Theproclamationissuedin1792，whenthewarbrokeoutbetweenEnglandandFrance，wasanexamplewhich，insimilarcases，deservestobefollowed。
Thepresentstateofthiscountryinregardtothepiraticaldepredationscommittedonitscommerce，presentsanotherstrikingfeatureofdifficultyin，regardtoexecutiveduty。
ThewretcheswhosallyoutfromtheportsofaSpanishisland，seizethedefencelessmerchantvessel，andafterremovingordestroyingthecargo，frequentlygluttheircrueltybythemostbarbarousdestructionofhumanlife，canbeeffectuallysuppressedbynoexertion，howevervigorous，ofthemarineforceunderthecommandofthepresident。Itcanonlybeeffectedbypursuingthemonshore，byassuming，insomedegree，thetemporarycommandofacountry，inwhichthelocalgovernmentiseithertoofeebleortoocorruptto。punishthem。Howeverstronglythevoiceofhumanityandtheinterestsofthecountrymighturgethepresidenttotakesuchenergeticbutjustifiablemeasures，itwouldinvolvehimingreatresponsibilitytodoso?andyetitwouldbedifficultforhimwhollytorestrainthezealandindignationoftheofficersemployedonthedistantservice，orontheotherhand，byhisownmereauthority，topunishforanactcommittedfromthebestmotives。Ifprovidedbycongresswithsufficientauthority，thesedifficultieswouldberemoved。
Butnotwithstandingalleffortstothecontrary，wemaybeinvolvedinwar，bymisconstructionsofhisacts，howeverjustlyintendedandcarefullyregulated。
Insuchacase，whetherimmediateinvasionensues，orstrongdefensivemeasuresbecomenecessary，itisstillthepresidentwhoistoactonhisownjudgment，tillcongresscanbeconvened。Ineveryaspectdirectlyorindirectlyconnectedwithforeignnationshisdutiesareserious，andhisresponsibilitygreat。
ItwashappyforthisnationthatatthetimeofadoptingtheConstitution，anindividualwasselectedtopreside，whosejudgmentneverfailed，andwhosefirmnessneverforsookhim:whoseconductprovedthattheexcellenciesoftheConstitutionconsistednot，merelyintheoryandcontemplation，butcouldberealizedinpractice；thatwithinitsproperspherenorightwasunprotected，andnoevilunredressed。ItoughttosatisfythepeopleiftheprinciplesofGeorgeWashington\'sadministrationarefaithfullyfollowedbyallhissuccessors。
1。3Wheaton，643。ThesameruleprevailsinEngland。
2。7Cranch，382。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXICHAPTERXXI。OFTHEJUDICIALPOWER。NOformofgovernmentiscompleteunlessitbeaccompaniedwithajudicialpower。
Tomakelawsandtoexecutethemarethetwogreatoperationsofgovernment；
buttheycannotbefullyandcorrectlyexecutedunlessthereissomewhereresidentapowertoexpoundandapplythem。Thispowerisauxiliarytotheexecutiveauthority，andinsomedegreepartakesofitsnature。Butitisalsorequiredattimestocontroltheexecutive，andwhatitdecidestobeunlawful，theexecutivecannotperform。Itmayalsoinsomedegreebesaidtoparticipateinthelegislativepower。Itsconstructionoftheactsofthelegislatureisreceivedasbindingandconclusive，althoughitdoesnotpreventthelegislaturefromrepairingitsowndefects，orclearingupitsownambiguitiesbysubsequentlaws，operatingonsubsequentcases。AhighfunctionalsoappertainstothejudiciaryintheexclusiverighttoexpoundtheConstitution，andtherebytotestthevalidityofalltheactsofthelegislature。
Tothepeopleatlarge，therefore，thisinstitutionispeculiarlyvaluable，andoughttobeeminentlycherishedbythem。Onitsfirmandindependentstructuretheyreposewithsafety，whiletheyperceiveinitafacultywhichisonlysetinmotionwhenappliedto，butwhichwhenthusbroughtintoaction，proceedswithcompetentpowerifrequired，tocorrecttheerrororsubduetheoppressionofbothoreitherofthetwootherbranches。
AConstitutioninwhichtherewasanomissiontoprovideanadequatejudiciarycouldnotbesuccessfullycarriedintoeffect；andifinsteadofbeingseparateandindependent，thispowerwereeitherblendedwiththeothertwo，orthosewhoadministeritweredependentonthewillandpleasureofothers，itslustrewouldbetarnishedanditsutilitydestroyed。
TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，therefore，requiredajudicialpower，notasanadjunct，butasanecessarycomponentpart。TheextraordinarycomplicationsoftheauthorityoftheUnitedStateswiththatoftheseveralstates，whichseematfirstviewtothrowsomanydifficultiesintheway，fullyproveitsnecessity。ThestatetribunalsarenopartofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。TorenderthegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesdependentonthem，wouldbeasolecismalmostasgreatastoleaveoutanexecutivepowerentirely，andtocallonthestatesalonetoenforcethelawsoftheUnion。ButitisnotinconsistentwiththisprinciplethattheUnitedStatesmay，wheneveritisfoundexpedient，electtomakeuseofastatetribunaltothesameextentasanyforeignpowermay，ifitthinkspropertoinstitutesuitsinthecourtsofothercountries，whichisincivilcasesonly。
Thejudicialpowerisgeneralorlimited，accordingtothescopeandobjectsofthegovernment。Inaword，itmustbefullyandexactlycommensuratewiththatofthelegislature。Itcannotbyanytermsoflanguage，bemadetoexceedthelegislativepower，forsuchexcesswouldbeinconsistentwithitsnature。Ifbyexpresswordsitshould，ontheotherband，berestrainedsoastoembraceonlyapartofthesubjectsoflegislation，itwouldimpairtheintegrityofthewholesystem。Theprotectionwhichitwasintendedtoafford，inregardtotheotherbranchesofgovernment，beingconfinedtopartsoftheirconduct，insteadofembracingthewhole，wouldproducetheincongruousmixtureofatheoretic，generalpowerwithpartialdebilityandimpotence。Ifgeneraltermsareusedindescribingit，thereisnodifficultyindefiningitsproperextent。
IntheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesweperceive，nottheexpresscreationofajudicialpower，buttherecognitionofitasanecessarypartofthegovernment，inwhichlightitwasjustlyconsideredandhasbeenuniversallyaccepted。Itspowerextendstothegreatselectedobjectsalreadynoticed，anditisthedutyofthosewhohavetoadministerit，tocarryittothatfullextent，butnevertoexceedit。Experiencehasalreadyshownthatfromawiseandtemperateadministration，theapprehensionofinconveniencefromseriouscollisionsbetweenthestatejudicaturesandthoseoftheUnitedStateswasunfounded。ItmustbeconfessedthatthemeritsofourConstitutionhavereceivedamplesupportfromtheprudenceandjudgmentwithwhichithasbeenadministered，andinnorespecthasasounderdiscretionbeenexhibitedthaninthejudicatory。Ifanyobjectioncouldbesustainedtotheproceduresofthejudgesofthesupremeandcircuitcourts，itwouldbethatofexcessivecaution，arisingfromasystematicanxietynottoexceedtheirjurisdiction。Anditisastrongargumentinfavourofanelectivegovernment，thatthosemeninwhomthepowerofappointmentisvestedbythechoiceofthepeople，have，inregardtothesejudicialofficers，exerciseditwithsomuchcaution，judgment，andsuccess。
Butitissaidthatthereisgenerallyapropensityinpublicfunctionariestoextendtheirpowerbeyonditsproperlimits，andthatthismayatsomefuturetimebethecasewiththecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Theinstancesmaybethoseinwhichthecaseisplain，andtheencroachmentuponstateauthoritytooobvioustobedenied；asifacourtoftheUnitedStatesshouldentertainacivilpleabetweentwocitizensofthesamestateinacasenotauthorizedbytheConstitution，orcriminalproceedingsonaccountofanoffencemerelyagainstastate。Insuchanextreme，andthereforeimprobablecase，astherewouldbenocolourofjurisdiction，thewholeproceedingswouldbevoid。If，however，undertheexistingcircumstances，itweredoubtfulandambiguous，orifitwereblendedwithmattersinwhichtheyhadjurisdiction，therulecommonlyadoptedamongdifferentcourts，sittingpreciselyunderthesameauthority，wouldprobablyberesortedto，-andthatwhichfirstobtainedpossessionofthecausewouldbeexclusivelyentitledtoproceed。
WherethejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatescourtandofastatecourtisconcurrent，thesentenceofeither，whetherofconvictionoracquittal，maybepleadedinbartoaprosecutionintheother，withthesameeffectasajudgmentofastatecourtinacivilcasemaybepleadedinbartoanactionforthesamecauseinacircuitcourt。1
Ajurisdictionexclusiveofthestatecourts，isnotexpresslygivenbytheConstitutiontoanyofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，butitisinseveralinstancesclearlyimplied。Casesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictionandcontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates，must，bynecessaryconstruction，exclusivelyappertaintothecourtsoftheUnitedStates:thefirst，becausethewholesystemofmaritimeaffairswithitsconnexionsanddependenciesiswithdrawnfromtheseveralstatesbytheirownconsent，andvestedinthegeneralgovernment；thesecond，becausetherecanexistnootherthanthecommontribunal，thesupremecourtoftheUnitedStates，toentertainsuchsuits。IndeedthejurisdictionitselfiscreatedbytheConstitution，andvestedinthesupremecourtoftheUnitedStatesalone，thusrenderingthedignityofthetribunalcorrespondenttothedignityoftheparties。
Casesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministersandconsuls，arealsoenumeratedasfallingwithinthejurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates；reasonshavebeengivenfornotconsideringthisjurisdictionasentirelyexclusive。Itistruethatanactofcongresshasdeclaredthatthejurisdictionisexclusive，andthepracticeisunderstoodtohavebeeninconformitytoit，butthemainquestionhasneverbeenbroughttoajudicialtest。ThesamesentenceextendsthejudicialpowertoallcasesinlawandequityarisingundertheConstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStates，andtreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemadeundertheirauthority；
tocontroversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；tocontroversiesbetweenastateandcitizensofanotherstate；betweencitizensofdifferentstates；betweencitizensofthesamestateclaiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates，andbetweenastateorthecitizensthereofandforeignstates，citizensorsubjects。Insomeofthesecases，itmaybedoubtedwhetheritwasintended，andwhetheritwouldbebeneficialtotheUnitedStates，thatthejurisdictionshould，beexclusive；itmayconducetoitsbestinterestsattimestohaverecourse，nottothelegislativeorexecutivepowersofastate，ofwhichitshouldeverbeindependent，buttoastatejudicature，whichifrightlyconstituted，canbeinfluencedbynolocalpartialitiesorpoliticaljealousies，andwhichcannomorewithholdjusticefromtheUnitedStatesthanfromthemeanestindividual。
CircumstancesmayrenderitexpedientfortheUnitedStatestoinstitutecivilsuitsfortherecoveryofdebts，ordamagesforthebreachofcontractsduetothemselvesinthestatecourts。ThereisnothingintheConstitutiontorestrainthemfromsodoing，nortojustifyarefusalonthepartofthestatecourttotakecognizanceofthem。Suchsuits，indeed，areoccasionallybrought，andtheUnitedStates，receivedasaplaintiffintheordinaryform，pursuesthemintheordinarycoursetojudgmentandexecution。Butalthoughtheword\"party\"indicatesadefendantaswellasaplaintiff，itisnottobeunderstoodthatsuitscanbebroughtinanycourtagainsttheUnitedStates。SupremeheadoftheUnion；centreofthegeneralpower；
itcannotbeamenabletoajudicialtribunal，unlessbyitsownexpressconsent，andthepowertogivethisconsentmustappearintheConstitutionitselftohavebeengrantedbythepeople。Anultimateandcompletesovereigntyforthepracticalpurposesofagovernment，extendingoverall，protectingall，andbindingall，isvestedinthem，bytheconfidenceofthepeople，forthehighestandmostsalutarypurposes。
Insomeconstitutionsapowerisgiventothelegislaturetodirectmodesbywhichsuitsmaybebroughtagainstthecommonwealth。NopowerisgiventocongresstoauthorizesuitsagainsttheUnitedStatesinanycase。
Acitizenofonestateisnotprecludedfromsuingacitizenofanotherstateinthecourtsofthelatter，noraforeignerfromasuitinthestatecourtagainstacitizenoftheUnitedStates，noristhereanythingtopreventonealienfromsuinganotherinastatecourt，oracitizenofonestatefromsuingthecitizenofanotherinthecourtsofathirdstate。
Astatemaymaintainasuitagainstanindividualinitsowncourtsorinthoseofanotherstate。Iftwocitizensofthesamestateclaimlandundergrantsofdifferentstates，thestatecourtsarenotprecludedfromjurisdictioninthefirstinstance；noraretheyprecludedfromholdingcognizanceofarightclaimedunderatreatyorstatuteoftheUnitedStates，oranauthorityexercisedundertheUnitedStates，orasuitinwhichisdrawninquestiontheconstructionofanyclauseoftheConstitution。InallthesecasesaconcurrentjurisdictionexistssofarasrelatestothelanguageoftheConstitutionitself。
TheConstitutioncontainingagrantofpowersinmanyinstancessimilartothosealreadyexistinginthestategovernments，andsomeofthesebeingofvitalimportancetostateauthorityandstatelegislatures，ameregrantofsuchpowers，inaffirmativetermstocongress，doesnotpersetransferanexclusivesovereigntyonsuchsubjectstothelatter。
Onthecontrary，thepowerssograntedwouldnotbeexclusiveofsimilarpowersexistinginthestates，unlesstheConstitutionhadexpresslygivenanexclusivepowertocongress，ortheexerciseofalikepowerwereprohibitedtothestates，ortherewasadirectrepugnancyorincompatibilityintheexerciseofitbythestates。
Inallothercasesnotfallingwithintheseclassesthestatesretainconcurrentauthority。
Thereisthisreserve，however，thatincasesofconcurrentauthoritywherethelawsofthestatesandoftheUnitedStatesareindirectandmanifestcollisiononthesamesubject，thoseoftheUnitedStatesbeingthesupremelawofthelandareofparamountauthority，andthestatelawssofar，andsofaronly，assuchincompatibilityexistsmustnecessarilyyield。2
Thecorrectgeneralpositionseemstobe，thatincivilcasesthejudicialpoweris，insomeinstances，unavoidablyexclusiveofstateauthority，andinmanyothersitmayberenderedsoattheelectionofcongress。3
Inregardtocriminalcases，thereismoredifficulty。ThesameactmayamounttoanoffencebothagainstthestateandtheUnitedStates。
ResistancetothelawsoftheUnitedStates，maybeaccompaniedwithpersonalinjuriestotheofficers。Robbingthemail，whichbyactofApril13th，1810，ismadehighlypenal，andincaseofasecondoffence，punishablewithdeath，mightbecognizableashighwayrobberyunderthestatelaws。
Wouldtheoffenderbeamenabletobothjurisdictions，ortoonlyone，andwhichofthem?Oneestablishedrulemayberesortedtoaspartlyaffordingananswer。Thegreatercrimeincludesandabsorbstheless。4Butthisruledoesnotaffordacompletesolutionofthedifficulty。A
prosecutionmaybecommencedinthestatecourt，beforeoneisinstitutedintheUnitedStatescourt。If，forinstance，theofficerwhowasbeaten，commencedandpersistedinaprosecutionforthebattery，itwouldseemthattheoffenderwouldnotbeacquitted，becauseitappearedinevidencethathisgeneralobjectwastoresistthelawsoftheUnitedStates。Ifhewereprosecutedatthesametimeforrobbingthecarrierofthemail，andforacommonhighwayrobbery，bothofwhichareoffencesofthesamegrade，andthelatter，accordingtothelawsofthestateinwhichitwascommitted，mightbeas，severelypunishedastheformer；neithercourtwouldbeboundtogivewaytotheother，atleastbytheapplicationoftherulebeforementioned。Apersonconvictedoracquittedinacourtofcompetentjurisdiction，maypleadsuchjudgmentinbarofasecondindictmentforthesameoffence，buthecannotpleadanacquittaloraconvictionofaninferioroffence，inbarofanindictmentforahigheroffence，althougheachwaspartofthesameact。5Where，however，theoffencesdifferonlyinname，theacquittalmaybepleaded，asamanindictedofmurderandacquitted，isnotliableonanindictmentofpetittreasonforthesameact，becausebothoffencesareinsubstancethesame；6butwhentheyaresubstantiallydifferent，thoughofequaldegree，theacquittalinonedoesnotconstituteabartoanindictmentfortheother。
Itremainsthentodiscoversomeotherruleorprincipletorelieveusfromthisembarrassment。Ithasbeenlaiddownthatthestatecourtsretaintheirjurisdictioninallcases，whichintheirnatureexistedbeforetheadoptionoftheConstitution，unlessexpresslyexcluded，orunlesstheexerciseofitwouldbeutterlyincompatiblewiththeauthoritygrantedtotheUnion。7InthecaseofoffenceswhichonlyarisebyreasonoftheUnion，as，forinstance，treasonagainsttheUnitedStates，thestatecourtswouldhavenojurisdiction。Ifinthestatecourtsanindictmentwerepreferredformurderorothercapitalcrime，committedintheperpetrationoftreason，itmustgivewaytothejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatescourt，aswellinrespecttothesuperiorityofjurisdiction，andthegreaterextentofpublicconcernment，astheinteriornatureofthecrime。Butiftheactcommitted，amountingatthesametimetooffencesagainstbothbodies，werestillinregardtoeachofthem，ofthesamedegree，thereseemsnoreasonwhyeachshouldnotsustainitsjurisdiction。
Itwouldnotcontravenethemaximthatnooneshallbetwicepunishedforthesameoffence，fortheoffencesaredifferentintheeyeofthelaw，althoughtheresultofthesameactonthepartoftheculprit。
Wemust，indeed，avoidtoobroadaconstructionofthismaxim，foradoublepunishmentforthesameact，isnotwhollyunknowntothelaw，iftheformsofproceedingandtheobjectsaredifferent；thus，hewhohascommittedanassault，battery，wounding，ormayhem，onthepersonofanother，isliablebothtoanindictment，andtoacivilactionfordamages。Thesatisfactionreceivedbythepublicdoesnotpreventtheinjuredpartyfromobtaininghispeculiarredress。IftheinflictionofpunishmentbythestatecouldimpedetheprosecutionoftheUnitedStatesinsuchacase，apardongrantedbythestatewouldhavethesameeffect，yetitwouldbeabsurdtosupposethatapardongrantedbythestateformurdercommittedintheperpetrationoftreason，wouldbartheprosecutionoftheUnitedStatesforsuchtreason。Onthewhole，thisdifficultquestionmaybefairlyresolvedontheprinciple，thatimmunityforonecrimecannotbeobtainedbyprovingthatindoingtheact，thepartycommittedanother；andfurther，thateachcommunityisentitled，anditspublicofficersarerequired，toprosecuteoffencescommittedagainstit。8
1。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheaton，31。SeealsoOsbornev。BankoftheUnitedStates，9Wheaton，733。
2。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。48。PerStory，J。
3。1Wheaton，337。Buttheauthorpresumestodissentfromtheopinionthatitiscompetentforcongressinallothercasestorenderitexclusive。Surelycongresscannotexcludeastatefromholdingpleaofasuitbyacitizenofanotherstateagainstthecitizenofastateinwhichthesuitwasbrought，norbyoragainstanalien。Manyothercasesmightbeputinwhichthestatecourtscouldnotbedeprivedofjurisdictionbyanyactofcongress。
4。OpinionofJudgeChase，inHall\'sJournalofJurisprudence，162。
5。Hawkins，b。2。c。39。§；5。
6。Ibid。
7。Federalist，No。82。4Dallas，Appendix，xxx。
8。SeethediscrepantopinionsofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinHoustonv。Moore。Theauthorofcourseadopts，andtakesthelibertytosaythatinhisownjudgmentheprefers，thoseofthemajority。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIICHAPTERXXII。OFIMPEACHMENTS。WEarenexttoconsiderwhatcourtsorjudicialtribunalsarecreatedbytheConstitutionitself，andwhathavebeencreatedunderthepowertothateffectgiventocongress。
Thelanguageofthetextis，thatthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinonesupremecourt，andinsuchinteriorcourtsascongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish。
Butnomentionismadeinanypartofthisarticle，otherwisethanbywayofexceptionastothemodeoftrial，ofaveryhightribunal，whichseemsrathertohavebeensupposedtoflowfromtheformationoftheConstitution，thantobeexpresslycreatedbyit。
Thefirstmentionofitiscontainedinthefollowingwords，inaprecedingarticle:Thehouseofrepresentatives?shallhavethesolepowerofimpeachment。
Inthethirdsectionofthesamearticle，itissaid，thatthesenateshallhavethesolepowertotryallimpeachments。Whensittingforthatpurpose，theyshallbeonoathoraffirmation。WhenthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesistried，thechiefjusticeshallpreside，andnopersonshallbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo-thirdsofthememberspresent。
Impeachmentsarethusintroducedasaknowndefiniteterm，andwemusthaverecoursetothecommonlawofEnglandforthedefinitionofthem。
InEngland，thepracticeofimpeachmentsbythehouseofcommonsbeforethehouseoflords，hasexistedfromveryancienttimes。Itsfoundationis，thatasubjectentrustedwiththeadministrationofpublicaffairs，maysometimesinfringetherightsofthepeople，andbeguiltyofsuchcrimesastheordinarymagistrateseitherdarenotorcannotpunish。Ofthese，therepresentativesofthepeopleorhouseofcommonscannotjudge，becausetheyandtheirconstituentsarethepersonsinjured，andcanthereforeonlyaccuse。Buttheordinarytribunalswouldnaturallybeswayedbytheauthorityofsopowerfulanaccuser。Thatbranchofthelegislaturewhichrepresentsthepeople，therefore，bringsthechargebeforetheotherbranch，whichconsistsofthenobility，whoaresaidnottohavethesameinterests，orthesamepassionsasthepopularassembly。
SuchistheEnglishtheory，anditwellsuitsagovernmentinwhichtherearethreedistinctandindependentinterests，andinwhichthecrown，possessingthepowerofappointingthehighofficers，whoaremostfrequentlythesubjectsofimpeachments，hasalsothesolepowertocarryonorwithdrawprosecutionsintheordinarycourts。Fornomisconduct，howeverflagrant，committedbysuchmen，couldthepeopleobtainredress，ifthemonarchinclinedtorefuseit，unlessamodeofproceedinghadbeeninventedwhichdidnotrequirehisassent，andwhichhecouldnotcontrol，andtherefore，asheretoforeobserved，hecannotdefeattheinquirybyapreviouspardon，althoughintheexerciseofanotherbranchofhisprerogative，hemaydelayitbyadjourningorproroguingthesessionoftheparliament。
Thedifferencebetweenthetwogovernmentshasnodoubtalreadyoccurredtothereader。Ourordinarytribunalsarenotdependentonthepleasureofhimwhoappointsthejudges，noraretheytobeinfluencedbytheauthorityoftheaccuserinacaseofthissortmorethaninanyother，forwithusthepeopleareconsideredasthe。accusersinallcaseswhatever。InEngland，thekingistheaccuser，exceptintheinstancenowunderconsideration，
andalloffencesarechargedtohavebeencommittedagainsthispeace，hiscrownanddignity。
Stilllessaretheweightandinfluenceofanyman，howeverexaltedhisstation，orgreathiswealth，likelytodeterourjudgesfromanimpartialadministrationofjustice。
Yetalthoughthereasonsarenotequallycogent，theywillbefoundonexaminationsufficienttowarranttheintroductionofthesystemintoourcode。
Weshallnowproceedtoconsider?Thenecessityorutilityofimpeachments。Thenecessityorutilityoferectingaseparatetribunalforthetrialofimpeachments。Theproprietyofrenderingthesenatesuchatribunal。Thepersonsliabletobeimpeached。Theconstitutionofthecourt，itsmodeofproceeding，andtheextentandeffectofitsjudgments。1。Thedelegationofimportanttrusts，affectingthehigherinterestsofsociety，isalwaysfromvariouscausesliabletoabuse。Thefondnessfrequentlyfeltfortheinordinateextensionofpower，theinfluenceofpartyandofprejudice，theseductionsofforeignstates，orthebaserappetiteforillegitimateemolument，aresometimesproductiveofwhatarenotunaptlytermedpoliticaloffences，1whichitwouldbedifficulttotakecognizanceofintheordinarycourseofjudicial
roceedings。
2。Theinvolutionsandvarietiesofvicearetoomany，andtooartfultobeanticipatedbypositivelaw，andsometimestoosubtleandmysterioustobefullydetectedinthelimitedperiodofordinaryinvestigation。Asprogressismadeintheinquiry，newfactsarediscoveredwhichmaybeproperlyconnectedwithothersalreadyknown，butwouldnotformsufficientsubjectsofseparateprosecution。Ontheseaccounts，apeculiartribunalseemsbothusefulandnecessary。Atribunalofaliberalandcomprehensivecharactersconfinedaslittleaspossibletostrictforms，enabledtocontinueitssessionaslongasthenatureofthecasemayrequire，qualifiedtoviewthechargeinallitsbearingsanddependencies，andtoappreciateonsoundprinciplesofpublicpolicythedefenceoftheaccused；theproprietyofsuchaseparatetribunalseemstobeplain，butnotupontheassumedgroundthatthejudgesofthesupremecourtwouldnotpossesssufficientfortitudetoperformtheduty，orsufficientcreditandauthoritytoreconcilethepeopletotheirdecisions。2
3。Tocomposethiscourtofpersonswhollydistinctfromtheotherbranchesofgovernment?toformapermanentbodyforthissinglepurpose?andtokeepthemalwayscollectedattheseatofgovernmentforthepossibleoccurrenceofanimpeachment，wouldbeasinconvenientastoappointandcollectsuchabodyfromtimetotime，whenartimpeachmentisdeterminedon。
OnareviewofallthedepartmentsofgovernmentprovidedbytheConstitution，nonewillbefoundmoresuitabletoexercisethispeculiarjurisdictionthanthesenate。
Althoughliketheaccusers，theyarerepresentativesofthepeople，yettheyarebyadegreemoreremoved，andholdtheirstationsforalongerterm。Theyarethereforemoreindependentofthepeople，andbeingchosenwiththeknowledgethattheymay，whileinoffice，becalledupontoexercisethishighfunction，theybringwiththemtheconfidenceoftheirconstituentsthattheywillfaithfullyexecuteit，andtheimpliedcompactontheirownpartsthatitshallbehonestlydischarged。Precludedfromeverbecomingaccusersthemselves，itistheirdutynottolendthemselvestotheanimositiesofpartyortheprejudicesagainstindividualswhichmaysometimesunconsciouslyinducethehouseofrepresentativestotheactsofaccusation。Habituatedtocomprehensiveviewsofthegreatpoliticalrelationsofthecountry，theyare，naturallythebestqualifiedtodecideonthosechargeswhichmayhaveanyconnexionwith，transactionsabroad，orgreatpoliticalinterestsathome，andalthoughwecannotsay，thatliketheEnglishhouseoflordstheyformadistinctbody，whollyuninfluencedbythepassions，andremotefromtheinterestsofthepeople，yetwecandiscoverinnootherdivisionofthegovernmentagreaterprobabilityofimpartialityandindependence。
Nordoesitformasolidobjectioninpointofprinciple，thatinthispeculiarinstance，apartofthelegislativebodyshouldbeadmittedtoexercisejudicialpower。Insomedegreealllegislativebodiesnecessarilypossesssuchapower。Wehaveseenthatforsufficientcausetheymayexpelanyoftheirownmembers?theymaytryandpunishothersforattemptstocorrupt，bribe，orintimidatethem，andtheymaypunishforwhataretechnicallytermedcontemptscommittedintheirpresence，inallwhichtheyactjudicially。Butitissufficient，toclosethesubject，thatthepeopleatlargehaveconcludedthatthispowerwouldbebestdepositedinthisbody。
4。Fromthereasonsalreadygiven，itisobvious，thattheonlypersonsliabletoimpeachment，arethosewhoareorhavebeeninpublicoffice。
Allexecutiveandjudicialofficers，fromthepresidentdownwards，fromthejudgesofthesupremecourttothoseofthemostinferiortribunals，areincludedinthisdescription。Butintheyear1796，aconstructionwasgiventotheConstitution，founded，itisbelieved，merelyonitsphraseology，bywhichamemberofthesenatewasheldnottobeliabletoimpeachment。
Theirdeliberations，aftertheargumentsofcounsel，beingheldinprivate，wecanonlyinferfromthosearguments，thatthetermofficersoftheUnitedStates，asusedintheConstitution，washeldbyamajorityofthesenate，nottoincludemembersofthesenate，andonthesameprinciple，membersofthehouseofrepresentativeswouldalsobeexcludedfromthisjurisdiction。
AnamendmenttotheConstitutioninthisrespectwouldperhapsbeuseful。
Abreachofdutyisasreprehensibleinalegislatorasinanexecutiveorjudicialofficer，andifthispeculiarjurisdictionpossessessomuchvalueinrespecttothetwolatter，itisdifficulttoconceivewhythepublicshouldnothavethebenefitofitinregardtotheformer。
Noapprehensionsofpartialityinfavourofoneoftheirownbodyneedtobecarriedsofarastorequirethesubstitutionofanothertribunal。
InEngland，wherethereisnotagreaterportionofpublicvirtuethanhere，peersarenecessarilyimpeachedbeforepeers，andmembersofthehouseofcommonshavebeenfrequentlythesubjectsofimpeachment。Judgesareliabletotrialforeveryoffencebeforetheirbrethren，anditisinnocasetobepresumed，thatafairandfulladministrationofjusticewouldbewanting。Ofgreatpublicdelinquenciesthepeopledonotlongremaininignorance。Iftheoffencesofamemberofthehouseofrepresentativeswereculpablypassedoverbyhisbrethren，thepeoplebytherecurrenceoftheperiodicalelectionwouldsoonbeenabledtosubstituteotherstoprefertheaccusation，and，beingsensibleofthis，thehousewouldbeslowtoexposethemselvestothereproachoftheirconstituents，andthelossofpublicconfidence，byomittingtodotheirduty。Thesenateisobligedtoreceiveanddecideonthecharge，andtothestrongestmoralobligationsisaddedthatofanoathoraffirmation。ItisnotprobablethattheeffectoftheseUnitedimpulseswouldbecounteractedbyotherconsiderations，whichwouldinthemselvesbecriminal。
5。Thelegitimatecausesofimpeachmenthavebeenalreadybrieflynoticed。
Theycanonlyhavereferencetopubliccharacterandofficialduty。Thewordsofthetextaretreason，bribery，andotherhighcrimes，andmisdemeanors。
ThetreasoncontemplatedmustbeagainsttheUnitedStates。Ingeneralthoseoffenceswhichmaybecommittedequallybyaprivatepersonasapublicofficer，arenotthesubjectsofimpeachment。Murder，burglary，robbery，andindeedalloffencesnotimmediatelyconnectedwithoffice，exceptthetwoexpresslymentioned，arelefttotheordinarycourseofjudicialproceeding，andneitherhousecanregularlyinquireintothem，exceptforthepurposeofexpellingthemember。Buttheordinarytribunals，asweshallsee，arenotprecluded，eitherbeforeorafteranimpeachment，fromtakingcognizanceofthepublicandofficialdelinquency。
Wehavehithertohadbutthreeinstancesofimpeachment，thefirstofwhichhasalreadybeennoticed。Asnodecisionwasgivenonthemerits，itisimpossibletosaywhetherthecharges，whichwerechieflyfoundedonaconspiracytoinvadetheterritoriesofthekingofSpain，withwhomtheUnitedStateswereatpeace，andtoexcitetheCreekandCherokeeIndianstoconcurintheoutrage，wouldhavebeendeemedbythesenatesufficient，ifproved，tosupporttheimpeachment。Thesecond，onwhichaconstitutionalconvictiontookplace，wasagainstajudgeofadistrictcourt，andpurelyforofficialmisconduct。Thethirdwasagainstajudgeofthesupremecourt，andwasalsoachargeofofficialmisconduct。Itterminatedinanacquittal，therenotbeingaconstitutionalmajorityagainsthimonanyonearticle。
Asarticlesofimpeachmentcanonlybeexhibitedbythehouseofrepresentatives，ifitshouldhappenthatthesenateinthecourseoftheirexecutivefunctionsorotherwise，becameapprizedofunlawfulactscommittedbyapublicofficer，andintheiropinions，meritingatleastapublicinquiry，itwouldbetheirdutytocommunicatetheevidencetheypossessed，whetheractualorpresumptive，tothehouseofrepresentatives，butthebarecommunicationisallthatwouldbeconsistentwiththeirduty。Theywouldcautiouslyavoidtorecommendorsuggestanimpeachment，andthesamewouldbethecoursepursuedbythepresident。
Articlesofimpeachmentneednottobedrawnupwiththeprecisionandstrictnessofindictments。Theymusthoweverbedistinctandintelligible。
Nooneisboundtoanswertoachargesoobscureandambiguousthatitcannotbeunderstood。Additionalarticlesmaybeexhibited，perhapsatanystageoftheprosecution；certainlybeforethedefendanthasputinhisanswerorplea。
Noprecisenumberofsenatorsisrequiredtoconstitutethecourt，butnopersoncanbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo-thirdsofthemembers，present。Thevicepresidentbeingthepresidentofthesenate，presidesonthetrial，exceptwhenthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesistried。AsthevicepresidentsucceedstothefunctionsandemolumentsofthepresidentoftheUnitedStateswheneveravacancyhappensinthelatteroffice，itwouldbeinconsistentwiththeimpliedpurityofajudgethatapersonunderaprobablebiasofsuchanatureshouldparticipateinthetrialanditwouldfollowthatheoughtwhollytoretirefromthecourt。
ItisnotstatedintheConstitutionwhetherthepresidentofthesenateisonthetrialofanimpeachmentrestricted，asinlegislativecases，tothecastingvote。Asheisconstitutedoneofthejudgesbybeingappointedtopresidewithoutanyrestriction，thefairinferencewouldbe，thatheisentitledtovoteliketheotherjudges，butonthetriallastmentionedofajudgeoftheSupremeCourt，thevoteofthevicepresidentdoesnotappearintheprintedjournal。
Thedefendantisentitledtothebenefitofcounselbutitisnotnecessarythatheshouldbepersonallypresent；thetrialmayproceedinhisabsenceifhehashadduenoticetoappear。
Theconsultationsofthesenate，aswelluponincidentalpointsasonthemainquestions，areconductedinprivate，butthejudgmentisrenderedinpublic。
Thejudgmentisofalimitedandpeculiarnature?itextendsnofurtherthantoremovalfromoffice，anddisqualificationtoholdandenjoyanyofficeofhonour，trust，orprofit，undertheUnitedStates。
Hereinwemayperceivetheimportanceandutilityofthissystemunderourregulations。InEnglandimpeachmentsmaybeprosecutedforcapitalcrimesandthecourtmayawardcapitalpunishment，ofwhichmanyinstancesoccurinthehistoryofthatkingdom。LordStraffordinthereignofCharlesI。andLordStaffordinthereignofCharlesII。werebeheadedonthesentencesofthecourtwhichdecidedwithouttheaidofajury，andbothofthemhavebeenconsideredratherasvictimstothespiritofthetimes，thanasmeritedoblationstojustice。Butwithus，althoughthepartyaccusedmaybefoundguiltyofthehighestcrime，hislifeisnotindangerbeforethistribunal，andinnocasesarehislibertyandpropertyaffected:indictment，trial，judgment，andpunishment，stillawaithimaccordingtotheusualcourseoflaw。
Whythen，itmaybeasked，hasthissystembeenintroduced，andwhy，ifthefirmnessandintegrityoftheordinarytribunalscannotbeoverpoweredbyanysupposedinfluenceofcharacter，wealth，oroffice，havewedeemeditexpedienttocopyfromaforeignnationaninstitutionforwhichthereisnotthesamenecessity，andwhichwedonotallowaltogethertoproducethesameeffects?Oneansweris，thatthesentencewhichthiscourtisauthorizedtoimposecannotregularlybepronouncedbythecourtsoflaw。
Theycanneitherremovenordisqualifythepersonconvicted，andthereforetheobnoxiousofficermightbecontinuedinpower，andtheinjurysustainedbythenationberenewedorincreased，iftheexecutiveauthoritywereperverse，tyrannical，orcorrupt:butbythesentencewhichmaybegivenbythesenate，notonlytheappointmentmadebytheexecutiveissupersededandrenderedvoid，butthesameindividualmayberenderedincapableofagainabusinganofficetotheinjuryofthepublic。Itisthereforerightandproperthatthepresidentshouldbedisabledfromgrantingapardon，andrestoringtheoffendertohisformercompetency；butthereisnorestraintonhispardoningwhenaconvictioninthecommoncourseensues，forsuchpardonextendsonlytothepunishmentwhichisthenpronounced，anddoesnotaffectthesentenceofthesenate。
Wemayperceiveinthisschemeoneusefulmodeofremovingfromofficehimwhoisunworthytofillit，incaseswherethepeople，andsometimesthepresidenthimselfwouldbeunabletoaccomplishthatobject。Acommissiongrantedduringgoodbehaviourcanonlyberevokedbythismodeofproceeding。
ButtheexpresswordsoftheConstitutionalsoextendtothepresidentandvicepresident，whopartakeofthelegislativecapacity，andarechosenbythepeople。Whenthiscorrectivejurisdictionisthusapplied；whenitreachesalljudicialofficers，allcivilofficersappointedbythepresidentduringpleasure，andinvolvesinitsgraspthevicepresidentandthepresidenthimself，itisdifficulttoconceivethatitwasintendedtoexemptmenwhosetreacherytotheircountrymightbeproductiveofthemostseriousdisasters，becausetheydonotcomepreciselywithinaverbaldescriptionsupposedtobeexclusivelyapplicabletothosewho，exceptinthetwoinstancesofspecificenumeration，receivecommissionsfromthepresident。Amemberofeitherhouseofthelegislaturebetrayinghistrustandguiltyofthemostculpableactsofanofficialnatureis，underthedecisionofthesenate，liable，indeed，toexpulsion，butnottoimpeachment；liabletotheordinarycourseoflegalproceedings，butnottodisqualification。
Yetasfromthejudgmentofthishightribunalthereisnoappeal；asthedecisionwhichhasbeengiveninthecaseadvertedtoisajudicialone，andprobablywillbeheldbindingonthemselvesonallfutureoccasions，wemustnowreceiveitasthesettledconstructionoftheConstitution。
WhetheranamendmentoftheConstitutioninthisrespectwilleverbemade，isnotfortheauthortoanticipate。
1。Federalist，No。65。
2。ThisisoneofthefewpointsinwhichtheauthoriscompelledtodifferfromthatexcellentworktheFederalist。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIIICHAPTERXXIII。OFANOTHERSPECIALJURISDICTION。THEREisanotherspeciesofcourtshavingaspecialjurisdiction，fromwhichtrialbyjuryisalsoexcluded，yetwhosepowerextendstopecuniarymulcts，deprivationofoffice，imprisonment，personalchastisement，andevenlossoflife。Itwillbeatonceperceivedthatwealludetocourtsmartial。
AlthoughnotexpresslymentionedintheConstitution，thepowertoinstitutethemisunquestionablygivenbytheauthorityvestedincongresstomakerulesforthegovernmentandregulationofthelandandnavalforces，andtheamendmentheretoforenoticed，whichbeforeapersonshallbeheldtoanswerforacapitalorotherwiseinfamouscrime，requiresapresentmentorindictmentbyagrandjury，exceptsthelandandnavalforces，andthemilitiawheninactualserviceintimeofwarorpublicdanger，therebyindirectlyrecognisingtheestablishmentandtheefficientpowersofcourtsmartial。
Congresshasreasonablyandmoderatelyexecutedthispower，butthedetailsareinconsistentwiththeplanofthiswork。Thesubjectsofacourtmartialareonlythosewhofallwithintheabovedescriptions。Martialemploymentcreatesmartiallaw，andrequiresmartialcourts。Onthecivilclassofthecommunity，itcanneveroperate，exceptperhapsinoneinstance，whichonourpart，couldnotwellapplytooneofourowncitizensorinhabitants。
Itisasettledprincipleofthelawsofwarthataspymaybeputtodeath。
Onedetectedinhisobnoxiousemploymentwithinourlinesintimeofwar，althoughnothimselfasoldier，isalegitimatesubjectofthisseverity；
anduponthesameprincipleweshouldbeboundtoadmittherightoftheenemytoexecuteanyofourcitizensorsoldiers，apprehendedbythemintheperformanceofthesameact。
WehaveheretoforeadvertedtotheprocedureofpresidentMadisoninthecaseofacitizenoftheUnitedStateswhohadjoinedtheenemyduringthelatewar，andwasapprehendedasaspywithinourlinesonthefrontiers:
thecoursepursuedbyhisdirections，wasbothhumaneandconsistentwiththetrueprinciplesoflaw。Itgavetotheindividualthefairerprospectofacquittalonatrialbyjuryaccompaniedwithalltheguardsandprecautionsallottedtochargesoftreason；whileitmoreextensivelyenforcedaprincipleofwhichallshouldbeapprized，thatitislawfulfornoonetodeserthiscountryinthehourofherdanger，andliftaparricidearmagainsther。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIVCHAPTERXXIV。OFGENERALTRIBUNALS，ANDFIRSTOFTHESUPREMECOURT。AVIEWofthegeneralsystemwillnowbetaken。
TheonlytribunalexpresslynoticedintheConstitutionistheSupremeCourt，whosepowerisco-extensivewithalltheexigenciesofthegovernment，andpervadeseverypartoftheUnitedStates，andtheterritoriesbelongingtothem。Inmanyparticulars，however，itpossessesonlyanappellatejurisdiction；
inafew，itsjurisdictionisoriginal。
Inthelatterareembracedallcasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministersandconsuls，andthoseinwhichastateshallbeaparty。
Casesofthefirstdescriptionmaybeeithercivilorcriminal。Theprotectionaffordedbythelawsofnationstodiplomaticfunctionaries，extends，however，sofarthatitisnoteasytoconceiveanycaseinwhichapersoninvestedwiththathighcharactercanbesubjectedeithertocriminalorcivilproceedings。Buthemaybeentitledtoprosecuteothers?hemayhavereceivedoutragesorinsultsaffectinghisnationalcharacter，forwhichredressmaybejustlydue。TheUnitedStates，whoareresponsibletoforeignnationsfortheirMinistersreceivingallduerespect，andanalmostunlimitedfreedomintheexerciseoftheirfunctions，supplythepropermeansforthesepurposes，bytakingonthemselvesandvestingintheirhighesttribunal，thecognizanceofsuchcases。Whentheproceedingsareagainstoneoftheseofficers，wemustconsiderthejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesasbeingfromitsownnatureexclusiveofthestatecourts。
Itmaynotbeequallyclear；ifheshouldbethecomplainant，andseekredressineitheracriminalorcivilcaseintheforumofastate，thatthelattercouldnottakecognizanceofit。Theunityofthesystemwouldperhapsbebetterpromoted，ifthestatecourtswereauthorizedtodeclinethecognizanceofallsuchcases。TheUnitedStatesareresponsibletoforeignnationsforthedueadministrationofjusticeintheirowntribunalsonly，anditmightinvolvetheminsomedifficulties，ifstatecourts，whosejudgestheydonotappoint，andwhomonaccountofmalconducttheycouldnotimpeach，weretointermeddleevenontheapplicationoftheministerhimselfincasesofthisnature。Butifthestatecourtsarenotprohibitedbytheirownconstitutions，itdoesnotappearthattheycouldjustlyrefusetheirassistancetoaforeignministerwhothoughtitexpedienttoapplytothem，althoughperhapssomepoliticalinconveniencemayoccurtothemindreflectingonthepossibilityofwidelydifferentviewsbeingentertainedonthesamesubjectbyastatecourtandacourtoftheUnitedStates。
Congress1hasdeclaredthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttobeexclusiveinallsuchsuitsorproceedingsagainstambassadorsorotherpublicministers，theirdomestics，&；c。asacourtoflawcanhaveorexerciseconsistentlywiththelawofnations，buttheyhavegonenofurther。
SuchcasescertainlycomewithinthetermsusedintheConstitutionaffectingambassadors，&；c。，andsuchjurisdictionmusthavebeenintendedtobeexclusive。
Thepowergiventocongresstodefineandtopunishoffencesagainstthelawofnations，hasbeenpartlyexecutedbycongress，2?offeringviolencetothepersonofanambassadororotherpublicminister，andsuingoutprocessagainsthimorhisdomestics，aredeclaredtobeoffencessubjectingthepartiestofineandimprisonment。Havingbeendefinedbycongress，theymayproperlybesaidtoariseundertheConstitutionandtobecognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。Butotherviolationsofthelawofnationsthanthoseexpresslyenumerated，maybecommitted，andifitisasounddoctrine，whichisintendedtobehereafterexamined，thatthecriminaljurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesisconfinedtocasesexpresslyprovidedforbystatute，eithersuchoffences，howeverflagrant，mustgounpunished，andtheUnitedStatesincuranationaldisgrace，orthestatecourtsmustberesortedto。
Inrespecttocivilsuits，whenaforeignministermaysueanalien，thejurisdictionisconfessedlyconcurrent，3butitwouldseemthatifaforeign。nationbroughtacivilsuitinacourtoftheUnitedStates，itoughttobeinthesupremecourt，althoughherealsoitisapprehendedthatthestatecourtsmightsustainit。
Thereasonforplacingconsulsonthesamefooting，deservesinquiry。Consulsarenotdiplomaticfunctionaries，orpoliticalrepresentativesofaforeignnation。Theirgeneralcharacteristhatofcommercialagents。
Theymaybecitizensorsubjectsoftheforeignpower，ortheymaybecitizensandpermanentinhabitantsoftheUnitedStates。Thepresidentmay，athisdiscretion，acknowledgetheircapacityorrefusetodoso。Whenhedeemsitexpedient，hemayrevoketheadmissionofthem，4bywhichacttheywouldbeatoncestrippedoftheirprivilegesandimmunities，andreducedtothelevelofprivatepersons。
Itmaysometimeshappen，thataconsulintheabsenceoftheproperministerofhiscountry，maybechargedwithhighernationalduties，butinthiscase，thegreatercharacterabsorbsthesmaller。
Inrespecttothecitizensorsubjectsoftheirownnations，theyaresometimesadmittedbythenationwhichreceivesthemtoexercisefunctionspartakingofajudicialnature，buttheycannotbecarriedsofarastoaffectothers，norbeexercisedatallwithoutthepermissionofthegovernment。
Andtheirproceduresmustbedistinguishedfromacourt，oranestablishmentinthenatureofacourt，affectingtheinterestsofanyothersthanthenationtowhichtheconsulbelongs。Intheyear1793，theFrenchconsulsattemptedtoexerciseprizejurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesovercapturesmadefromtheBritish，withwhomFrancewasatwar；butthesupremecourtatoncedecided，thatnoforeignpowercanofrightinstituteorerectanycourtorjudicatureofanykindwithintheUnitedStates，unlesswarrantedbyandinpursuanceoftreaties。5
Butwhethersuchfunctionsarepermittedandexercisedornot，theothertrustsanddutiesofconsulsrequirethattheyshouldbetreatedwithmuchrespect。Thesovereignwhoreceivesthem，tacitlyengagestoaffordthemallthefreedomandprotectionnecessarytoenablethemtoexecutetheirfunctions，withoutwhichtheadmissionwouldbeillusoryandvain。6
Whatmaybedoneinsomeothercountriesbythemeregrantoftheexecutivemagistrate，mustwithusbeeffectedbyconstitutionalorlegislativeprovisions；
andtherefore，althoughatotalexemptionfromcivilandcriminalprocessisnotrequiredbythenatureoftheoffice，yetalimitationofthegeneraljudicialpoweroperatingtoacertaindegreeasanationalprotection，wasdeemedexpedient，andcannotbedisapproved。
Thelegislativeprovisionsthathavebeenmadeinrespecttothem，maybeconsideredasfoundedonthesamearticleintheConstitution。Ifthelawofnationsconsidersthemasentitledtoprotection，offencesagainstthemfallwithintheclassofoffencesagainstthelawofnations。
Casesinwhichastateshallbeaparty，originallysignifiedthoseinwhichastatewaseitherplaintiffordefendant，aswellsuitsbroughtbyastateagainstindividualsasthosebyindividualsagainstastate，andalsothoseinwhichthecontroversywasbetweentwostates；
buttheConstitutionhavingsincebeenaltered，7andastatebeingnolongerliabletoaprivateaction，thisprovisionmustbeconfinedtotheothertwocases。
Generalexpressionsmustalwaysbeconstruedaccordingtothesubject。
Ithasbeenjustlydecidedthatthewordscasesinlaworequity，applyaswelltocriminalastocivilmatters，8butitcannotbeconceivedthatastatewasintendedbytheConstitutiontobeabletoprosecuteintheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesoneofitsowncitizensforanoffencecommittedagainstitself，althoughitmighthavethepowertoinstituteinthatcourtasuitonacivilcontracteitherbetweenitselfanditsowncitizens，orcitizensofanotherstate，orforeigners。
Inallothercases，theSupremeCourtpossessesjurisdictiononlybyappealorwritoferror；thatis，itmayreviseandcorrecttheproceedingsinacauseinstitutedinaninferiortribunal，butcannotoriginateacause；