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　　\"Butitisperfectlyconsistentwiththeconcessionofthispowertothe

　　SupremeCourt，incasesfallingwithinthecourseofitsfunctions，to

　　maintain，thatthepowerhasnotalwaysbeenrightlyexercised。Tosay

　　nothingoftheperiod，happilyashortone，whenjudgesintheirseatsdid

　　notabstainfromintemperateandpartyharangues，equallyatvariancewith

　　theirdutyandtheirdignity；therehavebeenoccasionaldecisionsfromthe

　　bench，whichhaveincurredseriousandextensivedisapprobation。Stillit

　　wouldseem，that，withbutfewexceptions，thecourseofthejudiciaryhas

　　beenhithertosustainedbytheprominentsenseofthenation。

　　\"Thosewhohavedenied，ordoubtedthesupremacyofthejudicialpowerof

　　theUnitedStates，anddenounceatthesametimeanullifyingpowerina

　　state，seemnottohavesufficientlyadvertedtotheutterinefficiencyof

　　asupremacyinalawoftheland，withoutasupremacyintheexpositionand

　　executionofthelaw：nortothedestructionofallequipoisebetweenthe

　　federalgovernmentandthestategovernments，if，whilstthefunctionaries

　　ofthefederalgovernmentaredirectlyorindirectlyelectedby，and

　　responsibletothestates，andthefunctionariesofthestatesareintheir

　　appointmentandresponsibilitywhollyindependentoftheUnitedStates，no

　　constitutionalcontrolofanysortbelongedtotheUnitedStatesoverthe

　　states。Undersuchanorganization，itisevident，thatitwouldbeinthe

　　powerofthestates，individually，topassunauthorizedlaws，andtocarry

　　themintocompleteeffect，anythingintheconstitutionandlawsofthe

　　UnitedStatestothecontrarynotwithstanding。Thiswouldbeanullifying

　　powerinitsplenarycharacter；andwhetherithaditsfinaleffect，

　　throughthelegislative，executive，orjudiciaryorganofthestate，would

　　beequallyfataltotheconstitutedrelationbetweenthetwogovernments。

　　\"Shouldtheprovisionsoftheconstitutionasherereviewed，befoundnot

　　tosecurethegovernmentandrightsofthestates，againstusurpationsand

　　abusesonthepartoftheUnitedStates，thefinalresortwithinthe

　　purviewoftheconstitution，liesinanamendmentoftheconstitution，

　　accordingtoaprocessapplicablebythestates。

　　\"Andintheeventofafailureofeveryconstitutionalresort，andan

　　accumulationofusurpationsandabuses，renderingpassiveobedienceand

　　non—resistanceagreaterevil，thanresistanceandrevolution，therecan

　　remainbutoneresort，thelastofall；anappealfromthecan—

　　380CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。

　　_________________________________

　　celledobligationsoftheconstitutionalcompact，tooriginalrightsand

　　thelawofself—preservation。Thisistheultimaratiounderall

　　governments，whetherconsolidated，confederated，oracompoundofboth；and

　　itcannotbedoubted，thatasinglememberoftheUnion，intheextremity

　　supposed，butinthatonly，wouldhavearight，asanextraandultra

　　constitutionalright，tomaketheappeal。

　　\"Thisbringsustotheexpedientlatelyadvanced，whichclaimsfora

　　singlestatearighttoappealagainstanexerciseofpowerbythe

　　governmentoftheUnitedStates，decidedbythestatetobe

　　unconstitutional，tothepartiestotheconstitutionalcompact；the

　　decisionofthestatetohavetheeffectofnullifyingtheactofthe

　　governmentoftheUnitedStates，unlessthedecisionofthestatebe

　　reversedbythreefourthsoftheparties。

　　\"Thedistinguishednamesandhighauthorities，whichappeartohave

　　asserted，andgivenapracticalscopetothisdoctrine，entitleittoa

　　respect，whichitmightbedifficultotherwisetofeelforit。

　　\"Ifthedoctrineweretobeunderstoodasrequiringthethreefourthsof

　　thestatestosustain，insteadofthatproportiontoreversethedecision

　　oftheappealingstate，thedecisiontobewithouteffectduringthe

　　appeal，itwouldbesufficienttoremark，thatthisextra—constitutional

　　coursemightwellgivewaytothatmarkedoutbytheconstitution，which

　　authorizestwothirdsofthestatestoinstitute，andthreefourthsto

　　effectuateanamendmentoftheconstitution，establishingapermanentrule

　　ofthehighestauthority，inplaceofanirregularprecedentof

　　constructiononly。

　　\"Butitisunderstood，thatthenullifyingdoctrineimports，thatthe

　　decisionofthestateistobepresumedvalid，andthatitoverrulesthe

　　lawoftheUnitedStates，unlessoverruledbythreefourthsofthestates。

　　\"Canmorebenecessarytodemonstratetheinadmissibilityofsucha

　　doctrine，than，thatitputsitinthepowerofthesmallestfractionover

　　onefourthoftheUnitedStates，thatis，ofsevenstatesoutof

　　twentyfour，togivethelaw，andeventheconstitutiontoseventeenstates，

　　eachoftheseventeenhaving，aspartiestotheconstitution，anequal

　　rightwitheachoftheseven，toexpoundit，andtoinsistonthe

　　exposition？Thatthesevenmight，inparticularinstancesberight，andthe

　　seventeenwrong，ismorethanpossible。Buttoestablishapositiveand

　　permanentrulegivingsuchapower，tosuchaminority，oversucha

　　majority，wouldoverturnthefirstprincipleoffreegovernment，andin

　　practicenecessarilyoverturnthegovernmentitself。

　　\"Itistoberecollected，thattheconstitutionwasproposedtothepeople

　　ofthestatesasawhole，andunanimouslyadoptedbythestatesasawhole，

　　itbeingapartoftheconstitution，thatnotlessthanthreefourthsof

　　thestatesshouldbecompetenttomakeanyalterationinwhathadbeen

　　unanimouslyagreedto。Sogreatisthecautiononthispoint，thatintwo

　　caseswherepeculiarinterestswereatstake，aproportioneven

　　CH。IV。]FINALINTERPRETER。381

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　　ofthreefourthsisdistrusted，andunanimityrequiredtomakeanalteration。

　　\"Whentheconstitutionwasadoptedasawhole，itiscertain，thatthere

　　weremanyparts，which，ifseparatelyproposed，wouldhavebeenpromptly

　　rejected。Itisfarfromimpossible，thateverypartofaconstitution

　　mightberejectedbyamajority，andyettakentogetherasawhole，be

　　unanimouslyaccepted。Freeconstitutionswillrarely，ifever，beformed，

　　withoutreciprocalconcessions；withoutarticlesconditionedon，and

　　balancingeachother。Isthereaconstitutionofasinglestateoutofthe

　　twenty—four，thatwouldbeartheexperimentofhavingitscomponentparts

　　submittedtothepeople，andseparatelydecidedon？

　　\"WhatthefateoftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStateswouldbe，ifa

　　smallproportionofthestatescouldexpungepartsofitparticularly

　　valuedbyalargemajority，canhavebutoneanswer。

　　\"Thedifficultyisnotremovedbylimitingthedoctrinetocasesof

　　construction。Howmanycasesofthatsort，involvingcardinalprovisionsof

　　theconstitution，haveoccurred？Howmanynowexist？Howmanymayhereafter

　　springup？Howmanymightbeingeniouslycreated，ifentitledtothe

　　privilegeofadecisioninthemodeproposed？

　　\"Isitcertain，thattheprincipleofthatmodewouldnotreachfurther

　　thaniscontemplated？Ifasinglestatecan，ofright，requirethree

　　fourthsofitsco—statestooverruleitsexpositionoftheconstitution，

　　becausethatproportionisauthorizedtoamendit，wouldthepleabeless

　　plausible，that，astheconstitutionwasunanimouslyestablished，itought

　　tobeunanimouslyexpounded？

　　\"Thereplytoallsuchsuggestions，seemstobeunavoidableand

　　irresistible；thattheconstitutionisacompact；thatitstextistobe

　　expounded，accordingtotheprovisionsforexpoundingit——makingapartof

　　thecompact；andthatnoneofthepartiescanrightfullyrenouncethe

　　expoundingprovisionmorethananyotherpart。Whensucharightaccrues，

　　asmayaccrue，itmustgrowoutofabusesofthecompactreleasingthe

　　sufferersfromtheirfealtytoit。\"

　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：

　　Book3Chapter5CHAPTERV。RULESOFINTERPRETATION。&sect；397。INourfuturecommentariesupontheconstitutionweshalltreatit，then，asitisdenominatedintheinstrumentitself，asaCONSTITUTIONofgovernment，ordainedandestablishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStatesforthemselvesandtheirposterity。1Theyhavedeclareditthesupremelawoftheland。Theyhavemadeitalimitedgovernment。Theyhavedefineditsauthority。Theyhaverestrainedittotheexerciseofcertainpowers，andreservedallotherstothestatesortothepeople。Itisapopulargovernment。Thosewhoadministeritareresponsibletothepeople。Itisaspopular，andJustasmuchemanatingfromthepeople，asthestategovernments。Itiscreatedforonepurpose；

　　thestategovernmentsforanother。Itmaybealtered，andamended，andabolishedatthewillofthepeople。Inshort，itwasmadebythepeople，madeforthepeople，andisresponsibletothepeople。2

　　&sect；398。Inthisviewofthematter，letusnowproceedtoconsidertherules，bywhichitoughttobeinterpreted；

　　for，iftheserulesarecorrectlylaiddown，itwillsaveusfrommanyembarrassmentsinexamininganddefiningitspowers。Muchofthedifficulty，whichhasariseninallthepublicdiscussionsonthissubject，hashaditsorigininthewantofsomeuniformrulesofinterpretation，expresslyortacitlyagreedonbythedisputants。Verydifferentdoctrinesonthispointhavebeenadoptedbydifferentcommentators；andnotunfrequentlyverydifferentlanguageheldbythesamepartiesatdifferentperiods。

　　Inshort，therulesofinterpretationhaveoftenbeenshiftedtosuittheemergency；andthepassionsandprejudicesoftheday，orthefavourandodiumofaparticularmeasure，havenotunfrequentlyfurnishedamodeofargument，whichwould，ontheonehand，leavetheconstitutioncrippledandinanimate，or，onotherhand，giveitanextentandelasticity，subversiveofallrationalboundaries。

　　&sect；399。Letus，then，endeavourtoascertain，whatarethetruerulesofinterpretationapplicabletotheconstitution；

　　sothatwemayhavesomefixedstandard，bywhichtomeasureitspowers，andlimititsprohibitions，andguarditsobligations，andenforceitssecuritiesofourrightsandliberties。

　　&sect；400。I。Thefirstandfundamentalruleintheinterpretationofallinstrumentsis，toconstruethemaccordingtothesenseoftheterms，andtheintentionoftheparties。Mr。JusticeBlackstonehasremarked，thattheintentionofalawistobegatheredfromthewords，thecontext，thesubject—matter，theeffectsandconsequence，orthereasonandspiritofthelaw。3Hegoesontojustifytheremarkbystating，thatwordsaregenerallytobeunderstoodintheirusualandmostknownsignification，notsomuchregardingtheproprietyofgrammar，astheirgeneralandpopularuse；thatifwordshappentobedubious，theirmeaningmaybeestablishedbythecontext，orbycomparingthemwithotherwordsandsentencesinthesameinstrument；thatillustrationsmaybefurtherderivedfromthesubject—matter，withreferencetowhichtheexpressionsareused；thattheeffectandconsequenceofaparticularconstructionistobeexamined，because，ifaliteralmeaningwouldinvolveamanifestabsurdity，itoughtnottobeadopted；andthatthereasonandspiritofthelaw，orthecauses，whichledtoitsenactment，areoftenthebestexponentsofthewords，andlimittheirapplication。4

　　&sect；401。Wherethewordsareplainandclear，andthesensedistinctandperfectarisingonthem，thereisgenerallynonecessitytohaverecoursetoothermeansofinterpretation。Itisonly，whenthereissomeambiguityordoubtarisingfromothersources，thatinterpretationhasitsproperoffice。Theremaybeobscurity，astothemeaning，fromthedoubtfulcharacterofthewordsused，fromotherclausesinthesameinstrument，orfromanincongruityorrepugnancybetweenthewords，andtheapparentintentionderivedfromthewholestructureoftheinstrument，oritsavowedobject。Inallsuchcasesinterpretationbecomesindispensable。

　　&sect；402。Rutherforth5hasdividedinterpretationintothreekinds，literal，rational，andmixed。

　　Thefirstis，wherewecollecttheintentionofthepartyfromhiswordsonly，astheyliebeforeus。Thesecondis，wherehiswordsdonotexpressthatintentionperfectly，butexceedit，orfallshortofit，andwearetocollectitfromprobableorrationalconjecturesonly。Thethirdis，wherethewords，thoughtheydoexpresstheintention，whentheyarerightlyunderstood，arethemselvesofdoubtfulmeaning，andweareboundtohaverecoursetothelikeconjecturestofindoutinwhatsensetheyareused。

　　Inliteralinterpretationtheruleobservedis，tofollowthatsenseinrespectbothofthewords，andoftheconstructionofthem，whichisagreeabletocommonuse，withoutattendingtoetymologicalfanciesorgrammaticalrefinements。Inmixedinterpretation，whichsupposesthewordstoadmitoftwoormoresenses，eachofwhichisagreeabletocommonusage，weareobligedtocollectthesense，partlyfromthewords，andpartlyfromconjectureoftheintention。Therulesthenadoptedare，toconstruethewordsaccordingtothesubjectmatter，insuchasenseastoproduceareasonableeffect，andwithreferencetothecircumstancesoftheparticulartransaction。

　　Lightmayalsobeobtainedinsuchcasesfromcontemporaryfacts，orexpositions，fromantecedentmischiefs，fromknownhabits，manners，andinstitutions，andfromothersourcesalmostinnumerable，whichmayjustlyaffectthejudgmentindrawingafitconclusionintheparticularcase。

　　&sect；403。Interpretationalsomaybestrictorlarge；thoughwedonotalwaysmeanthesamething，whenwespeakofastrictorlargeinterpretation。Whencommonusagehasgiventwosensestothesameword，oneofwhichismoreconfined，orincludesfewerparticularsthantheother，theformeriscalleditsstrictsense，andthelatter，whichismorecomprehensiveorincludesmoreparticulars，iscalleditslargesense。Ifwefindsuchawordinalaw，andwetakeitinitsmoreconfinedsense，wearesaidtointerpretitstrictly。Ifwetakeitinitsmorecomprehensivesense，wearesaidtointerpretitlargely。Butwhetherwedotheoneortheother，westillkeeptotheletterofthelaw。Butstrictandlargeinterpretationarefrequentlyopposedtoeachotherinadifferentsense。Thewordsofalawmaysometimesexpressthemeaningofthelegislatorimperfectly。Theymay，intheircommonacceptation，includeeithermoreorlessthanhisintention。Andas，ontheonehand，wecallitastrictinterpretation，wherewecontend，thattheletteristobeadheredtoprecisely；so，ontheotherhand，wecallitalargeinterpretation，wherewecontend，thatthewordsoughttobetakeninsuchasense，ascommonusagewillnotfullyjustify；orthatthemeaningofthelegislatorissomethingdifferentfromwhathiswordsinanyusagewouldimport。Inthissensealargeinterpretationissynonymouswithwhathasbeforebeencalledarationalinterpretation。Andastrictinterpretation，inthissense，includesbothliteralandmixedinterpretation；andmay，ascontradistinguishedfromtheformer，becalledaclose，inoppositiontoafreeorliberalinterpretation。6

　　&sect；404。Theseelementaryexplanationsfurnishlittleroomforcontroversy；buttheymayneverthelessaidusinmakingacloserpracticalapplication，whenwearriveatmoredefiniterules。

　　&sect；405。II。InconstruingtheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，weare，inthefirstinstance，toconsider，whatareitsnatureandobjects，itsscopeanddesign，asapparentfromthestructureoftheinstrument，viewedasawhole，andalsoviewedinitscomponentparts。Whereitswordsareplain，clear，anddeterminate，theyrequirenointerpretation；anditshould，therefore，beadmitted，ifatall，withgreatcaution，andonlyfromnecessity，eithertoescapesomeabsurdconsequence，ortoguardagainstsomefatalevil。Wherethewordsadmitoftwosenses，eachofwhichisconformabletocommonusage，thatsenseistobeadopted，which，withoutdepartingfromtheliteralimportofthewords，bestharmonizeswiththenatureandobjects，thescopeanddesignoftheinstrument。Wherethewordsareunambiguous，buttheprovisionmaycovermoreorlessgroundaccordingtotheintention，whichisyetsubjecttoconjecture；orwhereitmayincludeinitsgeneraltermsmoreorless，thanmightseemdictatedbythegeneraldesign，asthatmaybegatheredfromotherpartsoftheinstrument，thereismuchmoreroomforcontroversy；andtheargumentfrominconveniencewillprobablyhavedifferentinfluencesupondifferentminds。Wheneversuchquestionsarise，theywillprobablybesettled，eachuponitsownpeculiargrounds；andwheneveritisaquestionofpower，itshouldbeapproachedwithinfinitecaution，andaffirmedonlyuponthemostpersuasivereasons。Inexaminingtheconstitution，theantecedentsituationofthecountry，anditsinstitutions，theexistenceandoperationsofthestategovernments，thepowersandoperationsoftheconfederation，inshortallthecircumstances，whichhadatendencytoproduce，ortoobstructitsformationandratification，deserveacarefulattention。Much，also，maybegatheredfromcontemporaryhistory，andcontemporaryinterpretation，toaidusinjustconclusions。7

　　&sect；406。Itisobvious，however，thatcontemporaryinterpretationmustberesortedtowithmuchqualificationandreserve。

　　Inthefirstplace，theprivateinterpretationofanyparticularman，orbodyofmen，mustmanifestlybeopentomuchobservation。TheconstitutionwasadoptedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates；anditwassubmittedtothewholeuponajustsurveyofitsprovisions，astheystoodinthetextitself。Indifferentstatesandindifferentconventions，differentandveryoppositeobjectionsareknowntohaveprevailed；andmightwellbepresumedtoprevail。Oppositeinterpretations，anddifferentexplanationsofdifferentprovisions，maywellbepresumedtohavebeenpresentedindifferentbodies，toremovelocalobjections，ortowinlocalfavour。Andtherecanbenocertainty，eitherthatthedifferentstateconventionsinratifyingtheconstitution，gavethesameuniforminterpretationtoitslanguage，orthat，eveninasinglestateconvention，thesamereasoningprevailedwithamajority，muchlesswiththewholeofthesupportersofit。Intheinterpretationofastatestatute，nomanisinsensibleoftheextremedangerofresortingtotheopinionsofthose，whoframedit，orthosewhopassedit。Itstermsmayhavedifferentlyimpresseddifferentminds。Somemayhaveimpliedlimitationsandobjects，whichotherswouldhaverejected。Somemayhavetakenacursoryviewofitsenactments，andothershavestudiedthemwithprofoundattention。Somemayhavebeengovernedbyatemporaryinterestorexcitement，andhaveacteduponthatexposition，whichmostfavouredtheirpresentviews。Othersmayhaveseenlurkingbeneathitstext，whatcommendedittotheirjudgmentagainstevenpresentinterests。

　　Somemayhaveinterpreteditslanguagestrictlyandclosely；othersfromadifferenthabitofthinkingmayhavegivenitalargeandliberalmeaning。

　　Itisnottobepresumed，that，evenintheconvention，whichframedtheconstitution，fromthecausesabovementioned，andothercauses，theclauseswerealwaysunderstoodinthesamesense，orhadpreciselythesameextentofoperation。Everymembernecessarilyjudgedforhimself；andthejudgmentofnoonecould，oroughttobe，conclusiveuponthatofothers。Theknowndiversityofconstructionofdifferentpartsofit，aswellofthemassofitspowers，inthedifferentstateconventions；thetotalsilenceuponmanyobjections，whichhavesincebeenstarted；andthestrongrelianceuponothers，whichhavesincebeenuniversallyabandoned，addweighttothesesuggestions。Nothingbutthetextitselfwasadoptedbythepeople。

　　Anditwouldcertainlybeamostextravagantdoctrinetogivetoanycommentarythenmade，and，afortiori，toanycommentarysincemadeunderaverydifferentpostureoffeelingandopinion，anauthority，whichshouldoperateanabsolutelimituponthetext，orshouldsupersedeitsnaturalandjustinterpretation。

　　&sect；407。Contemporaryconstructionisproperlyresortedto，toillustrate，andconfirmthetext，toexplainadoubtfulphrase，ortoexpoundanobscureclause；andinproportiontotheuniformityanduniversalityofthatconstruction，andtheknownabilityandtalentsofthose，bywhomitwasgiven，isthecredit，towhichitisentitled。

　　Itcanneverabrogatethetext；itcanneverfritterawayitsobvioussense；

　　itcannevernarrowdownitstruelimitations；itcanneverenlargeitsnaturalboundaries。10Weshallhaveabundantreasonhereaftertoobserve，whenweenterupontheanalysisoftheparticularclausesoftheconstitution，howmanylooseinterpretations，andplausibleconjectureswerehazardedatanearlyperiod，whichhavesincesilentlydiedaway，andarenowretainedinnolivingmemory，asatopiceitherofpraiseorblame，ofalarmorofcongratulation。

　　&sect；408。And，afterall，themostunexceptionablesourceofcollateralinterpretationisfromthepracticalexpositionofthegovernmentitselfinitsvariousdepartmentsuponparticularquestionsdiscussed，andsettledupontheirownsinglemerits。Theseapproachthenearestintheirownnaturetojudicialexpositions；andhavethesamegeneralrecommendation，thatbelongstothelatter。Theyaredecideduponsolemnargument，prorenata，uponadoubtraised，uponalismota，uponadeepsenseoftheirimportanceanddifficulty，inthefaceofthenation，withaviewtopresentaction，inthemidstofjealousinterests，andbymencapableofurging，orrepellingthegroundsofargument，fromtheirexquisitegenius，theircomprehensivelearning，ortheirdeepmeditationupontheabsorbingtopic。Howlight，comparedwiththesemeansofinstruction，aretheprivatelucubrationsofthecloset，ortheretiredspeculationsofingeniousminds，intentontheory，orgeneralviews，andunusedtoencounterapracticaldifficultyateverystep！

　　&sect；409。Buttoreturntotherulesofinterpretationarisingexdirectofromthetextoftheconstitution。

　　Andfirsttherulestobedrawnfromthenatureoftheinstrument。1。

　　Itistobeconstrued，asaframe，orfundamentallawofgovernment，establishedbythePEOPLEoftheUnitedStates，accordingtotheirownfreepleasureandsovereignwill。

　　Inthisrespectitisinnowisedistinguishablefromtheconstitutionsofthestategovernments。Eachofthemisestablishedbythepeoplefortheirownpurposes，andeachisfoundedontheirsupremeauthority。Thepowers，whichareconferred，therestrictions，whichareimposed，theauthorities，whichareexercised，theorganizationanddistributionthereof，whichareprovided，areineachcaseforthesameobject，thecommonbenefitofthegoverned，andnotfortheprofitordignityoftherulers。

　　&sect；410。Andyetithasbeenaverycommonmodeofinterpretationtoinsistuponadiversityofrulesinconstruingthestateconstitutions，andthatofthegeneralgovernment。Thus，intheCommentariesofMr。TuckeruponBlackstone，wefinditlaiddown，asifitwereanincontrovertibledoctrineinregardtotheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，that\"asfederal，itistobeconstruedstrictly，inallcases，wheretheantecedentrightsofastatemaybedrawninquestion。\"

　　Asasocialcompact，itoughtlikewise\"toreceivethesamestrictconstruction，wherevertherightofpersonalliberty，ofpersonalsecurity，orofprivatepropertymaybecometheobjectofdispute；becauseeveryperson，whoselibertyorpropertywastherebyrenderedsubjecttothenewgovernment，wasantecedentlyamemberofacivilsociety，towhoseregulationshehadsubmittedhimself，andunderwhoseauthorityandprotectionhestillremains，inallcasesnotexpresslysubmittedtothenewgovernment。\"13

　　&sect；411。Weheresee，thatthewholereasoningisfounded，notonthenotion，thattherightsofthepeopleareconcerned，buttherightsofthestates。Andbystrictconstructionisobviouslymeantthemostlimitedsensebelongingtothewords。Andthelearnedauthorrelies，forthesupportofhisreasoning，uponsomeruleslaiddownbyVattelinrelationtotheinterpretationoftreatiesinrelationtoodiousthings。

　　Itwouldseem，then，thattheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistobedeemedanodiousinstrument。Andwhy，itmaybeasked？Wasitnotframedforthegoodofthepeople，andbythepeople？OneofthesectionsofVattel，whichisreliedon，statesthisproposition，14\"Thatwhatevertendstochangethepresentstateofthings，isalsotoberankedintheclassofodiousthings。\"Isitnotmostmanifest，thatthispropositionis，oratleastmaybe，inmanycases，fundamentallywrong？

　　Ifapeoplefreethemselvesfromadespotism，isittobesaid，thatthechangeofgovernmentisodious，andoughttobeconstruedstrictly？What，uponsuchaprinciple，istobecomeoftheAmericanRevolution；andofourstategovernments，andstateconstitutions？Supposeawell—orderedgovernmentarisesoutofastateofdisorderandanarchy，issuchagovernmenttobeconsideredodious？Anothersection15adds，\"Sinceodiousthingsarethose，whoserestrictiontendsmorecertainlytoequitythantheirextension，andsinceweoughttopursuethatline，whichismostconformabletoequity，whenthewillofthelegislatureorofthecontractingpartiesisnotexactlyknown，weshould，wherethereisaquestionofodiousthings，interpretthetermsinthemostlimitedsense。Wemayeven，toacertaindegree，adoptafigurativemeaninginordertoaverttheoppressiveconsequencesoftheproperandliteralsense，oranythingofanodiousnature，whichitwouldinvolve。\"Doesnotthissectioncontainmostlaxandunsatisfactoryingredientsforinterpretation？

　　Whoistodecide，whetheritismostconformabletoequitytoextend，ortorestrictthesense？Whoistodecide，whethertheprovisionisodious？

　　Accordingtothisrule，themostoppositeinterpretationsofthesamewordswouldbeequallycorrect，accordingastheinterpretatorshoulddeemitodiousorsalutary。Nay，thewordsaretobedeserted，andafigurativesenseadopted，wheneverhedeemsitadvisable，lookingtotheodiousnatureorconsequenceofthecommonsense。He，whobelievesthegeneralgovernmentfoundedinwisdom，andsoundpolicy，andthepublicsafety，mayextendthewords。He，whodeemsitodious，orthestategovernmentsthetruestprotectionofallourrights，mustlimitthewordstothenarrowestmeaning。

　　&sect；412。Thetwelfthamendmenttotheconstitutionisalsoreliedonbythesameauthor，whichdeclares，\"thatthepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheconstitution，norprohibitedbyittothestates，arereservedtothestatesrespectively，ortothepeople。\"Heevidentlysupposes，thatthismeans\"inallcasesnotexpresslysubmittedtothenewgovernment\"；yettheword\"expressly\"isnowherefoundintheamendment。Butwearenotconsidering，whetheranypowerscanbeimplied；theonlypointnowbeforeusis，howtheexpresspowersaretobeconstrued。Aretheytobeconstruedstrictly，thatis，intheirmostlimitedsense？Oraretheytoreceiveafairandreasonableconstruction，accordingtotheplainmeaningofthetermsandtheobjects，forwhichtheyareused？

　　&sect；413。Whenitissaid，thattheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesshouldbeconstruedstrictly，viewedasasocialcompact，wheneverittouchestherightsofproperty，orofpersonalsecurity，orliberty，theruleisequallyapplicabletothestateconstitutionsinthelikeeases。Theprinciple，uponwhichthisinterpretationrests，ifithasanyfoundation，mustbe，thatthepeopleoughtnottobepresumedtoyielduptheirrightsofpropertyorliberty，beyondwhatistheclearsenseofthelanguageandtheobjectsoftheconstitution。Allgovernmentsarefoundedonasurrenderofsomenaturalrights，andimposesomerestrictions。

　　Wemaynotbeatlibertytoextendthegrantsofpowerbeyondthefairmeaningofthewordsinanysuchcase；butthatisnotthequestionhereunderdiscussion。Itis，howwearetoconstruethewordsasused，whetherinthemostconfined，orinthemoreliberalsenseproperlybelongingtothem。Now，inconstruingagrant，orsurrenderofpowersbythepeopletoamonarch，forhisownbenefitoruse，itisnotonlynatural，butjust，topresume，asinallothercasesofgrants，thatthepartieshadnotinviewanylargesenseoftheterms，becausetheobjectswereaderogationpermanentlyfromtheirrightsandinterests。Butinconstruingaconstitutionofgovernment，framedbythepeoplefortheirownbenefitandprotection，forthepreservationoftheirrights，andproperty，andliberty；wherethedelegatedpowersarenot，andcannotbeusedforthebenefitoftheirrulers，whoarebuttheirtemporaryservantsandagents；butareintendedsolelyforthebenefitofthepeople，nosuchpresumptionofanintentiontousethewordsinthemostrestrictedsensenecessarilyarises。Thestrict，orthemoreextendedsense，bothbeingwithintheletter，maybefairlyheldtobewithintheirintention，aseithershallbestpromotetheveryobjectsofthepeopleinthegrant；aseithershallbestpromoteorsecuretheirrights，property，orliberty。Thewordsarenot，indeed，tobestretchedbeyondtheirfairsense；butwithinthatrange，theruleofinterpretationmustbetaken，whichbestfollowsouttheapparentintention。16Thisisthemodeitisbelieveduniversallyadoptedinconstruingthestateconstitutions。Ithasitsoriginincommonsense。Anditnevercanbeamatterofjustjealousy；becausetherulerscanhavenopermanentinterestinafreegovernment，distinctfromthatofthepeople，ofwhomtheyareapart，andtowhomtheyareresponsible。WhythesamereasoningshouldnotapplytothegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，itisnotveryeasytoconjecture。

　　&sect；414。Butitissaid，thatthestategovernmentsbeingalreadyinexistence，andthepeoplesubjectedtothem，theirobediencetothenewgovernmentmayendangertheirobediencetothestates，orinvolvetheminaconflictofauthority，andthusproduceinconvenience。

　　Inthefirstplace，itisnottrue，inajustsense，ifwearerightinourviewoftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，thatsuchaconflictcanultimatelyexist。Forifthepowersofthegeneralgovernmentareofparamountandsupremeobligation，iftheyconstitutethesupremelawoftheland，noconflict，astoobedience，canbefound。Wheneverthequestionarises，astowhomobedienceisdue，itistobejudiciallysettled；andbeingsettled，itregulates，atonce，therightsanddutiesofallthecitizens。

　　&sect；415。Inthenextplace，thepowersgivenbythepeopletothegeneralgovernmentarenotnecessarilycarvedoutofthepowersalreadyconfidedbythemtothestategovernments。Theymaybesuch，astheyoriginallyreservedtothemselves。And，iftheyarenot，theauthorityofthepeople，intheirsovereigncapacity，towithdrawpowerfromtheirstatefunctionaries，andtoconfideittothefunctionariesofthegeneralgovernment，cannotbedoubtedordenied。17Iftheywithdrawthepowerfromthestatefunctionaries，itmustbepresumedtobe，becausetheydeemitmoreusefulforthemselves，moreforthecommonbenefit，andcommonprotection，thantoleaveit，whereithasbeenhithertodeposited。Whyshouldapowerinthehandsofonefunctionarybedifferentlyconstruedinthehandsofanotherfunctionary，if，ineachcase，thesameobjectisinview，thesafetyofthepeople\"Thestategovernmentshavenorighttoassume，thatthepowerismoresafeormoreusefulwiththem，thanwiththegeneralgovernment；thattheyhaveahighercapacityandamorehonestdesiretopreservetherightsandlibertiesofthepeople，thanthegeneralgovernment；thatthereisnodangerintrustingthem；

　　butthatalltheperilandalltheoppressionimpendontheotherside。

　　Thepeoplehavenotsosaid，orthought；andtheyhavetheexclusiverighttojudgeforthemselvesonthesubject。Theyavow，thattheconstitutionoftheUnitedStateswasadoptedbythem，\"inordertoformamoreperfectunion，establishjustice，ensuredomestictranquility，provideforthecommondefence，promotethegeneralwelfare，andsecuretheblessingsoflibertytothemselvesandtheirposterity。\"Itwouldbeamockerytoask，iftheseareodiousobjects。Iftheserequireeverygrantofpower，withdrawnfromthestategovernments，tobedeemedstrictissimijuris，andconstruedinthemostlimitedsense，evenifitshoulddefeattheseobjects。Whatpeculiarsanctityhavethestategovernmentsintheeyesofthepeoplebeyondtheseobjects？Aretheynotframedforthesamegeneralends？Wasnottheveryinabilityofthestategovernmentssuitablytoprovideforournationalwants，andnationalindependence，andnationalprotection，theverygroundworkofthewholesystem？

　　&sect；416。Ifthisbethetrueviewofthesubject，theconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistoreceiveasfavourableaconstruction，asthoseofthestates。Neitheristobeconstruedalone；

　　buteachwithareferencetotheother。Eachbelongstothesamesystemofgovernment；eachislimitedinitspowers；andwithinthescopeofitspowerseachissupreme。Each，bythetheoryofourgovernment，isessentialtotheexistenceandduepreservationofthepowersandobligationsoftheother。Thedestructionofeitherwouldbeequallycalamitous，sinceitwouldinvolvetheruinofthatbeautifulfabricofbalancedgovernment，whichhasbeenrearedwithsomuchcareandwisdom，andinwhichthepeoplehavereposedtheirconfidence，asthetruestsafeguardOrtheircivil，religious，andpoliticalliberties。Theexactlimitsofthepowersconfidedbythepeopletoeach，maynotalwaysbecapable，fromtheinherentdifficultyofthesubject，ofbeingdefined，orascertainedinallcaseswithperfectcertainty。18Butthelinesaregenerallymarkedoutwithsufficientbroadnessandclearness；andintheprogressofthedevelopmentofthepeculiarfunctionsofeach，thepartoftruewisdomwouldseemtobe，toleaveineverypracticabledirectionawide，ifnotanunmeasured，distancebetweentheactualexerciseofthesovereigntyofeach。Ineverycomplicatedmachineslightcausesmaydisturbtheoperations；

　　anditisoftenmoreeasytodetectthedefects，thantoapplyasafeandadequateremedy。

　　&sect；417。ThelanguageoftheSupremeCourt，inthecaseofMartinv。Hunter，19seemspeculiarlyappropriatetothispartofoursubject。\"TheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，\"saythecourt，\"wasordainedandestablished，notbythestatesintheirsovereigncapacities，butemphatically，asthepreambleoftheconstitutiondeclares，bythepeopleoftheUnitedStates。20Therecanbenodoubt，thatitwascompetenttothepeopletoinvestthegeneralgovernmentwithallthepowers，whichtheymightdeemproperandnecessary；toextendorrestrainthosepowersaccordingtotheirowngoodpleasure；andtogivethemaparamountandsupremeauthority。Aslittledoubtcantherebe，thatthepeoplehadarighttoprohibittothestatestheexerciseofanypowers，whichwereintheirjudgmentincompatiblewiththeobjectsofthegeneralcompact；tomakethepowersofthestategovernments，ingivencases，subordinatetothoseofthenation；ortoreservetothemselvesthosesovereignauthorities，whichtheymightnotchoosetodelegatetoeither。Theconstitutionwashot，therefore，necessarilycarvedoutofexistingstatesovereignties，norasurrenderofpowersalreadyexistinginstateinstitutions。Forthepowersofthestategovernmentsdependupontheirownconstitutions；andthepeopleofeverystatehadarighttomodifyorrestrainthemaccordingtotheirownviewsofpolicyorprinciple。Ontheotherhand，itisperfectlyclear，thatthesovereignpowers，vestedinthestategovernmentsbytheirrespectiveconstitutions，remainedunalteredandunimpaired，exceptsofarastheyweregrantedtothegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。\"Thesedeductionsdonotrestupongeneralreason，plainandobviousastheyseemtobe。Theyhavebeenpositivelyrecognisedbyoneofthearticlesinamendmentoftheconstitution，whichdeclares，that\"thepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheconstitution，norprohibitedbyittothestates，arereservedtothestatesrespectively，ortothepeople。\"21

　　\"Thegovernment，then，oftheUnitedStates，canclaimnopowers，whicharenotgrantedtoitbytheconstitution；andthepowersactuallygrantedmustbesuch，asareexpresslygiven，orgivenbynecessaryimplication。

　　Ontheotherhand，thisinstrument，likeeveryothergrant，istohaveareasonableconstructionaccordingtotheimportofitsterms。Andwhereapowerisexpresslygiveningeneralterms，itisnottoberestrainedtoparticularcases，unlessthatconstructiongrowoutofthecontextexpressly，orbynecessaryimplication。Thewordsaretobetakenintheirnaturalandobvioussense，andnotinasenseunreasonablyrestrictedorenlarged。\"

　　&sect；418。Astillmorestrikingresponsetotheargumentforastrictconstructionoftheconstitutionwillbefoundinthelanguageofthecourt，inthecaseofGibbonsv。Ogden，9

　　Wheat。1，&amp；c。Mr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourt，says，\"Thisinstrumentcontainsanenumerationofpowersexpresslygrantedbythepeopletotheirgovernment。Ithasbeensaid，thatthesepowersoughttobeconstruedstrictly。Butwhyoughttheytobesoconstrued？

　　Isthereonesentenceintheconstitution，whichgivescountenancetothisrule？Inthelastoftheenumeratedpowers，that，whichgrantsexpresslythemeansforcarryingallothersintoexecution，congressisauthorized\"tomakealllaws，whichshallbenecessaryandproper\"forthepurpose。

　　Butthislimitationonthemeans，whichmaybeused，isnotextendedtothepowers，whichareconferred；noristhereonesentenceintheconstitution，whichhasbeenpointedoutbythegentlemenofthebar，orwhichwehavebeenabletodiscern，thatprescribesthisrule。Wedonot，therefore，thinkourselvesjustifiedinadoptingit。Whatdogentlemenmeanbyastrictconstruction？Iftheycontendonlyagainstthatenlargedconstruction，whichwouldextendwordsbeyondtheirnaturalandobviousimport，wemightquestiontheapplicationoftheterms，butshouldnotcontroverttheprinciple。

　　Iftheycontendforthatnarrowconstruction，which，insupportofsometheorynottobefoundintheconstitution，woulddenytothegovernmentthosepowers，whichthewordsofthegrant，asusuallyunderstood，import，andwhichareconsistentwiththegeneralviewsandobjectsoftheinstrument；

　　forthatnarrowconstruction，whichwouldcripplethegovernment，andrenderitunequaltotheobjects，forwhichitisdeclaredtobeinstituted，andtowhichthepowersgiven，asfairlyunderstood，renderitcompetent；thenwecannotperceivetheproprietyofthisstrictconstruction，noradoptitastherule，bywhichtheconstitutionistobeexpounded。Asmen，whoseintentionsrequirenoconcealment，generallyemploythewords，whichmostdirectlyandaptlyexpresstheideastheyintendtoconvey；theenlightenedpatriots，whoframedourconstitution，andthepeople，whoadoptedit，mustbeunderstoodtohaveemployedwordsintheirnaturalsense，andtohaveintended，whattheyhavesaid。If，fromtheimperfectionofhumanlanguage，thereshouldbeseriousdoubtsrespectingtheextentofanygivenpower，itisawellsettledrule，thattheobjects，forwhichitwasgiven，especially，whenthoseobjectsareexpressedintheinstrumentitself，shouldhavegreatinfluenceintheconstruction。Weknowofnoreasonforexcludingthisrulefromthepresentcase。Thegrantdoesnotconveypower，whichmightbebeneficialtothegrantor，ifretainedbyhimself，orwhichcanensuresolelytothebenefitofthegrantee；butisaninvestmentofpowerforthegeneraladvantage，inthehandsofagentsselectedforthatpurpose；whichpowercanneverbeexercisedbythepeoplethemselves，butmustbeplacedinthehandsofagents，orliedormant。Weknowofnoruleforconstruingtheextentofsuchpowers，otherthanisgivenbythelanguageoftheinstrument，whichconfersthem，takeninconnexionwiththepurposes，forwhichtheywereconferred。\"22

　　IthasbeenremarkedbyPresidentJ。Q。Adams，that\"itisacircumstance，whichwillnotescapetheobservationofaphilosophicalhistorian，thattheconstructivepowersofthenationalgovernmenthavebeenstretchedtotheirextremesttensionbythatpartywheninpower，whichhasbeenmosttenderlyscrupulousofthestatesovereignty，whenuninvestedwiththeauthorityoftheunionthemselves。\"HeAdds，\"Oftheseinconsistencies，ourtwogreatpartiescanhavelittletosayinreproofofeachother。\"

　　Withoutinquiringintothejusticeoftheremarkingeneral，itmaybetrulystated。thattheEmbargoof1807，andtheadmissionofLouisianaintotheUnion，areverystrikingillustrationsoftheapplicationofconstructivepowers。

　　&sect；419。IV。Fromtheforegoingconsiderationswededucetheconclusion，thatasaframeorfundamentallawofgovernment，2。TheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistoreceiveareasonableinterpretationofitslanguage，anditspowers，keepinginviewtheobjectsandpurposes，forwhichthosepowerswereconferred。Byareasonableinterpretation，wemean，thatincasethewordsaresusceptibleoftwodifferentsenses，theonestrict，theothermoreenlarged，thatshouldbeadopted，whichismostconsonantwiththeapparentobjectsandintentoftheconstitution；

　　that，whichwillgiveitefficacyandforce，asagovernment，ratherthanthat，whichwillimpairitsoperations，andreduceittoastateofimbecility。

　　Ofcoursewedonotmean，thatthewordsforthispurposearetobestrainedbeyondtheircommonandnaturalsense；butkeepingwithinthatlimit，theexpositionistohaveafairandjustlatitude，soasontheonehandtoavoidobviousmischief，andontheotherhandtopromotethepublicgood。23

　　&sect；420。Thisconsiderationisofgreatimportanceinconstruingaframeofgovernment；andafortioriaframeofgovernment，thefreeandvoluntaryinstitutionofthepeoplefortheircommonbenefit，security，andhappiness。Itiswhollyunlikethecaseofamunicipalcharter，oraprivategrant，inrespectbothtoitsmeansanditsends。Whenapersonmakesaprivategrantofaparticularthing，orofalicensetodoathing，orofaneasementfortheexclusivebenefitofthegrantee，wenaturallyconfinetheterms，howevergeneral，totheobjectsclearlyintheviewoftheparties。Buteveninsuchcases，doubtfulwords，withinthescopeofthoseobjects，areconstruedmostfavourablyforthegrantee；because，thoughinderogationoftherightsofthegrantor，theyarepromotiveofthegeneralrightssecuredtothegrantee。But，wherethegrantenures，solelyandexclusively，forthebenefitofthegrantorhimself，noonewoulddenytheproprietyofgivingtothewordsofthegrantabenignandliberalinterpretation。Incases，however，ofprivategrants，theobjectsgenerallyarefew；theyarecertain；theyarelimited；

　　theyneitherrequire，norlooktoavarietyofmeansorchanges，whicharetocontrol，ormodifyeithertheend，orthemeans。

　　&sect；421。Inregardalsotomunicipalcharters，orpublicgrants，similarconsiderationsusuallyapply。Theyaregenerallydeemedrestrictiveoftheroyalorpublicprerogative，orofthecommonrightssecuredbytheactualorganizationofthegovernmenttootherindividuals，orcommunities。Theyaresupposedtobeprocured，notsomuchforpublicgood，asforprivateorlocalconvenience。Theyaresupposedtoarisefrompersonalsolicitation，upongeneralsuggestions，andnotexcertacausa，orexmeromotuoftheking，orgovernmentitself。Hence，suchchartersareoftenrequiredbythemunicipaljurisprudencetobeconstruedstrictly，becausetheyyieldsomething，whichiscommon，forthebenefitofafew。

　　Andyet，whereitisapparent，thattheyproceedupongreaterorbroadermotives，aliberalexpositionisnotonlyindulged，butisencouraged，ifitmanifestlypromotesthepublicgood。24Sothatwesee，thateveninthesecases，commonsenseoftendictatesadeparturefromanarrowandstrictconstructionoftheterms，thoughtheordinaryrulesofmeremunicipallawmaynothavefavouredit。

　　&sect；422。Butaconstitutionofgovernment，foundedbythepeopleforthemselvesandtheirposterity，andforobjectsofthemostmomentousnature，forperpetualunion，fortheestablishmentofjustice，forthegeneralwelfare，andforaperpetuationoftheblessingsofliberty，necessarilyrequires，thateveryinterpretationofitspowersshouldhaveaconstantreferencetotheseobjects。Nointerpretationofthewords，inwhichthosepowersaregranted，canbeasoundone，whichnarrowsdowntheirordinaryimport，soastodefeatthoseobjects。Thatwouldbetodestroythespirit，andtocramptheletter。Ithasbeenjustlyobserved，that\"theconstitutionunavoidablydealsingenerallanguage。

　　Itdidnotsuitthepurposesofthepeople，inframingthisgreatcharterofourliberties，toprovideforminutespecificationofitspowers，ortodeclarethemeans，bywhichthosepowersshouldbecarriedintoexecution。

　　Itwasforeseen，thatitwouldbeaperilous，anddifficult，ifnotanimpracticabletask。Theinstrumentwasnotintendedtoprovidemerelyfortheexigenciesofafewyears；butwastoendurethroughalonglapseofages，theeventsofwhichwerelockedupintheinscrutablepurposesofProvidence。Itcouldnotbeforeseen，whatnewchangesandmodificationsofpowermightbeindispensabletoeffectuatethegeneralobjectsofthecharter；andrestrictionsandspecifications，whichatthepresentmightseemsalutary，mightintheendprovetheoverthrowofthesystemitself。

　　Henceitspowersareexpressedingeneralterms，leavingthelegislature，fromtimetotime，toadoptitsownmeanstoeffectuatelegitimateobjects，andtomouldandmodeltheexerciseofitspowers，asitsownwisdomandthepublicinterestsshouldrequire。\"25Languagetothesameeffectwillbefoundinotherjudgmentsofthesametribunal。26

　　&sect；423。If，then，wearetogiveareasonableconstructiontothisinstrument，asaconstitutionofgovernmentestablishedforthecommongood，wemustthrowasideallnotionsofsubjectingittoastrictinterpretation，asifitweresubversiveofthegreatinterestsofsociety，orderogatedfromtheinherentsovereigntyofthepeople。Andthiswillnaturallyleadustosomeotherrulesproperlybelongingtothesubject。

　　&sect；424。V。Wherethepowerisgrantedingeneralterms，thepoweristobeconstrued，asco—extensivewiththeterms，unlesssomeclearrestrictionuponitisdeduciblefromthecontext。

　　Wedonotmeantoassert，thatitisnecessary，thatsuchrestrictionshouldbeexpresslyfoundinthecontext。Itwillbesufficient，ifitarisebynecessaryimplication。Butitisnotsufficienttoshow，thattherewas，ormighthavebeen，asoundorprobablemotivetorestrictit。Arestrictionfoundedonconjectureiswhollyinadmissible。Thereasonisobvious：thetextwasadoptedbythepeopleinitsobvious，andgeneralsense。Wehavenomeansofknowing，thatanyparticulargloss，shortofthissense，waseithercontemplated，orapprovedbythepeople；andsuchaglossmight，thoughsatisfactoryinonestate，havebeentheverygroundofobjectioninanother。Itmighthaveformedamotivetorejectitinone，andtoadoptitinanother。Thesenseofapartofthepeoplehasnotitletobedeemedthesenseofthewhole。Motivesofstatepolicy，orstateinterest，mayproperlyhaveinfluenceinthequestionofratifyingit；buttheconstitutionitselfmustbeexpounded，asitstands；andnotasthatpolicy，orthatinterestmayseemnowtodictate。Wearetoconstrue，andnottoframetheinstrument。27

　　&sect；425。VI。Apower，giveningeneralterms，isnottoberestrictedtoparticularcases，merelybecauseitmaybesusceptibleofabuse，and，ifabused，mayleadtomischievousconsequences。

　　Thisargumentisoftenusedinpublicdebate；andinitscommonaspectaddressesitselfsomuchtopopularfearsandprejudices，thatitinsensiblyacquiresaweightinthepublicmind，towhichitisnowiseentitled。

　　Theargumentabinconvenientiissufficientlyopentoquestion，fromthelaxityofapplication，aswellasofopinion，towhichitleads。

　　Buttheargumentfromapossibleabuseofapoweragainstitsexistenceoruse，is，initsnature，notonlyperilous，but，inrespecttogovernments，wouldshaketheirveryfoundation。Everyformofgovernmentunavoidablyincludesagrantofsomediscretionarypowers。Itwouldbewhollyimbecilewithoutthem。Itisimpossibletoforeseealltheexigencies，whichmayariseintheprogressofevents，connectedwiththerights，duties，andoperationsofagovernment。Iftheycouldbeforeseen，itwouldbeimpossibleabantetoprovideforthem。Themeansmustbesubjecttoperpetualmodification，andchange；theymustbeadaptedtotheexistingmanners，habits，andinstitutionsofsociety，whichareneverstationary；tothepressureofdangers，ornecessities；totheendsinview；togeneralandpermanentoperations，aswellastofugitiveandextraordinaryemergencies。

　　Inshort，ifthewholesocietyisnottoberevolutionizedateverycriticalperiod，andremodeledineverygeneration，theremustbelefttothose，whoadministerthegovernment，averylargemassofdiscretionarypowers，capableofgreaterorlessactualexpansionaccordingtocircumstances，andsufficientlyflexiblenottoinvolvethenationinutterdestructionfromtherigidlimitationsimposeduponitbyanimprovidentjealousy。

　　Everypower，howeverlimited，aswellasbroad，isinitsownnaturesusceptibleofabuse。Noconstitutioncanprovideperfectguardsagainstit。Confidencemustbereposedsomewhere；andinfreegovernments，theordinarysecuritiesagainstabusearefoundintheresponsibilityofrulerstothepeople，andinthejustexerciseoftheirelectivefranchise；andultimatelyinthesovereignpowerofchangebelongingtothem，incasesrequiringextraordinaryremedies。Fewcasesaretobesupposed，inwhichapower，howevergeneral，willbeexertedforthepermanentoppressionofthepeople。28Andyet，casesmayeasilybeput，inwhichalimitationuponsuchapowermightbefoundinpracticetoworkmischief；toinciteforeignaggression；

　　orencouragedomesticdisorder。Thepoweroftaxation，forinstance，maybecarriedtoaruinousexcess；andyet，alimitationuponthatpowermight，inagivencase，involvethedestructionoftheindependenceofthecountry。

　　&sect；426。VII。Ontheotherhand，aruleofequalimportanceis，nottoenlargetheconstructionofagivenpowerbeyondthefairscopeofitsterms，merelybecausetherestrictionisinconvenient，impolitic，orevenmischievous。29Ifitbemischievous，thepowerofredressingtheevillieswiththepeoplebyanexerciseofthepowerofamendment。Iftheydonotchoosetoapplytheremedy，itmayfairlybepresumed，thatthemischiefislessthanwhatwouldarisefromafurtherextensionofthepower；orthatitistheleastoftwoevils。Norshoulditeverbelostsightof，thatthegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesisoneoflimitedandenumeratedpowers；andthatadeparturefromthetrueimportandsenseofitspowersis，protanto，theestablishmentofanewconstitution。Itisdoingforthepeople，whattheyharenotchosentodoforthemselvesItisusurpingthefunctionsofalegislator，anddesertingthoseofanexpounderofthelaw。Argumentsdrawnfromimpolicyorinconvenienceoughtheretobeofnoweight。Theonlysoundprincipleistodeclare，italexscriptaest，tofollow，andtoobey。Nor，ifaprinciplesojustandconclusivecouldbeoverlooked，couldtherewellbefoundamoreunsafeguideinpractice，thanmerepolicyandconvenience。Menonsuchsubjectscomplexionallydifferfromeachother。

　　Thesamemendifferfromthemselvesatdifferenttimes。Temporarydelusions，prejudices，excitements，andobjectshaveirresistibleinfluenceinmerequestionsofpolicy。Andthepolicyofoneagemayillsuitthewishes，orthepolicyofanother。Theconstitutionisnottobesubjecttosuchfluctuations。Itistohaveafixed，uniform，permanentconstruction。Itshouldbe，sofaratleastashumaninfirmitywillallow，notdependentuponthepassionsorpartiesofparticulartimes，butthesameyesterday，to—day，andforever。

　　&sect；427。Ithasbeenobservedwithgreatcorrectness，thatalthoughthespiritofaninstrument，especiallyofaconstitution，istoberespectednotlessthanitsletter；yetthespiritistobecollectedchieflyfromtheletter。Itwouldbedangerousintheextreme，toinferfromextrinsiccircumstances，thatacase，forwhichthewordsofaninstrumentexpresslyprovide，shallbeexemptedfromitsoperation。Wherewordsconflictwitheachother，wherethedifferentclausesofaninstrumentbearuponeachother，andwouldbeinconsistent，unlessthenaturalandcommonimportofwordsbevaried，constructionbecomesnecessary，andadeparturefromtheobviousmeaningofwordsisjustifiable。

　　Butif，inanycase，theplainmeaningofaprovision，notcontradictedbyanyotherprovisioninthesameinstrument，istobedisregarded，becausewebelievetheframersofthatinstrumentcouldnotintendwhattheysay，itmustbeone，wheretheabsurdityandinjusticeofapplyingtheprovisiontothecasewouldbesomonstrous，thatallmankindwould，withouthesitation，uniteinrejectingtheapplication。30Thislanguagehasreferencetoacasewherethewordsofaconstitutionalprovisionaresoughttoberestricted。Butitappearswithequalforcewheretheyaresoughttobeenlarged。

　　&sect；428。VIII。Noconstructionofagivenpoweristobeallowed，whichplainlydefeats，orimpairsitsavowedobjects。

　　If，therefore，thewordsarefairlysusceptibleoftwointerpretations，accordingtotheircommonsenseanduse，theoneofwhichwoulddefeatone，oralloftheobjects，forwhichitwasobviouslygiven，andtheotherofwhichwouldpreserveandpromoteall，theformerinterpretationoughttoberejected，andthelatterbeheldthetrueinterpretation。Thisruleresultsfromthedictatesofmerecommonsense；foreveryinstrumentoughttobesoconstrued，utmagisvaleat，quampereat。31Forinstance，theconstitutionconfersoncongressthepowertodeclarewar。Nowtheworddeclarehasseveralsenses。Itmaymeantoproclaim，orpublish。Butnopersonwouldimagine，thatthiswasthewholesense，inwhichthewordisusedinthisconnexion。Itshouldbeinterpretedinthesense，inwhichthephraseisusedamongnations，whenappliedtosuchasubjectmatter。Apowertodeclarewarisapowertomake，andcarryonwar。Itisnotamerepowertomakeknownanexistingthing，buttogivelifeandeffecttothethingitself。32ThetruedoctrinehasbeenexpressedbytheSupremeCourt：\"Iffromtheimperfectionofhumanlanguagethereshouldbeanyseriousdoubtsrespectingtheextentofanygivenpower，theobjects，forwhichitwasgiven，especiallywhenthoseobjectsareexpressedintheinstrumentitself，shouldhavegreatinfluenceintheconstruction。\"33

　　&sect；429。IX。Whereapowerisremedialinitsnature，thereismuchreasontocontend，thatitoughttobeconstruedliberally。ThatwasthedoctrineofMr。ChiefJusticeJay，inChisholmv。Georgia；34anditisgenerallyadoptedintheinterpretationoflaws。35Butthisliberalityofexpositionisclearlyinadmissible，ifitextendsbeyondthejustandordinarysenseoftheterms。

　　&sect；430。X。Intheinterpretationofapower，alltheordinaryandappropriatemeanstoexecuteitaretobedeemedapartofthepoweritself。Thisresultsfromtheverynatureanddesignofaconstitution。Ingivingthepower，itdoesnotintendtolimitittoanyonemodeofexercisingit，exclusiveofallothers。Itmustbeobvious，ashasbeenalreadysuggested，thatthemeansofcarryingintoeffecttheobjectsofapowermay，nay，mustbevaried，inordertoadaptthemselvestotheexigenciesofthenationatdifferenttimes。36Amodeefficaciousandusefulinoneage，orunderonepostureofcircumstances，maybewhollyvain，orevenmischievousatanothertime。Governmentpresupposestheexistenceofaperpetualmutabilityinitsownoperationsonthose，whoareitssubjects；andaperpetualflexibilityinadaptingitselftotheirwants，theirinterests，theirhabits，theiroccupations，andtheirinfirmities。37

　　&sect；431。Besides；ifthepoweronlyisgiven，withoutpointingoutthemeans，howarewetoascertain，thatanyonemeans，ratherthananother，isexclusivelywithinitsscope？Thesamecourseofreasoning，whichthosealone，withoutwhichthepowergivenwouldbenugatory，wouldhavebeentodeprivethelegislatureofthecapacitytoavailitselfofexperience，toexerciseitsreason，andtoaccommodateitslegislationtocircumstances。Ifweapplythisprincipleofconstructiontoanyofthepowersofthegovernment，weshallfinditsoperniciousinitsoperation，thatweshallbecompelledtodiscardit。Thepowersvestedincongressmaycertainlybecurriedintoexecution，withoutprescribinganoathofoffice。Thepowertoexactthissecurityforthefaithfulperformanceofdutyisnotgiven，norisitindispensablynecessary。Thedifferentdepartmentsmaybeestablished；taxesmaybeimposedandcollected；armiesandnaviesmayberaisedandmaintained；andmoneymaybeborrowed，withoutrequiringanoathofoffice。Itmightbeargued，withasmuchplausibility，asotherincidentalpowershavebeenassailed，thattheconventionwasnotunmindfulofthissubject。Theoath，whichmightbeexacted——thatoffidelitytotheconstitution——isprescribed，andnoothercanberequired。

　　Yet，hewouldbechargedwithinsanity，whoshouldcontend，thatthelegislaturemightnotsuperadd，totheoathdirectedbytheconstitution，suchotheroathofoffice，asitswisdommightsuggest。

　　&sect；432。Inthepracticalapplicationofgovernment，then，thepublicfunctionariesmustbeleftatlibertytoexercisethepowers，withwhichthepeoplebytheconstitutionandlawshaveentrustedthem。Theymusthaveawidediscretion，astothechoiceofmeans；andtheonlylimitationuponthatdiscretionwouldseemtobe，thatthemeansareappropriatetotheend。Andthismustnaturallyadmitofconsiderablelatitude；fortherelationbetweentheactionandtheendhashasbeenjustlyremarkedisnotalwayssodirectandpalpable，astostriketheeyeofeveryobserver。40Iftheendbelegitimateandwithinthescopeoftheconstitution，allthemeans，whichareappropriate，andwhichareplainlyadaptedtothatend，andwhicharenotprohibited，maybeconstitutionallyemployedtocarryitintoeffect。41When，then，itisasked，whoistojudgeofthenecessityandproprietyofthelawstobepassedforexecutingthepowersoftheUnion，thetrueansweris，thatthenationalgovernment，likeeveryother，mustjudgeinthefirstinstanceoftheproperexerciseofitspowers；anditsconstituentsinthelast。Ifthemeansarewithinthereachofthepower，nootherdepartmentcaninquireintothepolicyorconvenienceoftheuseofthem。Iftherebeanexcessbyoverleapingthejustboundaryofthepower，thejudiciarymaygenerallyaffordtheproperrelief；andinthelastresortthepeople，byadoptingsuchmeasurestoredressit，astheexigencymaysuggest，andprudencemaydictate。42

　　&sect；433。XI。Andthisleadsustoremark，inthenextplace，thatintheinterpretationoftheconstitutionthereisnosolidobjectiontoimpliedpowers。43Hadthefacultiesofmanbeencompetenttotheframingofasystemofgovernment，whichwouldleavenothingtoimplication，itcannotbedoubted，thattheeffortwouldhavebeenmadebytheframersofourconstitution。Thefact，however，isotherwise。Thereisnotinthewholeofthatadmirableinstrumentagrantofpowers，whichdoesnotdrawafteritothers，notexpressed，butvitaltotheirexercise；notsubstantiveandindependent，indeed，butauxiliaryandsubordinate。44Thereisnophraseinit，which，likethearticlesofconfederation，45excludesincidentalandimpliedpowers，andwhichrequires，thateverythinggrantedshallbeexpresslyandminutelydescribed。Eventhetenthamendment，whichwasframedforthepurposeofquietingtheexcessivejealousies，whichhadbeenexcited，omitstheword\"expressly，\"whichwascontainedinthearticlesofconfederation，anddeclaresonly，that\"thepowers，notdelegatedtotheUnitedStates，norprohibitedbyittothestates，arereservedtothestatesrespectively，ortothepeople；\"thusleavingthequestion，whethertheparticularpower，whichmaybecomethesubjectofcontest，hasbeendelegatedtotheonegovernment，orprohibitedtotheother，todependuponafairconstructionofthewholeinstrument。

　　Themen，whodrewandadoptedthisamendment，hadexperiencedtheembarrassments，resultingfromtheinsertionofthiswordinthearticlesofconfederation，andprobablyomittedittoavoidthoseembarrassments。Aconstitution，tocontainanaccuratedetailofallthesubdivisions，ofwhichitsgreatpowerswilladmit，andofallthemeans，bywhichthesemaybecarriedintoexecution，wouldpartakeoftheprolixityofalegalcode，andcouldscarcelybeembracedbythehumanmind。Itwouldprobablyneverbeunderstoodbythepublic。Itsnature，therefore，requires，thatonlyitsgreatoutlinesshouldbemarked，itsimportantobjectsdesignated，andtheminoringredientwhichcomposethoseobjects，bededucedfromthenatureofthoseobjectsthemselves。ThatthisideawasentertainedbytheframersoftheAmericanconstitution，isnotonlytobeinferredfromthenatureoftheinstrument，butfromthelanguage。Why，else，weresomeofthelimitations，foundintheninthsectionofthefirstarticle，introduced？Itisalso，insomedegree，warranted，bytheirhavingomittedtouseanyrestrictiveterm，whichmightpreventitsreceivingafairandjustinterpretation。Inconsideringthispoint，weshouldneverforget，thatitisaconstitutionweareexpounding。46

　　&sect；434。ThereasoningoftheFederalististothesameeffect。Everypower，whichisthemeansofcarryingintoeffectagivenpower，isimpliedfromtheverynatureoftheoriginalgrant。

　　Itisanecessaryandunavoidableimplicationfromtheactofconstitutingagovernment，andvestingitwithcertainspecifiedpowers。Whatisapower，buttheabilityorfacultyofdoingathing？Whatistheabilitytodoathing，butthepowerofemployingthemeansnecessarytoitsexecution？

　　Whatisalegislativepower，butapowerofmakinglaws？Whatarethemeanstoexecutealegislativepower，butlaws？47Noaxiom，indeed，ismoreclearlyestablishedinlaworinreason，thanthat，wheretheendisrequired，themeansareauthorized。Wheneverageneralpowertodoathingisgiven，everyparticularpowernecessaryfordoingitisincluded。Ineverynewapplicationofageneralpower，theparticularpower，whicharethemeansofattainingtheobjectofthegeneralpower，mustalwaysnecessarilyvarywiththatobject；andbeoftenproperlyvaried，whilsttheobjectremainsthesame。48Evenundertheconfederation，wherethedelegationofauthoritywasconfinedtoexpresspowers，theFederalistremarks，thatitwouldbeeasytoshow，thatnoimportantpowerdelegatedbythearticlesofconfederationhadbeen，orcouldbe，executedbycongress，withoutrecurringmoreorlesstothedoctrineofconstructionorimplication！49

　　&sect；435。XII。Anotherpoint，inregardtotheinterpretationoftheconstitution，requiresustoadverttotherulesapplicabletocasesofconcurrentandexclusivepowers。Inwhatcasesarethepowersgiventothegeneralgovernmentexclusive，andinwhatcasesmaythestatesmaintainaconcurrentexercise？UponthissubjectwehaveanelaborateexpositionbytheauthorsoftheFederalist；50andasitinvolvessomeofthemostdelicatequestionsgrowingoutoftheconstitution，andthose，inwhichaconflictwiththestatesismostlikelytoarise，wecannotdobetterthantoquotethereasoning。