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　　&sect；1123。Upontheconstructionofthisclauseoftheconstitution，twooppositeopinionshavebeenexpressed。

　　Onemaintains，thatthepowertoestablishpost—officesandpost—roadscanintendnomore，thanthepowertodirect，wherepost—officesshallbekept，andonwhatroadsthemailsshallbecarried。8Or，asithasbeenonotheroccasionsexpressed，thepowertoestablishpost—roadsisapowertodesignate，orpointout，whatroadsshallbemail—roads，andtherightofpassageorwayalongthem，whensodesignated。9Theothermaintains，thatalthoughthesemodesofexercisingthepowerareperfectlyconstitutional；yettheyarenotthewholeofthepower，anddonotexhaustit。Onthecontrary，thepowercomprehendstherighttomake，orconstructanyroads，whichcongressmaydeemproperfortheconveyanceofthemail，andtokeeptheminduerepairforsuchpurpose。

　　&sect；1124。Thegroundsoftheformeropinionseemtobeasfollows。Thepowergivenundertheconfederationneverpracticallyreceivedanyotherconstruction。Congressneverundertooktomakeanyroads，butmerelydesignatedthoseexistingroads，onwhichthemailshouldpass。

　　Attheadoptionoftheconstitutionthereisnottheslightestevidence，thatadifferentarrangement，astothelimitsofthepower，wascontemplated。

　　Onthecontrary，itwastreatedbytheFederalist，asaharmlesspower，andnotrequiringanycomment。10Thepracticeofthegovernment，sincetheadoptionoftheconstitution，hasconformedtothisview。Thefirstactpassedbycongress，in1799，isentitled\"anacttoestablishpost—officesandpost—roads。\"Thefirstsectionofthisactestablishedmanypost—officesaswellaspost—roads。

　　Itwascontinued，amended，andfinallyrepealed，byaseriesofactsfrom1792to1810；allofwhichactshavethesametitle，andthesameprovisionsdeclaringcertainroadstobepost—roads。Fromallofwhichitismanifest，thatthelegislaturesupposed，thattheyhadestablishedpost—roadsinthesenseoftheconstitution，whentheydeclaredcertainroads，theninexistence，tobepost—roads，anddesignatedtheroutes，alongwhichthemailsweretopass。Asafartherproofuponthissubject，thestatutebookcontainsmanyactspassedatvarioustimes，duringaperiodofmorethantwentyyears，discontinuingcertainpost—roads。11AstrongargumentisalsoderivablefromthepracticeofcontinentalEurope，whichmustbepresumedtohavebeenknowntotheframersoftheconstitution。

　　DifferentnationsinEuropehaveestablishedposts，andformutualconveniencehavestipulatedafreepassageforthepostsarrivingontheirfrontiersthroughtheirterritories。Itisprobable，thattheconstitutionintendednothingmorebythisprovision，thantoenablecongresstodobylaw，withoutconsultingthestates，whatinEuropecanbedoneonlybytreatyorcompact。

　　Itwasthoughtnecessarytoinsertanexpressprovisionintheconstitution，enablingthegovernmenttoexercisejurisdictionovertenmilessquareforaseatofgovernment，andofsuchplaces，asshouldbecededbythestatesforforts，arsenals，andothersimilarpurposes。Itisincredible，thatsuchsolicitudeshouldhavebeenexpressedforsuchinconsiderablespots，andyet，thatatthesametime，theconstitutionintendedtoconveybyimplicationthepowertoconstructroadsthroughoutthewholecountry，withtheconsequentrighttousethetimberandsoil，andtoexercisejurisdictionoverthem。Itmaybesaid，that，unlesscongresshavethepower，themail—roadsmightbeobstructed，ordiscontinuedatthewillofthestateauthorities。

　　Butthatconsequencedoesnotfollow；forwhenaroadisdeclaredbylawtobeamail—road，theUnitedStateshavearightofwayoverit；and，untilthelawisrepealed，suchaninterestintheuseofit，asthatthestateauthoritiescouldnotobstructit。12Thetermsoftheconstitutionareperfectlysatisfiedbythislimitedconstruction，andthepowerofcongresstomakewhateverroadstheymayplease，inanystate，wouldbeamostseriousinroadupontherightsandjurisdictionofthestates。Itnevercouldhavebeencontemplated。13

　　&sect；1125。Thegrounds，uponwhichtheotheropinionismaintained，areasfollows：Thisisnotaquestionofimpliedpower；butofexpresspower。Wearenotnowlookingtowhatareproperlyincidents，ormeanstocarryintoeffectgivenpowers；butaretoconstruethetermsofanexpresspower。Thewordsoftheconstitutionare，\"Congressshallhavepowerto\"establishpost—officesandpost—roads。\"Whatisthetruemeaningofthesewords？Thereisnosuchknownsenseoftheword\"establish，\"

　　asto\"direct，\"\"designate，\"or\"pointout。\"Andiftherewere，itdoesnotfollow，thataspecialorpeculiarsenseistobegiventothewords，notconformabletotheirgeneralmeaning，unlessthatsenseberequiredbythecontext，or，atleast，betterharmonizeswiththesubjectmatter，andobjectsofthepower，thananyothersense。Thatcannotbepretendedinthepresentcase。Thereceivedgeneralmeanings，ifnottheonlymeaningsoftheword\"establish，\"are，tosettlefirmly，toconfirm，tofix，toformormodify，tofound，tobuildfirmly，toerectpermanently。14Anditisnosmallobjectiontoanyconstruction，thatitrequiresthewordtobedeflectedfromitsreceivedandusualmeaning；andgivesitameaningunknownto，andunacknowledgedbylexicographers。Especiallyisitobjectionableandinadmissible，wherethereceivedandcommonmeaningharmonizeswiththesubjectmatter；andiftheveryendwererequired，nomoreexactexpressioncouldordinarilybeused。Inlegislativeacts，instatepapers，andintheconstitutionitself，thewordisfoundwiththesamegeneralsensenowinsistedon；thatis，inthesenseof，tocreate，toform，tomake，toconstruct，tosettle，tobuildupwithaviewtopermanence。

　　Thus，ourtreatiesspeakofestablishingregulationsoftrade。Ourlawsspeakofestablishingnavy—hospitals，wherelandistobepurchased，workdone，andbuildingserected；ofestablishingtrading—houseswiththeIndians，wherehousesaretobeerectedandotherthingsdone。

　　Thewordisconstantlyusedinalikesenseinthearticlesofconfederation。

　　Theauthorityisthereingiventocongressofestablishingrulesincasesofcaptures；ofestablishingcourtsofappealincasesofcapture；and，whatisdirectlyinpoint，ofestablishingandregulatingpost—offices。Now，ifthemeaningofthewordherewassimplytopointout，ordesignatepost—offices，therewouldhavebeenanendofallfurtherauthority，exceptofregulatingthepost—offices，sodesignatedandpointedout。Undersuchcircumstances，howcouldithavebeenpossibleunderthatinstrumentwhichdeclares，thateverypowernotexpresslydelegatedshallberetainedbythestatestofindanyauthoritytocarrythemail，ortomakecontractsforthispurpose？Muchmoretoprohibitanyotherpersonsunderpenaltiesfromconveyingletters，despatches，orotherpacketsfromoneplacetoanotheroftheUnitedStates？

　　Theveryfirstactofthecontinentalcongressonthissubjectwas，\"forestablishingapost，\"notapostoffice；anditdirected，\"thatalineofpostsbeappointedunderthedirectionofthepostmastergeneral，fromFalmouth，inNew—England；toSavannah，inGeorgia，withasmanycross—posts，asheshallthinkfit；\"anditdirectsthenecessaryexpensesofthe\"establishment\"

　　beyondtherevenuetobepaidoutbytheUnitedColonies。15Underthis，andothersupplementaryacts，theestablishmentcontinueduntilOctober，1782，when，underthearticlesofconfederation，theestablishmentwasre—organized，and，insteadofamereappointmentanddesignationofpost—offices，provisionwasmade，\"thatacontinuedcommunicationofpoststhroughouttheUnitedStatesshallbeestablishedandmaintained，\"

　　&amp；c。；andmanyotherregulationsweremadewhollyincompatiblewiththenarrowconstructionofthewordsnowcontendedfor。16

　　&sect；1126。Theconstitutionitselfalsouniformlyusestheword\"establish\"inthegeneralsense，andneverinthispeculiarandnarrowsense。Itspeaksinthepreambleofonemotivebeing，\"toestablishjustice，\"andthatthepeopledoordainandestablishthisconstitution。Itgivespowertoestablishanuniformruleofnaturalizationanduniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptcies。

　　Doesnotthisauthorizecongresstomake，create，form，andconstructlawsonthesesubjects？Itdeclares，thatthejudicialpowershallbevestedinonesupremecourtandinsuchinferiorcourts，ascongressmay，fromtimetotime，ordainandestablish。Isnotapowertoestablishcourtsapowertocreate，andmake，andregulatethem？Itdeclares，thattheratificationofninestatesshallbesufficientfortheestablishmentofthisconstitutionbetweenthestatessoratifyingthesame。17Andinoneoftheamendments，itprovides，thatcongressshallmakenolawrespectinganestablishmentofreligion。Itisplain，thattoconstruethewordinanyofthesecases，asequivalenttodesignate，orpointout，wouldbeabsolutelyabsurd。Theclearimportofthewordis，tocreate，andform，andfixinasettledmanner。Referringittothesubjectmatter，thesense，innoinstance，canbemistaken。Toestablishcourtsistocreate，andform，andregulatethem。Toestablishrulesofnaturalizationistoframeandconfirmsuchrules。Toestablishlawsonthesubjectofbankruptciesistoframe，fix，andpassthem。Toestablishtheconstitutionistomake，andfix，anderectit，asapermanentformofgovernment。Inthesamemanner，toestablishpost—officesandpost—roadsistoframeandpasslaws，toerect，make，form，regulate，andpreservethem。Whateverisnecessary，whateverisappropriatetothispurpose，iswithinthepower。

　　&sect；1127。Besides；uponthisnarrowconstruction，whatbecomesofthepoweritself？Ifthepowerbetopointout，ordesignatepost—offices，thenitsupposes，thattherealreadyexistsomeoffices，outofwhichadesignationcanbemade。Itsupposesapowertoselectamongthingsofthesamenature。Now，ifanofficedoesnotalreadyexistattheplace，howcanitbedesignated，asapost—office？

　　Ifyoucannotcreateapost—office，youcandonomore，thanmarkoutonealreadyexisting。Inshort，theserulesofstrictconstructionmightbepressedstillfarther；and，asthepowerisonlygiventodesignate，notoffices，butpost—offices，thelattermustbealreadyinexistence；forotherwisethepowermustberead，todesignatewhatofficesshallbeused，aspost—offices，oratwhatplacespost—officesshallberecognised；eitherofwhichisadeparturefromthesupposedliteralinterpretation。

　　&sect；1128。Inthenextplace，letussee，whatuponthisnarrowinterpretationbecomesofthepowerinanotheraspect。

　　Itistoestablishpost—offices。Now，theargumentsupposes，thatthisdoesnotauthorizethepurchaseorerectionofabuildingforanoffice；

　　butitdoesnecessarilysupposetheauthoritytoerectorcreateanoffice；

　　toregulatethedutiesoftheofficer；andtofixaplace，officina

　　wherehisbusinessistobeperformed。Itthenunavoidablyincludes，notmerelyapowertodesignate，butapowertocreatethethingintended，andtodoallotheractstomakethethingeffectual；thatis，tocreatethewholesystemappropriatetoapost—officeestablishment。Now，thisinvolvesaplaindeparturefromtheverygroundoftheargument。Itisnolongerapowertodesignateathing，ormarkoutaroute；butitisapowertocreate，andfixeveryotherthingnecessary—andappropriatetopost—offices。Theargument，therefore，resortstoimplicationsinordertoescapefromitsownnarrowinterpretation；andtheverypowertodesignatebecomesapowertocreateofficesandframesystems，andinstitutepenalties，andraiserevenue，andmakecontracts。Itbecomes，infact，theverything，whichtheotherargumentsupposestobethenaturalsense，viz。thepowertoerect，andmaintainapost—officeestablishment。

　　&sect；1129。Underanyotherinterpretation，thepoweritselfwouldbecomeamerenullity。Ifresortbehadtoaverystrictandcriticalexaminationofthewords，thepower\"toestablishpost—offices\"

　　importsnomore，thanthepowertocreatetheofficesintended；thatdone，thepowerisexhausted；andthewordsaresatisfied。Thepowertocreatetheofficedoesnotnecessarilyincludethepowertocarrythemail，orregulatetheconveyanceofletters，oremploycarriers。Theonemayexistindependentlyoftheother。Astatemightwithoutabsurditypossesstherighttocarrythemail，whiletheUnitedStatesmightpossesstherighttodesignatethepost—offices，atwhichitshouldbeopened，andprovidetheproperofficers；ortheconversepowersmightbelongtoeach。Itwouldnotbeimpracticable，thoughitwouldbeextremelyinconvenientandembarrassing。

　　Yet，nomaneverimaginedsuchaconstructiontobejustifiable。Andwhynot？Plainly，becauseconstitutionsofgovernmentarenotinstrumentstobescrutinized，andweighed，uponmetaphysicalorgrammaticalniceties。

　　Theydonotturnuponingenioussubtleties；butareadaptedtothebusinessandexigenciesofhumansociety；andthepowersgivenareunderstoodinalargesense，inordertosecurethepublicinterests。Commonsensebecomestheguide，andpreventsmenfromdealingwithmerelogicalabstractions。

　　Undertheconfederation，thisverypowertoestablishpost—officeswasconstruedtoincludetheotherpowersalreadynamed，andothersfarmoreremote。Itneverenteredintotheheadsofthewisemenofthosedays，thattheypossessedapowertocreatepost—offices，withoutthepowertocreatealltheotherthingsnecessarytomakepost—officesofsomehumanuse。Theydidnotdreamofpost—officeswithoutposts，ormails，orroutes，orcarriers。Itwouldhavebeenworsethanamockery。Undertheconfederation，withthestrictlimitationofpowers，whichthatinstrumentconferred，theyputintooperationalargesystemfortheappropriatepurposesofapost—officeestablishment。18Nomaneverdoubted，ordeniedtheconstitutionalityofthisexerciseofthepower。Itwaslargelyconstruedtomeettheobviousintent，forwhichitwasdelegated。Thewordsoftheconstitutionaremoreextensive，thanthoseoftheconfederation。Inthelatter，thewordstoestablish\"post—roads\"

　　arenottobefound。Thesewordswerecertainlyaddedforsomepurpose。

　　Andifany，forwhatotherpurpose，thantoenablecongresstolayoutandmakeroads？19

　　&sect；1130。Undertheconstitutioncongresshas，withoutanyquestioning，givenaliberalconstructiontothepowertoestablishpost—officesandpost—roads。Ithasbeentrulysaid，thatinastrictsense，\"thispowerisexecutedbythesingleactofmakingtheestablishment。Butfromthishasbeeninferredthepoweranddutyofcarryingthemailalongthepost—roadfromonepost—officetoanother。

　　Andfromthisimpliedpowerhasbeenagaininferredtherighttopunishthose，whosteallettersfromthepost—office，orrobthemail。Itmaybesaidwithsomeplausibility，thattherighttocarrythemail，andtopunishthose，whorobit，isnotindispensablynecessarytotheestablishmentofapost—officeandapost—road。Thisrightisindeedessentialtothebeneficialexerciseofthepower；butnotindispensablynecessarytoitsexistence。\"20

　　&sect；1131。Thewholepracticalcourseofthegovernmentuponthissubject，fromitsfirstorganizationdowntothepresenttime，undereveryadministration，hasrepudiatedthestrictandnarrowconstructionofthewordsabovementioned。21Thepowertoestablishpost—officesandpost—roadshasneverbeenunderstoodtoincludenomore，thanthepowertopointoutanddesignatepost—officesandpost—roads。Resorthasbeenconstantlyhadtothemoreexpandedsenseoftheword\"establish；\"andnoothersensecanincludetheobjects，whichthepost—officelawshaveconstantlyincluded。Nay，itisnotonlynottrue，thattheselawshavestoppedshortofanexpositionofthewordssufficientlybroadtojustifythemakingofroads；buttheyhaveincludedexercisesofpowerfarmoreremotefromtheimmediateobjects。Ifthepracticeofthegovernmentis，therefore，ofanyweightingivingaconstitutionalinterpretation，itisinfavouroftheliberalinterpretationoftheclause。

　　&sect；1132。Thefact，iftrue，thatcongresshavenothithertomadeanyroadsforthecarryingofthemall，wouldnotaffecttheright，ortouchthequestion。Itisnotdoubted，thatthepowerhasbeenproperlycarriedintoeffect，bymakingcertainstateroadspost—roads。

　　Whencongressfoundthoseroadssuitedtothepurpose，therecouldbenoconstitutionalreasonforrefusingtoestablishthem，asmail—routes。Theexerciseofauthoritywasclearlywithinthescopeofthepower。Buttheargumentwouldhaveit，that，becausethisexerciseofthepower，clearlywithinitsscope，hasbeenhithertorestrainedtomakingexistingroadspost—roads，thereforecongresscannotproceedconstitutionallytomakeapost—road，wherenoroadnowexists。Thisisclearlywhatlawyerscallanonsequitur。Itmightwithjustasmuchproprietybeurged，that，becausecongresshadnothithertousedaparticularmeanstoexecuteanyothergivenpower，thereforeitcouldnotnowdoit。If，forinstance，congresshadneverprovidedashipforthenavy，exceptbypurchase，theycouldnotnowauthorizeshipstobebuiltforanavy，or&agrave；converso。

　　Iftheyhadnotlaidataxoncertaingoods，itcouldnotnowbedone。

　　Iftheyhadnevererectedacustom—house，orcourt—house，theycouldnotnowdoit。Suchamodeofreasoningwouldbedeemedbyallpersonswhollyindefensible。

　　&sect；1133。Butitisnotadmitted，thatcongresshavenotexercisedthisverypowerwithreferencetothisveryobject。Bytheactof21stofApril，1806，ch。41，thepresidentwasauthorizedtocausetobeopenedaroadfromthefrontierofGeorgia，ontheroutefromAthenstoNew—Orleans；andtocausetobeopenedaroadorroadsthroughtheterritory，thenlatelycededbytheIndianstotheUnitedStates，fromtheriverMississippitotheOhio，andtotheformerIndianboundaryline，whichwasestablishedbythetreatyofGreenville；

　　andtocausetobeopenedaroadfromNashville，inthestateofTennessee，toNatchez，intheMississippiterritory。Thesameremarkappliestotheactof29thofMarch，1806，ch。19，\"toregulatethelayingoutandmakingaroadfromCumberland，inthestateofMaryland，tothestateofOhio。\"

　　BothoftheseactswerepassedintheadministrationofPresidentJefferson，who，itiswellknown，onotheroccasionsmaintainedastrictconstructionoftheconstitution。

　　&sect；1134。Butpassingbyconsiderationsofthisnature，whydoesnotthepowertoestablishpost—officesandpost—roadsincludethepowertomakeandconstructthem，whenwanted，aswellasthepowertoestablishanavy—hospital，oracustom—house，apowertomakeandconstructthem？Thelatterisnotdoubtedbyanypersons；whythenistheformer？Ineachcase，thesenseoftherulingterm\"establish\"wouldseemtobethesame；ineach，thepowermaybecarriedintoeffectbymeansshortofconstructing，orpurchasingthethingsauthorized。Atemporaryuseofasuitablesiteorbuildingsmaypossiblybeobtainedwith，orwithouthire。Besides；whymaynotcongresspurchase，orerectapost—officebuilding，andbuythenecessaryland，ifitbeintheirjudgmentadvisable？Cantherebeajustdoubt，thatapowertoestablishpost—officesincludesthispower，justasmuch，asapowertoestablishcustom—houseswouldtobuildthelatter？Woulditnotbeastrangeconstructiontosay，thattheabstractofficemightbecreated，butnottheofficina，orplace，whereitcouldbeexercised？Therearemanyplacespeculiarlyfitforlocalpost—offices，wherenosuitablebuildingmightbefound。And，ifapowertoconstructpost—officebuildingsexists，whereistherestraintuponconstructingroads？

　　&sect；1135。Itissaid，thatthereisnoreason，whycongressshouldbeinvestedwithsuchapower，seeingthatthestateroadsmay，andwillfurnishconvenientroutesforthemail。Whenthestate—roadsdofurnishsuchroutes，therecancertainlybenosoundpolicyincongressmakingotherroutes。Butthereisagreatdifferencebetweenthepolicyofexercisingapower，andtherightofexercisingit。

　　But，supposethestate—roadsdonotfurnishasinpointoffacttheydidnotatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheconstitution，andashereafter，formanyexigenciesofthegovernmentintimesofwarandotherwise，theymaynotsuitableroutesforthemails，whatisthentobedone？Isthepowerofthegeneralgovernmenttobeparalyzed？Supposeamail—roadisoutofrepairandfounderous，cannotcongressauthorizetherepairofit？

　　Iftheycan，whythennotmakeitoriginally？Istheonemoreameanstoanend，thantheother？Ifnot，thenthepowertocarrythemailsmaybeobstructed；nay，maybeannihilatedbytheneglectofastate。22Couldithavebeentheintentionoftheconstitution，intheexerciseofthismostvitalpower，tomakeitdependentuponthewill，orthepleasureofthestates？

　　&sect；1136。Ithasbeensaid，thatwhenonceastate—roadismadeapost—roadbyanactofcongress，thenationalgovernmenthaveacquiredsuchaninterestintheuseofit，thatitisnotcompetentforthestateauthoritiestoobstructit。Buthowcanthisbemadeout？

　　Ifthepowerofcongressismerelytoselectordesignatethemail—roads，whatinterestintheuseisacquiredbythenationalgovernmentanymore，thanbyanytravellersupontheroad？Whereisthepowergiventoacquireit？Canitbepretended，thatastatemaynotdiscontinuearoad，afterithasbeenonceestablished，asamail—road？Thepowerhasbeenconstantlyexercisedbythestateseversincetheadoptionoftheconstitution。Thestateshavealtered，anddiscontinued，andchangedsuchroadsattheirpleasure。Itwouldbeamosttrulyalarminginroaduponstatesovereigntytodeclare，thatastate—roadcouldneverbealteredordiscontinuedafterithadoncebecomeamail—road。Thatwouldbetosupersedeallstateauthorityovertheirownroads。Ifthestatescandiscontinuetheirroads，whynotobstructthem？Whoshallcompelthemtorepairthem，whendiscontinued，ortokeepthematanytimeingoodrepair？Nooneeveryetcontended，thatthenationalgovernmentpossessedanysuchcompulsiveauthority。If，then，thestatesmayalterordiscontinuetheirroads，orsufferthemtogooutofrepair，isitnotobvious，thatthepowertocarrythemailsmayberetardedordefeatedinagreatmeasurebythisconstitutionalexerciseofstatepower？And，ifitbetherightanddutyofcongresstoprovideadequatemeansforthetransportationofthemails，whereverthepublicgoodrequiresit，whatlimitistheretothesemeans，otherthanthattheyareappropriatetotheend？23

　　&sect；1137。Inpointoffact，congresscannotbesaid，inanyexactsense，tohaveyetexecutedthepowertoestablishpost—roads，ifbythatpowerwearetounderstandthedesignationofparticularstate—roads，onwhichthemailsshallbecarried。Thegeneralcoursehasbeentodesignatemerelythetowns，betweenwhichthemailsshallbecarried，withoutascertainingtheparticularroadsatall。Thus，theActof20thofFebruary，1799，ch。7，whichisbutasampleoftheotheracts，declares，that\"thefollowingroadsbeestablished，aspost—roads，namely，fromWiscassetintheDistrictofMainetoSavannahinGeorgia，bythefollowingroute，towit：Portland，Portsmouth，Newburyport，Ipswich，Salem，Boston，Worcester，\"

　　&amp；c。&amp；c。；withoutpointingoutanyroadbetweenthoseplaces，onwhichitshouldbecarried。Therearedifferentroadsfromseveraloftheseplacestotheothers。Supposeoneoftheseroadsshouldbediscontinued，couldthemail—carriersinsistupontravellingit？

　　&sect；1138。Thetruthis，thatcongresshavehithertoactedunderthepowertoaverylimitedextentonly；andwillforevercontinuetodosofromprinciplesofpublicpolicyandeconomy，exceptincasesofanextraordinarynature。Therecanbenomotivetousethepower，exceptforthepublicgood；andcircumstancesmayrenderitindispensabletocarryitoutinparticularcasestoitsfulllimits。Ithasalreadyoccurred，andmayhereafteroccur，thatpost—roadsmaybeimportantandnecessaryforthepurposeoftheUnion，inpeaceaswellasinwar，betweenplaces，wherethereisnotanygoodstate—road，andwheretheamountoftravelwouldnotjustifyanystateinanexpenditureequaltotheconstructionofsuchastate—road。24Insuchcases，asthebenefitisfortheUnion，theburthenoughttobebornebytheUnion。

　　Withoutanyinvidiousdistinction，itmaybestated，thatthewintermail—routebetweenPhiladelphia，andBaltimore，andWashington，bythewayoftheSusquehannahandHavredeGrace，hasbeenbeforecongressunderthisveryaspect。Thereisnoone，whowilldoubttheimportanceofthebestpost—roadinthatdirection；thenearestbetweenthetwocities；andyetitisobvious，thatthenationalonecanbejustlycalledupontoprovidetheroad。

　　&sect；1139。Letacasebetaken，whenstatepolicyorstatehostilityshallleadthelegislaturetocloseup，ordiscontinuearoad，thenearestandthebestbetweentwogreatstates，rivalsperhapsforthetradeandintercourseofathirdstate，shallitbesaid，thatcongresshasnorighttomake，orrepairaroadforkeepingopenforthemailthebestmeansofcommunicationbetweenthosestates？Maythenationalgovernmentbecompelledtotakethemostinconvenientandindirectroutesforthemail？25Inotherwords，havethestatesapowertosay，how，anduponwhatroadsthemailsshall，andshallnottravel？Ifso，theninrelationtopost—roads，thestates，andnottheUnion，aresupreme。

　　&sect；1140。Butitissaid，thatitwouldbedangeroustoallowanypowerintheUniontolayoutandconstructpost—roads；

　　forthentheexerciseofthepowerwouldsupercedethestatejurisdiction。

　　Thisisanuttermistake。Ifcongressshouldlayoutandconstructapost—roadinastate，itwouldstillbearoadwithintheordinaryterritorialjurisdictionofthestate。Thestatecouldnot，indeed，supercede，orobstruct，ordiscontinueit，orpreventtheUnionfromrepairingit，orthemailsfromtravellingonit。Butsubjecttotheseincidentalrights，therightofterritoryandjurisdiction，civillyandcriminally，wouldbecompleteandperfectinthestate。Thepowerofcongressovertheroadwouldbelimitedtothemererightofpassageandpreservation。Thatofthestatewouldbegeneral，andembraceallotherobjects。Congressundoubtedlyhaspowertopurchaselandsinastateforanypublicpurposes，suchasforts，arsenals，anddock—yards。So，theyhavearighttoerecthospitals，custom—houses，andcourthousesinastate。Butnopersoneverimagined，thattheseplacesweretherebyremovedfromthegeneraljurisdictionofthestate。Onthecontrary，theyareuniversallyunderstoodforallotherpurposes，notinconsistentwiththeconstitutionalrightsandusesoftheUnion，tobesubjecttostateauthorityandrights。

　　&sect；1141。Theclauserespectingcessionsofterritoryfortheseatofgovernment，andforforts，arsenals，dockyards，&amp；c。hasnothingtodowiththepoint。Butifithad，itisfavourabletothepower。Thatclausewasnecessaryforthepurposeofoustingthestatejurisdictioninthespecifiedcases，andforvestinganexclusivejurisdictioninthegeneralgovernment。Nogeneralorexclusivejurisdictioniseitherrequired，orwouldbeusefulinregardtopost—roads。

　　Itwouldbeinconvenientforcongresstoassembleinaplace，whereithadnotexclusivejurisdiction。Andanexclusivejurisdictionwouldseemindispensableoverforts，arsenals，dock—yards，andotherplacesofalikenature。Butsurelyitwillnotbepretended，thatcongresscouldnoterectafort，ormagazine，inaplacewithinastate，unlessthestateshouldcedetheterritory。Theonlyeffectwouldbe，thatthejurisdictioninsuchacasewouldnotbeexclusive。Supposeastateshouldprohibitasaleofanyofthelandswithinitsboundariesbyitsowncitizens，foranypublicpurposesindispensablefortheUnion，eithermilitaryorcivil，wouldnotcongresspossessaconstitutionalrighttodemand，andappropriatelandwithinthestateforsuchpurposes，makingajustcompensation？Exclusivejurisdictionoveraroadisonething；therighttomakeitisquiteanother。

　　Aturnpikecompanymaybeauthorizedtomakearoad；andyetmayhavenojurisdiction，oratleastnoexclusivejurisdictionoverit。

　　&sect；1142。ThesupposedsilenceoftheFederalist26provesnothing。Thatworkwasprincipallydesignedtomeetobjections，andremoveprejudices。Thepost—officeestablishmentinitsnature，andcharacter，andpurposes，wassogenerallydeemedusefulandconvenient，andunexceptionable，thatitwaswhollyunnecessarytoexpounditsvalue，orenlargeuponitsbenefits。

　　&sect；1143。Suchisasummaryoftheprincipalreasoningoneachsideofthismuchcontestedquestion。Thereadermustdecideforhimself，uponthepreponderanceoftheargument。

　　&sect；1144。Thisquestion，astotherighttolayoutandconstructpost—roads，iswhollydistinctfromthatofthemoregeneralpowertolayoutandmakecanals，andmilitaryandotherroads。

　　Thelatterpowermaynotexistatall；eveniftheformershouldbeunquestionable。

　　Thelatterturnsuponaquestionofimpliedpower，asincidenttogivenpowers。27Theformerturnsuponthetrueinterpretationofwordsofexpressgrant。Nobodydoubts，thatthewords\"establishpost—roads，\"may，withoutviolatingtheirreceivedmeaninginothercases，beconstruedso，astoincludethepowertolayoutandconstructroads。Thequestionis，whetherthatisthetruesenseofthewords，asusedintheconstitution。Andhere，ifever，theruleofinterpretation，whichrequiresustolookatthenatureoftheinstrument，andtheobjectsofthepower，asanationalpower，inordertoexpounditsmeaning，mustcomeintooperation。

　　&sect；1145。Butwhateverbetheextentofthepower，narroworlarge，therewillstillremainanotherinquiry，whetheritisanexclusivepower，orconcurrentinthestates。Thisisnot，perhaps，averyimportantinquiry，becauseitisadmittedonallsides，thatitcanbeexercisedonlyinsubordinationtothepowerofcongress，ifitbeconcurrentinthestates。Alearnedcommentatordeemsitconcurrent，inasmuchasthereseemsnothingintheconstitution，orinthenatureofthethingitself，whichmaynotbeexercisedbybothgovernmentsatthesametime，withoutprejudiceorinterference；butsubordinate，because，wheneveranypowerisexpresslygrantedtocongress，itistobetakenforgranted，thatitisnottobecontravenedbytheauthorityofanyparticularstate。Astatemight，therefore，establishapost—road，orpost—office，onanyroute，wherecongresshadnotestablishedany。28Ontheotherhand，anotherlearnedcommentatorisofopinion，thatthepowerisexclusiveincongress，sofarasrelatestotheconveyanceofletters，&amp；c。29Itishighlyimprobable，thatanystatewillattemptanyexerciseofthepower，consideringthedifficultyofcarryingitintoeffect，withouttheco—operationofcongress。

　　1。TheFederalist，No。42。

　　2。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。265；RawleontheConst。ch。9，p。103。

　　3。IntheAmericanAlmanacandRepositorypublishedatBoston，in1830，averyvaluablepublication，thereis，atpage217，atabularviewofthenumberofpost—offices，andamountsofpostage，andnetrevenueandextentofroadsinmilestravelledbythemailforalargenumberofyearsbetween1790and1828。In1790therewereseventy—fivepost—offices，andtheamountofpostagewas$37，935。andthenumberofmilestravelledwas1875。In1828therewere7530post—offices，andtheamountofpostagewas$1，659，915，andthenumberofmilestravelledwas115，176。SeealsoAmericanAlmanacfor1839，p。134。AndfromDr。Lieber’sEncyclopediaAmericana，articlePosts，itappears，thatin1831，theamountofpostagewas$1，997，811，andthenumberofmilestravelled15，468，692。Thefirstpost—office，everestablishedinAmerica，seemstohavebeenunderanactofparliament，in1710。Dr。Lieber’sEncyc。Amer。

　　articlePosts。

　　InMr。ProfessorMalkin’sintroductoryLectureonHistory，beforetheLondonUniversity，inMarch，1830，hestates，p。14，\"Itisunderstood，thatinEnglandthefirstmodeadoptedforaproperandregularconveyanceofletterswasin1649，weekly，andonhorsebacktoeverypartofthekingdom。Thepresentimprovedsystembymail—coacheswasnotintroduceduntil1782。\"

　　4。Thereis，inBiorenandDuane’sEditionoftheLawoftheUnitedStates，Vol。1，p。649，&amp；c。anaccountofthepost—officeestablishment，duringtherevolutionandbeforetheconstitutionwasadopted。Dr。FranklinwasappointedinJuly，1775，thefirstPostmasterGeneral。Theactof1782directed，thatamailshouldbecarriedatleastonceineveryweektoandfromeachstatedpost—office。

　　5。AmericanAlmanac，1830，p。217；Dr。

　　Lieber’sEncyc。Amer。articlePosts，ante，vol。iii。p。24，note。

　　6。SeeSergeantonConst。Introduction，p。17，2dEdition。

　　7。JournalofConvention。220，256，257，261，357。

　　8。4Elliot’sDebates，279。

　　9。4Elliot’sDebates，354；Ibid。233。

　　10。TheFederalist，No。42。

　　11。4Elliot’sDebates，354。

　　12。4Elliot’sDebates，354，355。

　　13。Awareofthedifficultiesattendantuponthisextremelystrictconstruction，anotherhasbeenattempted，whichismoreliberal，butwhichithasbeenthoughtaswillbehereafterseen

　　tosurrenderthesubstanceoftheargument。Itwillbemostsatisfactorytogiveitintheverywordsofitsmostdistinguishedadvocate：

　　\"Thefirstofthesegrantsisinthefollowingwords：

　　’Congressshallhavepowertoestablishpost—officesandpost—roads。’Whatisthejustimportofthesewords，andtheextentofthegrant？Theword’establish’istherulingterm；’post—officesandpost—roads’arethesubjects，onwhichitacts。Thequestion，therefore，is，whatpowerisgrantedbythatword？Thesense，inwhichwordsarecommonlyused，isthat，inwhichtheyaretobeunderstoodinalltransactionsbetweenpublicbodiesandindividuals。Theintentionofthepartiesistoprevail，andthereisnobetterwayofascertainingit，thanbygivingtothetermsusedtheirordinaryimport。Ifweweretoaskanynumberofourmostenlightenedcitizens，whohadnoconnexionwithpublicaffairs，andwhosemindswereunprejudiced，whatwastheimportoftheword，’establish，’andtheextentofthegrant，whichitcontrols，wedonotthink，thattherewouldbeanydifferenceofopinionamongthem。Wearesatisfied，thatallofthemwouldanswer，thatapowerwastherebygiventocongresstofixonthetowns，court—houses，andotherplaces，throughoutourUnion，atwhichthereshouldbepost—offices；

　　theroutes，bywhichthemailsshouldbecarriedfromonepost—officetoanothersoastodiffuseintelligenceasextensively，andtomaketheinstitutionasuseful，aspossible；tofixthepostagetobepaidoneveryletterandpacketthuscarriedtosupporttheestablishment；andtoprotectthepost—officesandmailsfromrobbery，bypunishingthose，whoshouldcommittheoffence。

　　TheideaofarighttolayofftheroadsoftheUnitedStates，onageneralscaleofimprovement；totakethesoilfromtheproprietorbyforce；toestablishturnpikesendtolls，andtopunishoffendersinthemannerstatedabove，wouldneveroccurtoanysuchperson。Theuseoftheexistingroad，bythestage，mail—carrier，orpost—boy，inpassingoverit，asothersdo，isall，thatwouldbethoughtof；thejurisdictionandsoilremainingtothestate，witharightinthestate，orthoseauthorizedbyitslegislature，tochangetheroadatpleasure。

　　\"Theintentionofthepartiesissupportedbyotherproof，whichoughttoplaceitbeyondalldoubt。Intheformeractofgovernment，theconfederation，wefindagrantforthesamepurpose，expressedinthefollowingwords：’TheUnitedStates，incongressassembled，shallhavethesoleandexclusiverightandpowerofestablishingandregulatingpost—officesfromonestatetoanother，throughouttheUnitedStates，andofexactingsuchpostageonthepaperspassingthroughthesameasmayberequisitetodefraytheexpensesofthesaidpost—office。’Theterm’establish’waslikewisetherulingoneinthatinstrumentandwasevidentlyintendedandunderstoodtogiveapowersimplyandsolelytofixwherethereshouldbepost—offices。Bytransferringthistermfromtheconfederationintotheconstitutionitwasdoubtlessintendedthatitshouldbeunderstoodinthesamesenseinthelatterthatitwasintheformerinstrumentandtobeappliedaliketopost—officesandpost—roads。Inwhateversenseitisappliedtopost—officesitmostbeappliedinthesamesensetopost—roads。

　　Butitmaybeasked，ifsuchwastheintention，whywerenotalltheothertermsofthegranttransferredwithit？Thereasonisobvious。Theconfederationbeingabondofunionbetweenindependentstates，itwasnecessary，ingrantingthepowers，whichweretobeexercisedoverthem，tobeveryexplicitandminuteindefiningthepowersgranted。Buttheconstitution，totheextentofitspowers，havingincorporatedthestatesintoonegovernment，likethegovernmentofthestates，individually，fewerwords，indefiningthepowersgrantedbyit，werenotonlyadequate，butperhapsbetteradaptedtothepurpose。Wefind，thatbrevityisacharacteristicoftheinstrument。

　　Haditbeenintendedtoconveyamoreenlargedpowerintheconstitution，thanhadbeengrantedintheconfederation，surelythesamecontrollingtermwouldnothavebeenused；orotherwordswouldhavebeenadded，toshowsuchintention，andtomarktheextent，towhichthepowershouldbecarried。Itisaliberalconstructionofthepowersgrantedintheconstitutionbythisterm，toincludeinitallthepowers，thatweregrantedintheconfederationbyterms，whichspecificallydefined，andaswassupposed

　　extendedtheirlimits。Itwouldbeabsurdtosay，that，byomittingfromtheconstitutionanyportionofthephraseology，whichwasdeemedimportantintheconfederation。theimportofthattermwasenlarged，andwithitthepowersoftheconstitution，inaproportionaldegree，beyondwhattheywereintheconfederation。Therighttoexactpostageandtoprotectthepost—officesandmailsfromrobberybypunishingtheoffenders，mayfairlybeconsidered，asincidentstothegrant，since，withoutit，theobjectofthegrantmightbedefeated。Whateverisabsolutelynecessarytotheaccomplishmentoftheobjectofthegrant，thoughnotspecified，mayfairlybeconsideredasincludedinit。Beyondthisthedoctrineofincidentalpowercannotbecarried。

　　\"Ifwegobacktotheoriginofoursettlementsandinstitutions，andtracetheirprogressdowntotheRevolution，weshallsee，thatitwasinthissenseandinnoneother，thatthepowerwasexercisedbyallourcolonialgovernments。Post—officesweremadeforthecountry，andnotthecountryforthem。Theyaretheoffspringofimprovement。Theynevergobeforeit。Settlementsarefirstmade；afterwhichtheprogressisuniformandsimple，extendingtoobjectsinregularorder，mostnecessarytothecomfortofman；schools，placesofpublicworship，court—houses，andmarkets；

　　post—officesfollow。Roadsmay，indeed，besaidtohecoevalwithsettlements。

　　Theyleadtoalltheplacesmentioned，andtoeveryother，whichthevariousandcomplicatedinterestsofsocietyrequire。

　　\"Itisbelievedthatnotoneexamplecanbegiven，fromthefirstsettlementofourcountrytotheadoptionofthisconstitution，ofapost—officebeingestablished，withoutaviewtoexistingroads；orofasingleroadhavingbeenmadebypavement，turnpike。&amp；c。forthesolepurposeofaccommodatingapost—office。Such，too，istheuniformprogressofallsocieties。IngrantingthenthispowertotheUnitedStates，itwas，undoubtedly，intendedbytheframersandratifiersoftheconstitution，toconveyitinthesenseandextentonly，inwhichithadbeenunderstoodandexercisedbythepreviousauthoritiesofthecountry。

　　\"Thisconclusionisconfirmedbytheobjectofthegrantandthemannerofitsexecution。TheobjectisthetransportationofthemailthroughouttheUnitedStates，whichmaybedoneonhorse—back，andwassodone，untillately，sincetheestablishmentofstages。Betweenthegreattowns，andinotherplaces，wherethepopulationisdense，stagesarepreferred，becausetheyaffordanadditionalopportunitytomakeaprofitfrompassengers。Butwherethepopulationissparse，andoncrossroads，itisgenerallycarriedonhorseback。Unconnectedwithpassengersandotherobjects，itcannotbedoubted，thatthemailitselfmaybecarriedineverypartofourUnion，withnearlyasmucheconomy，andgreaterdespatch，onhorseback，thaninastage；andinmanypartswithmuchgreater。IneverypartoftheUnioninwhichstagescanbepreferred，theroadsaresufficientlygood，providedthose，whichserveforeveryotherpurpose，willaccommodatethem。Ineveryotherpart，wherehorsesaloneareused，ifotherpeoplepassthemonhorseback，surelythemailcarriercan。Foranobjectsosimpleandsoeasyintheexecution，itwould，doubtless，excitesurpriseifitshouldbethoughtpropertoappointcommissionerstolayoffthecountryonagreatschemeofimprovement，withthepowertoshortendistances，reduceheights，levelmountains，andpavesurfaces。

　　\"IftheUnitedStatespossessedthepowercontendedforunderthisgrant，mighttheynot，inadoptingtheroadsoftheindividualstatesforthecarriageofthemail，ashasbeendone，assumejurisdictionoverthem，andprecludearighttointerferewithoralterthem？Mighttheynotestablishturnpikes，andexercisealltheotheractsofsovereignty，abovestated，oversuchroads，necessarytoprotectthemfrominjury，anddefraytheexpenseofrepairingthem？Surely，iftherightexists，theseconsequencesnecessarilyfollowed，assoonastheroadwasestablished。

　　Theabsurdityofsuchapretensionmustbeapparenttoall，whoexamineit。Inthisway，alargeportionoftheterritoryofeverystatemightbetakenfromit；forthereisscarcelyaroadinanystate，whichwillnotbeusedforthetransportationofthemail。Anewfieldforlegislationandinternalgovernmentwouldthusbeopened。\"PresidentMonroe’sMessage，of4thMay，1822，p。24to27。

　　14。Johnson’sDict。adverb。；

　　Webster’sDict。ibid。

　　15。Ordinanceof26thJuly1775；1JournalofCongress，177，178。

　　16。Ordinance，18Oct。1782；1U。S。

　　Laws，Bioren&amp；Duane，651；7Journ。ofCongress，503。

　　17。See4Elliot’sDebates，356。

　　18。SeeActof18thofOctober，1782。

　　19。4Elliot’sDebates，356。

　　20。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。316，417。

　　21。SeethelawsreferredtoinPost—Master—Generalv。Early，12Wheat。R。136，144，145。

　　22。4Elliot’sDebates，356。

　　23。4Elliot’sDebates，356。

　　24。SeeRawleontheConstitution，ch。

　　9，p。103，104。

　　25。4Elliot’sDebates，356。

　　26。No。42。

　　27。SeeRawleontheConstitution，ch。

　　9，p。104。

　　28。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。265。

　　29。RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。103，104。

　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：

　　Book3Chapter19CHAPTERXIX。POWERTOPROMOTESCIENCEANDUSEFULARTS。&sect；1146。THEnextpowerofcongressis，\"topromotetheprogressofscienceandtheusefularts，bysecuring，forlimitedtimes，toauthorsandinventorstheexclusiverighttotheirrespectivewritingsanddiscoveries。\"

　　&sect；1147。Thispowerdidnotexistundertheconfederation；anditsutilitydoesnotseemtohavebeenquestioned。

　　Thecopyrightofauthorsintheirworkshad，beforetherevolution，beendecidedinGreatBritaintobeacommonlawright；anditwasregulatedandlimitedunderstatutespassedbyparliamentuponthatsubject。1Therighttousefulinventionsseems，withequalreason，tobelongtotheinventors；and，accordingly，itwassavedoutofthestatuteofmonopoliesinthereignofKingJamestheFirst，andhaseversincebeenallowedforalimitedperiod，notexceedingfourteenyears。2Itwasdoubtlesstothisknowledgeofthecommonlawandstatuteablerightsofauthorsandinventors，thatwearetoattributethisconstitutionalprovision。3Itwasbeneficialtoallparties，thatthenationalgovernmentshouldpossessthispower；toauthorsandinventors，because，otherwise，theywouldhavebeensubjectedtothevaryinglawsandsystemsofthedifferentstatesonthissubject，whichwouldimpair，andmightevendestroythevalueoftheirrights；tothepublic，asitwouldpromotetheprogressofscienceandtheusefularts，andadmitthepeopleatlarge，afterashortinterval，tothefullpossessionandenjoymentofallwritingsandinventionswithoutrestraint。

　　Inshort，theonlyboon，whichcouldbeofferedtoinventorstodisclosethesecretsoftheirdiscoveries，wouldbetheexclusiverightandprofitofthem，asamonopolyforalimitedperiod。Andauthorswouldhavelittleinducementtoprepareelaborateworksforthepublic，iftheirpublicationwastobeatalargeexpense，and，assoonastheywerepublished，therewouldbeanunlimitedrightofdepredationandpiracyoftheircopyright。

　　Thestatescouldnotseparatelymakeeffectualprovisionforeitherofthecases；4andmostofthem，atthetimeoftheadoptionoftheconstitution，hadanticipatedtheproprietyofsuchagrantofpower，bypassinglawsonthesubjectattheinstanceofthecontinentalcongress。5

　　&sect；1148。Thepower，initsterms，isconfinedtoauthorsandinventors；andcannotbeextendedtotheintroducersofanynewworksorinventions。Thishasbeenthoughtbysomepersonsofhighdistinctiontobeadefectintheconstitution。6Butperhapsthepolicyoffurtherextendingtherightisquestionable；

　　and，atallevents，therestrictionhasnothithertooperatedasanydiscouragementofscienceorthearts。Ithasbeendoubted，whethercongresshasauthoritytodecidethefact，thatapersonisanauthororinventorinthesenseoftheconstitution，soastoprecludethatquestionfromjudicialinquiry。

　　But，atallevents，suchaconstructionoughtnevertobeputuponthetermsofanygeneralactinfavourofaparticularinventor，unlessitbeinevitable。7

　　&sect；1149。Ithasbeensuggested，thatthispowerisnotexclusive，butconcurrentwiththatofthestates，soalways，thattheactsofthelatterdonotcontravenetheactsofcongress。8Ithas，therefore，beenasserted，thatwherecongressgonofartherthantosecuretherighttoanauthororinventor，thestatemayregulatetheuseofsuchright，orrestrainit，sofarasitmaydeemitinjurioustothepublic。Whetherthisbesoornotmaybematterforgraveinquiry，wheneverthequestionshallarisedirectlyinjudgment。Atpresent，itseemswhollyunnecessarytodiscussittheoretically。But，atanyrate，theredoesnotseemtobethesamedifficultyinaffirming，that，asthepowerofcongressextendsonlytoauthorsandinventors，astatemaygrantanexclusiverighttothepossessororintroducerofanartorinvention，whodoesnotclaimtobeaninventor，buthasmerelyintroduceditfromabroad。9

　　&sect；1150。Inthefirstdraftoftheconstitutiontheclauseisnottobefound；butthesubjectwasreferredtoacommittee，amongotherpropositions，whosereportwasaccepted，andgavetheclauseintheveryform，inwhichitnowstandsintheconstitution。10Amoreextensiveproposition，\"toestablishpublicinstitutions，rewards，andimmunitiesforthepromotionofagriculture，commerce，andmanufactures\"

　　wasashasbeenbeforestatedmade，andsilentlyabandoned。11Congresshavealready，byaseriesoflawsonthissubject，providedfortherightsofauthorsandinventors；and，withoutquestion，theexerciseofthepowerhasoperatedasanencouragementtonativegenius，andtothesolidadvancementofliteratureandthearts。

　　&sect；1151。Thenextpowerofcongressis，\"toconstitutetribunalsinferiourtotheSupremeCourt。\"Thisclauseproperlybelongstothethirdarticleoftheconstitution；andwillcomeinreview，whenwesurveytheconstitutionandpowersofthejudicialdepartment。

　　Itwill，therefore，be，forthepresent，passedover。

　　1。2Black。Comm。406，407，andChristian’snote，5；4Burr。R。2303；RawleonConst。ch。9，p。105，106；2Kent’sComm。Lect。36，p。306，307，314，315。

　　2。2Black。Comm。407，andChristian’snote，8；4Black。Comm。159；2Kent’sComm。Lect36，p。299to306。

　　3。TheFederalist，No。43。

　　4。2Kent’sComm。Lect。36，p298，299。

　　5。TheFederalist，No。43；Seealso1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。265，266；RawleonConst。ch。9，p。105，106；

　　SeeHamilton’sReportonManufactures，&sect；8，p。235，&amp；c。

　　6。Hamilton’sRep。onManufactures，&sect；8，p。235，236。

　　7。Evansv。Eaton。3Wheat。R。

　　454，513。

　　8。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。265，266；Livingstonv。VanIngen，9John。R。507。

　　9。Livingstonv。VanIngen，9

　　John。R。507；SergeantonConst。ch。28，[ch。39]

　　10。Journ。ofConvention，260，327，328，329。

　　11。JournalofConvention，261。

　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：

　　Book3Chapter20CHAPTERXX。POWERTOPUNISHPIRACIESANDFELONIES。&sect；1152。Thenextpowerofcongressis，\"todefineandpunishpiraciesandfeloniescommittedonthehighseas，andoffencesagainstthelawofnations。\"

　　&sect；1153。Bytheconfederationthesoleandexclusivepowerwasgiventocongress\"ofappointingcourtsforthetrialofpiraciesandfeloniescommittedonthehighseas。\"1Buttherewasnopowerexpresslygiventodefineandpunishpiraciesandfelonies。2Congress，however，proceededtopassanordinancefortheerectionofacourtforsuchtrials，andprescribedthepunishmentofdeathuponconvictionoftheoffence。3Buttheyneverundertooktodefine，whatpiraciesorfelonieswere。Itwastakenforgranted，thattheseweresufficientlyknownandunderstoodatthecommonlaw；andthatresortmight，inallsuchcases，behadtothatlaw，astherecognisedjurisprudenceoftheUnion。4

　　&sect；1154。Iftheclauseoftheconstitutionhadbeenconfinedtopiracies，therewouldnothavebeenanynecessityofconferringthepowertodefinethecrime，sincethepowertopunishwouldnecessarilybeheldtoincludethepowerofascertainingandfixingthedefinitionofthecrime。Indeed，therewouldnotseemtobetheslightestreasontodefinethecrimeatall；forpiracyisperfectlywellknownandunderstoodinthelawofnations，thoughitisoftenfounddefinedinmeremunicipalcodes。6Bythelawofnations，robberyorforcibledepredationuponthesea，animofurandi，ispiracy。Thecommonlaw，too，recognises，andpunishespiracyasanoffence，notagainstitsownmunicipalcode，butasanoffenceagainsttheuniversallawofnations；apiratebeingdeemedanenemyofthehumanrace。7Thecommonlaw，therefore，deemspiracytoberobberyonthesea；thatis，thesamecrime，whichitdenominatesrobbery，whencommittedonland。8Andifcongresshadsimplydeclared，thatpiracyshouldbepunishedwithdeath，thecrimewouldhavebeensufficientlydefined。Congressmayaswelldefinebyusingatermofaknownanddeterminatemeaning，asbyanexpressenumerationofalltheparticularsincludedinthatterm；forthatiscertain，which，byreference，ismadecertain。Ifcongressshoulddeclaremurderafelony，nobodywoulddoubt，whatwasintendedbymurder。And，indeed，ifcongressshouldproceedtodeclare，thathomicide，\"withmaliceaforethought，\"shouldbedeemedmurder，andafelony；therewouldstillbethesamenecessityofascertaining，fromthecommonlaw，whatconstitutedmaliceaforethought。So，thattherewouldbenoendtodifficultiesordefinitions；foreachsuccessivedefinitionmightinvolvesometerms，whichwouldstillrequiresomenewexplanation。

　　Butthetrueintentoftheconstitutioninthispart，was，notmerelytodefinepiracy，asknowntothelawofnations，buttoenumeratewhatcrimesinthenationalcodeshouldbedeemedpiracies。Andsothepowerhasbeenpracticallyexpoundedbycongress。11

　　&sect；1155。Butthepowerisnotmerelytodefineandpunishpiracies，butfelonies，andoffencesagainstthelawofnations；andonthisaccount，thepowertodefine，aswellastopunish，ispeculiarlyappropriate。Ithasbeenremarked，thatfelonyisatermofloosesignification，eveninthecommonlaw；andofvariousimportinthestatutelawofEngland。12Mr。

　　JusticeBlackstonesays，thatfelony，inthegeneralacceptationoftheEnglishlaw，compriseseveryspeciesofcrime，whichoccasionedatcommonlawtheforfeitureoflandsandgoods。Thismostfrequentlyhappensinthosecrimes，forwhichacapitalpunishmenteitheris，orwasliabletobeinflicted。AlloffencesnowcapitalbytheEnglishlawarefelonies；

　　buttherearestillsomeoffences，notcapital，whichareyetfelonies，suchassuicide，pettylarceny，andhomicidebychancemedley；13

　　thatis，theysubjectthecommittersofthemtosomeforfeiture，eitheroflandsorgoods。14Buttheideaofcapitalpunishmenthasnowbecomesoassociated，intheEnglishlaw，withtheideaoffelony，thatifanactofparliamentmakesanewoffencefelony，thelawimplies，thatitshallbepunishedwithdeath，aswellaswithforfeiture。15

　　&sect；1156。LordCokehasgivenasomewhatdifferentaccountofthemeaningoffelony；forhesays\"exviterminisignificatquodlibetcapitalecrimenfelleoanimoperpetratum；\"thatis，itsignifieseverycapitaloffencecommittedwithafeloniousintent；

　　\"inwhichsensemurderissaidtobedoneperfeloniam，andissoappropriatedbylaw，asthatfelonicecannotbeexpressedbyanyotherword。16Thishasbeentreatedasafancifulderivation，andnotascorrect，asthatofMr。J。Blackstone，whohasfollowedoutthatofSpelman。17

　　&sect；1157。Butwhatevermaybethetrueimportofthewordfelonyatthecommonlaw，withreferencetomunicipaloffences，inrelationtooffencesonthehighseas，itsmeaningisnecessarilysomewhatindeterminate；sincethetermisnotusedinthecriminaljurisprudenceoftheAdmiraltyinthetechnicalsenseofthecommonlaw。18LordCokelongagostated，thatapardonoffelonieswouldnotpardonpiracy，for\"piracyorrobberyonthehighseaswasnofelony，whereofthecommonlawtookanyknowledge，&amp；c。；butwasonlypunishablebythecivillaw，&amp；c。；theattainderbywhichlawwroughtnoforfeitureoflandsorcorruptionofblood。\"19Andheadded，thatthestatuteof98Henry8，ch。15，whichcreatedtheHighCommissionCourtforthetrialof\"alltreasons，felonies，robberies，murders，andconfederacies，committedinoruponthehighsea，&amp；c。，\"didnotaltertheoffence，ormaketheoffencefelony，butlefttheoffenceasitwasbeforetheact，viz。felonyonlybythecivillaw。20

　　&sect；1158。Offencesagainstthelawofnationsarequiteasimportant，andcannotwithanyaccuracybesaidtobecompletelyascertained，anddefinedinanypubliccode，recognizedbythecommonconsentofnations。Inrespect，therefore，aswelltofeloniesonthehighseas，astooffencesagainstthelawofnations，thereisapeculiarfitnessingivingtocongressthepowertodefine，aswellastopunish。Andthereisnottheslightestreasontodoubt，thatthisconsiderationhadverygreatweightwiththeconvention，inproducingthephraseologyoftheclause。21Oneithersubjectitwouldhavebeeninconvenient，ifnotimpracticable，tohavereferredtothecodesofthestates，aswellfromtheirimperfection，astheirdifferentenumerationoftheoffences。Certainty，aswellasuniformity，required，thatthepowertodefineandpunishshouldreachoverthewholeoftheseclassesofoffences。22

　　&sect；1159。Whatisthemeaningof\"highseas\"withintheintentofthisclausedoesnotseemtoadmitofanyseriousdoubt。Thephraseembracesnotonlythewatersoftheocean，whichareoutofsightofland，butthewatersontheseacoastbelowlowwatermark，whetherwithintheterritorialboundariesofaforeignnation，orofadomesticstate。23Mr。JusticeBlackstonehasremarked，thatthemainseaorhighseabeginsatthelowwatermark。Butbetweenthehighwatermarkandthelowwatermark，wherethetideebbsandflows，thecommonlawandtheadmiraltyhavedivisumimperium，analternatejurisdiction，oneuponthewater，whenitisatfullsea；

　　theotherupontheland，whenitisatanebb。24Hedoubtlessherereferstothewatersoftheoceanonthesea—coast，andnotincreeksandinlets。LordHalesays，thattheseaiseitherthat，whichlieswithinthebodyofacountryorwithout。That，whichlieswithoutthebodyofacountry，iscalledthemainsea，orocean。25Sofar，then，asregardsthestatesoftheUnion，\"highseas\"maybetakentomeanthatpartoftheocean，whichwashesthesea—coast，andiswithoutthebodyofanycounty[sic]，accordingtothecommonlaw；and，sofarasregardsforeignnations，anywatersontheirsea—coast，belowlow—watermark。26

　　&sect；1160。Upontheproprietyofgrantingthispowertothenationalgovernment，theredoesnotseemtohavebeenanycontroversy；orifany，noneofaseriousnature。Itisobvious，thatthispowerhasanintimateconnexionandrelationwiththepowertoregulatecommerceandintercoursewithforeignnations，andtherightsanddutiesofthenationalgovernmentinpeaceandwar，arisingoutofthelawofnations。AstheUnitedStatesareresponsibletoforeigngovernmentsforallviolationsofthelawofnations，andasthewelfareoftheUnionisessentiallyconnectedwiththeconductofourcitizensinregardtoforeignnations，congressoughttopossessthepowertodefineandpunishallsuchoffences，whichmayinterruptourintercourseandharmonywith，andourdutiestothem。27

　　&sect；1161。Whetherthispower，sofarasitconcernsthelawofnations，isanexclusiveone，hasbeendoubtedbyalearnedcommentator。28As，uptothepresenttime，thatquestionmaybedeemedformostpurposestobeamerespeculativequestion，itisnotproposedtodiscussit，sinceitmaybebetterreasonedout，whenitshallrequirejudicialdecision。

　　&sect；1162。Theclause，asitwasoriginallyreportedinthefirstdraftoftheconstitution，wasinsubstance，thoughnotinlanguage，asitnowstands。Itwassubsequentlyamended；andintheseconddraftstoodinitspresentterms。29Thereis，however，intheSupplementtotheJournal，anobscurestatementofaquestionput，tostrikeouttheword\"punish，\"seemingtorefertothisclause，whichwascarriedintheaffirmativebythevoteofsixstatesagainstfive。30Yettheconstitutionitselfbearstestimony，thatitdidnotprevail。

　　1。Art。9。

　　2。TheFederalist，No。42。

　　3。SeeOrdinancefortrialofpiraciesandfelonies，5thApril，1781；7Journ。Cong。76。

　　4。AmotionwasmadeinCongresstoamendthearticlesofconfederation，byinsertinginlienofthewords，astheystandintheinstrument，thefollowing，\"declaringwhatactscommittedonthehighseasshallbedeemedpiraciesandfelonies。Itwasnegativedbythevoteofninestatesagainsttwo。Thereason，probably，wastheextremereluctanceofcongresstoadmitanyamendmentaftertheprojecthadbeensubmittedtothestates。5

　　5。1SecretJournalsofCongress384，June25，1778。

　　6。TheFederalist，No。42；RawleonCoast。ch。9。p。107；2Elliot’sDebates，389，390。

　　7。4Black。Comm。71to73。

　　8。Mr。Eastsays，\"Theoffenceofpiracy，bythecommonlaw，consistsincommittingthoseactsofrobberyanddepredationuponthehighseas，which，ifcommitteduponland，wouldhaveamountedtofelonythere。\"9Ingivingthisdefinitionhehasdonenomorethanfollowthelanguageofprecedingwritersonthecommonlaw。10

　　9。2East，P。C。796。

　　10。4Black。Comm。71to73。

　　11。UnitedStatesv。Smith，5

　　WheatR。153，158to163。

　　12。TheFederalist，No。42；2Elliot’sDeb。389，390。

　　13。Co。Litt。391。

　　14。4Black。Comm。93to98。

　　15。4Black。Comm。98；Seealso1Hawk。

　　P。C。ch。37，Curwood’sEdit。ch。7。

　　16。Co。Litt。391；1Hawk。P。C。ch。

　　37。

　　17。See1Curwood’sHawk。P。C。ch。7，notep，71。

　　18。UnitedStatesv。Smith，5

　　Wheat。R。153，159。

　　19。3Inst。112。

　　20。3Inst。112；Co。Lect。391，a。

　　21。UnitedStatesv。Smith，5

　　Wheat。R。153，159。

　　22。TheFederalist，No。42；SergeantonConst。ch。28，ch。30；RawleonConst。ch。9，p。107。

　　23。UnitedStalesv。Pirates，5Wheat。R。184，200，204，206；UnitedStatesv。Willberger，5Wheat。

　　R。76，94。

　　24。1Black。Comm。110；Constable’scase，5Co。R。106；3Inst。113；2East’sP。C。802，803。

　　25。HaleinHarg。LawTracts，ch。4，p。10；1HaleP。C。423，494。

　　26。SeeRawleontheConst。ch。9，p。

　　107；SergeantontheConst。ch。28，[ch。30；]1Kent’sComm。Lect。17，p。342，&amp；e。；UnitedStatesv。Grush，5Mason’sR。290。

　　27。See1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。

　　268，269；RawleonCoast。ch。9，p。108。

　　28。RawleonConst。ch。9，p。108。

　　29。JournalofConvention，221，257

　　to259，357。

　　30。JournalofConvention，p。375，376。

　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：

　　Book3Chapter21CHAPTERXXI。THEPOWERTODECLAREWARANDMAKECAPTURES。&sect；1163。THEnextpowerofcongressisto\"declarewar，grantlettersofmarqueandreprisal，andmakerulesconcerningcapturesonlandandwater。\"

　　&sect；1164。Asimilarexclusivepowerwasgiventocongressbytheconfederation。1Thatsuchapoweroughttoexistinthenationalgovernment，noonewilldeny，whobelieves，thatitoughttohaveanypowerswhatsoever，eitherforoffenceordefence，forthecommongood，orforthecommonprotection。

　　Itis，therefore，whollysuperfluoustoreasonouttheproprietyofgrantingthepower。2Itisself—evident，unlessthenationalgovernmentistobeameremockeryandshadow。Thepowercouldnotbeleftwithoutextrememischief，ifnotabsoluteruin，totheseparateauthorityoftheseveralstates；forthenitwouldbeattheoptionofanyonetoinvolvethewholeinthecalamitiesandburthensofwarfare。3Inthegeneralgovernmentitissafe，becausethereitcanbedeclaredonlybythemajorityofthestates。

　　&sect；1165。Theonlypracticalquestionuponthissubjectwouldseemtobe，towhatdepartmentofthenationalgovernmentitwouldbemostwiseandsafetoconfidethishighprerogative，emphaticallycalledthelastresortofsovereigns，ultimaratioregum。InGreatBritainitistheexclusiveprerogativeofthecrown；4andinothercountries，itisusually，ifnotuniversallyconfidedtotheexecutivedepartment。Itmightbytheconstitutionhavebeenconfidedtotheexecutive，ortothesenate，ortobothconjointly。

　　&sect；1166。Intheplanofferedbyaneminentstatesmanintheconvention，itwasproposed，thatthesenateshouldhavethesolepowerofdeclaringwar。5Thereasons，whichmaybeurgedinfavourofsuchanarrangement，are，thatthesenatewouldbecomposedofrepresentativesofthestates，ofgreatweight，sagacity，andexperience，andthatbeingasmallandselectbody，promptitudeofaction，aswellaswisdom，andfirmness，would，astheyought，accompanythepossessionofthepower。Largebodiesnecessarilymoveslowly；andwheretheco—operationofdifferentbodiesisrequired，theretardationofanymeasuremustbeproportionallyincreased。Intheordinarycourseoflegislationthismaybenoinconvenience。Butintheexerciseofsuchaprerogative，asdeclaringwar，despatch，secrecy，andvigourareoftenindispensable，andalwaysusefultowardssuccess。Ontheotherhanditmaybeurgedinreply，thatthepowerofdeclaringwarisnotonlythehighestSovereignprerogative；butthatitisinitsownnatureandeffectssocriticalandcalamitous，thatitrequirestheutmostdeliberation，andthesuccessivereviewofallthecouncilsofthenation。War，initsbestestate，neverfailstoimposeuponthepeoplethemostburthensometaxes，andpersonalsufferings。Itisalwaysinjurious，andsometimessubversiveofthegreatcommercial，manufacturing，andagriculturalinterests。Nay，italwaysinvolvestheprosperity，andnotunfrequentlytheexistence，ofanation。Itissometimesfataltopubliclibertyitself，byintroducingaspiritofmilitaryglory，whichisreadytofollow，whereverasuccessfulcommanderwilllead；andinarepublic，whoseinstitutionsareessentiallyfoundedonthebasisofpeace，thereisinfinitedanger，thatwarwillfinditbothimbecileindefence，andeagerforcontest。Indeed，thehistoryofrepublicshasbuttoofatallyproved，thattheyaretooambitiousofmilitaryfameandconquest，andtooeasilydevotedtotheviewsofdemagogues，whoflattertheirpride，andbetraytheirinterests。Itshouldthereforebedifficultinarepublictodeclarewar；butnottomakepeace。Therepresentativesofthepeoplearetolaythetaxestosupportawar，andthereforehavearighttobeconsulted，astoitsproprietyandnecessity。Theexecutiveistocarryiton，andthereforeshouldbeconsulted，astoitstime，andthewaysandmeansofmakingiteffective。Theco—operationofallthebranchesofthelegislativepowerought，uponprinciple，toberequiredinthisthehighestactoflegislation，asitisinallothers。Indeed，theremightbeaproprietyeveninenforcingstillgreaterrestrictions，asbyrequiringaconcurrenceoftwothirdsofbothhouses。6

　　&sect；1167。Thisreasoningappearstohavehadgreatweightwiththeconvention，andtohavedecideditschoice。Itsjudgmenthashithertoobtainedtheunqualifiedapprobationofthecountry。8

　　&sect；1168。Intheconvention，inthefirstdraftoftheconstitution，thepowerwasgivenmerely\"tomakewar。\"Itwassubsequently，andnotwithoutsomestruggle，alteredtoitspresentform。9Itwasproposedtoaddthepower\"tomakepeace；\"butthiswasunanimouslyrejected；10upontheplainground，thatitmoreproperlybelongedtothetreaty—makingpower。Theexperienceofcongress，undertheconfederation，ofthedifficulties，attendantuponvestingthetreaty—makingpowerinalargelegislativebody，wastoodeeplyfelttojustifythehazardofanotherexperiment。11