=A7354。Butthat，whichwouldseemconclusiveonthesubject，as
hasbeen
alreadystated，is，theverylanguageoftheconstitutionitself，
declaringittobeasupremefundamentallaw，andtobeofjudicial
obligation，andrecognitionintheadministrationofjustice。\"This
constitution，\"saysthesixtharticle，\"andthelawsoftheUnitedStates，
whichshallbemadeinpursuancethereof，andalltreatiesmade，orwhich
shallbemadeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，shallbethe
supremelawoftheland；andthejudgesineverystateshallbebound
thereby，anythingintheconstitutionorlawofanystatetothecontrary
notwithstand—
_____________________________________
1TheFederalist，No。22；Id。No。43。
322CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
ing。\"Ifitisthesupremelaw，howcanthepeopleofanystate，eitherby
anyformofitsownconstitution，orlaws，orotherproceedings，repeal，or
abrogate，orsuspendit？
=A7355。But，ifthelanguageoftheconstitutionwerelessexplicitand
irresistible，nootherinferencecouldbecorrectlydeducedfromaviewof
thenatureandobjectsoftheinstrument。Thedesignistoestablishaform
ofgovernment。This，ofitself，importslegalobligation，permanence，and
uncontrollabilitybyany，buttheauthoritiesauthorizedtoalter，or
abolishit。Theobjectwastosecuretheblessingsoflibertytothe
people，andtotheirposterity。Theavowedintentionwastosupercedethe
oldconfederation，andsubstituteinitsplaceanewformofgovernment。We
haveseen，thattheinefficiencyoftheoldconfederationforcedthestates
tosurrendertheleaguethenexisting，andtoestablishanational
constitution。1Theconventionalso，whichframedtheconstitution，
declaredthisintheletteraccompanyingit。\"Itisobviouslyimpracticable
inthefederalgovernmentofthesestates，\"saysthatletter，\"tosecure
allrightsofindependentsovereigntytoeach，andyetprovideforthe
interestandsafetyofall。Individualsenteringintosocietymustgiveup
ashareoflibertytopreservetherest。\"2\"Inallourdelibera—
_____________________________________
1Theveryfirstresolutionadoptedbytheconventionsixstatestotwo
stateswasinthefollowingwords：\"Resolved，thatitistheopinionof
thiscommittee，thatanationalgovernmentoughttobeestablishedofa
supremelegislative，judiciary，andexecutive；\"*plainlyshowing，thatit
wasanationalgovernment，notacompact，whichtheywereaboutto
establish；asupremelegislative，judiciary，andexecutive，andnotamere
treatyfortheexerciseofdependentpowersduringthegoodpleasureofall
thecontractingparties。
2JournalofConvention，p。367，368。
*JournalofCongress，p。83，134，139，207；4Elliot’sDebates，49See
also2Pitkin’sHistory，232。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。323
tionsonthissubject，wekeptsteadilyinourviewthat，whichappearedto
usthegreatestinterestofeverytrueAmerican，theconsolidationofour
Union，inwhichisinvolvedourprosperity，felicity，safety，perhapsour
nationalexistence。\"Couldthisbeattainedconsistentlywiththenotionof
anexistingtreatyorconfederacy，whicheachatitspleasurewasat
libertytodissolve？1
=A7356。Itisalsohistoricallyknown，thatoneoftheobjections
takenby
theopponentsoftheconstitutionwas，\"thatitisnotaconfederationof
thestates，butagovernmentofindividuals。\"2Itwas，nevertheless，in
thesolemninstrumentsofratificationbythepeopleoftheseveralstates，
assentedto，asaconstitution。Thelanguageofthoseinstrumentsuniformly
is，\"We，&c。doassentto，andratifythesaidconstitution。\"3Theforms
oftheconventionofMassachusettsandNewHampshirearesomewhatpeculiar
intheirlanguage。\"Theconvention，&c。acknowledging，withgrateful
hearts，thegoodnessoftheSupremeRuleroftheUni—
_____________________________________
1ThelanguageoftheSupremeCourtinGibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。1，
187，isveryexpressiveonthissubject。
\"Aspreliminarytotheveryablediscussionsoftheconstitution，whichwe
haveheardfromthebar，andashavingsomeinfluenceonitsconstruction，
referencehasbeenmadetothepoliticalsituationofthesestates，
anteriortoitsformation。Ithasbeensaid，thattheyweresovereign，were
completelyindependent，andwereconnectedwitheachotheronlybya
league。Thisistrue。But，whenthesealliedsovereignsconvertedtheir
leagueintoagovernment，whentheyconvertedtheirCongressof
Ambassadors，deputedtodeliberateontheircommonconcerns，andto
recommendmeasuresofgeneralutility，intoalegislature，empoweredto
enactlawsonthemostinterestingsubjects，thewholecharacter，inwhich
thestatesappear，underwentachange，theextentofwhichmustbe
determinedbyafairconsiderationoftheinstrument，bywhichthatchange
waseffected。\"
2TheFederalist，No。38，p。247；Id。No。39，p。256。
3SeetheformsintheJournalsoftheConvention，&c。1819，p。390to46=5。
324CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
verseinaffordingthepeopleoftheUnitedStates，inthecourseofhis
providence，anopportunity，deliberatelyandpeaceably，withoutforceor
surprise，ofenteringintoanexplicitandsolemncompactwitheachother，
byassentingto，andratifyinganewconstitution，&c。doassentto，and
ratifythesaidconstitution。\"1
Andalthoughmanydeclarationsofrights，manypropositionsofamendments，
andmanyprotestationsofreservedpowersaretobefoundaccompanyingthe
ratificationsofthevariousconventions，sufficientlyevinciveofthe
extremecautionandjealousyorthosebodies，andofthepeopleatlarge，
itisremarkable，thatthereisnowheretobefoundtheslightestallusion
totheinstrumentsasaconfederationorcompactofstatesintheir
sovereigncapacity，andnoreservationofanyright，onthepartofany
state，todissolveitsconnexion，ortoabrogateitsassent，ortosuspend
theoperationsoftheconstitution，astoitself。Onthecontrary，thatof
Virginia，whichspeaksmostpointedlytothetopic，merelydeclares，\"that
thepowersgrantedundertheconstitution，beingderivedfromthepeopleof
theUnitedStates，mayberesumedbythem[notbyanyoneofthestates]
wheneverthesameshallbepervertedtotheirinjuryoroppression。\"2
=A7357。Sothatthereisverystrongnegativetestimonyagainst
thenotion
ofitsbeingacompactorconfederation，ofthenatureofwhichwehave
spoken，foundedupontheknownhistoryofthetimes，andtheactsof
ratification，aswellasupontheantecedentarticlesofconfederation。The
latterpurportedontheir
_____________________________________
1JournalsoftheConvention，&c。1819，p。401，402，412。
2Id。p。416。——Oftherightofamajorityofthewholepeopletochange
theirconstitution，atwill，thereisnodoubt。See1Wilson’sLectures，
418；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。165。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。325
facetobeamereconfederacy。Thelanguageofthethirdarticlewas，\"The
saidstatesherebyseverallyenterintoafirmleagueoffriendshipwith
eachotherfortheircommondefence，&c。bindingthemselvestoassisteach
other。\"Andtheratificationwasbydelegatesofthestatelegislatures，
whosolemnlyplightedandengagedthefaithoftheirrespective
constituents，thattheyshouldabidebythedeterminationoftheUnited
Statesincongressassembledonallquestions，which，bythesaid
confederation，aresubmittedtothem；andthatthearticlesthereofshould
beinviolablyobservedbythestatestheyrespectivelyrepresented。1
=A7358。Itisnotunworthyofobservation，thatinthedebatesofthe
variousconventionscalledtoexamineandratifytheconstitution，this
subjectdidnotpasswithoutdiscussion。Theopponents，onmanyoccasions，
pressedtheobjection，thatitwasaconsolidatedgovernment，and
contrasteditwiththeconfederation。2Noneofitsadvocatespretendedto
deny，thatitsdesignwastoestablishanationalgovernment，as
contradistinguishedfromamereleagueortreaty，howevertheymightoppose
thesuggestions，thatitwasaconsolidationofthestates。3IntheNorth
Carolinade—
_____________________________________
1ArticlesofConfederation，1781，art。13。
2Idonotsay，thatthemannerofstatingtheobjectionwasjust，butthe
factabundantlyappearsintheprinteddebates。Forinstance，inthe
Virginiadebates，2Elliot’sDeb。47，Mr。Henrysaid，\"Thatthisisa
consolidatedgovernmentisdemonstrablyclear。\"\"Thelanguage[is]’We，the
people，’insteadof，’We，thestates。’Statesarethecharacteristicsand
soulofaconfederation。Ifthestatesbenottheagentsofthiscompact，
itmustbeonegreatconsolidatednationalgovernmentofthepeopleofall
thestates。\"ThelikesuggestionwillbefoundinvariousplacesinMr。
Elliot’sDebatersinotherstates。See1Elliot’sDebates，91，92，110。See
also，3Amer。Museum，422；2Amer。Museum，540，546；Mr。Martin’sLetter，4
Elliot’sDebates，p。53。
33Elliot’sDebates，145，257，201；TheFederalist，No。32，33，39，44。
45；3Amer。Museum，422，424。
326CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
bates，oneofthememberslaiditdown，asafundamentalprincipleofevery
saleandfreegovernment，that\"agovernmentisacompactbetweenthe
rulersandthepeople。\"Thiswasmoststrenuouslydeniedontheotherside
bygentlemenofgreateminence。Theysaid，\"Acompactcannotbeannulled，
butbytheconsentofbothparties。Therefore，unlesstherulersareguilty
ofoppression，thepeople，ontheprinciplesofacompact，havenorightto
new—modeltheirgovernment。Thisisheldtobetheprincipleofsome
monarchicalgovernmentsinEurope。Ourgovernmentisfoundedonmuchnobler
principles。Thepeopleareknownwithcertaintytohaveoriginatedit
themselves。Thoseinpoweraretheirservantsandagents。Andthepeople，
withouttheirconsent，maynew—modelthegovernment，whenevertheythink
proper，notmerelybecauseitisoppressivelyexercised，butbecausethey
thinkanotherformwillbemoreconducivetotheirwelfare。\"1
=A7359。Norshoulditbeomitted，thatinthemostelaborate
expositionso=
f
theconstitutionbyitsfriends，itscharacter，asapermanentformof
government，asafundamentallaw，asasupremerule，whichnostatewasat
libertytodisregard，suspend，orannul，wasconstantlyadmitted，andinsist
edon，asoneofthestrongestreasons，whyitshouldbeadoptedinlieuof
theconfederation。2Itismatterofsurprise，therefore，that
_____________________________________
1Mr。Iredell，3Elliot’sDebates，24，25；Id。200，Mr。McClure，Id。25；
Mr。Spencer，Id。26，27；Id。139。Seealso3Elliot’sDebates，156；See
alsoChisholmv。Georgia，3Dall，419；2CondensedRep。635，667，668。See
alsoinPenn。Debates，Mr。Wilson’sdenial，thattheconstitutionwasa
compact；3Elliot’sDebates，286，287。SeealsoMcCullochv。Maryland，4
Wheaton，316，404。
2TheFederalist，No。15to20，38，39，44；NorthAmer。Review，Oct。1827，
p。265，266
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。327
alearnedcommentatorshouldhaveadmittedtherightofanystate，orof
thepeopleofanystate，withouttheconsentoftherest，tosecedefrom
theUnionatitsownpleasure。1ThepeopleoftheUnitedStateshavea
righttoabolish，oraltertheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates；butthat
thepeopleofasinglestatehavesucharight，isapropositionrequiring
somereasoningbeyondthesuggestion，thatitisimpliedintheprinciples，
onwhichourpoliticalsystemsarefounded。2Itseems，indeed，tohave
itsorigininthenotionofallgovernmentsbeingfoundedincompact，and
thereforeliabletobedissolvedbytheparties，oreitherofthem；a
notion，whichithasbeenourpurposetoquestion，atleastinthesense，
towhichtheobjectionapplies。
=A7360。TousthedoctrineofMr。Daneappearsfarbetterfounded，that
\"theconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisnotacompactorcontractagreed
tobytwoormoreparties，tobeconstruedbyeachforitself，andhereto
stopforthewantofacommonarbitertorevisetheconstructionofeach
partyorstate。Butthatitis，asthepeoplehavenamedandcalledit，
trulyaConstitution；andtheyproperlysaid，’We，thepeopleofthe
UnitedStates，doordainandestablishthisconstitution，’andnot，we，the
peopleofeachstate。\"3Andthisexpo—
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1RawleontheConstitution，ch。32，p。295，296，297，302，305。
2Dane’sApp。=A759，60，p。69，71。
3Mr。afterwardsMr。JusticeWilson，whowasamemberoftheFederal
Convention，uses，inthePennsylvaniaDebates，thefollowinglanguage：\"We
weretold，&c。thattheconventionnodoubtthoughttheywereforminga
compactorcontractofthegreatestimportance。Itwasmatterofsurprise
toseethegreatlendingprinciplesofthissystemstillsoverymuch
misunderstood。Icannotanswerforwhateverymemberthought；butIbelieve
itcannotbesaid，theythoughttheyweremakingacontract，becauseI
cannotdiscovertheleasttraceofacompactinthatsystem。Therecanbe
nocompact，unlesstherearemorepartiesthanone。Itisanewdoctrine，
thatonecanmakeacompactwith
328CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
tionhasbeensustainedbyopinionsofsomeofourmosteminentstatesmen
andjudges。1ItwastrulyremarkedbytheFederalist，2thatthe
constitutionwastheresultneitherfromthedecisionofamajorityofthe
peopleoftheunion，norfromthatofamajorityofthestates。Itresulted
fromtheunanimousassentoftheseveralstatesthatarepartiestoit，
differingnootherwisefromtheirordinaryassent，thanitsbeing
expressed，notbythelegislativeauthoritybutbythatofthepeople
themselves。
=A7361。Butiftheconstitutioncouldinthesense，totowhichwehave
alluded，bedeemedacompact，betweenwhomisittobedeemedacontract？
Wehavealreadyseen，thatthelearnedcommentatoronBlackstone，deemsit
acompactwithseveralaspects，andfirstbetweenthestates，as
contradistinguishedfromthepeopleofthestatesbywhichtheseveral
stateshaveboundthemselvestoeachother，andtothefed—
_____________________________________
himself。’Theconventionwereformingcontracts！withwhom？Iknowno
bargains，thatweretheremade，Iamunabletoconceive，whothepatties
couldbe。Thestategovernmentsmakeabargainwitheachother。Thatisthe
doctrine，thatisendeavouredtobeestablishedbygentlemeninthe
opposition；theirstatesovereigntieswishtoberepresented。Butfarother
weretheideasoftheconvention。Thisisnotagovernmentfoundedupon
compact。Itisfoundeduponthepowerofthepeople。Theyexpressintheir
nameandtheirauthority，we，thepeople，doordainandestablish，\"&c。3
Elliot’sDebates，286，287。HeaddsId。288\"Thissystemisnotacompact
orcontract。Thesystemtellsyou，whatitis；itisanordinanceand
establishmentofthepeople。\"9Dane’sAbridg。ch。187，art。20，=A715，p。
589，590；Dane’sApp。=A710，p。21，=A750，p。69。
1SeeWarev。Hylton，3Dall。199；ICond。Rep。99，112；Chrisholmv。
Georgia，3Dall。419；2Cond。R。668，671；Elliot’sDebates，72；2Elliot’s
Debates，47；Webster’sSpeeches，p。410；TheFederalist，No。22，33，39；2
Amer。Museum，536，516；VirginiaDebatesin1798，ontheAlienLaws，p。
111，136，138，140；NorthAmer。Rev。Oct。1830，p。437，444。
2No。39。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。329
eralgovernment。1TheVirginiaResolutionsof1798，assert，that
\"Virginiaviewsthepowersofthefederalgovernment，asresultingfromthe
compact，towhichthestatesareparties。\"Thisdeclarationwas，atthe
time，matterofmuchdebateanddifferenceofopinionamongtheablest
representativesinthelegislature。Butwhenitwassubsequentlyexpounded
byMr。MadisoninthecelebratedReportofJanuary，1800，afteradmitting，
thattheterm\"states\"isusedindifferentsenses，andamongothers，that
itsometimesmeansthepeoplecomposingapoliticalsocietyintheir
highestsovereigncapacity，heconsiderstheresolutionunobjectionable，at
leastinthislastsense，becauseinthatsensetheconstitutionwas
submittedtothe\"states\"；inthatsensethe\"states\"ratifiedit；andin
thatsensethestatesareconsequentlypartiestothecompact，fromwhich
thepowersofthefederalgovernmentresult。2Andthatisthesense，in
whichheconsidersthestatespartiesinhisstilllaterandmore
deliberateexaminations。3
=A7362。Thisviewofthesubjectis，however，whollyatvariance
withthat=
，
onwhichwearecommenting；andwhich，havingnofoundationinthewordsof
theconstitution，isaltogetheragratuitousassumption，andtherefore
inadmissible。Itisnomoretrue，thatastateisapartytothe
constitution，assuch，becauseitwasframedbydelegateschosenbythe
states，andsubmittedbythelegislaturesthereoftothepeopleofthe
statesforratification，andthatthestatesarenecessaryagentstogive
effecttosomeofitsprovisions，thanthat
_____________________________________
11Tuck。Black。Comm。169；Haynes’sSpeechintheSenate，in1830；4
Elliot’sDebates，315，316。
2Resolutionsof1800，p。5，6。
3NorthAmericanReviewOct。1830，p。537，544。
330CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
forthesamereasonsthegovernor，orsenate，orhouseofrepresentatives，
orjudges，eitherofastateoroftheUnitedStates，arepartiesthereto。
Nostate，assuch，thatisthebodypolitic，asitwasactuallyorganized，
hadanypowertoestablishacontractfortheestablishmentofanynew
governmentoverthepeoplethereof，ortodelegatethepowersofgovernment
inwhole，orinparttoanyothersovereignty。Thestategovernmentswere
framedbythepeopletoadministerthestateconstitutions，suchasthey
were，andnottotransfertheadministrationthereoftoanyotherpersons，
orsovereignty。Theyhadnoauthoritytoenterintoanycompactorcontract
forsuchapurpose。Itisnowheregiven，orimpliedinthestate
constitutions；andconsequently，ifactuallyenteredinto，asitwasnot，
wouldhavehadnoobligatoryforce。Thepeople，andthepeopleonly，in
theiroriginalsovereigncapacity，hadarighttochangetheirformof
government，toenterintoacompact，andtotransferanysovereigntytothe
nationalgovernment。1Andthestatesnever，infact，didintheir
politicalcapacity，ascontradistinguishedfromthepeoplethereof，ratify
theconstitution。They=20werenotcalledupontodoitbycongress；andwere
notcontemplated，asessentialtogivevaliditytoit。2
_____________________________________
14Wheaton，404。
2TheFederalist，No39。——Inconfirmationofthisview，wemayquotethe
reasoningoftheSupremeCourtinthecaseofMcCullochv。Maryland，4
Wheaton’sR316，inanswertotheveryargument。
\"Thepowersofthegeneralgovernment，ithasbeensaid，aredelegatedby
thestates，whoalonearetrulysovereign；andmustbeexercisedin
subordinationtothestates，whoalonepossesssupremedominion。
\"Itwouldbedifficulttosustainthisproposition。Theconvention，which
framedtheconstitution，wasindeedelectedbythestatelegislatures。But
theinstrument，whenitcamefromtheirhands，wasamereproposal，without
obligation，orpretensionstoit。Itwasreportedtothe
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。331
=A7363。Thedoctrine，then，thatthestatesarepartiesisagratuitous
assumption。Inthelanguageofamost
_____________________________________
thenexistingcongressoftheUnitedStates，witharequest，thatitmight
besubmittedtoaconventionofdelegates，chosenineachstatebythe
peoplethereof，undertherecommendationofitslegislature，fortheir
assentandratification。’Thismodeofproceedingwasadopted；andbythe
convention，bycongress，andbythestatelegislatures，theinstrumentwas
submittedtothepeople。Theyacteduponitintheonlymanner，inwhich
theycanactsafely，effectively，andwisely，onsuchasubject，by
assemblinginconvention。Itistrue，theyassembledintheirseveral
states——andwhereelseshouldtheyhaveassembled？Nopoliticaldreamer
waseverwildenoughtothinkofbreakingdownthelines，whichseparate
thestates，andofcompoundingtheAmericanpeopleintoonecommonmass。Of
consequence，whentheyact，theyactintheirstates。Butthemeasuresthey
adoptdonot，onthataccount，ceasetobethemeasuresofthepeople
themselves，orbecomethemeasuresofthestategovernments。
\"Fromtheseconventionstheconstitutionderivesitswholeauthority。The
governmentproceedsdirectlyfromthepeople；is’ordainedandestablished
’inthenameofthepeople；andisdeclaredtobeordained，’inorderto
formamoreperfectunion，establishjustice，ensuredomestictranquility，
andsecuretheblessingsoflibertytothemselvesandtotheirposterity。’
Theassentofthestates，intheirsovereigncapacity，isimpliedin
callingaconvention，andthussubmittingthatinstrumenttothepeople。
Butthepeoplewereatperfectlibertytoacceptorrejectit；andtheir
actwasfinal。Itrequirednottheaffirmance，andcouldnotbenegatived，
bythestategovernments。Theconstitution，whenthusadopted，wasof
completeobligation，andboundthestatesovereignties。
\"Ithasbeensaid，thatthepeoplehadalreadysurrenderedalltheir
powerstothestatesovereignties，andhadnothingmoretogive。But，
surely，thequestion，whethertheymayresumeandmodifythepowergranted
togovernment，doesnotremaintobesettledinthiscountry。Muchmore
mightthelegitimacyofthegeneralgovernmentbedoubted，haditbeen
createdbythestates。Thepowersdelegatedtothestatesovereigntieswere
tobeexercisedbythemselves，notbyadistinctandindependent
sovereignty，createdbythemselves。Totheformationofaleague，suchas
wastheconfederation，thestatesovereigntieswerecertainlycompetent。
Butwhen，’inordertoformamoreperfectunion，’itwasdeemednecessary
tochangethisallianceintoaneffectivegovernment，possessinggreatand
sovereignpowers，andactingdirectlyonthepeople，thenecessityof
referringittothepeople，antofderivingitspowerdirectlyfromthem，
wasfeltandacknowledgedbyall。
332CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
distinguishedstatesman，1\"theconstitutionitselfinitsveryfront
refutesthat。Itdeclares，thatitisordainedandestablishedbythe
PEOPLEoftheUnitedStates。Sofarfromsaying，thatitisestablishedby
thegovernmentsoftheseveralstates，itdoesnotevensay，thatitis
establishedbythepeopleoftheseveralstates。Butitpronounces，thatit
isestablishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStatesintheaggregate。
Doubtlessthepeopleoftheseveralstates，takencollectively，constitute
thepeopleoftheUnitedStates。Butitisinthistheircollective
capacity，itisasallthepeopleoftheUnitedStates，thattheyestablish
theconstitution。\"2
_____________________________________
\"ThegovernmentoftheUnion，then，whatevermaybetheinfluenceofthis
factonthecase，is，emphatically，andtruly，agovernmentofthepeople。
Informandinsubstanceitemanatesfromthem。Itspowersaregrantedby
them，andaretobeexerciseddirectlyonthem，andfortheirbenefit。
\"Thisgovernmentisacknowledgedbyalltobeoneofenumeratedpowers。
Theprinciple，thatitcanexerciseonlythepowersgrantedtoit，would
seemtooapparenttohaverequiredtobeenforcedbyallthosearguments，
whichitsenlightenedfriends，whileitwasdependingbeforethepeople，
founditnecessarytourge。Thatprincipleisnowuniversallyadmitted。But
thequestionrespectingtheextentofthepowersactuallygranted，is
perpetuallyarising，andwillprobablycontinuetoarise，aslongasour
systemshallexist。\"
1Webster’sSpeeches，1830，p。431；4Elliot’sDebates，326。
2Mr。Danereasonstothesameeffect，thoughitisobvious，thathecould
not，atthetime，havehadanyknowledgeoftheviewsofMr。Webster。*He
adds，\"Ifacontract，whenandhowdidtheUnionbecomeapartytoit？If
acompact，whyisitneversodenominated，butoftenandinvariablyinthe
instrumentitself，andinitsamendments，styled，\"Thisconstitution？and
ifacontract，whydidtheframersandpeoplecallitthesupremelaw。\"#
InMartinv。Hunter，1Wheat。R。304，324，thesupremecourtexpressly
declared，that\"theconstitutionwasordainedandestablished，\"notbythe
statesintheirsovereigncapacity，butemphatically，asthepreambleof
theconstitutiondeclares，\"bythepeopleoftheUnitedStates。\"
*9Dane’sAbridg。ch。189，art。20，=A715，p。589，590；Dane’sApp。40，41，
4=2。
#9Dane’sAbridg。590。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。333
=A7364。Butifitwereadmitted，thattheconstitutionisacompact
betwee=
n
thestates，\"theinferencesdeducedfromit，\"ashasbeenjustlyobserved
bythesamestatesman，1\"arewarrantedbynojustreason。Because，ifthe
constitutionbeacompactbetweenthestates，stillthatconstitutionor
thatcompacthasestablishedagovernmentwithcertainpowers；andwhether
itbeoneofthesepowers，thatitshallconstrueandinterpretforitself
thetermsofthecompactindoubtfulcases，canonlybedecidedbylooking
tothecompact，andinquiring，whatprovisionsitcontainsonthatpoint。
Withoutanyinconsistencywithnaturalreason，thegovernmenteventhus
createdmightbetrustedwiththispowerofconstruction。Theextentofits
powersmust，therefore，besoughtintheinstrumentitself。\"\"Ifthe
constitutionwerethemerecreationofthestategovernments，itmightbe
modified，interpreted，orconstruedaccordingtotheirpleasure。Buteven
inthatcase，itwouldbenecessary，thattheyshouldagree。Onealone
couldnotinterpretitconclusively。Onealonecouldnotconstrueit。One
alonecouldnotmodifyit。\"\"Ifallthestatesarepartiestoit，onealone
canhavenorighttofixuponitherownpeculiarconstruction。\"2
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1Webster’sSpeeches，429；4Elliot’sDebates，324。
2Evenundertheconfederation，whichwasconfessedly，inmanyrespects，a
mereleagueortreaty，thoughinotherrespectsnational，congress
unanimouslyresolved，thatitwasnotwithinthecompetencyofanystateto
passactsforinterpreting，explaining，orconstruinganationaltreaty，or
anypartorclauseofit。Yetinthatinstrumenttherewasnoexpress
judicialpowersgiventothegeneralgovernmenttoconstrueit。Itwas，
however，deemedanirresistibleandexclusiveauthorityinthegeneral
government，fromtheverynatureoftheotherpowersgiventothem；and
especiallyfromthepowertomakewarandpeace，andtoformtreaties。
JournalsofCongress，April13，1787，p。32，&c。；RawleonConst。App。2，
P。316，320。
334CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
=A7365。Then，isitacompactbetweenthepeopleoftheseveralstates，
eachcontractingwithallthepeopleoftheotherstates？1Itmaybe
admitted，aswastheearlyexpositionofitsadvocates，\"thatthe
constitutionisfoundedontheassentandratificationofthepeopleof
America，givenbydeputieselectedforthespecialpurpose；butthatthis
assentandratificationistobegivenbythewholepeople，notas
individuals，composingoneentirenation，butascomposingthedistinctand
independentstates，towhichtheyrespectivelybelong。Itistobethe
assentandratificationoftheseveralstates，derivedfromthesupreme
authorityineachstate，theauthorityofthepeoplethemselves。Theact，
therefore，establishingtheconstitutionwillnotbe[isnottobe]a
national，butafederalact。\"2\"Itmayalsobeadmitted，\"inthelanguage
ofoneofitsmostenlightenedcommentators，that\"itwasformed，notby
thegovernmentsofthecomponentstates，asthefederalgovernment，for
whichitwassubstituted，wasformed。Norwasitformedbyamajorityof
thepeopleoftheUnitedStates，asasinglecommunity，inthemannerofa
consolidatedgovernment。Itwasformedbythestates，thatis，bythe
peopleineachofthestatesactingmtheirhighestsovereigncapacity；and
formedconsequentlybythesameauthority，whichformedthestate
constitutions。\"3Butthiswouldnotnecessarily
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1IntheresolutionspassedbythesenateofSouth—CarolinainDecember，
1827，itwasdeclared，that\"theconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisa
compactbetweenthepeopleofthedifferentstateswitheachother，as
separateandindependentsovereignties。\"Mr。Grimkefiledaprotestfounded
ondifferentviewsofit。SeeGrimke’sAddressandResolutionsin1828，
edition，1829，atCharleston，wherehisexpositionoftheconstitutionis
givenatlarge，andmaintainedinaveryablespeech。
2TheFederalist，No。39；seeSturgisv。Crowninshield，4Wheat。R。122，
19=3。
3Mr。Madison’sLetterinNorthAmericanReview，October，1830，P。537，538=。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。335
drawafterittheconclusion，thatitwastobedeemedacompact，inthe
sense，towhichwehavesooftenalluded，bywhicheachstatewasstill，
aftertheratification，toactuponit，asaleagueortreaty，andto
withdrawfromitatpleasure。Agovernmentmayoriginateinthevoluntary
compactorassentofthepeopleofseveralstates，orofapeoplenever
beforeunited，andyetwhenadoptedandratifiedbythem，benolongera
matterrestingincompact；butbecomeanexecutedgovernmentor
constitution，afundamentallaw，andnotamereleague。Butthedifficulty
inassertingittobeacompactbetweenthepeopleofeachstate，andall
thepeopleoftheotherstatesis，thattheconstitutionitselfcontainsno
suchexpression，andnosuchdesignationofparties。1We，\"thepeopleof
theUnitedStates，&c。doordain，andestablishthisconstitution，\"isthe
language；andnotwe，thepeopleofeachstate，doestablishthiscompact
betweenourselves，andthepeopleofalltheotherstates。Weareobliged
todepartfromthewordsoftheinstrument，tosustaintheother
interpretation；aninterpretation，whichcanservenobetterpurpose，than
toconfusethemindinrelationtoasubjectotherwiseclear。Itisfor
thisreason，thatweshouldpreferanadherencetothewordsofthe
constitution，andtothejudicialexpositionofthesewordsaccordingto
theirplainandcommonimport。2
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1SeeDane’sApp。=A732，33，p。41，42，43。
2Chisholmv。Georgia，2Dall。419；2Cond。Rep。668，671；Martinv。
Hunter，1Wheat。R。304，324；Dane’sApp。p。22，24，29，30，37，39，
40，
41，42，43，=2051。
ThissubjectisconsideredwithmuchcarebyPresidentMonroeinhis
Exposition，accompanyinghisMessage，ofthe4thofMay，1822。Itisdueto
hismemorytoinsertthefollowingpassageswhichexhibitshisnotionof
thesupremacyoftheUnion。
\"TheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesbeingratifiedbythepeopleofthe
severalstates，became，ofnecessity，totheextentofitspowers，the
paramountauthorityoftheUnion。Onsoundprinciples，itcanbeview—
336CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
=A7366。Butsupposing，thatitweretobedeemedsuchacompactamongthe
peopleoftheseveralstates，letusseewhattheenlightenedstatesman，
whovindi—
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edinnootherlight。Thepeople，thehighestauthorityknowntoour
system，fromwhomallourinstitutionsspring，andonwhomtheydepend，
formedit。Hadthepeopleoftheseveralstatesthoughtproperto
incorporatethemselvesintoonecommunityunderonegovernment，theymight
havedoneit。Theyhadthepower，andtherewasnothingthen，noristhere
anythingnow，shouldtheybesodisposed，topreventit。Theywisely
stopped，however，atacertainpoint，extendingtheincorporationtothat
point，makingthenationalgovernment，thusfar，Aconsolidatedgovernment，
andpreservingthestategovernment，withoutthatlimit，perfectly
sovereignandindependentofthenationalgovernment。Hadthepeopleofthe
severalstatesincorporatedthemselvesintoonecommunity，theymusthave
remainedsuch；theirconstitutionbecomingthen，liketheconstitutionsof
theseveralstates，incapableofchange，untilalteredbythewillofthe
majority。Intheinstitutionofastategovernmentbythecitizensofa
state，acompactisformed，towhichallandeverycitizenareequal
parties。Theyarealsothesoleparties；andmayamenditatpleasure。In
theinstitutionofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，bythecitizensof
everystate，acompactwasformedbetweenthewholeAmericanpeople，which
hasthesameforce，andpartakesofallthequalities，totheextent；of
itspowers，asacompactbetweenthecitizensofastate，intheformation
oftheirownconstitution。Itcannotbealtered，exceptbythosewhoformed
it，orinthemodeprescribedbythepartiestothecompactitself。
\"Thisconstitutionwasadoptedforthepurposeofremedyingallthe
defectsoftheconfederation；andinthis，ithassucceeded，beyondany
calculation，thatcouldhavebeenformedofanyhumaninstitution。By
bindingthestatestogether，theconstitutionperformsthegreatofficeof
theconfederation，butitisinthatsenseonly，thatithasanyofthe
propertiesofthatcompact，andinthatitismoreeffectual，tothe
purpose，asitholdsthemtogetherbyamuchstrongerbond，andinall
otherrespects，inwhichtheconfederationfailed，theconstitutionhas
beenblessedwithcompletesuccess。Theconfederationwasacompactbetween
separateandindependentstates；theexecutionofwhosearticles，inthe
powerswhichoperatedinternally，dependedonthestategovernments。But
thegreatofficeoftheconstitution，byincorporatingthepeopleofthe
severalstates，totheextentofitspowers，intoonecommunity，and
enablingittoactdirectlyonthepeople，wastoannulthepowersofthe
stategovernmenttothatextent，exceptincaseswheretheywere
concurrent，andtoprecludetheiragencyingivingeffecttothoseofthe
generalgovernment。ThegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesreliesonitsown
meansfortheexecutionofitspowers，asthestategovernmentdofor
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。337
catesthatopinion，holdsastheappropriatedeductionfromit。\"Beingthus
derivedsayshefromthesamesource，astheconstitutionsofthestates，
ithas，withineachstate，thesameauthority，astheconstitutionofthe
state；andisasmuchaconstitutionwithinthestrictsenseoftheterm，
withinitsprescribedsphere，astheconstitutionsofthestatesare，
withintheirrespectivespheres。Butwiththisobviousandessentialdiffere
nce，thatbeingacompactamongthestatesintheirhighestsovereign
capacity，andconstitutingthepeoplethereofonepeopleforcertain
purposes，itcannotbealtered，orannulledatthewillofthestates
individually，astheconstitutionofastatemaybeatitsindividual
will。\"1
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theexecutionoftheirs；bothgovernmentshaving，acommonorigin，or
sovereign，thepeople；thestategovernments，thepeopleofeachstate，the
nationalgovernment，thepeopleofeverystate；andbeingamenabletothe
power，whichcreatedit。Itisbyexecutingitsfunctionsasagovernment，
thusoriginatingandthusacting，thattheconstitutionoftheUnited
Statesholdsthestatestogether，andperformstheofficeofaleague。It
isowingtothenatureofitspowers，andthehighsource，fromwhencethey
arederived，thepeople，thatitperformsthatofficebetterthanthe
confederation，oranyleague，whicheverexisted，beingacompact，whichthe
stategovernmentsdidnotform，towhichtheyarenotparties，andwhich
executesitsownpowersindependentlyofthem。\"
1Mr。Madison’sLetter，NorthAmericanReview，Oct。1830，p。538。——Mr。
PatersonafterwardsMr。JusticePatersonintheconvention，whichframed
theconstitution，heldthedoctrine，thatundertheconfederationnostate
hadarighttowithdrawfromtheUnionwithouttheconsentofall。\"The
confederationsaidheisinthenatureofacompact；andcananystate，
unlessbytheconsentofthewhole，eitherinpoliticsorlaw，withdraw
theirpowers？LetitbesaidbyPennsylvaniaandtheotherlargestates，
thatthey，forthesakeofpeace，assentedtotheconfederation；canshe
nowresumeheroriginalrightwithouttheconsentofthedonee？\"*Mr。Dane
unequivocallyholdsthesamelanguageinrespecttotheconstitution。\"It
isclearsayshethepeopleofanyonestatealonenevercantake，or
withdrawpowerfromtheUnitedStates，whichwasgrantedtoitbyall，as
thepeopleofallthestatescandorightfullyinajustifiablerevolution，
orasthepeoplecandointhemannertheirconstitutionprescribes。\"
Dane’sApp。
=A710，p。21。
*Yates’sdebates，4Elliot’sDebates，75。
338CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
=A7367。Theotherbranchoftheproposition，wehavebeenconsidering，is，
thatitisnotonlyacompactbetweentheseveralstates，andthepeople
thereof，butalsoacompactbetweenthestatesandthefederalgovernment；
andeconversobetweenthefederalgovernment，andtheseveralstates，and
everycitizenoftheUnitedStates。1Thisseemstobeadoctrinefarmore
involved，andextraordinary，andincomprehensible，thananypartofthe
preceding。Thedifficultieshavenotescapedtheobservationofthose，by
whomithasbeenadvanced。\"Althoughsaysthelearnedcommentatorthe
federalgovernmentcan，innopossibleview，beconsideredasapartytoa
compactmadeanteriortoitsexistence；yet，asthecreatureofthat
compact，itmustbeboundbyittoitscreators，theseveralstatesinthe
Union，andthecitizensthereof。\"2Ifbythis，nomoreweremeantthanto
state，thatthefederalgovernmentcannotlawfullyexerciseanypowers，
exceptthoseconferredonitbytheconstitution，itstruthcouldnotadmit
ofdispute。Butitisplain，thatsomethingmorewasintheauthor’smind。
Atthesametime，thatheadmits，thatthefederalgovernmentcouldnotbe
apartytothecompactoftheconstitution\"inanypossibleview，\"hestill
seemstoinsistuponit，asacompact，bywhichthefederalgovernmentis
boundtotheseveralstates，andtoeverycitizen；thatis，thatithas
enteredintoacontractwiththemforthedueexecutionofitsduties。
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Theordinanceof1787，forthegovernmentofthewesternterritory，
containsaswehaveseencertainarticlesdeclaredtobe\"articlesof
compact；\"buttheyarealsodeclaredto\"remainforeverunalterable，
exceptbycommonconsent。\"So，thattheremaybeacompactandyetbythe
stipulationsneitherpartymaybeatlibertytowithdrawfromit，or
absolveitselffromitsobligations。Ante，p。209。
11Tucker’sBlack。Comm。169，170。
21Tucker’sBlack。Comm。170。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。339
=A7368。Andadoctrineofalikenature，viz。thatthefederalgovernment
isapartytothecompact，seemstohavebeengravelyentertainedonother
solemnoccasions。1Thedifficultyofmaintainingit，however，seems
absolutelyinsuperable。Thefederalgovernmentistheresultofthe
constitution，orifthephraseisdeemedbyanypersonmoreappropriate
thecreatureothecompact。How，then，canitbeapartytothatcompact，
towhichitowesitsownexistence？2Howcanitbesaid，thatithas
enteredintoacontract，whenatthetimeithadnocapacitytoconduct；
andwasnoteveninesse？Ifanyprovisionwasmadeforthegeneral
government’sbecomingaparty，andenteringintoacompact，afteritwas
broughtintoexistence，whereisthatprovisiontobefound？Itisnotto
befoundintheconstitutionitself。Areweatlibertytoimplysucha
provision，attachingtonopowergivenintheconstitution？Thiswouldbe
topushthedoctrineofimplicationtoanextenttrulyalarming；todraw
inferences，notfromwhatis，butfromwhatisnot，statedinthe
instrument。But，ifanysuchimplicationcouldexist，whendidthegeneral
governmentsignifyitsassenttobecomesuchaparty？Whendidthepeople
authorizeittodoso？3Couldthegovernmentdoso，withouttheexpress
authorityofthepeople？Thesearequestions，whicharemoreeasilyasked，
thananswered。
=A7369。Inshort，thedifficultiesattendantuponallthevarious
theories
underconsideration，whichtreattheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，as
acompact，eitherbetweentheseveralstates，orbetweenthepeople
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1DebatesintheSenate，in1830，onMr。Foot’sResolution，4Elliot’s
Debates，315to331。
2Webster’sSpeeches，429；4Elliot’sDebates，324。
3Dane’sApp。=A732，p。41；Id。=A738，p。46。
340CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
oftheseveralstates，orbetweenthewholepeopleoftheUnitedStates，
andthepeopleoftheseveralstates，orbetweeneachcitizenofallthe
states，andallothercitizens，are，ifnotabsolutelyinsuperable，so
serious，andsowhollyfoundeduponmereimplication，thatitismatterof
surprise，thattheyshouldhavebeensoextensivelyadopted，andso
zealouslypropagated。Thesetheories，too，seemmainlyurgedwithaviewto
drawconclusions，whichareatwarwiththeknownpowers，andreasonable
objectsoftheconstitution；andwhich，ifsuccessful，wouldreducethe
governmenttoamereconfederation。Theyareobjectionable，then，inevery
way；first，becausetheyarenotjustifiedbythelanguageofthe
constitution；secondly，becausetheyhaveatendencytoimpair，andindeed
todestroy，itsexpresspowersandobjects；andthirdly，becausethey
involveconsequences，which，atthewillofasinglestate，mayoverthrow
theconstitutionitself。Oneofthefundamentalrulesintheexpositionof
everyinstrumentis，sotoconstrueitsterms，ifpossible，asnottomake
themthesourceoftheirowndestruction，ortomakethemutterlyvoid，and
nugatory。Andifthisbegenerallytrue，withhowmuchmoreforcedoesthe
ruleapplytoaconstitutionofgovernment，framedforthegeneralgood，
anddesignedforperpetuity？Surely，ifanyimplicationsaretobemade
beyonditsterms，theyareimplicationstopreserve，andnottodestroy
it。1
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1ThefollowingstronglanguageisextractedfromInstructiongivento
someRepresentativesofthestateofVirginiabytheirconstituentsin
1787，withreferencetotheconfederation：\"Governmentwithoutcoercionis
apropositionatoncesoabsurdandselfcontradictory，thattheidea
createsaconfusionoftheunderstanding。Itisformwithoutsubstance；at
bestabodywithoutasoul。Ifmenwouldactright，governmentofallkinds
wouldbeuseless。Ifstatesornations，whoarebutassemblagesofmen，
woulddoright，therewouldbenowarsordisordersintheuniverse。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。341
=A7370。Thecardinalconclusion，forwhichthisdoctrineofacompacthas
been，withsomuchingenuityandability，forcedintothelanguageofthe
constitution，forthelanguagenowherealludestoit，isavowedlyto
establish，thatinconstruingtheconstitution，thereisnocommonumpire；
butthateachstate，nayeachdepartmentofthegovernmentofeachstate，
isthesupremejudgeforitself，ofthepowers，andrights，andduties，
arisingunderthatinstrument。1Thus，ithasbeensolemnlyassertedon
morethanoneoccasion，bysomeofthestatelegislatures，thatthereisno
commonarbiter，ortribunal，authorizedtodecideinthelastresort，upon
thepowersandtheinterpretationoftheconstitution。Andthedoctrinehas
beenrecentlyrevivedwithextraordinaryzeal，andvindicatedwithuncommon
vigour。2Amajorityofthestates，however，haveneveras—
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Badasindividualsare，statesareworse。Clothemenwithpublicauthority，
andalmostuniversallytheyconsiderthemselves，asliberatedfromthe
obligationsofmoralrectitude，becausetheyarenolongeramenableto
justice。\"1Amer。Mus。290。
1Madison’sVirginiaReport，January，1800，p。6，7，8，9；Webster’s
Speeches，407to409，410，411，419to421。
2ThelegislatureofVirginia，in1829，resolved，thatthereisnocommon
arbitertoconstruetheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates；theconstitution
beingafederativecompactbetweensovereignstates，eachstatehasaright
toconstruethecompactforitself\"GeorgiaandSouth—Carolinahave
recentlymaintainedthesamedoctrine；andithasbeenassertedinthe
senateoftheUnitedStates，withanuncommondisplayofeloquenceand
pertinacity。*Itisnotalittleremarkable，thatin1810，thelegislature
ofVirginiathoughtverydifferently，andthendeemedthesupremecourta
fitandimpartialtribunal。#Pennsylvaniaatthesametime，thoughshedid
notdenythecourttobe，undertheconstitution，theappropriatetribunal，
wasdesirousofsubstitutingsomeotherarbiter。Therecentresolutions
ofherownlegislatureinMarch，1831show，thatshenowapprovesofthe
supremecourt，asthetrueandcommonar—
*Dane’sAbridg。ch。197，art。=A720，to13，p。589，&c。591；Dane’sApr。
5=
2to59，67to72；3AmericanAnnualRegister，LocalHist。131。
#NorthAmericanReviewOctober，1830。p。509，512；6Wheat。R。358。
NorthAmericanReview，Id。507，508。
342CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
sentedtothisdoctrine；andithasbeen，atdifferenttimes，resistedby
thelegislaturesofseveralofthestates，inthemostformal
declarations。1
=A7371。Butifitwereadmitted，thattheconstitutionisa
compact，the
conclusion，thatthereisnocommonarbiter，wouldneitherbeanecessary，
nornaturalconclusionfromthatfactstandingalone。Todecideuponthe
point，itwouldstillbehoveustoexaminetheverytermsofthe
constitution，andthedelegationofpowersunderit。Itwouldbeperfectly
competentevenforconfederatedstatestoagreeupon，anddelegate
authoritytoconstruethecompacttoacommonarbiter。Thepeopleofthe
UnitedStateshadanunquestionablerighttoconfidethispowertothe
governmentoftheUnitedStates，ortoanydepartmentthereof，ifthey
choseso
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biter。Oneoftheexpositionsofthedoctrineis，thatifasinglestate
deniesapowertoexistundertheconstitution，thatpoweristobedeemed
defunct，unlessthree—fourthsofthestatesshallafterwardsreinstatethat
powerbyanamendmenttotheconstitution。*What，then，istobedone，
wheretenstatesresolve，thatapowerexists，andone，thatitdoesnot
exist？SeeMr。Vice—PresidentCalhoun’sLetterof28thAugust，1832，to
Gov。Hamilton。
1Massachusettsopenlyopposeditintheresolutionsofherlegislatureof
the12thofFebruary，1799，anddeclared，\"thatthedecisionofallcases
inlawandequityarisingundertheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，and
theconstructionofalllawsmadeinpursuancethereof，areexclusively
vestedbythepeople，inthejudicialcourtsoftheUnitedStates。\"#Six
otherstates，atthattime，seemtohavecometothesameresult。Andon
otheroccasions，aLargernumberhaveconcurredonthesamepoint。@Similar
resolutionshavebeenpassedbythelegislaturesofDelawareand
Connecticutin1834，andbysomeotherstates。Howisitpossible，fora
moment，toreconcilethenotion，thateachstateisthesupremejudgefor
itselfoftheconstructionoftheconstitution，withtheveryfirst
resolutionoftheconvention，whichformedtheconstitution：\"Resolved，&c。
thatanationalgovernmentoughttobeestablished；consistingofa
supreme，legislative，judiciary，andexecutive？\"%
*Elliot’sDebates，320，321。#Dane’sApp。58。
#NorthAmericanReview，October，1830，p。500。
@Dane’sApp。67；Id。52to59。
%JournalsofConvention，83；4Elliot’sDeb。49。
CH。III。]NATUREOFTHECONSTITUTION。343
todo。Thequestionis，whethertheyhavedoneit。Iftheyhave，itbecomes
obligatoryandbindinguponallthestates。
=A7372。Itisnot，then，byartificialreasoningfoundedupon
theory，but
uponacarefulsurveyofthelanguageoftheconstitutionitself，thatwe
aretointerpretitspowers，anditsobligations。Wearetotreatit，asit
purportsonitsfacetobe，asaCONSTITUTIONofgovernment；andweareto
rejectallotherappellations，anddefinitionsofit，such，asthatitisa
compact，especiallyastheymaymisleadusintofalseconstructionsand
glosses，andcanhavenotendencytoinstructusinitsrealobjects。
344CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
CHAPTERIV。
WHOISFINALJUDGEORINTERPRETERIN
CONSTITUTIONALCONTROVERSIES。
=A7373。THEconsiderationofthequestion，whethertheconstitutionhas
madeprovisionforanycommonarbitertoconstrueitspowersand
obligations，wouldproperlyfindaplaceintheanalysisofthedifferent
clausesofthatinstrument。But，asitisimmediatelyconnectedwiththe
subjectbeforeus，itseemsexpedientinthisplacetogiveitadeliberate
attention。1
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1Thepointwasverystronglyargued，andmuchconsidered，inthecaseof
Cohensv。Virginia，intheSupremeCourtin1821，6Wheat。R。264。The
wholeargument，aswellasthejudgment，deservesanattentivereading。The
result，towhichtheargumentagainsttheexistenceofacommonarbiter
leads，ispresentedinaveryforciblemannerbyMr。ChiefJustice
Marshall，inpages376，377。
\"Thequestionspresentedtothecourtbythetwofirstpointsmadeatthe
barareofgreatmagnitude，andmaybetrulysaidvitallytoaffectthe
Union。Theyexcludetheinquiry，whethertheconstitutionandlawsofthe
UnitedStateshavebeenviolatedbythejudgment，whichtheplaintiffsin
errorseektoreview；andmaintain，that，admittingsuchviolation，itis
notinthepowerofthegovernmenttoapplyacorrective。Theymaintain，
thatthenationdoesnotpossessadepartmentcapableofrestraining
peaceably，andbyauthorityoflaw，anyattempts，whichmaybemadebya
partagainstthelegitimatepowersofthewhole；andthatthegovernmentis
reducedtothealternativeofsubmittingtosuchattempts，orofresisting
thembyforce。Theymaintain，thattheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates
hasprovidednotribunalforthefinalconstructionofitself，orofthe
lawsortreatiesofthenation；butthatthispowermaybeexercisedinthe
lastresortbythecourtsofeverystateintheUnion。Thatthe
constitution，laws，andtreaties，mayreceiveasmanyconstructions，as
therearestates；andthatthisisnotamischief，or，ifamischief，is
irremediable。Theseabstractpropositionsaretobedetermined；forhe，who
demandsdecisionwithoutpermittinginquiry，affirms，thatthedecisionhe
asksdoesnotdependoninquiry。
CH。IV。]FINALINTERPRETER。345
=A7374。Inordertoclearthequestionofallminorpoints，whichmight
embarrassusinthediscussion，itisnecessarytosuggestafew
preliminaryremarks。Theconstitution，contemplatingthegrantoflimited
powers，anddistributingthemamongvariousfunctionaries，andthestate
governments，andtheirfunctionaries，beingalsoclothedwithlimited
powers，subordinatetothosegrantedtothegeneralgovernment，whenever
anyquestionarises，astotheexerciseofanypowerbyanyofthese
functionariesunderthestate，orfederalgovernment，itisofnecessity，
thatsuchfunctionariesmust，inthefirstinstance，decideuponthe
constitutionalityoftheexerciseofsuchpower。1Itmayariseinthe
courseofthedischargeofthefunctionsofanyone，orofall，ofthe
greatdepartmentsofgovernment，theexecutive，thelegislative，andthe
judicial。Theofficersofeachofthesedepartmentsareequallyboundby
theiroathsofofficetosupporttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，and
arethereforeconscientiouslyboundtoabstainfromallacts，whichare
inconsistentwithit。Whenever，therefore，theyarerequiredtoactina
case，nothithertosettledbyanyproperauthority，thesefunctionaries
must，inthefirstinstance，decide，eachforhimself，whether，
consistentlywiththeconstitution，theactcanbedone。If，forinstance，
thepresidentisrequiredtodoanyact，heisnotonlyauthorized，but
required，todecideforhimself，whether，consistentlywithhis
constitutionalduties，hecandotheact。2So，ifapropositionbebe—
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\"Ifsuchbetheconstitution，itisthedutyofthiscourttobowwith
respectfulsubmissiontoitsprovisions。Ifsuchbenottheconstitution，
itisequallythedutyofthiscourttosayso；andtoperformthattask，
whichtheAmericanpeoplehaveassignedtothejudicialdepartment。\"
1SeetheFederalist，No。33。
2Mr。Jeffersoncarrieshisdoctrinemuchfarther，andholds，thateach
346CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
forecongress，everymemberofthelegislativebodyisboundtoexamine，
anddecideforhimself，whetherthebillorresolutioniswithinthe
constitutionalreachofthelegislativepowersconfidedtocongress。Andin
manycasesthedecisionsoftheexecutiveandlegislativedepartments，thus
made，becomefinalandconclusive，beingfromtheirverynatureand
characterincapableofrevision。Thus，inmeasuresexclusivelyofa
political，legislative，orexecutivecharacter，itisplain，thatasthe
supremeauthority，astothesequestions，belongstothelegislativeand
executivedepartments，theycannotbere—examinedelsewhere。Thus，congress
havingthepowertodeclarewar，tolevytaxes，toappropriatemoney，to
regulateintercourseandcommercewithforeignnations，theirmodeof
executingthesepowerscanneverbecomethesubjectofreexaminationinany
othertribunal。Sothepowertomaketreatiesbeingconfidedtothe
presidentandsenate，whenatreatyisproperlyratified，itbecomesthe
lawoftheland，andnoothertribunalcangainsayitsstipulations。Yet
casesmayreadilybeimagined，inwhichataxmaybelaid，oratreaty
made，uponmotivesandgroundswhollybesidetheintentionofthe
constitution。1The
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departmentofgovernmenthasanexclusiveright，independentofthe
judiciary，todecideforitself，astothetrueconstructionofthe
constitution。\"Myconstruction，\"sayshe，\"isverydifferentfromthat，
youquote。Itis，thateachdepartmentofthegovernmentistruly
independentoftheothers，andhasanequalrighttodecideforitself，
whatisthemeaningoftheconstitutioninthelawssubmittedtoits
action，andespecially，whenitistoactultimatelyandwithoutappeal。\"
Andheproceedstogiveexamples，inwhichhedisregarded，whenpresident，
thedecisionsofthejudiciary，andreferstothealienandseditionlaws，
andthecaseofMarburyv。Madison，1Cranch，137。4Jefferson’sCorresp。
316，317。Seealso4Jefferson’sCorresp。27；Id。75；Id。372，
374。
=091See4Elliot’sDebates，315to320。
CH。IV。]FINALINTERPRETER。347
remedy，however，insuchcasesissolelybyanappealtothepeopleatthe
elections；orbythesalutarypowerofamendment，providedbythe
constitutionitself。1
=A7375。But，wherethequestionisofadifferentnature，and
capableof
judicialinquiryanddecision，thereitadmitsofaverydifferent
consideration。Thedecisionthenmade，whetherinfavour，oragainstthe
constitutionalityoftheact，bythestate，orbythenationalauthority，
bythelegislature，orbytheexecutive，beingcapable，initsownnature，
ofbeingbroughttothetestoftheconstitution，issubjecttojudicial
revision。Itisinsuchcases，asweconceive，thatthereisafinaland
commonarbiterprovidedbytheconstitutionitself，towhosedecisionsall
othersaresubordinate；andthatarbiteristhesupremejudicialauthority
ofthecourtsoftheUnion。2
=A7376。Letusexaminethegrounds，onwhichthisdoctrineis
maintained。
Theconstitutiondeclares，Art。6，that\"Thisconstitution，andthelaws
oftheUnitedStates，whichshallbemadeinpursuancethereof，andall
treaties，&c。shallbethesupremelawofthe
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1TheFederalist，No。44。——Mr。Madison，intheVirginiaReportofJan。
1800，hasgoneintoaconsiderationofthispoint，andveryproperly
suggested，thattheremaybeinfractionsoftheconstitutionnotwithinthe
reachofthejudicialpower，orcapableofremedialredressthroughthe
instrumentalityofcourtsoflaw。Butwecannotagreewithhim，thatin
suchcases，eachstatemaytaketheconstructionoftheconstitutioninto
itsownhands，anddecideforitselfinthelastresort；muchless，thatin
acaseofjudicialcognizance，thedecisionisnotbindingonthestates。
SeeReportp。6，7，8，9。
2Dane’sApp。=A744，45，p。52to59。——Itaffordsmeverysincere
gratificationtoquotethefollowingpassagefromthelearnedCommentaries
ofMr。ChancellorKent，thanwhomveryfewjudgesinourcountryaremore
profoundlyversedinconstitutionallaw。Afterenumeratingthejudicial
powersintheconstitution，heproceedstoobserve：\"Theproprietyand
fitnessofthesejudicialpowersseem
348CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
land。\"Italsodeclares，Art。3，that\"Thejudicialpowershallextend
toallcasesinlawandequity，arisingunderthisconstitution，thelaws
oftheUnitedStatesandtreatiesmade，andwhichshallbemadeundertheir
authority。\"Itfurtherdeclares，Art。3，thatthejudicialpowerofthe
UnitedStates\"shallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferior
courts，asthecongressmay，fromtimetotime，ordainandestablish。\"
Here，then，wehaveexpress，anddeterminateprovisionsuponthevery
subject。Nothingisimperfect，andnothingislefttoimplication。The
constitutionisthesupremelaw；thejudicialpowerextendstoallcases
arisinginlawandequityunderit；andthecourtsoftheUnitedStates
are，and，inthelastresort，theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesis，to
bevestedwiththisjudicialpower。Nomancandoubtordeny，thatthe
powertoconstruetheconstitutionisajudicialpower。1Thepowerto
construeatreatyisclearlyso，whenthecasearisesinjudgmentina
controversybetweenindividuals。2Thelikeprinciplemustapply，where
themeaningoftheconstitutionarisesinajudicialcontroversy；foritis
anappropriatefunctionofthejudiciarytoconstruelaws。3If，then，a
caseundertheconstitu—
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toresult，asanecessaryconsequence，fromtheunionofthesestatesin
onenationalgovernment，andtheymaybeconsideredasrequisitetoits
existence。Thejudicialpowerineverygovernmentmustbeco—extensivewith
thepoweroflegislation。Weretherenopowertointerpret，pronounce，and
executethelaw，thegovernmentwouldeitherperishthroughitsown
imbecility，aswasthecasewiththeoldconfederation，orotherpowers
mustbeassumedbythelegislativebodytothedestructionofliberty。\"1
Kent’sComm。2ded。p。296，Lect。14，277。
14Dane’sAbridg。ch。187。art。20，=A715，p。590；Dane’sApp。=A742，p。4=
9，50；
=A744，p。52，53；1Wilson’sLectures，461，462，463。
2SeeAddressofCongress，Feb。1787；JournalsofCongress，p。33；Rawle
ontheConstitution，App。2，p。316。
3Bacon’sAbridgment，Statute。H。
CH。IV。]FINALINTERPRETER。349
tiondoesarise，ifitiscapableofjudicialexaminationanddecision，we
see，thattheverytribunalisappointedtomakethedecision。Theonly
pointleftopenforcontroversyis，whethersuchdecision，whenmade，is
conclusiveandbindinguponthestates，andthepeopleofthestates。The
reasons，whyitshouldbesodeemed，willnowbesubmitted。
=A7377。Inthefirstplace，thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates
rightfullyextendingtoallsuchcases，itsjudgmentbecomesipsofacto
conclusivebetweenthepartiesbeforeit，inrespecttothepointsdecided，
unlesssomemodebepointedoutbytheconstitution，inwhichthatjudgment
mayberevised。Nosuchmodeispointedout。Congressisvestedwithample
authoritytoprovidefortheexercisebytheSupremeCourtofappellate
jurisdictionfromthedecisionsofallinferiortribunals，whetherstateor
national，incaseswithinthepurviewofthejudicialpoweroftheUnited
States；butnomodeisprovided，bywhichanysuperiortribunalcan
re—examine，whattheSupremeCourthasitselfdecided。Oursisemphatically
agovernmentoflaws，andnotofmen；andjudicialdecisionsofthehighest
tribunal，bytheknowncourseofthecommonlaw，areconsidered，as
establishingthetrueconstructionofthelaws，whicharebroughtinto
controversybeforeit。Thecaseisnotaloneconsideredasdecidedand
settled；buttheprinciplesofthedecisionareheld，asprecedentsand
authority，tobindfuturecasesofthesamenature。Thisistheconstant
practiceunderourwholesystemofjurisprudence。Ourancestorsbroughtit
withthem，whentheyfirstemigratedtothiscountry；anditis，andalways
hasbeenconsidered，asthegreatsecurityofourrights，ourliberties，
andourproperty。Itisonthisaccount，thatourlawisjustly
350CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
deemedcertain，andfoundedinpermanentprinciples，andnotdependentupon
thecaprice，orwillofparticularjudges。Amorealarmingdoctrinecould
notbepromulgatedbyanyAmericancourt，thanthatitwasatlibertyto
disregardallformerrulesanddecisions，andtodecideforitself，without
referencetothesettledcourseofantecedentprinciples。