictionsofforeignnations，then，whatlimitsaretobeassignedtothisuseofthepower？62Iftheircommercialregulations，eitherdesignedlyorincidentally，dopromotetheirownagricultureandmanufactures，andinjuriouslyaffectours，whymaynotcongressapplyaremedycoextensivewiththeevil？Ifcongresshave，ascannotbedenied，thechoiceofthemeans，theymaycountervailtheregulations，notonlybytheexerciseofthelextalionisinthesameway，butinanyotherwayconducivetothesameend。IfGreatBritainbycommercialregulationsrestrictstheintroductionofourstapleproductsandmanufacturesintoherownterritories，andleviesprohibitoryduties，whymaynotcongressapplytheSameruletoherstapleproductsandmanufactures，andsecurethesamemarkettoourselves？Thetruthis，thatassoonastherighttoretaliateforeignrestrictionsorforeignpolicybycommercialregulationsisadmitted，thequestion，inwhatmanner，andtowhatextent，itshallbeapplied，isamatteroflegislativediscretion，andnotofconstitutionalauthority。Whenevercommercialrestrictionsandregulationsshallceaseallovertheworld，sofarastheyfavourthenationadoptingthem，itwillbetimeenoughtoconsider，whatAmericaoughttodoinherownregulationsofcommerce，whicharedesignedtoprotectherownindustryandcounteractsuchfavoritism。Itwillthenbecomeaquestion，notofpower，butofpolicy。Suchastateofthingshasneveryetexisted。
Infacttheconcession，thatthepowertoregulatecommercemayembraceotherobjects，thanrevenue，oreventhancommerceitself，isirreconcilablewiththefoundationoftheargumentontheotherside。
§；1084。Besides；thepoweristoregulatecommerce。Andinwhatmannerregulateit？Whydoesthepowerinvolvetherighttolayduties？Simply，becauseitisacommonmeansofexecutingthepower。Ifso，whydoesnotthesamerightexistastoallothermeansequallycommonandappropriate？Whydoesthepowerinvolvearight，notonlytolayduties，buttolaydutiesforrevenue，andnotmerelyfortheregulationandrestrictionofcommerce，consideredperse？
Nootheranswercanbegiven，butthatrevenueisanincidenttosuchanexerciseofthepower。Itflowsfrom，anddoesnotcreatethepower。Itmayconstitutethemotivefortheexerciseofthepower，justasanyothercausemay；asforinstance，theprohibitionofforeigntrade，ortheretaliationofforeignmonopoly；butitdoesnotconstitutethepower。
§；1085。Now，themotiveofthegrantofthepowerisnotevenalludedtointheconstitution。Itisnotevenstated，thatcongressshallhavepowertopromoteandencouragedomesticnavigationandtrade。Apowertoregulatecommerceisnotnecessarilyapowertoadvanceitsinterests。Itmayingivencasessuspenditsoperationsandrestrictitsadvancementandscope。Yetnomaneveryetdoubtedtherightofcongresstolaydutiestopromoteandencouragedomesticnavigation，whetherintheformoftonnageduties，orotherpreferencesandprivileges，eitherintheforeigntrade，orcoastingtrade，orfisheries。63Itisascertain，asanythinghumancanbe，thatthesoleobjectofcongress，insecuringthevastprivilegestoAmericanbuiltships，bysuchpreferences，andprivileges，andtonnageduties，was，toencouragethedomesticmanufactureofships，andallthedependentbranchesofbusiness。64Itspeaksoutinthelanguageofalltheirlaws，andhasbeenasconstantlyavowed，andactedon，asanysinglelegislativepolicyeverhasbeen。Nooneeverdreamed，thatrevenueconstitutedtheslightestingredientintheselaws。Theywerepurelyfortheencouragementofhomemanufactures，andhomeartisans，andhomepursuits。Uponwhatgroundscancongressconstitutionallyapplythepowertoregulatecommercetoonegreatclassofdomesticmanufactures，whichdoesnotinvolvetherighttoencourageall？Ifitbesaid，thatnavigationisapartofcommerce，thatistrue。Butapowertoregulatenavigationnomoreincludesapowertoencouragethemanufactureofshipsbytonnageduties，thananyothermanufacture。Whynotextendittotheencouragementofthegrowthandmanufactureofcottonandhempforsailsandrigging；oftimber，boards，andmasts；oftar，pitch，andturpentine；
ofironandwool；ofsheetingsandshirtings；ofartisansandmechanics，howeverremotelyconnectedwithit？Therearemanyproductsofagricultureandmanufactures，whichareconnectedwiththeprosperityofcommerceasintimately，asdomesticshipbuilding。Iftheonemaybeencouraged，asaprimarymotiveinregulationsofcommerce，whymaynottheothers？Thetruthis，thattheencouragementofdomesticshipbuildingiswithinthescopeofthepowertoregulatecommerce，simply，becauseitisaknownandordinarymeansofexercisingthepower。Itisoneofmany，andmaybeusedlikeallothers。accordingtolegislativediscretion。Themotivetotheexerciseofapowercanneverformaconstitutionalobjectiontotheexerciseofthepower。
§；1086。Here，then，isacaseoflayingduties，anordinarymeansusedinexecutingthepowertoregulatecommerce；
howcanitbedeemedunconstitutional？Ifitbesaid，thatthemotiveisnottocollectrevenue，whathasthattodowiththepower？Whenanactisconstitutional，asanexerciseofapower，canitbeunconstitutionalfromthemotives，withwhichitispassed？Ifitcan，thentheconstitutionalityofanactmustdepend，notuponthepower，butuponthemotivesofthelegislature。Itwillfollow，asaconsequence，thatthesameactpassedbyonelegislaturewillbeconstitutional，andbyanotherunconstitutional。
Nay，itmightbeunconstitutional，aswellfromitsomissionsasitsenactments，sinceifitsomissionsweretofavourmanufactures，themotivewouldcontaminatethewholelaw。Suchadoctrinewouldbenovelandabsurd。Itwouldconfuseanddestroyallthetestsofconstitutionalrightsandauthorities。Congresscouldneverpassanylawwithoutaninquisitionintothemotivesofeverymember；andeventhen，theymightbere—examinable。Besides；whatpossiblemeanscantherebeofmakingsuchinvestigations？Themotivesofmanyofthemembersmaybe，naymustbeutterlyunknown，andincapableofascertainmentbyanyjudicialorotherinquiry：theymaybemixedupinvariousmannersanddegress；theymaybeoppositeto，orwhollyindependentofeachother。
Theconstitutionwouldthusdependuponprocessesutterlyvague，andincomprehensible；
andthewrittenintentofthelegislatureuponitswordsandacts，thelexscripta，wouldbecontradictedorobliteratedbyconjecture，andparoldeclarations，andfleetingreveries，andheatedimaginations。
Nogovernmentonearthcouldrestforamomentonsuchafoundation。Itwouldbeaconstitutionofsandheapedupanddissolvedbythefluxandrefluxofeverytideofopinion。Everyactofthelegislaturemustthereforebejudgedoffromitsobjectandintent，astheyareembodiedinitsprovisions；
andifthelatterarewithinthescopeofadmittedpowers，theactmustbeconstitutional，whetherthemotiveforitwerewise，orjust，orotherwise。
Themannerofapplyingapowermaybeanabuseofit；butthisdoesnotprove，thatitisunconstitutional。
§；1087。Passingbytheseconsiderations，letthepracticeofthegovernmentandthedoctrinesmaintainedbythose，whohaveadministeredit，bedeliberatelyexamined；andtheywillbefoundtobeinentireconsistencywiththisreasoning。Theveryfirstcongress，thateversatundertheconstitution，composedinaconsiderabledegreeofthose，whohadframed，orassistedinthediscussionofitsprovisionsinthestateconventions，deliberatelyadoptedthisviewofthepower。
Andwhatismostremarkable，uponasubjectofdeepinterestandexcitement，whichatthetimeoccasionedlongandvehementdebates，notasinglesyllableofdoubtwasbreathedfromanyquarteragainsttheconstitutionalityofprotectingagricultureandmanufacturesbylayingduties，althoughtheintentiontoprotectandencouragethemwasconstantlyavowed。65Nay，itwascontendedtobeaparamountduty，uponthefaithfulfulfillmentofwhichtheconstitutionhadbeenadopted，andtheomissionofwhichwouldbeapoliticalfraud，withoutawhisperofdissentfromanyside。66ItwasdemandedbythepeoplefromvariouspartsoftheUnion；andwasresistedbynone。67Yet，statejealousywasnevermorealivethanatthisperiod，andstateinterestsnevermoreactivelymingledinthedebatesofcongress。Thetwogreatparties，whichafterwardssomuchdividedthecountryuponthequestionofaliberalandstrictconstructionoftheconstitution，werethendistinctlyformed，andproclaimedtheiropinionswithfirmnessandfreedom。If，therefore，therehadbeenapointofdoubt，onwhichtohanganargument，itcannotbequestioned，butthatitwouldhavebeenbroughtintothearrayofopposition。Suchasilence，undersuchcircumstances，ismostpersuasiveandconvincing。
§；1088。Theverypreambleofthisact68thesecondpassedbycongress
is，\"Whereasitisnecessaryforthesupportofthegovernment，forthedischargeofthedebtsoftheUnitedStates，andtheencouragementandprotectionofmanufactures，thatdutiesbelaidongoods，wares，andmerchandisesimported，Beitenacted，\"&；c。69Yet，notasolitaryvoicewasraisedagainstit。Theright，andtheduty，topasssuchlawswas，indeed，takensomuchforgranted，thatinsomeofthemostelaborateexpositionsofthegovernmentuponthesubjectofmanufactures，itwasscarcelyalludedto。70TheFederalistitself，dealingwitheveryshadowofobjectionagainsttheconstitution，neveroncealludestosuchaone；butincidentallycommendsthispower，asleadingtobeneficialresultsonalldomesticinterests。71Everysuccessivecongresssincethattimehasconstantlyacteduponthesystemthroughallthechangesofpartyandlocalinterests。Everysuccessiveexecutivehassanctionedlawsonthesubject；andmostofthemhaveactivelyrecommendedtheencouragementofmanufacturestocongress。72Untilaveryrecentperiod，nopersoninthepubliccouncilsseriouslyrelieduponanyconstitutionaldifficulty。Andevennow，whenthesubjecthasbeenagitated，anddiscussedwithgreatabilityandzealthroughouttheUnion，notmorethanfivestateshaveexpressedanopinionagainsttheconstitutionalright，whileithasreceivedanunequivocalsanctionintheotherswithanalmostunexampleddegreeofunanimity。Andthistoo，whenin，mostotherrespectsthesestateshavebeeninstrongoppositiontoeachotheruponthegeneralsystemofpoliticspursuedbythegovernment。
§；1089。Ifever，therefore，contemporaneousexposition，andtheuniformandprogressiveoperationsofthegovernmentitself，inallitsdepartments，canbeofanyweighttosettletheconstructionoftheconstitution，thereneverhasbeen，andtherenevercanbemoredecidedevidenceinfavourofthepower，thanisfurnishedbythehistoryofournationallawsfortheencouragementofdomesticagricultureandmanufactures。Toresignanexpositionsosanctioned，wouldbetodeliveroverthecountrytointerminabledoubts；andtomaketheconstitutionnotawrittensystemofgovernment，butafalseanddelusivetext，uponwhicheverysuccessiveageofspeculatistsandstatesmenmightbuildanysystem，suitedtotheirownviewsandopinions。Butifitbeaddedtothis，thattheconstitutiongivesthepowerinthemostunlimitedterms，andneitherassignsmotives，norobjectsforitsexercise；butleavesthesewhollytothediscretionofthelegislature，actingforthecommongood，andthegeneralinterests；theargumentinitsfavourbecomesasabsolutelyirresistible，asanydemonstrationofamoralorpoliticalnatureevercanbe。Withoutsuchapower，thegovernmentwouldbeabsolutelyworthless，andmademerelysubservienttothepolicyofforeignnations，incapableofself—protectionorself—support；73withit，thecountrywillhaveafighttoassertitsequality，anddignity，andsovereigntyamongtheothernationsoftheearth。74
§；1089[a]。Inregardtotherejectionofthepropositionintheconvention\"toestablishinstitutions，rewards，andimmunitiesforthepromotionofagriculture，commerce，trades，andmanufactures，\"75itismanifest，thatithasnobearingonthequestion。Itwasapowermuchmorebroadinitsextentandobjects，thanthepowertoencouragemanufacturesbytheexerciseofanothergrantedpower。Itmightbecontendedwithquiteasmuchplausibility，thattherejectionwasanimpliedrejectionoftherighttoencouragecommerce，forthatwasequallywithinthescopeoftheproposition。Intruth，itinvolvedadirectpowertoestablishinstitutions，rewards，andimmunitiesforallthegreatinterestsofsociety，andwas，onthataccount，deemedtoobroadandsweeping。Itwouldestablishageneral，andnotalimitedpowerofgovernment。
§；1090。Suchisasummarynecessarilyimperfectofthereasoningoneachsideofthiscontesteddoctrine。Thereaderwilldrawhisownconclusions；andtheseCommentarieshavenofurtheraim，thantoputhiminpossessionofthematerialsforaproperexerciseofhisjudgment。
§；1091。Whenthesubjectoftheregulationofcommercewasbeforetheconvention，thefirstdraftoftheconstitutioncontainedanarticle，that\"nonavigationactshallbepassed，withouttheassentoftwothirdsofthememberspresentineachhouse。\"76Thisarticlewasafterwardsrecommendedinareportofacommitteetobestrickenout。Inthesecondreviseddraftitwasleftout；andamotion，toinsertsucharestrictiontohaveeffectuntiltheyear1808，wasnegativedbythevoteofsevenstatesagainstthree。77Anotherproposition，thatnoact，regulatingthecommerceoftheUnitedStateswithforeignpowers，shouldbepassedwithouttheassentoftwothirdsofthemembersofeachhouse，wasrejectedbythevoteofsevenstatesagainstfour。78Therejectionwas，probably，occasionedbytwoleadingreasons。First，thegeneralimproprietyofallowingtheminorityinagovernmenttocontrol，andineffecttogovernallthelegislativepowersofthemajority。Secondly，theespecialinconvenienceofsuchapowerinregardtoregulationsofcommerce，wheretheproperremedyforgrievancesoftheworstsortmightbewithheldfromthenavigatingandcommercialstatesbyaverysmallminorityoftheotherstates。79Asimilarpropositionwasmade，aftertheadoptionoftheconstitution，bysomeofthestates；butitwasneveractedupon。80
§；1092。ThepowerofcongressalsoextendstoregulatecommercewiththeIndiantribes。Thispowerwasnotcontainedinthefirstdraftoftheconstitution。Itwasafterwardsreferredtothecommitteeontheconstitutionamongotherpropositionstoconsidertheproprietyofgivingtocongressthepower\"toregulateaffairswiththeIndians，aswellwithin，aswithoutthelimitsoftheUnitedStates。\"And，inthereviseddraft，thecommitteereportedtheclause，\"andwiththeIndianTribes，\"asitnowstands。81
§；1093。Undertheconfederation，thecontinentalcongresswereinvestedwiththesoleandexclusiverightandpower\"ofregulatingthetradeandmanagingallaffairswiththeIndians，notmembersofanyofthestates，provided，thatthelegislativerightofanystatewithinitsownlimitsbenotinfringedorviolated。\"82
§；1094。AntecedentlytotheAmericanRevolutiontheauthoritytoregulatetradeandintercoursewiththeIndiantribes，whethertheywerewithin，orwithouttheboundariesofthecolonies，wasunderstoodtobelongtotheprerogativeoftheBritishcrown。83AndaltertheAmericanRevolution，thelikepowerwouldnaturallyfalltothefederalgovernment，withaviewtothegeneralpeaceandinterestsofallthestates。84Tworestrictions，however，uponthepowerwere，bytheabovearticle，incorporatedintotheconfederation，whichoccasionedendlessembarrassmentsanddoubts。ThepowerofcongresswasrestrainedtoIndians，notmembersofanyofthestates；andwasnottobeexercised，soastoviolateorinfringethelegislativerightofanystatewithinitsownlimits。WhatdescriptionofIndiansweretobedeemedmembersofastatewasneversettledundertheconfederation；
andwasaquestionoffrequentperplexityandcontentioninthefederalcouncils。AndhowthetradewithIndians，thoughnotmembersofastate，yetresidingwithinitslegislativejurisdiction，wastoberegulatedbyanexternalauthority，withoutsofarintrudingontheinternalrightsoflegislation，wasabsolutelyincomprehensible。Inthiscase，asinsomeothercases，thearticlesofconfederationinconsideratelyendeavouredtoaccomplishimpossibilities；toreconcileapartialsovereigntyintheUnion，withcompletesovereigntyinthestates；tosubvertamathematicalaxiom，bytakingawayapart，andlettingthewholeremain。85Theconstitutionhaswiselydisembarrassedthepowerofthesetwolimitations；
andhasthusgiventocongress，astheonlysafeandproperdepositary，theexclusivepower，whichbelongedtothecrownintheante—revolutionarytimes；apowerindispensabletothepeaceofthestates，andtothejustpreservationoftherightsandterritoryoftheIndians。86Intheformerillustrationsofthissubject，itwasstated，thattheIndians，fromthefirstsettlementofthecountry，werealwaystreated，asdistinct，thoughinsomesort，asdependentnations。Theirterritorialrightsandsovereigntywererespected。Theyweredeemedincapableofcarryingontradeorintercoursewithanyforeignnations，orofcedingtheirterritoriestothem。Buttheirrightofself—governmentwasadmitted；andtheywereallowedanationalexistence，undertheprotectionoftheparentcountry，whichexemptedthemfromtheordinaryoperationsofthelegislativepowerofthecolonies。Duringtherevolutionandafterwardstheyweresecuredinthelikeenjoymentoftheirrightsandproperty，asseparatecommunities。87ThegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，sincetheconstitution，havealwaysrecognisedthesameattributesofdependentsovereignty，asbelongingtothem，andclaimedthesamerightofexclusiveregulationoftradeandintercoursewiththem，andthesameauthoritytoprotectandguaranteetheirterritorialpossessions，immunities，andjurisdiction。88
§；1095。Thepower，then，giventocongresstoregulatecommercewiththeIndiantribes，extendsequallytotribeslivingwithinorwithouttheboundariesofparticularstates，andwithinorwithouttheterritoriallimitsoftheUnitedStates。Itissaysalearnedcommentatorwhollyimmaterial，whethersuchtribescontinueseatedwithintheboundariesofastate，inhabitpartofaterritory，orroamatlargeoverlands，towhichtheUnitedStateshavenoclaim。Thetradewiththemis，inallitsforms，subjectexclusivelytotheregulationofcongress。
Andinthisparticular，also，wetracethewisdomoftheconstitution。
TheIndians，notdistractedbythediscordantregulationsofdifferentstates，aretaughttotrustonegreatbody，whosejusticetheyrespect，andwhosepowertheyfear。89
§；1096。Ithaslatelybeenmadeaquestion，whetheranIndiantribe，situatedwithintheterritorialboundariesofastate；butexercisingthepowersofgovernment，andnationalsovereignty，undertheguaranteeofthegeneralgovernment，isaforeignstateinthesenseoftheconstitution，andassuchentitledtosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Uponsolemnargument，ithasbeenheld，thatsuchatribeistobedeemedpoliticallyastate；thatis，adistinctpoliticalsociety，capableofself—government；butitisnottobedeemedaforeignstate，inthesenseoftheconstitution。Itisratheradomesticdependentnation。Suchatribemayproperlybedeemedinastateofpupillage；anditsrelationtotheUnitedStatesresemblesthatofawardtoaguardian。90，91
1。Article9。
2。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。245，246；
TheFederalist，No。41。
3。Westonv。CityCouncilofCharleston，2Peters’sR。449，468。
4。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，225，JohnsonJ。’sOpinion；Brownv。Maryland，12Wheat。R。
445，446。
5。TheFederalist，No。4，7，11，22，37。
6。Brownv。StateofMaryland，12Wheat。R。419，445，446；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。248to252；1
Amer。Museum，8，272，273，281，282，288；2Amer。Museum，263to276；Id。
371，372；TheFederalist，No。7，11，22；Mr。Madison’sLettertoMr。Cabell，18thSept。1828；5Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。2，p。74to80；2
Pitkin’sHist。189，192。
7。TheFederalist，No。7。11，12，22，41，42。
8。JournalofConvention，220，257，260，356，378。
9。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。189。
10。9Wheat。R。196。
11。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
189，190；Id。229，230。
12。9Wheat。R。190，191；Id。215，216，217；Id。229，230；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。249to252。
13。12Wheat。R。446。
14。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。247，248，249。
15。9Wheat。R。191。
16。9Wheat。R。191，215，216；NorthRiverSteamboatCompanyv。Livingston，3Cowen’sR。713。
17。9Wheat。193；1Kent’sComm。
Lect。19，p。404，405；TheBrigantineWilliam，2Hall’sLawJournal，265；SergeantonConst。ch。28，p。290，&；c。
18。9Wheat。193，215，216，217；Id。
226；12Wheat。R。446，447；NorthRiverSteamboatCompanyv。Livingston，3Cowen’sR。713。
19。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheaton’sR。1，201；Ib。224；Ib。225to228。SeeMr。Verplank’slettertoCol。Draytonin1831；ResolvesofCongress，14thOct。1774，1JournalofCongress，27；2Marshall’sLifeofWashington，infivevolumes，p。77，81；Dr。
Franklin’sExamination，beforethehouseofcommons，in1766；Dickerson’sFarmer’sLetters，No。2，1767；1Jefferson’sCorresp。7；Burke’sSpeechonAmericanTaxation，1774。
20。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheaton’sR。194。
21。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheaton’sR。194，195，196；Brownv。Maryland，12Wheaton，446，447。
22。SeetheFederalist，No。6，7，11，12，22，41，42；N。R。SteamboatCompanyv。Livingston，3Cowen’sR。713。
23。12Wheaton’sR。448，449；9Wheaton，199to204。
24。TheFederalist，No。42；1Tuck。
Black。Comm。App。247to252。
25。SeePresidentMonroe’sExpositionandMessage，4May，1822，p。31，32。
26。TheFederalist，No。42，22。
27。TheFederalist，No。42。
28。TheFederalist，No。11，12。
29。SeetheopinionofMr。JusticeJohnson，9Wheaton’sR。224to228。
30。Intheconvention，itwasmovedtoamendthearticle，soastogivetocongress\"thesoleandexclusive\"
power；butthepropositionwasrejectedbythevoteofsixstatesagainstfive。31
31。JournalofConvention，220，270。
32。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheaton’sR。1；Brownv。Maryland，12Wheaton’sR。419，445。446；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App，180，309；N。R。SteamBoatCompanyv。Livingston，3Cowen’sR。713。
33。9Wheaton’sR。196，198，209；Id。
227，228。
34。Wheaton’sR。199，200。
35。9Wheaton’sR。201，202；1Jefferson’sCorresp。7；TheFederalist，No。56；12Wheaton’sR。446，447。
36。9Wheaton’sR。201，202。
37。SeeCorfieldv。Cargill，4Wash。Cir。R。371，379，&；c。
38。9Wheaton’sR。203to207，209。
39。9Wheaton’sR。207，208，209。
40。1Kent’sComm。Lect19，p。404，410，411。SeealsoRawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。81to84；SergeantonConst。ch。98，p。291，292。？ThereisaveryableandcandidreviewofthewholesubjectbyMr。ChancellorKentinhisexcellentcommentaries。1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。404。Igladlyavailmyselfofthis，aswellasofallotheroccasions，torecommendhislearnedlabourstothose，whoseektostudythelaw，ortheconstitution，withaliberalandenlightenedspirit。
41。9Wheaton’sR。197to204。
42。Brownv。StateofMaryland，12Wheaton’sR。419，445to447；9Wheaton’sR。197。&；c。？Mr。JusticeThompsondissentedfromthisdoctrine，aswillbeseeninhisopinionin12Wheaton’sR。449，&；c。
43。Wilsonv。BlackbirdCreekCompany，2Peters’sR。245。
44。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。189to198；Id。211to215；1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。247to249；Id。
250。
45。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。252。
46。9Wheat。R。203，204，205，206，207，208；1Tuck。BlackComm。App。251，252。
47。9Wheat。R。214，915to221。
48。9Wheat。R。191，192；1Kent’sComm。
Lect。19，p。404，405。
49。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。249，251；
9Wheat。R。208，209。
50。Mr。Hamilton，inhiscelebratedargumentonthenationalbank，23dFeb。1791，enumeratesthefollowingaswithinthepowertoregulatecommerce，viz。theregulationofpoliciesofinsurance，ofsalvageupongoodsfoundatsea，andthedispositionofsuchgoods；theregulationofpilots；andtheregulationofbillsofexchangedrawnbyonemerchantuponamerchantofanotherstate；and，ofcourse，theregulationofforeignbillsofexchange。53
51。SergeantonConst。Lawch。28，ch。
30，2dedit。
52。See1Elliot’sDebates，144。
53。1Hamilton’sWork’s，134。
54。SeeAddressofthePhiladelphiaFreeTradeConvention，inSeptemberandOctober1831。
55。ApropositionwasreferredtothecommitteeofDetailsandRevision\"toestablishpublicinstitutions，rewards，andimmunities，forthepromotionofagriculture，commerce，trade，andmanufactures。\"Thecommitteeneverreportedonit。Journ。ofConvention，p。261。
56。Theaboveargumentsandreasoninghavebeengathered，asfarascouldbe，fromdocumentsadmittedtobeofhighauthoritybythose，whomaintaintherestrictivedoctrine。SeetheExpositionandProtestoftheSouthCarolinalegislature，inDec。1828，attributedtoMr。VicePresidentCalhoun；theAddressoftheFreeTradeConventionatPhiladelphia，inOct。1831，attributedtoMr。AttorneyGeneralBerrien；theOrationoftheHon。Mr。Drayton，onthe4thofJuly，1831；
andtheSpeechofMr。SenatorHayne，9thofJan。1832？Seealso4Jefferson’sCorresp。421。
57。SeeMr。Madison’sLettertoMr。
Cabell，18thSept。1828；Mr。Verplanck’sLettertoCol。Drayton，in183
1；AddressoftheNew—YorkConventioninfavourofDomesticIndustry，November，1831，p。12，13，149Wheat。K。202；1Pitk。Hist。ch。3，p。93to106。
58。1AmericanMuseum，16。
59。1Elliot’sDebates，74，75，76，77，115；3Elliot’sDebates，31，32，33；2Amer。Museum，371，372，373；
3Amer。Museum，62，554，556，557；TheFederalist，No。12，41；1Tuck。
Black。Comm。App。237，238；1AmericanMuseum，16，282，289，429，432；
Id。434，436；Hamilton’sReportonManufactures，in1791；4Elliot’sDebates，App。351to354。
60。SeeMr。Madison’sLettertoMr。
Cabell，18thSept。1828；4Elliot’sDebates，App。345。
61。Mr。Madison’sLettertoMr。Cabell，18thSept。1828；4Elliot’sDebates，App。345。
62。SeetheFederalist，No。11，12。
63。SeeMr。Jefferson’sReportontheFisheries，1stFeb。1791，10Amer。Mus。App。1，&；c。，8，&；c。
64。SeeMr。Williamson’sSpeechinCongress，8Amer。Mus。140。
65。See1Lloyd’sDeb。17，19，22，23，24，26，27，28，31，34，39，43，46，47，50，51，52，55，64to69，71，72，74to83，94，95，97。109，116，145，160，161，211，212，243，244，254；
Id。144，183，194，206，207。Seealso5Marshall’sWash。ch。3，p。189，190。
66。See1Lloyd’sDeb。24，160，161，243，244；4Elliot’sDeb。App。351，351。
67。SeeGrimke’sSpeech，inDec。1828，p。58，59，63。
68。Act。of4thJuly，1789。
69。Itisnotalittleremarkable，thatthecultureofcottonwasjustthenbeginninginSouthCarolina；andherstatesmenthenthoughtaprotectingdutytoaidagriculturewasinallrespectsproper，andconstitutional。1Lloyd’sDeb。79；Id。210，211，212，244。
70。Hamilton’sReportonManufacturers，in1791。
71。TheFederalist，No。10，35，41。
72。See4Elliot’sDebates，App。353，354。
73。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence，280，281；1Pitkin’sHist。ch。3，p。93to106。
74。TheforegoingsummaryhasbeenprincipallyabstractedfromtheLetterofMr。MadisontoMr。Cabell，18thSept。1828；
4Elliot’sDeb。345；Mr。Grimke’sSpeechinDec。1898，intheSouthCarolinasenate；Mr。Huger’sSpeechintheSouthCarolinalegislature，inDec。1830；
AddressoftheNewYorkConventionoftheFriendsofDomesticIndustry，inOct。1831；Mr。Verplanck’sLettertoCol。Drayton，in1831；Mr。Clay’sSpeechinthesenate，inFeb。1839；Mr。EdwardEverett’sAddresstotheAmericanInstitute，inOct。1831；Mr。Hamilton’sReportonManufactures，in1791；Mr。Jefferson’sReportontheFisheries，in1791。See，also，4
Jefferson’sCorrespondence，280，281。
75。JournalofConvention，p。961。
76。JournalofConvention，p。222。
77。JournalofConvention，222。285，286，293，358，387。See，also，3AmericanMuseum，62，419，420；2AmericanMuseum，553；2Pitkin’sHist。261。
78。JournalofConvention，306。
79。SeeTheFederalist，No。22；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。253，375。
80。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。253，375。
81。JournalofConvention，220，260，356。
82。Art。9。
83。Worcesterv。StateofGeorgia，6Peters’sR。515；Johnsonv。McIntosh，8Wheat。R。543；JournalofCongress，3August，1787，12thvol。p。81to86。
84。Ibid。
85。TheFederalist，No。42；1Tuck。
Black。Comm。App。253；12Jour。ofCongress，3August，1787，p。81to84。
86。Worcesterv。TheStateofGeorgia，6Peters’sR。515；12Journ。ofCongress，3August，1787，p。81to84。
87。Johnsonv。McIntosh，8Wheat。
R。543；Fletcherv。Peck，6Cranch，146，147，perJohnsonJ。；TheCherokeeNationv。Georgia，5Peters’sR1；Worcesterv。TheStateofGeorgia，6Peters’sR。515；Jacksonv。Goodell，20Johnson’sR。193；3Kent’sComm。Lect。50，p。303to318。
88。Worcesterv。StateofGeorgia，6Peters’sR。515；Journ。ofCongress，3August，1787，vol。12，p。81to84。？Mr。Blunt，inhisvaluableHistoricalSketchoftheFormationoftheConfederacy，&；c。hasgivenaveryfullviewoftheante—revolutionary，aswellaspost—revolutionaryauthorityexercisedinregardtotheIndiantribes。SeeBlunt’sHistoricalSketch，&；c。New—York，1825。Mr。Jefferson’sopinionwas，thattheUnitedStateshadnomorethanarightofpre—emptionoftheIndianlands，notamountingtoanydominion，orjurisdiction，orpermanentauthoritywhatever；andthattheIndianspossessedafull，undivided，and。independentsovereignty。4Jefferson’sCorresp。478。
89。RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。84。Seealso1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。254；1Kent’sComm。Lect。
50，p。508to318。
90。TheCherokeeNationv。Georgia，5Peters’sR。1，16，17；Jacksonv。Goodell，20John。R。193；3
Kent’sComm。Lect。50。p。308to318。InthefirstvolumeofBioren&；
Duane’seditionofthelawsoftheUnitedStates，therewillbefoundahistoryofourIndianTreatiesandLawsregulatingIntercourseandTradewiththeIndians。1UnitedStatesLaws，597to620。
91。Whilethissheetwaspassingthroughthepress，PresidentJackson’sProclamationofthe10thofDecember，1832，concerningtherecentOrdinanceofSouth—Carolinaonthesubjectofthetariff，appeared。Thatdocumentcontainsamostelaborateviewofseveralquestions，whichhavebeendiscussedinthisandtheprecedingvolume，especiallyrespectingthesupremacyofthelawsoftheUnion；therightofthejudiciarytodecideupontheconstitutionalityofthoselaws；andthetotalrepugnancytotheconstitutionofthemoderndoctrineofnullificationassertedinthatordinance。Asastatepaperitisentitledtoveryhighpraisefortheclearness，force，andeloquence，withwhichithasdefendedtherightsandpowersofthenationalgovernment。Igladlycopyintothesepagessomeofitsimportantpassages，asamongtimeablestcommentarieseverofferedupontheconstitution。\"Whereas，aconventionassembledinthestateofSouth—Carolinahavepassedanordinance，bywhichtheydeclare，’ThattheseveralactsandpartsofactsofthecongressoftimeUnitedStates，purportingtobelawsfortheimposingofdutiesandimpostsontheimportationofforeigncommodities，andnowhavingactualoperationandeffectwithintheUnitedStates，andmoreespecially，’twoactsforthesamepurposepassedonthe29thofMay，1828，andonthe14thofJuly，1832，areunauthorizedbytheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，andviolatethetruemeaningandintentthereof，andarenullandvoid，andnolaw，’norbindingonthecitizensofthatstateoritsofficers：andbythesaidordinance，itisfurtherdeclaredtobeunlawfulforanyoftheconstitutedauthoritiesofthestate，oroftheUnitedStates，toenforcethepaymentofthedutiesimposedbythesaidactswithinthesamestate，andthatitisthedutyofthelegislaturetopasssuchlaws，asmaybenecessarytogivefulleffecttothesaidordinance：
\"Andwhereas，bythesaidordinance，itisfurtherordained，thatinnoeaseoflaworequity，decidedinthecourtsofsaidstate，whereinshallbedrawninquestionthevalidityofthesaidordinance，oroftheactsofthelegislature，thatmaybepassedtogiveiteffect，orofthesaidlawsoftheUnitedStates，noappealshallbeallowedtotheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates，norshallanycopyoftherecordbepermittedorallowedforthatpurpose，andthatanypersonattemptingtotakesuchappealshallbepunishedasforacontemptofcourt：\"And，finally，thesaidordinancedeclares，thatthepeopleofSouthCarolinawillmaintainthesaidordinanceateveryhazard；andthattheywillconsiderthepassageofanyactbycongress，abolishingorclosingtheportsofthesaidstate，orotherwiseobstructingthetreeingressoregressofvesselstoandfromthesaidports，oranyotheractofthefederalgovernmenttocoercethestate，shutupherports，destroyorharasshercommerce，ortoenforcethesaidactsotherwise，thanthroughtheciviltribunalsofthecountry，asinconsistentwiththelongercontinuanceofSouth—CarolinaintheUnion；andthatthepeopleofthesaidstatewillthenceforthholdthemselvesabsolvedfromallfurtherobligationtomaintainorpreservetheirpoliticalconnexionwiththepeopleoftheotherstates，andwillforthwithproceedtoorganizeaseparategovernment，anddoalletheractsandthings，whichsovereignandindependentstatesmayofrightdo：
\"Andwhereas，thesaidordinanceprescribestothepeopleofSouthCarolinaacourseofconduct，indirectviolationoftheirduty，ascitizensoftheUnitedStates，contrarytothelawsoftheircountry，subversiveofitsconstitution，andhavingforitsobjectthedestructionoftheUnion，？thatUnion，which，coevalwithourpoliticalexistence，ledourfathers，withoutanyothertiestounitethem，thanthoseofpatriotismandacommoncause，throughasanguinarystruggletoagloriousindependence，？thatsacredUnion，hithertoinviolate，which，perfectedbyourhappyconstitution，hasbroughtus，bythefavourofHeaven，toastateofprosperityathome，andhighconsiderationabroad，rarely，ifever，equalledinthehistoryofnations。Topreservethisbondofourpoliticalexistencefromdestruction，tomaintaininviolatethisstateofnationalhonourandprosperity，andtojustifytheconfidencemyfellow—citizenshavereposedinme，I，AndrewJackson，PresidentoftheUnitedStates，havethoughtpropertoissuethismyProclamation，statingmyviewsoftheconstitutionandlaws，applicabletothemeasuresadoptedbytheconventionofSouth—Carolina，andtothereasonstheyhaveputforthtosustainthem，declaringthecourse，whichdutywillrequiremetopursue，and，appealingtotheunderstandingendpatriotismofthepeople，warnthemoftheconsequences，thatmustinevitablyresultfromanobservanceofthedictatesoftheconvention。
\"Strictdutywouldrequireofmenothingmore，thantheexerciseofthosepowers，withwhichIamnow，ormayhereafterbe，invested，forpreservingthepeaceoftheUnion，andfortheexecutionofthelaws。
Buttheimposingaspect，whichoppositionhasassumedinthiscase，byclothingitselfwithstateauthority，andthedeepinterest，whichthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesmustallfeelinpreventingaresorttostrongermeasures，whilethereisahope，thatanythine，willbeyieldedtoreasoningandremonstrance，perhapsdemand，andwillcertainlyjustify，afullexpositiontoSouth—CarolinaendthenationoftheviewsIentertainofthisimportantquestion，aswellasadistinctenunciationofthecourse，whichmysenseofdutywillrequiremetopursue。
\"Theordinanceisfounded，notontheindefeasiblerightofresistingacts，whichareplainlyunconstitutionalandtoooppressivetobeendured；butonthestrangeposition，thatanyonestatemaynotonlydeclareanactofcongressvoid，butprohibititsexecution，？thattheymaydothisconsistentlywiththeconstitution，？thatthetrueconstructionofthatinstrumentpermitsastatetoretainitsplaceintheUnion，andyetbeboundbynootherofitslaws，thanthoseitmaychoosetoconsiderasconstitutional。Itistrue，theyadd，thattojustifythisabrogationofalaw，itmustbepalpablycontrarytotheconstitution；butitisevident，thattogivetherightofresistinglawsofthatdescription，coupledwiththeuncontrolledrighttodecide，whatlawsdeservethatcharacter，istogivethepowerofresistingalllaws。For，asbythetheorythereisnoappeal，thereasonsallegedbythestate，goodorbad，mustprevail。
Ifitshouldbesaid，thatpublicopinionisasufficientcheckagainsttheabuseofthispower，itmaybeasked，whyitisnotdeemedasufficientguardagainstthepassageofanunconstitutionalactbycongress。Thereis，however，arestraintinthislastcase，whichmakestheassumedpowerofastatemoreindefensible，andwhichdoesnotexistintheother。Therearetwoappealsfromanunconstitutionalactpassedbycongress，？onetothejudiciary，theothertothepeople，andthestates。Thereisnoappealfromthestatedecisionintheory，andthepracticalillustrationshows，thatthecourtswereclosedagainstanapplicationtoreviewit，bothjudgesandjurorsbeingsworntodecideinitsfavour。Butreasoningonthissubjectissuperfluous，whenoursocialcompactinexpresstermsdeclares，thatthelawsoftheUnitedStates，theconstitution，andtreatiesmadeunderit，arethesupremelawoftheland；andforgreatercautionadds，’thatthejudgesineverystateshallbeboundthereby，anythingintheconstitutionorlawsofanystatetothecontrarynotwithstanding。’
Anditmaybeassertedwithoutfearofrefutation，thatnofederativegovernmentcouldexistwithoutasimilarprovision。Lookforamomenttotheconsequence。
IfSouth—Carolinaconsiderstherevenuelawsunconstitutional，andhasarighttopreventtheirexecutioninthepertofCharleston，therewouldbeaclearconstitutionalobjectiontotheircollectionineveryotherport，andnorevenuecouldbecollectedanywhere；forallimpostsmustbeequal。Itisnoanswertorepeat，thatanunconstitutionallawisnolaw，solongasthequestionofitslegalityistobedecidedbythestateitself；foreverylaw，operatinginjuriouslyuponanylocalinterest，willbeperhapsthought，andcertainlyrepresented，asunconstitutional，and，ashasbeenshown，thereisnoappeal。
\"Ifthisdoctrinehadbeenestablishedatanearlierday，theUnionwouldhavebeendissolvedinitsinfancy。TheexciselawinPennsylvania；
theembargoandnon—intercourselawintheEasternstates；thecarriagetaxinVirginia，werealldeemedunconstitutional，andweremoreunequalintheiroperation，thansayorthelawsnowcomplainedor；butfortunatelynoneorthosestatesdiscovered，thattheyhadtherightnowclaimedbySouth—Carolina。Thewar，intowhichwewereforced，tosupportthedignityorthenationandtherightorourcitizens，mighthaveendedindefeatanddisgrace，insteadorvictoryandhonour。Ifthestates，whosupposeditaruinousandunconstitutionalmeasure，hadthoughttheypossessedtherightofnullifyingtheact，bywhichitwasdeclared，anddenyingsuppliesforitsprosecution。Hardlyandunequally，asthosemeasuresboreuponseveralmembersoftheUnion，tothelegislaturesofnonedidthisefficientandpeaceableremedy，asitiscalled，suggestitself。Thediscoveryofthisimportantfeatureinourconstitutionwasreservedtothepresentday。TothestatesmenorSouth—Carolinabelongstheinvention；anduponthecitizensofthatstatewillunfortunatelyfailtheevilsofreducingittopractice。
\"IfthedoctrineofastatevetouponthelawsoftheUnioncarrieswithitinternalevidenceoritsimpracticableabsurdityourconstitutionalhistorywillalsoaffordabundantproof，thatitwouldhavebeenrepudiatedwithindignation，haditbeenproposedtoformafeatureinourgovernment。
\"Inourcolonialstate，althoughdependentonanotherpower，weveryearlyconsideredourselves，asconnectedbycommoninterestwitheachother。Leagueswereformedforcommondefence，andbeforetheDeclarationofIndependencewewereknowninouraggregatecharacter，asTheUnitedColoniesofAmerica。Thatdecisiveandimportantstepwastakenjointly。Wedeclaredourselvesanationbyatjoint，notbyseveralacts；
andwhenthetermsofourconfederationwerereducedtoform，itwasinthatofasolemnleagueofseveralstates，bywhichtheyagreed，thattheywouldcollectivelyformonenation，forthepurposeofconductingsomecertaindomesticconcerns，andallforeignrelationsintheinstrumentformingthatunionisfoundanarticle，whichdeclares，that’everystateshallabidebythedeterminationsofcongressonallquestions，whichbythatconfederationshouldbesubmittedtothem。
\"Undertheconfederation，then，nostatecouldlegallyannuladecisionofthecongress，orrefusetosubmittoitsexecution；
butnoprovisionwasmadetoenforcethesedecisions。Congressmaderequisitions，buttheywerenotcompliedwith。Thegovernmentcouldnotoperateonindividuals。
Theyhadnojudiciary；nomeansofcollectingrevenue。
\"Butthedefectsoftheconfederationneednotbedetailed。
Underitsoperationwecouldscarcelybecalledanation。Wehadneitherprosperityathome，norconsiderationabroad。Thisstateofthingscouldnotbeendured；andourpresenthappyconstitutionwasformed，butformedinvain，ifthisfataldoctrineprevails。Itwasformedforimportantobjects，thatareannouncedinthepreamble，madeinthenameandbytheauthorityorthepeopleoftheUnitedStates，whosedelegatesframed，andwhoseconventionsapprovedit。Themostimportantamongtheseobjects，that。whichisplacedfirstinrank，onwhichalltheothersrest，is，’formamoreperfectUnion。’
Now，isitpossible，thateveniftherewerenoexpressprovisiongivingsupremacytotheconstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStatesoverthoseofthestates，itcanbeconceived，thataninstrument，madeforthepurposeof’formingamoreperfectUnion，’thanthatoftheconfederation，couldbesoconstructedbytheassembledwisdomofourcountry，astosubstituteforthatconfederationaformofgovernmentdependentforitsexistenceonthelocalinterest，thepartyspiritofastate，orofaprevailingfactioninastate？Everymanofplain。unsophisticatedunderstanding，whohearsthequestion，willgivesuchananswer，aswillpreservetheUnion。Metaphysicalsubtlety，inpursuitofanimpracticabletheory，couldalonehavedevisedone，thatiscalculatedtodestroyit。
\"Iconsider，then，thepowertoannulalawortheUnitedStates，assumedbyonestate，incompatiblewiththeexistenceoftheUnion；
contradictedexpresslybytheletteroftheconstitution；unauthorizedbyitsspirit；inconsistentwitheveryprinciple，onwhichitwasfounded；
anddestructiveofthegreatobject，forwhichitwasformed。
\"Afterthisgeneralviewoftheleadingprinciple，wemustexaminetheparticularapplicationofit，whichismadeintheOrdinance。
\"Thepreamblerestsitsjustificationonthesegrounds：？Itassumesasafact，thattheobnoxiouslaws，althoughtheypurporttobelawsforraisingrevenue，were，inreality，intendedfortheprotectionofmanufactures，whichpurposeitassertstobeunconstitutional；thattheoperationoftheselawsisunequal；thattheamountraisedbythemisgreaterthanisrequiredbythewantsofthegovernment；andfinally，thattheproceedsaretobeappliedtoobjectsunauthorizedbytheconstitution。
Thesearetheonlycausesallegedtojustifyanopenopposition；tothelawsofthecountry，andathreatofsecedingfromtheUnion，ifanyattemptshouldbemadetoenforcethem。Thefirstvirtuallyacknowledges，thatthelawinquestionwaspassedunderapowerexpresslygivenbytheconstitution，tolayandcollectimposts；butitsconstitutionalityisdrawninquestionfromthemotivesofthose，whopassedit。Howeverapparentthispurposemaybeinthepresentcase，nothingcanbemoredangerous，thantoadmittheposition，thatanunconstitutionalpurpose，entertainedbythemembers，whoassenttoalawenactedunderaconstitutionalpower，shallmakethatlawvoid；forhowisthatpurposetobeascertained？Whoistomakethescrutiny？Howoftenmaybadpurposesbefalselyimputed？Inhowmanycasesaretheyconcealedbyfalseprofessions？Inhowmanyisnodeclarationofmotivemade？Admitthisdoctrine，andyougivetothestatesanuncontrolledfighttodecide；andeverylawmaybeannulledunderthispretext。If，therefore，theabsurdanddangerousdoctrineshouldbeadmitted，thatastatemayannulanunconstitutionallaw，oronethatitdeemssuch，itwillnotapplytothepresentcase。
\"Thenextobjectionis，thatthelawsinquestionoperateunequally。Thisobjectionmaybemade，withtruth，toeverylawthathasbeenorcanhepassed。Thewisdomofmanneveryetcontrivedasystemoftaxation，thatwouldoperatewithperfectequality。Iftheunequaloperationofalawmakesitunconstitutional，andifalllawsofthatdescriptionmaybeabrogatedbyanystateforthatcause，then，indeed，isthefederalconstitutionunworthyoftheslightest。effortforitspreservation。Wehavehithertoreliedonit，astheperpetualbondofourunion。Wehavereceivedit，astheworkoftheassembledwisdomofthenation。Wehavetrustedtoit，asthesheet—anchorofoursafetyinthestormytimesofconflictwithaforeignordomesticfoe。Wehavelookedtoitwithsacredawe，asthepalladiumofourliberties，andwithallthesolemnitiesofreligionhavepledgedtoeachotherourlivesandfortuneshere，andourhopesofhappinesshereafter，initsdefenceandsupport。Werewemistaken，mycountrymen，inattachingthisimportancetotheconstitutionofourcountry？Wasourdevotionpaidtothewretched，inefficient，clumsycontrivance，whichthisnewdoctrinewouldmakeit？Didwepledgeourselvestothesupportofanairynothing，abubble，thatmustbeblownawaybythefirstbreathofdisaffection？Wasthisself—destroying，visionarytheory，theworkoftheprofoundstatesmen，theexaltedpatriots，towhomthetaskofconstitutionalreformwasentrusted？