§；436。\"Anentireconsolidationofthestatesintoonecompletenationalsovereignty，wouldimplyanentiresubordinationoftheparts；andwhateverpowersmightremaininthem，wouldbealtogetherdependentonthegeneralwill。Butastheplanoftheconventionaimsonlyatapartialunionorconsolidation，thestategovernmentswouldclearlyretainalltherightsofsovereignty，whichtheybeforehad，andwhichwerenot，bythatact，exclusivelydelegatedtotheUnitedStates。Thisexclusivedelegation，orratherthisalienationofstatesovereignty，wouldonlyexistinthreecases：wheretheconstitutioninexpresstermsgrantedanexclusiveauthoritytotheUnion；whereitgranted，inoneinstance，anauthoritytotheUnion，andinanother，prohibitedthestatesfromexercisingthelikeauthority；andwhereitgrantedanauthoritytotheUnion，towhichasimilarauthorityinthestateswouldbeabsolutelyandtotallycontradictoryandrepugnant。Iusethesetermstodistinguishthislastcasefromanother，whichmightappeartoresembleit；butwhichwould，infact，beessentiallydifferent：Imean，wheretheexerciseofaconcurrentjurisdictionmightbeproductiveofoccasionalinterferencesinthepolicyofanybranchofadministration，butwouldnotimplyanydirectcontradictionorrepugnancyinpointofconstitutionalauthority。Thesethreecasesofexclusivejurisdictioninthefederalgovernment，maybeexemplifiedbythefollowinginstances。Thelastclausebutoneintheeighthsectionofthefirstarticle，providesexpressly，thatcongressshallexercise’exclusivelegislation’overthedistricttobeappropriatedastheseatofgovernment。Thisanswerstothefirstcase。Thefirstclauseofthesamesectionempowerscongress’tolayandcollecttaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises；’andthesecondclauseofthetenthsectionofthesamearticledeclares，that’nostateshall，withouttheconsentofcongress，layanyimpostsordutiesonimportsorexports，exceptforthepurposeofexecutingitsinspectionlaws；’HencewouldresultanexclusivepowerintheUniontolaydutiesonimportsandexports，withtheparticularexceptionmentioned。
Butthispowerisabridgedbyanotherclause，whichdeclares，thatnotaxordutyshallbelaidonarticlesexportedfromanystate；inconsequenceofwhichqualification，itnowonlyextendstothedutiesonimports。Thisanswerstothesecondcase。Thethirdwillbefoundinthatclause，whichdeclares，thatcongressshallhavepower’toestablishanuniformruleofnaturalizationthroughouttheUnitedStates。’Thismustnecessarilybeexclusive；because，ifeachstatehadpowertoprescribeadistinctrule，therecouldbenouniform，rule。\"Thecorrectnessoftheserulesofinterpretationhasneverbeencontroverted；andtheyhavebeenoftenrecognisedbytheSupremeCourt。51
§；437。Thetwofirstrulesaresocompletelyselfevident，thateveryattempttoillustratethemwouldbevain，ifithadnotatendencytoperplexandconfuse。Thelastrule，viz。thatwhichdeclares，thatthepowerisexclusiveinthenationalgovernment，whereanauthorityisgrantedtotheUnion，towhichasimilarauthorityinthestateswouldbeabsolutelyandtotallycontradictoryandrepugnant，isthatalone，whichmaybethoughttorequirecomment。Thisruleseems，initsownnature，aslittlesusceptibleofdoubt，astheothersinreferencetotheconstitution。For，sincetheconstitutionhasdeclared，thattheconstitutionandlaws，andtreatiesinpursuanceofitshallbethesupremelawoftheland；itwouldbeabsurdtosay，thatastatelaw，repugnanttoit，mighthaveconcurrentoperationandvalidity；andespecially，asitisexpresslyadded，anythingintheconstitutionorlawsofanystatetothecontrarynotwithstanding。Therepugnancy，then，beingmadeout，itfollows，thatthestatelawisjustasmuchvoid，asthoughithadbeenexpresslydeclaredtobevoid；orthepowerincongresshadbeenexpresslydeclaredtobeexclusive。Everypowergiventocongressisbytheconstitutionnecessarilysupreme；andif，fromitsnature，orfromthewordsofthegrant，itisapparentlyintendedtobeexclusive，itisasmuchso，asifthestateswereexpresslyforbiddentoexerciseit。52
§；438。Theprincipaldifficultylies，notsomuchintherule，asinitsapplicationtoparticularcases。Here，thefieldfordiscussioniswide，andtheargumentuponconstructionissusceptibleofgreatmodifications，andofveryvariousforce。Butunless，fromthenatureofthepower，orfromtheobviousresultsofitsoperations，arepugnancymustexist，soastoleadtoanecessaryconclusion，thatthepowerwasintendedtobeexclusive，thetrueruleofinterpretationis，thatthepowerismerelyconcurrent。Thus，forinstance，anaffirmativepowerincongresstolaytaxes，isnotnecessarilyincompatiblewithalikepowerintheStates。Bothmayexistwithoutinterference；andifanyinterferenceshouldariseinaparticularcase，thequestionofsupremacywouldturn，notuponthenatureofthepower，butuponsupremacyofrightintheexerciseofthepowerinthatcase。53Inourcomplexsystem，presentingtherareanddifficultschemeofonegeneralgovernment，whoseactionextendsoverthewhole，butwhichpossessesonlyenumeratedpowers，andofnumerousstategovernments，whichretainandexercisemanypowersnotdelegatedtotheUnion，contestsrespectingpowermustarise。Wereitevenotherwise，themeasurestakenbytherespectivegovernmentstoexecutetheiracknowledgedpowerswouldbeoftenofthesamedescription，andmightsometimesinterfere。This，however，doesnotprove，thattheoneisexercising，orhasarighttoexercise，thepowersoftheother。54
§；439。Andthisleadsustoremark，thatintheexerciseofconcurrentpowers，iftherebeaconflictbetweenthelawsoftheUnionandthelawsofthestate，theformerbeingsupreme，thelattermustofcourseyield。Thepossibility，naytheprobability，ofsuchaconflictwasforeseenbytheframersoftheconstitution，andwasaccordinglyexpresslyprovidedfor。IfastatepassesalawinconsistentwiththeconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesitisamerenullity。Ifitpassesalawclearlywithinitsownconstitutionalpowers，stillifitconflictswiththeexerciseofapowergiventocongress，totheextentoftheinterferenceitsoperationissuspended；for，inaconflictoflaws，thatwhichissuprememustgovern。Therefore，ithasoftenbeenadjudged，thatifastatelawisinconflictwithatreaty，oranactofcongress，itbecomesipsofactoinoperativetotheextentoftheconflict。55
§；440。Fromthisgreatrule，thattheconstitutionandlaws，madeinpursuancethereof，aresupreme；andthattheycontroltheconstitutionsandlawsofthestates，andcannotbecontrolledbythem，fromthis，whichmaybedeemedanaxiom，otherauxiliarycorollariesmaybededuced。Inthefirstplace，that，ifapowerisgiventocreateathing，itimpliesapowertopreserveit。Secondly，thatapowertodestroy，ifwieldedbyadifferenthand，ishostiletoandincompatiblewiththispowertocreateandpreserve。Thirdly，thatwherethisrepugnancyexists，theauthority，whichissupreme，mustcontrol，andnotyieldtothat，overwhichitissupreme。56Consequently，theinferiorpowerbecomesanullity。57
§；441。Butaquestionofastillmoredelicatenaturemayarise；andthatis，howfarintheexerciseofaconcurrentpower，theactuallegislationofcongresssupersedesthestatelegislation，orsuspendsitsoperationoverthesubjectmatter。Arethestatelawsinoperativeonlytotheextentoftheactualconflict；ordoesthelegislationofcongresssuspendthelegislativepowerofthestatesoverthesubjectmatter？Tosuchaninquiry，probably，nouniversalanswercouldbegiven。Itmaydependuponthenatureofthepower，theeffectoftheactualexercise，andtheextentofthesubjectmatter。
§；442。Thismay，perhaps，bebestillustratedbyputtingacase，whichhasbeenreasonedoutbyaverylearnedjudge，inhisownwords：58\"Congresshaspower，\"sayshe，\"toprovidefororganizing，arming，anddiscipliningthemilitia；anditispresumable，thattheframersoftheconstitutioncontemplatedafullexerciseofallthesepowers。Nevertheless，ifcongresshaddeclinedtoexercisethem，itwascompetenttothestategovernmentstoprovidefororganizing，arming，anddiscipliningtheirrespectivemilitiainsuchmanner，astheymightthinkproper。Butcongresshasprovidedforthesesubjectsintheway，whichthatbodymusthavesupposedthebestcalculatedtopromotethegeneralwelfare，andtoprovideforthenationaldefence。
Afterthis，canthestategovernmentsenteruponthesameground，provideforthesameobjects，astheymaythinkproper，andpunish，intheirownway，violationsofthelawstheyhavesoenacted？Theaffirmativeofthisquestionisassertedbycounsel，&；c。whocontend，thatunlesssuchstatelawsareindirectcontradictiontothoseoftheUnitedStates，theyarenotrepugnanttotheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates。——FromthisdoctrineImust，forone，bepermittedtodissent。Thetwolawsmaynotbeinsuchabsoluteoppositiontoeachother，astorendertheoneincapableofexecutionwithoutviolatingtheinjunctionsoftheother；andyetthewilloftheonelegislaturemaybeindirectcollisionwiththatoftheother。Thiswillistobediscovered，aswellbywhatthelegislaturehasnotdeclared，asbywhattheyhaveexpressed。Congress，forexample，havedeclared，thatthepunishmentfordisobedienceoftheactofcongressshallbeacertainfine。Ifthatprovidedbythestatelegislatureforthesameoffencebeasimilarfinewiththeadditionofimprisonmentordeath，thelatterlawwouldnotpreventtheformerfrombeingcarriedintoexecution，andmaybesaid，therefore，nottoberepugnanttoit。ButsurelythewillofCongressisneverthelessthwartedandopposed。\"59Headds，\"Iconsideritanovelandunconstitutionaldoctrine，thatincases，wherethestategovernmentshaveaconcurrentpoweroflegislationwiththenationalgovernment，theymaylegislateuponanysubject，onwhichcongresshasacted，providedthetwolawsarenotinterms，orintheiroperationcontradictoryandrepugnanttoeachother。\"60
§；443。Anotherillustrationmaybedrawnfromtheopinionofthecourtinanotherhighlyimportantcase。Onequestionwas，whetherthepowerofcongresstoestablishuniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptcieswasexclusive，orconcurrentwiththestates。\"Itdoesnotappear，\"itwasthensaid，\"tobeaviolentconstructionoftheconstitution，andiscertainlyaconvenientone，toconsiderthepowerofthestatesasexistingoversuchcases，asthelawsoftheUnionmaynotreach。Bethisasitmay，thepowerofcongressmaybeexercised，ordeclined，asthewisdomofthatbodyshalldecide。If，intheopinionofcongress，uniformlawsconcerningbankruptciesoughtnottobeestablished，itdoesnotfollow，thatpartiallawsmaynotexist，orthatstatelegislationonthesubjectmustcease。Itisnotthemereexistenceofthepower，butitsexercise，whichisincompatiblewiththeexerciseofthesamepowerbythestates。
Itisnottherighttoestablishtheseuniformlaws；buttheiractualestablishment，whichisinconsistentwiththepartialactsofthestates。Iftherightofthestatestopassabankruptlawisnottakenawaybythemeregrantofthatpowertocongress，itcannotbeextinguished。Itcanonlybesuspendedbytheenactmentofageneralbankruptlaw。Therepealofthatlawcannot，itistrue，conferthepoweronthestates；butitremovesadisabilitytoitsexercise，whichwascreatedbytheactofcongress\"61
Itisnotourintentiontocommentonthesecases；buttoofferthemasexamplesofreasoninginfavourandagainsttheexclusivepower，whereapositiverepugnancycannotbepredicated。
§；444。Ithasbeensometimesargued，thatwhenapowerisgrantedtocongresstolegislateinspecificcases，forpurposesgrowingoutoftheUnion，thenaturalconclusionis，thatthepowerisdesignedtobeexclusive；thatthepoweristobeexercisedforthegoodofthewholebythewillofthewhole，andconsistentlywiththeinterestsofthewhole；andthattheseobjectscannowherebesoclearlyseen，orsothoroughlyweighed，asincongress，wherethewholenationisrepresented。Buttheargumentprovestoomuch；andpursuedtoitsfullextent，itwouldestablish，thatallthepowersgrantedtocongressareexclusive，unlesswhereconcurrentauthorityisexpresslyreservedtothestates。62Forinstance，uponthisreasoningthepoweroftaxationincongresswouldannulthewholepoweroftaxationofthestates；andthusoperateavirtualdissolutionoftheirsovereignty。Suchapretensionhasbeenconstantlydisclaimed。
§；445。Ontheotherhand，ithasbeenmaintainedwithgreatpertinacity，thatthestatespossessconcurrentauthoritywithcongressinallcases，wherethepowerisnotexpresslydeclaredtobeexclusive，orexpresslyprohibitedtothestates；andif，intheexerciseofaconcurrentpower，aconflictarises，thereisnoreason，whyeachshouldnotbedeemedequallyrightful。63Butitisplain，thatthisreasoninggoestothedirectoverthrowoftheprincipleofsupremacy；and，ifadmitted，itwouldenablethesubordinatesovereigntytoannulthepowersofthesuperior。Thereisaplainrepugnanceinconferringononegovernmentapowertocontroltheconstitutionalmeasuresofanother，whichother，withrespecttotheseverymeasures，isdeclaredtobesupremeoverthat，whichexertsthecontrol。64Forinstance，thestateshaveacknowledgedlyaconcurrentpoweroftaxation。
Butitiswhollyinadmissibletoallowthatpowertobeexertedoveranyinstrumentemployedbythegeneralgovernmenttoexecuteitsownpowers；
forsuchapowertotaxinvolvesapowertodestroy；andthispowertodestroymaydefeat，andrenderuselessthepowertocreate。65Thusastatemaynottaxthemail，themint，patentrights，custom—housepapers，orjudicialprocessofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。66Andyetthereisnoclauseintheconstitution，whichprohibitsthestatesfromexercisingthepower；noranyexclusivegranttotheUnitedStates。
Theapparentrepugnancycreates，byimplication，theprohibition。Socongress，bytheconstitution，possesspowertoprovideforgoverningsuchpartofthemilitia，asmaybeemployedintheserviceoftheUnitedStates。Yetitisnotsaid，thatsuchpowerofgovernmentisexclusive。Butitresultsfromthenatureofthepower。Nopersonwouldcontend，thatastatemilitia，whileintheactualserviceandemploymentoftheUnitedStates，mightyetbe，atthesametime，governedandcontrolledbythelawsofthestate。
Theverynatureofmilitaryoperationswould，insuchcase，requireunityofcommandanddirection。Andtheargumentfrominconveniencewouldbeabsolutelyirresistibletoestablishanimpliedprohibition。67Ontheotherhand，congresshavepowertoprovidefororganizing，arming，anddiscipliningthemilitia；butifcongressshouldmakenosuchprovision，thereseemsnoreason，whythestatesmaynotorganize，arm，anddisciplinetheirownmilitia。Nonecessaryincompatibilitywouldexistinthenatureofthepower；though，whenexercisedbycongress，theauthorityofthestatesmustnecessarilyyield。And，here，theargumentfrominconveniencewouldbeverypersuasivetheotherway。Forthepowertoorganize，arm，anddisciplinethemilitia，intheabsenceofcongressionallegislation，wouldseemindispensableforthedefenceandsecurityofthestates。68Again，congresshavepowertocallforththemilitiatoexecutethelawsoftheUnion，tosuppressinsurrections，andrepelinvasions。Buttheredoesnotseemanyincompatibilityinthestatescallingouttheirownmilitiaasauxiliariesforthesamepurpose。69
§；446。Inconsidering，then，thissubject，itwouldbeimpracticabletolaydownanyuniversalrule，astowhatpowersare，byimplication，exclusiveinthegeneralgovernment，orconcurrentinthestates；andinrelationtothelatter，whatrestrictionseitheronthepoweritself，orontheactualexerciseofthepower，arisebyimplication。
Insomecases，aswehaveseen，theremayexistaconcurrentpower，andyetrestrictionsuponitmustexistinregardtoobjects。Inothercases，theactualoperationsofthepoweronlyaresuspendedorcontrolled，whentherearisesaconflictwiththeactualoperationsoftheUnion。Everyquestionofthissortmustbedecidedbyitselfuponitsowncircumstancesandreasons。Becausethepowertoregulatecommerce，fromitsnatureandobjects，isexclusive，itdoesnotfollow，thatthepowertopassbankruptlawsalsoisexclusive。70
§；447。Wemay，however，laydownsomefewrules，deduciblefromwhathasbeenalreadysaid，inrespecttocasesofimpliedprohibitionsupontheexistenceorexerciseofpowersbythestates，asguidestoaidourinquiries。1。Whereverthepowergiventothegeneralgovernmentrequires，that，tobeefficaciousandadequatetoitsend，itshouldbeexclusive，therearisesajustimplicationfordeemingitexclusive。Whetherexercised，ornot，insuchacasemakesnodifference。
2。Whereverthepowerinitsownnatureisnotincompatiblewithaconcurrentpowerinthestates，eitherinitsnatureorexercise，therethepowerbelongstothestates。3。Butinsuchacase，theconcurrencyofthepowermayadmitofrestrictionsorqualificationsinitsnature，orexercise。
Initsnature，whenitiscapablefromitsgeneralcharacterofbeingappliedtoobjectsorpurposes，whichwouldcontrol，defeat，ordestroythepowersofthegeneralgovernment。Initsexercise，whentherearisesaconflictintheactuallawsandregulationsmadeinpursuanceofthepowerbythegeneralandstategovernments。Intheformercasethereisaqualificationengrafteduponthegeneralityofthepower，excludingitsapplicationtosuchobjectsandpurposes。Inthelatter，thereisatleastgenerally
aqualification，notuponthepoweritself，butonlyuponitsexercise，totheextentoftheactualconflictintheoperationsofeach。4。Incasesofimpliedlimitationsorprohibitionsofpower，itisnotsufficienttoshowapossible，orpotentialinconvenience。Theremustbeaplainincompatibility，adirectrepugnancy，oranextremepracticalinconvenience，leadingirresistiblytothesameconclusion。5。Ifsuchincompatibility，repugnancy，orextremeinconveniencewouldresult，itisnoanswer，thatintheactualexerciseofthepower，eachpartymay，ifitchooses，avoidapositiveinterferencewiththeother。Theobjectionliestothepoweritself，andnottotheexerciseofit。Ifitexist，itmaybeappliedtotheextentofcontrolling，defeating，ordestroyingtheother。Itcanneverbepresumed，thattheframersoftheconstitution，declaredtobesupreme，couldintendtoputitspowersathazarduponthegoodwishes，orgoodintentions，ordiscretionofthestatesintheexerciseoftheiracknowledgedpowers。6。Wherenosuchrepugnancy，incompatibility，orextremeinconveniencewouldresult，thenthepowerinthestatesisrestrained，notinitsnature，butinitsoperations，andthenonlytotheextentoftheactualinterference。Infact，itisobvious，thatthesamemeansmayoftenbeappliedtocarryintooperationdifferentpowers。Andastatemayusethesamemeanstoeffectuateanacknowledgedpowerinitself，whichcongressmayapplyforanotherpurposeintheacknowledgedexerciseofaverydifferentpower。
Congressmaymakethataregulationofcommerce，whichastatemayemployasaguardforitsinternalpolicy，ortopreservethepublichealthorpeace，ortopromoteitsownpeculiarinterests。71Theserulesseemclearlydeduciblefromthenatureoftheinstrument；andtheyareconfirmedbythepositiveinjunctionsofthetenthamendmentoftheconstitution。
§；448。XIII。Anotherruleofinterpretationdeservesconsiderationinregardtotheconstitution。Therearecertainmaxims，whichhavefoundtheirway，notonlyintojudicialdiscussions，butintothebusinessofcommonlife，asfoundedincommonsense，andcommonconvenience。Thus，itisoftensaid，thatinaninstrumentaspecificationofparticularsisanexclusionofgenerals；ortheexpressionofonethingistheexclusionofanother。LordBacon’sremark，\"that，asexceptionstrengthenstheforceofalawincasesnotexcepted，soenumerationweakensitincasesnotenumerated，\"hasbeenperpetuallyreferredto，asafineillustration。
Thesemaxims，rightlyunderstood，andrightlyapplied，undoubtedlyfurnishsafeguidestoassistusinthetaskofexposition。Buttheyaresusceptibleofbeingapplied，andindeedareofteningeniouslyapplied，tothesubversionofthetext，andtheobjectsoftheinstrument。Thus，ithasbeensuggested，thatanaffirmativeprovisioninaparticularcaseexcludestheexistenceofthelikeprovisionineveryothercase；andanegativeprovisioninaparticularcaseadmitstheexistenceofthesamethingineveryothercase。72Bothofthesedeductionsare，orrathermaybe，unfoundedinsolidreasoning。73Thus，itwasobjectedtotheconstitution，that，havingprovidedforthetrialbyjuryincriminalcases，therewasanimpliedexclusionofitincivilcases。Asiftherewasnotanessentialdifferencebetweensilenceandabolition，betweenapositiveadoptionofitinoneclassofcases，andadiscretionaryrightitbeingclearlywithinthereachofthejudicialpowersconfidedtotheUniontoadopt，orrejectitinalloranyothercases。74Onemightwithjustasmuchproprietyhold，that，becausecongresshaspower\"todeclarewar，\"butnopowerisexpresslygiventomakepeace，thelatterisexcluded；orthat，becauseitisdeclared，that\"nobillofattainder，orexpostfactolawshallbepassed\"bycongress，thereforecongresspossessinallothercasestherighttopassanylaws。Thetruthis，thatinordertoascertain，howfaranaffirmativeornegativeprovisionexcludes，orimpliesothers，wemustlooktothenatureoftheprovision，thesubjectmatter，theobjects，andthescopeoftheinstrument。These，andtheseonly，canproperlydeterminetheruleofconstruction。Therecanbenodoubt，thatanaffirmativegrantofpowersinmanycaseswillimplyanexclusionofallothers。As，forinstance，theconstitutiondeclares，thatthepowersofcongressshallextendtocertainenumeratedcases。Thisspecificationofparticularsevidentlyexcludesallpretensionstoagenerallegislativeauthority。Why？Becauseanaffirmativegrantofspecialpowerswouldbeabsurd，aswellasuseless，ifageneralauthoritywereintended。75Inrelation，then，tosuchasubjectasaconstitution，thenaturalandobvioussenseofitsprovisions，apartfromanytechnicalorartificialrules，isthetruecriterionofconstruction。76
§；449。XIV。Anotherruleofinterpretationoftheconstitution，suggestedbytheforegoing，is，thatthenaturalimportofasingleclauseisnottobenarrowed，soastoexcludeimpliedpowersresultingfromitscharacter，simplybecausethereisanotherclause，whichenumeratescertainpowers，whichmightotherwisebedeemedimpliedpowerswithinitsscope；forinsuchcaseswearenot，asamatterofcourse，toassume，thattheaffirmativespecificationexcludesallotherimplications。
Thisrulehasbeenputinaclearandjustlightbyoneofourmostdistinguishedstatesmen；andhisillustrationwillbemoresatisfactory，perhaps，thananyother，whichcanbeoffered。\"Theconstitution，\"sayshe，\"vestsincongress，expressly，thepowertolayandcollecttaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises，andthepowertoregulatetrade。Thattheformerpower，ifnotparticularlyexpressed，wouldhavebeenincludedinthelatter，asoneoftheobjectsofageneralpowertoregulatetrade，isnotnecessarilyimpugnedbyitsbeingsoexpressed。Examplesofthissortcannotsometimesbeeasilyavoided，andaretobeseenelsewhereintheconstitution。Thus，thepower’todefineandpunishoffencesagainstthelawofnations’includesthepower，afterwardsparticularlyexpressed，’tomakerulesconcerningcaptures，’&；c。fromoffendingneutrals。So，also，apower’tocoinmoney’would，doubtless，includethatof’regulatingitsvalue，’hadnotthelatterpowerbeenexpresslyinserted。Thetermtaxes，ifstandingalone，wouldcertainlyhaveincluded’duties，imposts，andexcises。’Inanotherclauseitissaid，’notaxordutyshallbelaidonexports。’Herethetwotermsareusedassynonymous。Andinanotherclause，whereitissaid’nostateshalllayanyimpostsorduties，’&；c。thetermsimpostsanddutiesaresynonymous。Pleonasms，tautologies，andthepromiscuoususeoftermsandphrases，differingintheirshadesofmeaning，alwaystobeexpoundedwithreferencetothecontext，andunderthecontrolofthegeneralcharacterandscopeoftheinstrument，inwhichtheyarefound，
aretobeascribed，sometimestothepurposesofgreatercaution，sometimestotheimperfectionoflanguage，andsometimestotheimperfectionofmanhimself。Inthisviewofthesubjectitwasquitenatural，howevercertainlythepowertoregulatetrademightincludeapowertoimposedutiesonit，nottoomititinaclauseenumeratingtheseveralmodesofrevenueauthorizedbytheconstruction。Infewcasescouldthe[rule]，exmajoricautela，occurwithmoreclaimtorespect。\"77
§；450。Wemayclosethisviewofsomeofthemoreimportantrulestobeemployedintheinterpretationoftheconstitution，byadvertingtoafewbelongingtomereverbalcriticism，whichareindeedbutcorollariesfromwhathasbeensaid，andhavebeenalreadyalludedto；butwhich，atthesametime，itmaybeofsomeuseagaindistinctlytoenunciate。
§；451。XV。Inthefirstplace，then，everywordemployedintheconstitutionistobeexpoundedinitsplain，obvious，andcommonsense，unlessthecontextfurnishessomegroundtocontrol，qualify，orenlargeit。Constitutionsarenotdesignedformetaphysicalorlogicalsubtleties，fornicetiesofexpression，forcriticalpropriety，forelaborateshadesOrmeaning，orfortheexerciseofphilosophicalacuteness，orjudicialresearch。Theyareinstrumentsofapracticalnature，foundedonthecommonbusinessofhumanlife，adaptedtocommonwants，designedforcommonuse，andfittedforcommonunderstandings。Thepeoplemakethem；
thepeopleadoptthem；thepeoplemustbesupposedtoreadthem，withthehelpofcommonsense；andcannotbepresumedtoadmitinthemanyreconditemeaning，oranyextraordinarygloss。
§；452。XVI。But，inthenextplace，words，fromthenecessaryimperfectionofallhumanlanguage，acquiredifferentshadesofmeaning，eachofwhichisequallyappropriate，andequallylegitimate；
eachofwhichrecedesinawiderornarrowerdegreefromtheothers，accordingtocircumstances；andeachofwhichreceivesfromitsgeneralusesomeindefinitenessandobscurity，astoitsexactboundaryandextent。78Weare，indeed，oftendriventomultiplycommentariesfromthevaguenessofwordsinthemselves；andperhapsstillmoreoftenfromthedifferentmanner，inwhichdifferentmindsareaccustomedtoemploythem。Theyexpandorcontract，notonlyfromtheconventionalmodificationsintroducedbythechangesofsociety；butalsofromthemorelooseormoreexactuses，towhichmenofdifferenttalents，acquirements，andtastes，fromchoiceornecessityapplythem。Nopersoncanfailtoremarkthegradualdeflectionsinthemeaningofwordsfromoneagetoanother；andsoconstantlyisthisprocessgoingon，thatthedailylanguageoflifeinonegenerationsometimesrequirestheaidofaglossaryinanother。Ithasbeenjustlyremarked，79thatnolanguageissocopious，astosupplywordsandphrasesforeverycomplexidea；orsocorrect，asnottoincludemany，equivocallydenotingdifferentideas。Henceitmusthappen，thathoweveraccuratelyobjectsmaybediscriminatedinthemselves，andhoweveraccuratelythediscriminationmaybeconsidered，thedefinitionofthemmayberenderedinaccuratebytheinaccuracyoftheterms，inwhichitisdelivered。Wemustresortthentothecontext，andshapetheparticularmeaning，soastomakeitfitthatoftheconnectingwords，andagreewiththesubjectmatter。
§；453。XVII。Inthenextplace，wheretechnicalwordsareused，thetechnicalmeaningistobeappliedtothem，unlessitisrepelledbythecontext。80Butthesamewordoftenpossessesatechnical，andacommonsense。Insuchacasethelatteristobepreferred，unlesssomeattendantcircumstancepointsclearlytotheformer。Noonewoulddoubt，whentheconstitutionhasdeclared，that\"theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusshallnotbesuspended，unless\"underpeculiarcircumstances，thatitreferred，nottoeverysortofwrit，whichhasacquiredthatname；buttothat，whichhasbeenemphaticallysocalled，onaccountofitsremedialpowertofreeapartyfromarbitraryimprisonment。81So，again，whenitdeclares，thatinsuitsatcommonlaw，&；c。therightoftrialbyjuryshallbepreserved，thoughthephrase\"commonlaw\"admitsofdifferentmeanings，noonecandoubt，thatitisusedinatechnicalsense。When，again，itdeclares，thatcongressshallhavepowertoprovideanavy，wereadilycomprehend，thatauthorityisgiventoconstruct，prepare，orinanyothermannertoobtainanavy。Butwhencongressisfurtherauthorizedtoprovideforcallingforththemilitia，weperceiveatonce，thattheword\"provide\"isusedinasomewhatdifferentsense。
§；454。XVIII。Andthisleadsustoremark，inthenextplace，thatitisbynomeansacorrectruleofinterpretationtoconstruethesamewordinthesamesense，whereveritoccursinthesameinstrument。Itdoesnotfollow，eitherlogicallyorgrammatically，thatbecauseawordisfoundinoneconnexionintheconstitution，withadefinitesense，thereforethesamesenseistobeadoptedineveryotherconnexion，inwhichitoccurs。82Thiswouldbetosuppose，thattheframersweighedonlytheforceofsinglewords，asphilologistsorcritics，andnotwholeclausesandobjects，asstatesmen，andpracticalreasoners。Andyetnothinghasbeenmorecommon，thantosubjecttheconstitutiontothisnarrowandmischievouscriticism。
Menofingeniousandsubtleminds，whoseekforsymmetryandharmonyinlanguage，havingfoundintheconstitutionawordusedinsomesense，whichfallsinwiththeirfavouritetheoryofinterpretingit，havemadethatthestandard，bywhichtomeasureitsuseineveryotherpartoftheinstrument。
Theyhavethusstretchedit，asitwere，onthebedofProcrustes，loppingoffitsmeaning，whenitseemedtoolargefortheirpurposes，andextendingit，whenitseemedtooshort。Theyhavethusdistortedittothemostunnaturalshapes，andcrippled，wheretheyhavesoughtonlytoadjustitsproportionsaccordingtotheirownopinions。ItwasveryjustlyobservedbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，inTheCherokeeNationv。TheStateofGeorgia，83that\"ithasbeensaid，thatthesamewordshavenotnecessarilythesamemeaningattachedtothem，whenfoundindifferentpartsofthesameinstrumentTheirmeaningiscontrolledbythecontext。Thisisundoubtedlytrue。Incommonlanguage，thesamewordhasvariousmeanings；andthepeculiarsense，inwhichitisusedinanysentence，istobedeterminedbythecontext。\"Averyeasyexampleofthissortwillbefoundintheuseoftheword\"establish，\"whichisfoundinvariousplacesintheconstitution。Thus，inthepreamble，oneobjectoftheconstitutionisavowedtobe\"toestablishjustice，\"whichseemsheretomeantosettlefirmly，tofixunalterably，orrather，perhaps，asjustice，abstractedlyconsidered，mustbeconsideredasforeverfixedandunalterable，todispenseoradministerjustice。Again，theconstitutiondeclares，thatcongressshallhavepower\"toestablishanuniformruleofnaturalization，anduniformlawsonthesubjectofbankruptcies，\"whereitismanifestlyusedasequivalenttomake，orform，andnottofixorsettleunalterablyandforever。Again，\"congressshallhavepowertoestablishpostofficesandpost—roads，\"wheretheappropriatesensewouldseemtobetocreate，tofound，andtoregulate，notsomuchwithaviewtopermanenceofform，astoconvenienceofaction。Again，itisdeclared，that\"congressshallmakenolawrespectinganestablishmentofreligion，\"whichseemstoprohibitanylaws，whichshallrecognise，found，confirm，orpatronizeanyparticularreligion，orformofreligion，whetherpermanentortemporary，whetheralreadyexisting，ortoariseinfuture。Inthisclause，establishmentseemsequivalentinmeaningtosettlement，recognition，orsupport。Andagain，inthepreamble，itissaid，\"We，thepeople，&；c。doordainandestablishthisconstitution，\"&；c。；wherethemostappropriatesenseseemstobetocreate，toratify，andtoconfirm。So，theword\"state\"
willbefoundusedintheconstitutioninallthevarioussenses，towhichwehavebeforealluded。Itsometimesmeans，theseparatesectionsofterritoryoccupiedbythepoliticalsocietieswithineach；sometimestheparticulargovernmentsestablishedbythesesocieties；sometimesthesesocietiesasorganizedintotheseparticulargovernments；andlastly，sometimesthepeoplecomposingthesepoliticalsocietiesintheirhighestsovereigncapacity。84
§；455。XIX。Butthemostimportantrule，incasesofthisnature，is，thataconstitutionofgovernmentdoesnot，andcannot，fromitsnature，dependinanygreatdegreeuponmereverbalcriticism，orupontheimportofsinglewords。Suchcriticismmaynotbewhollywithoutuse；itmaysometimesillustrate，orunfoldtheappropriatesense；butunlessitstandswellwiththecontextandsubject—matter，itmustyieldtothelatter。While，then，wemaywellresorttothemeaningofsinglewordstoassistourinquiries，weshouldneverforget，thatitisaninstrumentofgovernmentwearetoconstrue；and，ashasbeenalreadystated，thatmustbethetruestexposition，whichbestharmonizeswithitsdesign，itsobjects，anditsgeneralstructure。85
§；456。TheremarkofMr。Burkemay，withaveryslightchangeofphrasebeaddressedasanadmonitiontoallthose，whoarecalledupontoframe，ortointerpretaconstitution。Governmentisapracticalthingmadeforthehappinessofmankind，andnottofurnishoutaspectacleofuniformitytogratifytheschemesofvisionarypoliticians。
Thebusinessofthose，whoarecalledtoadministerit，istorule，andnottowrangle。Itwouldbeapoorcompensation，thatonehadtriumphedinadispute，whilstwehadlostanempire；86thatwehadfrittereddownapower，andatthesametimehaddestroyedtherepublic。
1。\"ThegovernmentoftheUnion，\"saysMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourtinMcCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。316，\"isemphaticallyandtrulyagovernmentofthepeople。Itemanatesfromthem；itspowersaregrantedbythem，andaretobeexerciseddirectlyonthemandfortheirbenefit。\"Id。
404，405；seealsoCohensv。Virginia，6Wheat。R。264，413，414。
\"ThegovernmentoftheUnitedStateswaserected，\"saysMr。ChancellorKent，withequalforceandaccuracy，\"bythefreevoiceandthejointwillofthepeopleofAmericafortheircommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。\"
1Kent’sComm。Lect。10，p。189。
2。IhaveusedtheexpressivewordsofMr。Webster，deemingthemasexactasanythatcouldbeused。SeeWebster’sSpeeches，p，410，418，419；4Elliot’sDebates，338，343。
3。1Black。Comm。59，60。SeealsoAyliffe’sPandects，B。1，tit4，p。25，&；c。；1Domat。Prelim。
Book，p。9；Id。TreatiseonLaws，ch。12，p。74。
4。Id。SeealsoWoodes。Elem。
ofJurisp。p。36。——RulesofasimilarnaturewillbefoundlaiddowninVattel，B。2，ch。17，from§；262to310，withmoreampleillustrationsandmorevariousqualifications。Butnotafewofhisrulesappeartometowantaccuracyandsoundness。Bacon’sAbridg。title，StatuteI。
containsanexcellentsummaryoftherulesforconstruingstatutes。Domat，also，containsmanyvaluableruleinrespecttointerpretation。SeehisTreatiseonLaws，c。12，p。74&；c。andPreliminaryDiscourse，tit。1，§；2，p。6to16。
5。Book2，ch。7，§；3。
6。TheforegoingremarksareborrowedalmostintermsfromRutherforth’sInstitutesofNaturalLawB。
2，ch。7，§；4to11，whichcontainaverylucidexpositionofthegeneralrulesofinterpretation。Thewholechapterdeservesanattentiveperusal。
7。ThevalueofcontemporaryinterpretationismuchinsistedonbytheSupremeCourt，inStuartv。Laird，2
Cranch，299，309，inMartinv。Hunter，1Wheat。R。304，andinCohensv。Virginia，6Wheat。R。264，418to421。Thereareseveralinstances，however，inwhichthecontemporaryinterpretationsbysomeofthemostdistinguishedfoundersoftheconstitutionhavebeenoverruled。OneofthemoststrikingistobefoundinthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtofthesuabilityofastatebyanycitizenofanotherstate；8andanotherinthedecisionbytheExecutiveandtheSenate，thattheconsentofthelatterisnotnecessarytoremovalsfromoffice，althoughitisforappointments。9
8。Chisholmv。Georgia，2Dall。
419。
9。TheFederalist，No。77。
10。Mr。Jeffersonhaslaiddowntworules，whichhedeemsperfectcanonsfortheinterpretationoftheconstitution。11Thefirstis\"Thecapitalandlendingobjectoftheconstitutionwas，toleavewiththestatesallauthorities，whichrespectedtheirowncitizensonly，andtotransfertotheUnitedStatesthose，whichrespectedcitizensofforeignorotherstates；tomakeusseveralastoourselves，butoneastoallothers。Inthelattercase，then，constructionsshouldleantothegeneraljurisdiction，ifthewordswillbearit；andinfavourofthestatesintheformer，ifpossible，tobesoconstrued。\"Now，theverytheory，onwhichthiscanonisfounded，iscontradictedbytheprovisionsoftheconstitutionitself。Imanyinstancesauthoritiesandpowersaregiven，whichrespectcitizensoftherespectivestates，withoutreferencetoforeigners，orthecitizensofotherstates。12Butifthisgeneraltheoryweretrue，itwouldfurnishnojustruleofinterpretation，sinceaparticularclausemightformanexceptiontoit；and，indeed，everyclauseought，atallevents，tobeconstruedaccordingtoitsfairintentandobjects，asdisclosedinitslanguage。Whatsortofaruleisthat，which，withoutregardtotheintentorobjectsofaparticularclause，insists，thatitshall，ifpossible，notifreasonablebeconstruedinfavourofthestates，simplybecauseitrespectstheircitizens？Thesecondcanonis，\"Oneveryquestionofconstruction[weshould]carryourselvesbacktothetime，whentheconstitutionwasadopted；recollectthespiritmanifestedinthedebates；andinsteadoftrying，whatmeaningmaybesqueezedoutofthetext，orinventedagainstit，conformtotheprobableone，inwhichitwaspassed。\"Now，whodoesnotseetheutterlooseness，andincoherenceofthiscanon。Howarewetoknow，whatwasthoughtofparticularclausesoftheconstitutionatthetimeofitsadoption？Inmanycases，noprinteddebatesgiveanyaccountofanyconstruction；andwhereanyisgiven，differentpersonshelddifferentdoctrines。Whoseistoprevail？Besides；ofallthestateconventions，thedebatesoffiveonlyarepreserved，andtheseveryimperfectly。Whatistobedone，astotheothereightstates？Whatistobedone，astotheelevennewstates，whichhavecomeintotheUnionunderconstructions，whichhavebeenestablished，againstwhatsomepersonsmaydeemthemeaningoftheframersofit？Howarewetoarriveatwhatisthemostprobablemeaning？AreMr。Hamilton，andMr。Madison，andMr。
Jay，theexpoundersintheFederalist，tobefollowed。Orareothersofadifferentopiniontoguideus？Arewetobegovernedbytheopinionsofafew，nowdead，whohaveleftthemonrecord？Orbythoseofafewnowliving，simplybecausetheywereactorsinthosedays，constitutingnotoneinathousandofthose，whowerecalledtodeliberateupontheconstitution，andnotoneintenthousandofthose，whowereinfavouroragainstit，amongthepeople？Orarewetobegovernedbytheopinionsofthose，whoconstitutedamajorityofthose，whowerecalledtoactonthatoccasion，eitherasframersof，orvotersupon，theconstitution？
Ifbythelatter，inwhatmannercanweknowthoseopinions？Arewetobegovernedbythesenseofamajorityofaparticularstate，orofalloftheUnitedStates？Ifso，howarewetoascertain，whatthatsensewas？
Isthesenseoftheconstitutiontobeascertained，notbyitsowntext，butbythe\"probablemeaning\"tobegatheredbyconjecturesfromscattereddocuments，fromprivatepapers，fromthetabletalkofsomestatesmen，orthejealousexaggerationsofothers？IstheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatestobetheonlyinstrument，whichisnottobeinterpretedbywhatiswritten，butbyprobableguesses，asidefromthetext？Whatwouldbesaidofinterpretingastatuteofastatelegislature，byendeavouringtofindout，fromprivatesources，theobjectsandopinionsofeverymember；
howeveryonethought；whathewished；howheinterpretedit？Supposedifferentpersonshaddifferentopinions，whatistobedone？Supposedifferentpersonsarenotagreed，asto\"theprobablemeaning\"oftheframersorofthepeople，whatinterpretationistobefollowed？These，andmanyquestionsofthesamesort，mightbeasked。Itisobvious，thattherecanbenosecuritytothepeopleinanyconstitutionofgovernment，iftheyarenottojudgeofitbythefairmeaningofthewordsofthetext；butthewordsaretobebentandbrokenbythe\"probablemeaning\"ofpersons，whomtheyneverknew，andwhoseopinions，andmeansofinformation，maybenobetterthantheirown？Thepeopleadoptedtheconstitutionaccordingtothewordsofthetextintheirreasonableinterpretation，andnotaccordingtotheprivateinterpretationofanyparticularmen。Theopinionsofthelattermaysometimesaidusinarrivingatjustresults；buttheycanneverbeconclusive。TheFederalistdenied，thatthepresidentcouldremoveapublicofficerwithouttheconsentofthesenate。Thefirstcongressaffirmedhisrightbyameremajority。Whichistobefollowed？
11。Jefferson’sCorresp。373；Id。391，392；Id。396。
12。Jefferson’sCorresp。391，392，396。
13。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。
151。
14。B。2，§；305。
15。§；508。
16。RawleontheConstitution，ch。1，p。31。
17。Martinv。Hunter，1Wheat。
R。304，325。
18。TheFederalist，No。37。
19。Wheat。R。304；S。C。3Peters’sCond。R。575。
20。ThisisstillmoreforciblystatedbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshallindeliveringtheopinionofthecourtinMcCullochv。Maryland，inapassagealreadycited。4Wheat。R。316，402to405。
21。SeealsoMcCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。316，402to406。
22。SeealsoId。222，andMr。
ChiefJusticeMarshall’sopinioninOgdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。
R。332。
23。SeeOgdenv。Saunders，12
Wheat。R。332，OpinionofMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall。
24。SeeGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。189。
25。Hunterv。Martin，1Wheat。
R。304，326，327；S。C。3Peters’sCond。R。575，583。
26。SeeGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，187，&；c。222，&；c。
27。SeeSturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。112，202。
28。Mr。JusticeJohnson，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourtinAndersonv。Dunn，6Wheat。204，226
usesthefollowingexpressivelanguage：\"TheideaisUtopian，thatgovernmentcanexistwithoutleavingtheexerciseofdiscretionsomewhere。Publicsecurityagainsttheabuseofsuchdiscretionmustrestonresponsibility，andstatedappealstopublicapprobation。Whereallpowerisderivedfromthepeople，andpublicfunctionariesatshortintervalsdeposititatthefeetofthepeople，toberesumedagainonlyattheirownwills，individualfearsmaybealarmedbythemonstersofimagination，butindividuallibertycanbeinlittledanger。\"
29。SeeUnitedStatesv。Fisher，2Cranch，358；S。C。Peters’sCond。R。421。
30。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4WheatR122，202。
31。SeeBacon’sAbridg。StatuteI；Vattel，B。2，ch。17，§；277to285，299to302。
32。SeeBasv。Tingey4Dall。
R。37；S。C。1Peters’sCond。R。221。
33。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，188，189。
34。2Dall。R。419；S。C。2Cond。R。
635，652。
35。Bacon’sAbridg。Statute1。
8。
36。TheFederalist，No。44。
37。ThereasoningofMr。ChiefJusticeMarshallonthissubject，inMcCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。316
issocogentandsatisfactory，thatweshallventuretociteitatlarge。
Afterhavingremarked，thatwordshavevarioussenses，andthatwhatisthetrueconstructionofanyusedintheconstitutionmustdependuponthesubject，thecontext，andtheintentionsofthepeople，tohegatheredfromtheinstrument，heproceedsthus：
\"Thesubjectistheexecutionofthosegreatpowers，onwhichthewelfareofanationessentiallydepends。Itmusthavebeentheintentionofthose，whogavethesepowers，toinsure，asfarashumanprudencecouldinsure，theirbeneficialexecution。Thiscouldnotbedonebyconfidingthechoiceofmeanstosuchnarrowlimits，asnottoleaveitinthepowerofcongresstoadoptany，whichmightbeappropriate，andwhichwereconducivetotheend。Thisprovisionismadeinaconstitutionintendedtoendureforagestocome，and，consequently，tobeadaptedtothevariouscrisesofhumanaffairs。Tohaveprescribedthemeans，bywhichgovernmentshould，inallfuturetime，executeitspowers，wouldhavebeentochangeentirelythecharacteroftheinstrument，andgiveitthepropertiesofalegalcode。Itwouldhavebeenanunwiseattempttoprovide，byimmutablerules，forexigencies，which，ifforeseenatall，musthavebeenseendimly，andwhichcanbebestprovidedfor，astheyoccur。Tohavedeclared，thatthebestmeansshallnotbeused，butwoulddenyachoiceofmeanstoexecutethepower，wouldreducethepoweritselftoanullity。For，asitnevercouldbedemonstrated，thatanyonemodeinparticularwasintended，andtobeexclusivelyemployed；and，asitmightbedemonstrated，thatothermeansmightbeemployed，thequestion，whetherthepowerwererightfullyputintoexercise，wouldforeverbesubjecttodoubtandcontroversy。
1Ifonemeansisadoptedtogiveiteffect，andiswithinitsscope，becauseitisappropriate，howarewetoescapefromtheargument，thatanother，fallingwithinthesamepredicament，isequallywithinitsscope？Ifeachisequallyappropriate，howisthechoicetobemadebetweenthem？Ifoneisselected，howdoesthatexcludeallothers？Ifoneismoreappropriateatonetime，andanotheratanothertime，whereistherestrictiontobefound，whichallowstheone，anddeniestheother？Apowergrantedinaframeofgovernmentisnotcontemplatedtobeexhaustedinasingleexertionofit，orunoflatu。Itisintendedforfreeandpermanentexercise；
andifthediscretionofthefunctionaries，whoaretoexerciseit，isnotlimited，thatdiscretion，especially，asthosefunctionariesmustnecessarilychange，mustbecoextensivewiththepoweritself。Take，forinstance，thepowertomakewar。Inoneage，thiswouldauthorizethepurchaseandemploymentoftheweaponsthenordinarilyusedforthispurpose。Butsupposetheseweaponsarewhollylaidaside，andotherssubstituted，moreefficientandpowerful；isthegovernmentprohibitedfromemployingthenewmodesofoffenceanddefence？Surelynot。Theinventionofgunpowdersupersededtheoldmodesofwarfare，andmayperhaps，byfutureinventions，besupersededinitsturn。Noonecanseriouslydoubt，thatthenewmodeswouldbewithinthescopeofthepowertomakewar，iftheywereappropriatetotheend。
Itwould，indeed，beamostextraordinarymodeofinterpretationoftheconstitution，togivesucharestrictivemeaningtoitspowers，asshouldobstructtheirfairoperation。Apowerbeinggiven，itistheinterestofthenationtofacilitateitsexecution。Itcanneverbetheirinterest，andcannotbepresumedtobetheirintention，toclogandembarrassitsexecution，bywithholdingthemostappropriatemeans。Therecanbenoreasonablegroundforpreferringthatconstruction，whichwouldrendertheoperationsofthegovernmentdifficult，hazardous，andexpensive；orforimputingtotheframersoftheconstitutionadesigntoimpedetheexerciseofitspowers，bywithholdingachoiceofmeans。38
\"So，withrespecttothewholepenalcodeoftheUnitedStates：whencearisesthepowertopunish，incasesnotprescribedbytheconstitution？Alladmit，thatthegovernmentmaylegitimately，punishanyviolationofitslaws；andyet，thisisnotamongtheenumeratedpowersofcongress。Therighttoenforcetheobservanceoflaw，bypunishingitsinfraction，mightbedeniedwiththemoreplausibility，becauseitisexpresslygiveninsomecases。Congressisempowered’toprovideforthepunishmentofcounterfeitingthesecuritiesandcurrentcoinoftheUnitedStates，’
and’todefineandpunishpiraciesandfeloniescommittedonthehighseas，andoffencesagainstthelawofnations。’Theseveralpowersofcongressmayexist，inaveryimperfectstatetobesure，buttheymayexist，andbecarriedintoexecution，althoughnopunishmentshouldbeinflictedincases，wheretherighttopunishisnotexpresslygiven。
\"Take，forexample，thepower’toestablishpostofficesandpostroads。’Thispowerisexecutedbythesingleactofmakingtheestablishment。But，fromthishasbeeninferredthepower，anddutyofcarryingthemailalongthepostroad，fromonepostofficetoanother。
And，fromthisimpliedpowerhasagainbeeninferredtherighttopunishthose，whosteallettersfromthepostoffice，orrobthemail。Itmaybesaid，withsomeplausibility，thattherighttocarrythemail，andtopunishthose，whorobit，isnotindispensablynecessarytotheestablishmentofapostoffice，andpostroad。Thisrightisindeedessentialtothebeneficialexerciseofthepower，butnotindispensablynecessarytoitsexistence。So，ofthepunishmentofthecrimesofstealingorfalsifyingarecord，orprocessofacourtoftheUnitedStates，orofperjuryinsuchcourt。Topunishtheseoffencesiscertainlyconducivetothedueadministrationofjustice。Butcourtsmayexist，andmaydecidethecausesbroughtbeforethem，thoughsuchcrimesescapepunishment。
\"Thebanefulinfluenceofthisnarrowconstruction，onalltheoperationsofthegovernment，andtheabsoluteimpracticabilityofmaintainingitwithoutrenderingthegovernmentincompetenttoitsgreatobjects，mightbeillustratedbynumerousexamplesdrawnfromtheconstitution，andfromourlaws。Thegoodsenseofthepublichaspronouncedwithouthesitation，thatthepowerofpunishmentappertainstosovereignty，andmaybeexercised，wheneverthesovereignhasarighttoact，asincidentaltohisconstitutionalpowers。Itisameansforcarryingintoexecutionallsovereignpowers，andmaybeused，althoughnotindispensablynecessary。
Itisarightincidentaltothepower，andconducivetoitsbeneficialexercise。\"39
38。McCullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。316，408。
39。SeeUnitedStatesv。Fisher，2Cranch，358；S。C。1Peters’sCond。R。421，429。
40。SeetheremarksofMr。JusticeJohnson，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourtinAndersonv。Dunn，6Wheat。
R。204，226；UnitedStatesv。Fisher，2Cranch。358；S。C。1Peters’sCond。R。421，429。
41。McCullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R，316，409，410，421，423；UnitedStatesv。Fisher，2Cranch，358；S。C。1Peters’sCond。R。421。
42。TheFederalist，No。33，44；McCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。316，423。
43。Inthediscussions，astotheconstitutionalityoftheBankoftheUnitedStates，inthecabinetofPresidentWashington，upontheoriginalestablishmentoftheBank，therewasalargerangeofargument，proelcontra，inrespecttoimpliedpowers。ThereaderwillfindasummaryofthelendingviewsoneachsideinthefifthvolumeofMarshall’sLifeofWashington，App。p。3，note3，&；c。；4
Jefferson’sCorresp。523to526；andinHamilton’sArgumentonConstitutionalityofBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，111to155。
44。Andersonv。Dunn，6Wheat。
204，226。
45。Article2。
46。PerMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，inMcCullochv。Maryland，4WheatR。316，406，407，421。
47。TheFederalist，No。33。
48。TheFederalist，No。44。
49。TheFederalist，No。44。
50。TheFederalist，No。32。
51。SeeHustonv。More，5Wheat。
R。1，22，24，48；Ogdenv。Gibbons，9Wheat。R。1，198，210，228，235；Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，192，193；Ogdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。1，275，307，322，334，335。
52。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，192，193；Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。1，198，&；c。
52。TheFederalist，No。32；Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。1，198，199to205；McCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat，R。316，425。
54。Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，205。——Mr。ChancellorKenthasgiventhiswholesubjectofexclusiveandconcurrentpowerathoroughexamination；andtheresultwillbefoundmostablystatedinhislearnedCommentaries，Lecture18。1KentComm。
364to379，2dedit。p。387to405。
55。Warev。Hylton，3Dall。199，S。C。1，Conden。R。99，112，127，128，129；Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，210，211；McCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。316，405，406，425to436Houstonv。Moore。5Wheat。R。1，22，24，49，51，53，56；Sturgisv。Crowninshield，2Wheat。R。1，190，196；Goldenv。Prince，3Wash。C。C。R。313，321；TheFederalist，No。32；
Brownv。Maryland，12Wheat。R。419，419。
56。McCullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。316，426。
57。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。1，193。
58。Mr。JusticeWashington，Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。R。1，21，22。
59。5WheatR。p。22。
60。Id。24。SeealsoGoldenv。Prince，3Wash。C。C。R。313，324，&；c。；
61。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，195，196。SeealsoGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。
1，197，227，235，238；Houstonv。Moore，5wheat。R。34，49，52，54，55。——Thisopinion，thatthepowertopassbankruptlawsisnotexclusive，hasnotbeenunanimouslyadoptedbytheSupremeCourt。Mr。JusticeWashingtonmaintainedatalltimesanoppositeopinion；andhisopinionisknowntohavebeenadoptedbyatleastoneotherofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourt。
Thereasons，onwhichMr。J。Washington’sopinionisfounded，willbefoundatlargeinthecaseofGoldenv。Prince，3Wash。C。C。R。313，322，&；c。SeealsoOgdenv。Saunders，12Wheat。R。213，264，265，andGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。1，209，226，238。
62。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。
R。1，49，55，56。
63。SeeGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，197，210；McCullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。316，527。
64。McCullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。316，431。
65。Ibid。
66。Id。432。
67。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。
R。1，53。
68。HoustonvMoore，5Wheat。
R。50，51，52。
69。Id。54，55。
70。Sturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。122，195，197，199；Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。1，196，197，209。
71。SeeGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。
R。1，203to210。
72。SeeTheFederalist，No。83，84。
73。Cohensv。Virginia，6Wheat。
R。395to401。
74。TheFederalist，No。83。
75。TheFederalist，No。83。SeeVattel，B。2，ch，17，§；282。
76。TheFederalist，No。83。
77。Mr。Madison’sLettertoMr。Cabell，18thSeptember，1828。
78。SeeVattel，B。2，ch。17，§；262，§；299。
79。TheFederalist，No。37。
80。SeeVattel，B。2，ch。17，§；276，277。
81。ExparteBollman&；Swartout，4Cranch，75；S。C。2Peters’sCond。R。33。
82。Vattel，B。2，ch。17，§；281。
5Peters’sRep。1，19。
83。
84。Mr。Madison’sVirginiaReport，7January，1800，p。5；ante，§；208，p。193。
85。SeeVattel，B。2，ch。17，§；285，286。
86。Burke’sLettertotheSheriffsofBristolin1777。
CH。VI。]THEPREAMBLE。443
CHAPTERVI。
THEPREAMBLE。
§；457。Havingdisposedofthesepreliminaryinquiries，wearenow
arrivedatthatpartofourlabours，whichinvolvesacommentaryuponthe
actualprovisionsoftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates。Itisproposedto
takeupthesuccessiveclausesintheorderinwhichtheystandinthe
instrumentitself，sothattheexpositionmaynaturallyflowfromthetermsof
thetext。
§；458。Webeginthenwiththepreambleoftheconstitution。It
isinthefollowingwords：
\"We，thepeopleoftheUnitedStates，inordertoformamoreperfect
union，establishjustice，insure\"domestictranquility，provideforthe
commondefence，promotethegeneralwelfare，andsecuretheblessingsof
libertytoourselvesandourposterity，doordainand\"establishthis
constitutionfortheUnitedStatesofAmerica。\"
§；459。Theimportanceofexaminingthepreamble，forthe
purposeofexpoundingthelanguageofastatute，hasbeenlongfelt，and
universallyconcededinalljuridicaldiscussions。Itisanadmittedmaximin
theordinarycourseoftheadministrationofjustice，thatthepreambleofa
statuteisakeytoopenthemindofthemakers，astothemischiefs，whichare
toberemedied，andtheobjects，whicharetobeaccomplishedbytheprovisions
ofthestatute。Wefinditlaiddowninsomeofourearliestauthoritiesinthe
commonlaw；andciviliansareaccustomedtoasimilarexpression，444CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
cessantelegispraemio，cessatetipsalex。1Probablyithasafoundation
intheexpositionofeverycodeofwrittenlaw，fromtheuniversalprincipleof
interpretation，thatthewillandintentionofthelegislatureistobe
regardedandfollowed。Itisproperlyresortedto，wheredoubtsorambiguities
ariseuponthewordsoftheenactingpart；foriftheyareclearand
unambiguous，thereseemslittleroomforinterpretation，exceptincases
leadingtoanobviousabsurdity，ortoadirectoverthrowoftheintention
expressedinthepreamble。
§；460。Theredoesnotseemanyreasonwhy，inafundamental
laworconstitutionofgovernment，anequalattentionshouldnotbegivento
theintentionoftheframers，asstatedinthepreamble。Andaccordinglywe
find，thatithasbeenconstantlyreferredtobystatesmenandjuriststoaid
themintheexpositionofitsprovisions。2
§；461。Thelanguageofthepreambleoftheconstitutionwas
probablyinagoodmeasuredrawnfromthatofthethirdarticleofthe
confederation，whichdeclared，that\"Thesaidstatesherebyseverally
enterintoafirmleagueoffriendshipwitheachother，fortheircommon
defence，thesecurityoftheirliberties，andtheirmutualandgeneralwelfare。
Andweaccordinglyfind，thatthefirstresolutionproposed，intheconvention
whichframedtheconstitution，was，thatthearticlesoftheconfederation
oughttobesocorrectedandenlarged，astoaccomplishtheobjectsproposedby
theirinstitution，namely，commondefence，securityofliberty，andgeneral
welfare。3
___________________________________1Bac。Abridg。Statute1。；2PlowdenR。369；1Inst。79。
2SeeChisholmv。Georgia，ChiefJusticeJay’sopinion，2Dall。419；2Cond。
Rep。635，671。
3JournalofConvention，67；Id。83。
CH。VI。]THEPREAMBLE。445
§；462。And，here，wemustguardourselvesagainstanerror，whichis
toooftenallowedtocreepintothediscussionsuponthissubject。Thepreamble
nevercanberesortedto，toenlargethepowersconfidedtothegeneral
government，oranyofitsdepartments。Itcannotconferanypowerperse；it
canneveramount，byimplication，toanenlargementofanypowerexpressly
given。Itcanneverbethelegitimatesourceofanyimpliedpower，when
otherwisewithdrawnfromtheconstitution。Itstrueofficeistoexpoundthe
nature，andextent，andapplicationofthepowersactuallyconferredbythe
constitution，andnotsubstantivelytocreatethem。Forexample，thepreamble
declaresoneobjecttobe，\"toprovideforthecommondefence。\"No
onecandoubt，thatthisdoesnotenlargethepowersofcongresstopassany
measures，whichtheymaydeemusefulforthecommondefence。1Butsupposethe
termsofagivenpoweradmitoftwoconstructions，theonemorerestrictive，
theothermoreliberal，andeachofthemisconsistentwiththewords，butis，
andoughttobe，governedbytheintentofthepower；ifonewouldpromote，and
theotherdefeatthecommondefence，oughtnottheformer，uponthesoundest
principlesofinterpretationtobeadopted？Areweatliberty，uponany
principlesofreason，orcommonsense，toadoptarestrictivemeaning，which
willdefeatanavowedobjectoftheconstitution，whenanotherequallynatural
andmoreappropriatetotheobjectisbeforeus？Wouldnotthisbetodestroy
aninstrumentbyameasureofitswords，whichthatinstrumentitself
repudiates？
___________________________________1Yet，strangelyenough，thisobjectionwasurgedveryvehementlyagainst
theadoptionoftheconstitution；1Elliot’sdebates，293，300。
446CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
§；463。Wehavealreadyhadoccasion，inconsideringthenatureofthe
constitution，todwellupontheterms，inwhichthepreambleisconceived，and
theproperconclusiondeduciblefromit。Itisanactofthepeople，andnotof
thestatesintheirpoliticalcapacities。1Itisanordinanceorestablishment
ofgovernmentandnotacompact，thoughoriginatinginconsent；anditbindsas
afundamentallawpromulgatedbythesovereignauthority，andnotasacompact
ortreatyenteredintoandinfieri，betweeneachandallthecitizensofthe
UnitedStates，asdistinctparties。Thelanguageis，\"We，thepeopleof
theUnitedStates，\"not，We，thestates，\"doordainand
establish；\"not，docontractandenterintoatreatywitheachother；
\"thisconstitutionfortheUnitedStatesofAmerica，\"notthistreaty
betweentheseveralstates。Anditis，therefore，anunwarrantableassumption，
nottocallitamostextravagantstretchofinterpretation，whollyatvariance
withthelanguage，tosubstituteotherwordsandothersensesforthewordsand
sensesincorporated，inthissolemnmanner，intothesubstanceofthe
instrumentitself。Wehavethestrongestassurances，thatthispreamblewasnot
adoptedasamereformulary；butasasolemnpromulgationofafundamental
fact，vitaltothecharacterandoperationsofthegovernment。Theobvious
objectwastosubstituteagovernmentofthepeople，foraconfederacyof
states；aconstitutionforacompact。2Thedifficultiesarisingfromthis
source___________________________________1See2Lloyd’sDebates，1789，p。178，180，181。
2Byaconstitution，isto，beunderstoodsaysMr。JusticeWilsonasupreme
law，madeandratifiedbythose，inwhomthesovereignpowerofthestate
resides，whichprescribesthemanner，inwhichthatsovereignpowerwillsthat
thegovernmentshouldbeinstitutedandadministered。*
Itcontributednota
littletotheinfirmitiesofthearticlesoftheconfederation，thatitnever
hadAratificationbythepeople。TheFederalist，22。
*1Wilson’sLect。417。
CH。VI。]THEPREAMBLE。447
werenotslight；foranotioncommonlyenough，howeverincorrectly，
prevailed，that，asitwasratifiedbythestatesonly，thestates
respectively，attheirpleasure，mightrepealit；andthis，ofitself，proved
thenecessityoflayingthefoundationsofanationalgovernmentdeeperthanin
themeresanctionofdelegatedpower。Theconventiondetermined，thatthe
fabricofAmericanempireoughttorestandshouldrestonthesolidbasisof
theconsentofthepeople。Thestreamsofnationalpoweroughttoflowand
shouldflowimmediatelyfromthehighestoriginalfountainofalllegitimate
authority。1And，accordingly，theadvocatesoftheconstitutionsotreatedit
intheirreasoninginfavourofitsadoption。\"Theconstitution，\"
saidtheFederalist，\"istobefoundedontheassentandratificationof
thepeopleofAmerica，givenbydeputieselectedforthatpurpose；butthis
assentandratificationistobegivenbythepeople，notasindividuals
composingawholenation，butascomposingthedistinctandindependentstates，
towhichtheybelong。\"2Andtheuniformdoctrineofthehighestjudicial
authorityhasaccordinglybeen，thatitwastheactofthepeople，andnotof
thestates；andthatitboundthelatter，assubordinatetothepeople。
\"Letusturn，\"saidMr。ChiefJusticeJay，\"totheconstitution。
Thepeoplethereindeclare，thattheirdesigninestablishingitcomprehended
sixobjects：1。Toformamoreperfectunion；2。toestablishjustice；3。
toinsuredomestictranquillity；4。toprovideforthecommondefence；5。
topromotethegeneralwelfare；6。tosecuretheblessingsoflibertyto
themselvesandtheirposterity。Itwould，\"headded，\"bepleasingand
useful___________________________________1TheFederalist，No。22；seealsoNo。43；4Elliot’sDebates，75；ante，p。
248。
2TheFederalist，No。39；Id。No。84。
448CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
toconsiderandtracetherelations，whicheachoftheseobjectsbearsto
theothers；andtoshow，that，collectively，theycompriseeverything
requisite，withtheblessingofDivineProvidence，torenderapeople
prosperousandhappy。\"1InHunterv。Martin，1Wheat。R。305，324，the
SupremeCourtsay，aswehaveseen，\"theconstitutionoftheUnited
Stateswasordainedandestablished，notbythestatesintheirsovereign
capacities，butemphatically，asthepreambleoftheconstitutiondeclares，by
thepeopleoftheUnitedStates；\"andlanguagestillmoreexpressivewill
befoundusedonothersolemnoccasions。2
§；464。Butthispointhasbeensomuchdweltuponinthe
discussionofothertopics，3thatitiswhollyunnecessarytopursueit
further。Itdoes，however，deservenotice，thatthisphraseologywasamatter
ofmuchcriticaldebateinsomeoftheconventionscalledtoratifythe
constitution。Ontheonehand，itwaspressed，asasubjectofjustalarmto
thestates，thatthepeopleweresubstitutedforthestates；thatthiswould
involveadestructionofthestatesinoneconsolidatednationalgovernment；
andwouldterminateinthesubversionofthepublicliberties。Ontheother
hand，itwasurged，astheonlysafecourseforthepreservationoftheUnion
andthelibertiesofthepeople，thatthegovernmentshouldemanatefromthe
people，andnotfromthestates；thatitshouldnotbe，liketheconfederation，
ameretreaty，operatingbyrequisitionsonthestates；andthatthepeople，
forwhosebenefitit___________________________________1Chisholmv。Georgia，2Dall。419；2Cond。R。p。635，671。