Ithasbeendecidedthatpersonswhohavebecomeboundforthegoodconductoftheofficeronthefirstappointment，arenotresponsibleforhisactsafterthedateofthesecondcommission，whichvirtuallysuspendsthefirst。4
1。SeeSergeant\'sConstitutionalLaw，p。360。
2。1Peters\'Rep。471。
3。1Cranch，137，Marburyv。Madison，andseeparticularlyp。167。
4。9Wheaton，730。UnitedStatesv。
Kirkpatrick。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXVCHAPTERXV。OFTHELIABILITYOFEXECUTIVEOFFICERS。ITisaself-evidentprinciple，thatanillegalmandateorinstructionsfromthepresident，cangivenosanctiontotheconductofasubordinateofficer。Onthecontrary，thepresidentwouldbeliabletotheactionofapersoninjuredinthesamemannerthataprivateindividualwouldbe。Thelawmakesnodistinctionofpersons，andthemaximthatthekingcandonowrong，somuchadmiredinEngland，existsbynoanalogyinarepublicangovernment。
Itmaynotbeimpropertoconsiderwhysucharuleisadmittedinmonarchies，andwhyitcannottakeplaceinawellconstitutedrepublic。Ineverymonarchy，aqualitytermedprerogative，isattachedtothemonarch。ItisdefinedbythelearnedcommentatoronthelawsofEngland，\"thatspecialpreeminencewhichthekinghathoverandaboveallotherpersons，andoutoftheordinarycourseoflaw。\"1Itcannotbesharedwiththepeople，forthenitwouldceasetobeprerogative:\"itisthatlawincaseoftheking，whichislawinnocaseofthesubject。\"Oneoftheseprerogativesis，thatnopersonalredresscanbehadfromtheking。
Hemayactually，itwouldseem，commitanyoutrageonanyofhissubjects；
hewouldbeliableneithertoaprosecutionnoracivilaction。\"Heisconsideredasasuperiorbeing，andentitledtothatawfulrespectwhichmayenablehimwithgreatereasetocarryonthebusinessofthegovernment。\"2Thesedoctrines，gratingastheyaretorepublicans，arepalliatedbythefurtherremark，thatprerogativeisgivenforthe\"benefitofthesubject，intheconfidencethatitwillonlybeexertedtotheadvantageoftherealm?andthattosubjecthimtocivilorcriminalproceedings，wouldbetosubvertthewholeorderofthatspeciesofgovernment。\"Thetheoryisnotunjust，andtheremarkofLocke，thegreatchampionofatemperedsystemofpopularrights，mustbeacknowledgedtobecogent?\"astopersonalwrongs，theharmwhichthesovereigncando，inhisownperson，notbeinglikelytohappenoften，nortoextenditselffar；theinconvenienceofsomeparticularmischiefs，thatmayhappensometimes，whenaheadyprincecomestothethrone，arewellrecompensedbythepeaceofthepublic，andthesecurityofthegovernment，inthepersonofthechiefmagistratebeingthussentoutofthereachofdanger。\"Buttheprinciplewhichthusshieldsandprotectsthemonarch；thesovereigntyresidentinhimself，createsthedistinctionbetweenhimandtheelected，thoughsupreme，magistrateofarepublic，wherethesovereigntyresidesinthepeople。Allitsofficers，whetherhighorlow，arebutagents，towhomatemporarypowerisimparted，andonwhomnoimmunityisconferred。Anexemptionfromthepowerofthelaw，eveninasmallparticular，exceptuponspecialoccasions，wouldbreakinuponthisimportantprinciple，andthefreedomofthepeople，thegreatandsacredobjectofrepublicangovernment，wouldbeputinjeopardy。Theexceptionadvertedto，isthatalreadynoticed，ofmembersofthelegislaturegoingto，attendingat，orreturningfromasessionofcongressbuteventhisexceptionisqualified；thecommissionoftreason，felony，ortheslightestbreachofthepeace，wouldconvincethemember，thathispublicfunctioninnowiseprotectedhimfromtheadministrationofjustice；butnootherofficerofgovernmentisentitledtothesameimmunityinanyrespect。
1。1Blackst。239。
2。1Blackst。240。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXVICHAPTERXVI。ONCOMMUNICATIONSTOBEMADEBYTHEPRESIDENTTOCONGRESS。ITisthedutyofthepresidentfromtimetotimetogivecongressinformationofthestateoftheunion；butalthoughthisaloneisexpresslymentionedintheConstitution，hiscommunicationsnaturallyembraceawiderscopethaninternalaffairs。Undertheexpression，heistoreceiveambassadors，thepresidentischargedwithalltransactionsbetweentheUnitedStatesandforeignnations，andheis，therefore，theregularchannelthroughwhichthelegislaturebecomesinformedofthepoliticalsituationoftheUnitedStatesinitsforeign，aswellasitsdomesticrelations；yetithasbeenalwaysunderstoodthatheisnotrequiredtocommunicatemorethan，inhisapprehension，maybeconsistentwiththepublicinterests。
Eitherhousemayatanytimeapplytohimforinformation；and，intheregularcourseofgovernment，canapplyonlytohim，wherethematterinquiredof，isprincipallyunderhissuperintendenceanddirection，althoughtheyfrequentlyexercisetherighttocalluponthechiefofficersofexecutivedepartments，onmatterspeculiarlyappertainingtothem，andinlikemanneroccasionallyrefertotheattorneygeneraloftheUnitedStatesonsubjectsappropriatetoItsoffice。Theapplicationsdirectlytothepresident，aregenerallyaccompaniedwithaqualificationevincingacorrectsenseoftheobligationonhisparttoavoidorsuspenddisclosures，bywhichthepublicinterest，thatbothareboundtokeepinview，mightbeaffected。
Suchdisclosuresthelegislatureingeneralexpresslydisclaims。Inrecurrencetoourhistory，itmustbeobvious，thattheseofficialcommunicationsarechargeablewithbeingrathermorefullandliberalthaniscommoninothercountries。Insupportofthepracticeithasbeensaid，thatinrepublicsthereoughttobefewornosecrets；anillusoryopinion，foundedonidealconceptions，andatvariancewiththeusefulpracticeofmankind。Ifallthetransactionsofacabinet，whetherinrespecttointernalorexternalbusiness，wereregularlyexhibitedtothepubliceye，itsownoperationswouldbeimpeded；thepublicmindbeperplexed，andimproperadvantageswouldsometimesbetaken。Foreignpowers，pursuingastheyinvariablydo，adifferentcoursethemselves，wouldjustlyobjecttosuchproceeding。
Thepresidentisalsorequiredtorecommendtotheirconsiderationsuchmeasuresashemaydeemexpedient。Thisisanobligationnottobedispensedwith。Exercisinghisofficeduringtherecessofthelegislature，themembersofwhich，whentheyreturntothemassofcitizens，aredisengagedfromtheobligatoryinspectionofpublicaffairs；suppliedbyhishighfunctionswiththebestmeansofdiscoveringthepublicexigencies，andpromotingthepublicgood，hewouldnotbeguiltlesstohisconstituentsifhefailedtoexhibitonthefirstopportunity，hisownimpressionsofwhatitwouldbeusefultodo，withhisinformationofwhathadbeendone。
Hewillthenhavedischargedhisduty，anditwillrestwiththelegislaturetoactaccordingtotheirwisdomanddiscretion。Thesecommunicationswereformerlymadeinpersonattheopeningofthesession，andwrittenmessagesweresubsequentlysentwhennecessary，butthewholeisnowdoneinwriting。
Itwasformerlythepracticetoreturnanswers，whichasamerematterofceremonyisnowdisused。Thecoursepursuedatpresentistoreferthemessagetoacommittee，whocommonlyreportananalysisofit，andthepartsonwhichitappearsnecessarytoact，arereferredtoothercommitteestopreparethemforthedeliberationsofthewhole。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXVIICHAPTERXVII。OFTHEPOWERTOGRANTPARDONS。Apowertograntreprievesandpardonsisexpresslygiventothepresident。
Thatpunishmentsshouldinallcasesbestrictlyappropriatetotheoffenceandcertainintheirexecution，isindeedtheperfectionofcriminallaw，butthefallibilityofhumanjudgmentwouldrenderaninflexibleruletothiseffect，toosevereforhumannature。Anactmayfallwithinthepurviewofthelawandjustlysubjectthepartytoconviction；yettheremaybealleviatingcircumstances，whichinduceeventhosewhodelivertheverdictorpronouncethejudgment，tofeelrepugnanceatitsbeingexecuted:
butitwouldtendtooverthrowthebarriersoflaw，ifthetribunalwhichistodecideontheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused，werepermittedtointermixotherconsiderations。Atfirstview，benevolentmindswouldnotobjecttotheadmissionoftheseprinciplesinfavouroftheaccused，onhistrial，butthegeneralinterestsofsocietyhaveastrongerclaimonthehumanityoffeelingsjustlyregulated，thantheparticularcaseoftheindividual。Thegeneralinterestrequiresthattheadministrationofjusticeshouldnotbedivertedfromitssettledcourse，byanerroneousassumptionofpowerandanirregulardistributionofjustice。Ifthelawisplain，thedutyofthetribunalistoconformtoit，becausethelawisascompulsoryonthetribunalasontheoffender。
Buttheconditionofsocietywouldbemiserableiftheseverityofthelawcouldinnoformbemitigated，andifthoseconsiderationswhichoughtnottooperateonajuryorajudgecouldhavenoinfluenceelsewhere。
Independentlyofotherviews，wemayinstancethecaseoftreasonagainstthestate。Publicpolicymayrequirethattheoffenders，thoughconvicted，shouldbeforgiven:severitymayincreasetheoppositionofthatpartofthecommunitywhichwasengagedinthecombination；mercymayproduceconciliationandsubmission；butiftheguiltisproved，nosuchconsiderationscanbeadmittedintothedeliberationsofthecourt。Itisthereforeexpedientandwise，todepositinsomeotherpartofthegovernment，thepowerorgrantingpardons；apower，whichnotwithstandingthestrangeassertionsofBlackstoneandMontesquieu，isnotinconsistentwiththenatureofademocraticgovernment。1Themostillustriousmindsaresometimesseducedfromplainandobvioustruthsbytheillusionsoftheory，andwhenwearetoldthatthepowerofpardoncanneversubsistindemocracies，becausenothinghigherisacknowledgedthanthemagistratewhoadministersthelaw，andbecauseitwouldconfoundallideasofrightamongthemassofthepeople，astheywouldfinditdifficulttotellwhetheraprisonerwasdischargedbyhisinnocence，orobtainedapardonthroughfavour，wemustatonceperceivethatthepositionisfallacious，bybeingtoogeneral。
Theinconveniencesuggestedinthelattermemberofit，correspondsindeedwithwhathasbeenalreadyobserved，ifconfinedtothejudicialtribunalthatoriginallyactsonthecase，butthefirstpartofitindicatesawantofacquaintancewiththesubdivisionsofauthoritycompatiblewiththepurestdemocracy。Itistheofficeofthejudgetoconvicttheguilty；
theexecutionofthesentenceisthedutyoftheexecutiveauthority，thetimeandplaceofexecutionarenopartofthejudgmentofthecourt。2Itistrue，thatduringavacancyintheofficeofpresident，whichashasbeenseen，iscarefullyprovidedagainst，therewouldbenopowertograntapardon，butthemomenttheofficeisagainfilled，thepowerwouldberevived。
Thepowertograntpardonsextendstoallcases，exceptimpeachments。
Someconsiderationsonthesubjectofimpeachmentswillbepresentedhereafter；
atpresent，itmaynotbeimpropertoobserve，thatnotonlyintheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，butinthoseofalmosteverystateintheUnion，wefindtheEnglishdoctrineofimpeachmentsintroduced，butthedifferenceinrespecttograntingpardonstothepersonsimpeachedisnotpreserved。
Impeachmentsaregenerallyeffortsofthepeopleofthatcountrythroughtheirrepresentativesinthehouseofcommons，toobtainredressbeforeadistinctandindependenttribunal，forthemalpracticesofthegreatofficersofthecrown。Nopardonpreviouslygranted，cansheltertheaccusedfromafullinquiry，andthushismisconduct，ifsubstantiated，isdevelopedandexposedtothenation，butaftertheimpeachmenthasbeensolemnlyheardanddetermined，itisnotunderstoodthattheroyalgraceisfurtherrestrainedorabridged。
Withus，nopardoncanbegrantedeitherbeforeoraftertheimpeachment；
andperhaps，ifthismodeoftrialisretainedatall，itisrightthatthesentenceofaguardedandaugusttribunal，which，asweshallfind，isexceedinglylimitedintheextentofitspunishments，shouldbeexceptedfromthegeneralpowerofthepresidenttodefeattheeffectofthecondemnation。
Inrespecttoanotherjurisdiction，itmaybedoubtedwhetherhepossessesthepowertopardon。
Itseemstoresultfromtheprincipleonwhichthepowertopunishcontemptsofeitherhouseofthelegislatureisfounded，thattheexecutiveauthoritycannotinterpose，inanyshape，betweenthemandtheoffender。Themainobjectistopreservethepurityandindependenceofthelegislature，forthebenefitofthepeople。Itacts，therefore，onitsownpower，withoutreferenceto，ordependenceupon，anyother。Iftheexecutiveauthoritycould，bygrantingapardon，or，inanyothermode，protectthosewhoinsidiouslyorviolentlyinterruptedordefeatedtheiroperations，thelegislature，whichisthesuperiorbody，wouldbesofardependentonthegoodwilloftheexecutive。Anditwouldbeonly，asitwere，bythepermissionofthelatter，thatitexercisedajurisdictionofsomuchimportancetothepeople\'srights。TheConstitutionisassilentinrespecttotherightofgrantingpardonsinsuchcases，asitisinrespecttothecreationofthejurisdictionitselfonearisesbyimplicationtheotherisexcludedbyimplication。
Inallotherthanthesetwocases，thepowerisgeneralandunqualified。
Itmaybeexercisedaswellbeforeasafteratrial，anditextendsaliketothehighestandthesmallestoffences。Theremissionoffines，penalties，andforfeitures，undertherevenuelaws，isincludedinit，andinthisshapeitisfrequentlyexercised:butalthoughitmayrelievethepartyfromthenecessityofpayingmoneyintothetreasury，thepresidentcannot，afterthemoneyhasreachedthetreasury，compeltherestitutionofit。
TheConstitutionnowhereexpresslydescribesanymodeofpunishment:
itempowerscongressinfourenumeratedcasestoprovidethepunishment。
Theyaretreason，piracy，offencesagainstthelawofnations，andcounterfeitingthesecuritiesandcurrentcoinoftheUnitedStates。Thepowerofcongresstoinflictpunishmentinothercasesisderivedfromimplicationonly，butitisnecessarytocarrytheConstitutionintoeffect，andisembracedinthegeneralprovisiontopassalllawswhichmaybenecessaryandproper。3Thepardoningpowerisasextensiveasthepunishingpower，andappliesaswelltopunishmentsimposedbyvirtueoflawsunderthisimpliedauthority，astothosewhereitisexpressed。
Theonlyexceptionsarethetwocaseswehavealreadymentioned，inoneofwhichthepowerofpardoningisexpresslywithheld?andintheotheritisincompatiblewiththepeculiarnatureofthejurisdiction。
Intheexerciseofthe\"benignperogativeofpardoning，\"asithasbeenjustlytermed，thepresidentstandsalone。TheConstitutionimposesnorestraintuponhimbyrequiringhimtoconsultothers。Asthesenseofresponsibilityisalwaysstronginproportionasitisundivided，asinglemanwillbemostreadytoattendtotheforceofthosemotives，whichoughttopleadforamitigationoftherigourofthelaw，andlessinclinedtoyieldtoconsiderationscalculatedtoshelterpropersubjectsfromitspunishment。Ontheotherhand；asmengenerallyderiveconfidencefromtheirnumber，theymightoftenencourageeachotherinactsofobduracy，andbelesssensibletoapprehensionsofcensureforaninjudiciousoranaffectedclemency。4
Inadditiontothisobjection，therewouldbeagreatinconvenienceinimposingonthepresidentthenecessityofconsultingabody，which，whetheralreadyapermanentpartofthegovernmentasthesenate，orspeciallycreatedforthepurpose，itmightbedifficulttoconveneonoccasionswhenperhapsanimmediatedecisionwouldbehighlyexpedient。
1。4Blackstone，397。Montesquieu，b。
6，c。5。
2。4Blackstone，p。404。
3。6Wheaton，233。
4。FederalistNo。74。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXVIIICHAPTERXVIII。OFCOMPENSATIONSTOPUBLICOFFICERS。THEprincipleofcompensationtothosewhorenderservicestothepublic，runsthroughthewholeConstitution。
Thesenatorsandrepresentativesshallreceiveacompensationfortheirservices，tobeascertainedbylaw，andpaidoutofthetreasuryoftheUnitedStates。
Thepresidentshallatstatedtimes，receiveforhisservicesacompensation，whichshallneitherbeincreasednordiminishedduringtheperiodforwhichheshallhavebeenelected，andheshallnotreceivewithinthatperiodanyotheremolumentfromtheUnitedStates，oranyofthem。
Thejudgesshallatstatedtimes，receivefortheirservicesacompensation，whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice。
Intheearlystagesofsociety，foundedonaslenderpopulation，beforeanyregularcivilinstitutionstookplace，thetasksofgovernmentwereprobablyperformedwithoutstatedemoluments。Intime，however，itwasperceivedthatthepublicoughtnottohavetheiraffairsadministeredwithoutmakingcompensationtothosewhopostponedtheirprivatebusinessforthegeneralbenefit。Acompensationwasthereforeeitherexactedorvoluntarilyrendered。Theformerisalwaysirregularandoppressive。Wemayreferasanillustrationofit，toapracticewhichinearlytimesprevailedinalmostallthekingdomsofEurope。Themonarch，forthesupplyofhiscourt，hisofficersandattendants，wasinthehabitofseizingprovisionsandimpressinghorsesandcarriages，forwhich，anarbitraryandinadequatecompensationwassometimesmade，butanycompensationwhateverwasfrequentlywithheld。1Thepractice，thoughconstantlycomplainedofasaheavygrievance，equallyinconsistentwiththerightsofthesubject，andtherealconvenienceofthecrown，wasnotabolishedinEnglandtilltherestorationofCharlesII。Thegovernmentofacountryisrelievedfromthenecessityofexactionsthusmutuallyinjurious，byvoluntaryprovisionsonthepartofthegeneralsociety。
Inrespecttoexecutiveandjudicialofficers，noquestionhaseverarisen:?Itseemstobeuniversallyagreed，thatcompensationsshouldbemadefortheirservices。Themannerofmakingitisvarious，itissometimesdonebyfixedsalaries，andsometimesbyfeesandperquisites，whichlatterareexactlyregulatedastotheamount。Argumentsarenotwantinginfavourofeachoftheseplans。Ifasalaryisgrantedwhichtheofficeristoreceive，whetherhedoesmuchorlittleofthebusinesswithinhissphere，thereisdangerofremissnessbuttorenderhimwhollydependantonthereceiptofcasualfees，wouldbeinconsistentwiththedignitythatoughtalwaystoaccompanyagreatexecutiveorjudicialoffice，andwouldtendtointerruptthededicationofhistimetohishighandimportantduties。
Inthosecases，salariesarepreferable。Alegalremedyforneglectofdutymaycertainlybefound，illadditiontothepublicreprobation，whichmustalwaysattenduponit。Butforinferiorofficers，notunderthesamecontrolofpublicopinion，oratleastnottothesameextent，thepaymentsbythosewhosebusinessistransactedseemstoformaproperfund。
Inrespecttothemembersofthelegislature，ourpracticecorrespondswiththatofsome，thoughnotofallthenationsofEurope。Inone，towhichweareaptmorefrequentlytolookthananyother，theancientusagehasmeltedaway，andthemembersofparliamentnowreceivenocompensationfortheirattendance。Theconsequenceis，thatonlymenoffortunecantakeseatsinthehouseofcommons。Thisisinconsistentwiththeequalitythatoughttobefoundinarepublic。Menofvirtueandtalent，thoughdepressedbypoverty，oughttohavetheavenuestopublictrustasopentothemastothemostwealthy。Wewillventuretoaddthatthecompensationoughttobeliberal:agenerouspeople，ifitisfaithfullyserved，willnevercomplain。Butthecompensationoughttobearasexactaproportionaspossibletothetimeemployed。Anactofcongresswaspassedafewyearsago，2inwhich，agrosssumwasallottedforanentiresession。Thedissatisfactionitoccasioned，producedanearlyrepeal。
Thecompensationofthepresidentisnottobeincreasedordiminishedwhileheisinoffice；thelegislatureshallneitherbribenorterrifyhiminthismode。Thecompensationsofjudgesshallnotbediminished，butthereisnorestraintontheirbeingincreased，becausetheirofficesbeinginlegalcontemplationequivalenttoofficesforlife；sincethelawbenignlycalculatesthatajudgewillalwaysbehavewell；thevalueofmoneymaydepreciate，andthesalarybecomeinadequatetothesupportintendedtobeallowed。
Itmaybeobserved，thatthepresidentandjudicialofficersaretoreceivetheircompensationsatstatedperiods，theintentionofwhichis，thatservicesshallnotbepaidfor，beforetheyareperformed；butnosuchrestrictionisimposedonthemembersofthelegislature，becauseitispresumedthattheywillnotviolateaprinciplesojust，andalso，becausefromtheuncertaindurationoftheirsessions，nostatedperiodcanbefixed。
Themilitarypowerisalsointhisrespecttobedistinguishedfromotherexecutiveoffices；beingliabletobeemployedinvariousplaceswhereitmaybedifficultorimpossibletoberegularlysuppliedwiththemeansofdischargingtheirpay，itwouldbeimpolitictoentitlethemtodemanditatcertainperiods。Theircompensationscannotbediminishedduringthetimeforwhichtheyareengaged，becauseitwouldbeabreachofthecontract:theymaybeincreased，becausethepublicsafetywouldnotbeendangeredbyit。Fortuitousadditions，tendingtostimulatetheirexertionsareallowed:anarmyisentitledtoshareinsomepartsofwhatistakenfromtheenemy，which，accordingtothelawsofwar，becomethepropertyofthecaptors。Arule，however，whichinmodernpracticeisratherspeciousthanprofitable，foritisrarelyenforced；buttothenavythesameprincipleisoftenproductiveofgreatemolument；adiscriminationhavingbeenlongestablishedbetweenmaritimecapturesandthoseonshore，onafoundationnotperceptiblyjust。Thepropertyofpeaceableandprivateindividualsonthelandisseldomconsideredinmoderntimes，asajustsubjectofconfiscation，althoughtheownersareinhabitantsofahostilecountry；butatsea，themerchantvessel，unarmedandunoffending，isthelawfulpreyofthecommissionedcruizer，andiscondemnedtohisuse，onbeingcapturedandbroughtintotheportsofhiscountry。Theamountoftheseadditionalcompensationsisfromtimetotimeregulatedbycongress。
Theappropriationforthesupportofthearmyandnavycanbemadeonlybycongress，andinrespecttothearmy，ashasbeenalreadyobserved，fornolongertimethantwoyears。Thismay，atfirstview，appearinconsistentwiththepracticeofenlistingsoldiersforalongertime，butwhenwetakeaviewofthewholepoliticalsystemandrecollectthatthislimitationhasbeenadoptedasasuitablecheckuponthepossibleilluseofaregulararmy，wemustallowapredominantoperationtothegreaterprinciple。Themilitarycontractsmustbeconstrued，inallcases，assubjecttotheconstitutionalrestriction，whichmustbeconsideredasaprovisointroducedintoeverylawthatauthorizesthepresidenttoraiseanarmy。
Todisbandanarmyentirely，mustbealegislativeact。Todismissanyoralloftheofficersis，bythetenureoftheircommissions，withinthepowerofthepresident。Itisthepracticeinmanycountrieswhenanarmyisreduced，toallowtotheofficerswhoseactiveservicesarenolongerrequired，halftheamountoftheirpayduringlife。Suchcompensationswithusdependonthejudgmentofcongress，andfromthatquarteralsomustproceedthosecharitableprovisionswhichseemfairlyduetothedisabledandinfirmsoldierwhohasfaithfullyservedhiscountry。
Arecentinstancehasprovedthatthechargeofingratitudecannotalwaysbejustlypreferredagainstarepublic。
Invitedtorevisitacountry，towhichin，earlylifehehadrenderedsplendidandsuccessfulservice；theheroismofGeneralLaFayettehasbeenrewarded，notmerelybyunboundedeffusionsofthepublicmind，butwithapecuniarycompensationequallyhonourabletothedonorsandtothereceiver。
1。SeeBarringtononStat。183，237，289。Hume\'sHistoryofEng。vol。v。346。519；andin12Coke，19，itisconsideredasaprerogativeinseparablefromthepersonoftheking，ofwhich，evenanactofparliamentcannotdeprivehim。
2。March19，1816。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIXCHAPTERXIX。OFINCOMPATIBLEOFFICES。TWOofficesmaybesoincompatibleintheirnature，thatthesamepersonshallnotbeadmittedtoholdthemboth。TheConstitutioninthisrespectisnotaltogethersilent，andweshallendeavourtoshowthejustnessoftheprinciplesonwhichitproceeds。
Itisaruleofgenerallaw，thatanofficerwhoacceptsanotherappointmentinconsistentwiththefirst，isheldtohavetherebyresignedthefirst。1Ifthemarshalofoneofthedistrictsweretobeappointedjudgeofthatdistrict，itwouldvirtuallyvacatehisofficeasmarshal。Ifamemberofthehouseofrepresentativesacceptedanappointmentassenator，hewouldceasetobeamemberofthehouseofrepresentatives。Butamanmayholdtwoormoreoffices，iftheyarenotincompatibleintheirnature，2andthereforetherewouldseemnoreason，otherthangeneralpolicy，forexcludingsomeoftheexecutiveofficers，belowthepresident，fromseatsineitherhouse，or，topreventanindividualfromholdingatthesametimetheofficeofsecretaryofstateandofthetreasury，oranysimilaroffices。Butalthoughnoreasons，merelyofalegalnature，mightbeopposedtoit，theimpolicyofadmittingsuchofficerstocomposeapartofthelegislatureisexceedinglyplain。
Wemust，oncemorerecurtoEngland，andexaminetheeffectsoftheirpracticeinthisrespect。Thegreatofficersofthecrown，unlesstheyare，membersoftheotherhouse，areeligibleasmembersofthehouseofcommons。Thewholeadministrationpartakesinoneorthe，otherofthehouses，ofthelegislativepower。Thereisnodoubtthatsomebenefitisderivedfromit，inthefacilityofobtaininginformationinregardtopublicmeasures，andtheinquiriesofothermembersonsuchsubjects，areusuallyansweredwithgreatcourtesy；butthissmalladvantageiscounterbalancedbytheinfluencetheypossessthere，andbythetotalsubversionofoneofthechiefpillars，onwhichtheimportanceandvalueofthehouseofcommonshavealwaysbeenassertedtorest。
EverypanegyristoftheBritishConstitutiondelightstodrawaperspectiveviewofthehouseofcommonsaskeeperofthepurseofthenation；regulatingitsexpensesandwithholdingsuppliesfromthecrown，exceptonsuchtermsasthegoodofthepeoplemayrequire。Butnothingisatpresentmoreremotefromthefact。Thewholeschemeoftaxation；theamounttoberaised；thesubjectstobetaxed，andtheobjectstowhichtheproductistobeapplied，arelaidbeforethembytheMinistersofthecrown；notindeedinthatcapacity，butintheprofessedqualityofmembersofthehouse，andperhapssincetherestorationofCharlesII。certainlynotformanyyearsback，theothermembersofthehouse，haveneverproposedotherplansoffinance，orundertakentoactontheoldprincipleofrepresentativesofthepeople，furtherthantoobjecttoandvoteagainsttheministerialpropositions。
Thusthehouseofcommonsisrenderedpartofthemachineryoftheexecutivegovernment，andwheneveraministerbecomessounpopularastolosehisascendancyinthehouse，eitheritmustbedissolved，andthechanceofonemorepliantbetakenbyanotherelection，ortheministerresigns，andthecrownemploysnewandmorejudiciousormoredexterousservants。
Greatjealousyoftheinterferenceofthehouseoflordswithmoneybillsisretained，inwhichtheministerialpartofthehouseofcommonsprudentlyunite；butnojealousyofthepoweroftheministryintheirownhouseiscollectivelymanifested。Inshort，theactualgovernmentofthatcountry，asnowadministered，ispurelythegovernmentofthecrown，andthesupposedrepresentativesofthepeople，thehouseofcommons，aremerelywhatthefirstlordofthetreasury，thechancelloroftheexchequer，andsimilargreatofficersareavowedly；thatis，theministersoftheexecutivegovernment。
Itistrue，thattokeepuptheappearanceofitsancientcharacterandindependencecertaininteriorofficersoftheexciseandcustoms，&；c。
thosewhoholdanyofficecreatedsincetheyear1705andpersonsholdingpensionsatthepleasureofthecrown，orforatermofyears，areostentatiouslyexcludedfromseatsinthehouseofcommons；asortofpoliticalflatterywhichcandeceiveonlysuperficialobservers；butthegreatmanagersofthewholemachineremainintheheartofit，anddirectallitsinternalspringsandmovements。
Howisthisopenandundisguisedprocessaccomplished?
Theanswerisbythealmostentiredestructionoftheirancientprincipleofrepresentation。
Inveryfewpartsofthekingdomisaseatobtainedthroughtheunbiassedandindependentvotesofthepeople。Boroughs，oncepopulousandfree，havebecometheactualproperty，inpointofsuffrage，ofthecrown，orofaristocraticfamilies，andnoware，infact，meresubjectsofsaleorbarter。Theministercarefullyavoidingtopresenthimselfasacandidateinthosefewplaceswhicharestillactuatedbythespiritoffreesuffrage，unlessassometimeshappenstheprevalentpoliticalopinionsinsuchplacesshouldcoincidewiththepartytowhichhebelongs，procuresareturninhisfavourwithoutdifficulty，andonthevotesofsomenominalelectors，takesaplaceinthehouse，equalinlegislativeattributestothatconferredbythechoiceofthousands。Allattemptsatreformationinthisrespectareuniformlyresistedbytheministersofthecrown。
Fromsuchperversionsofsoundandregularprinciples，ourConstitutioneffectuallysecuresus。Whiledecennialenumerationandapportionmentcontinue，thatis，whileourConstitutionlasts，noexecutiveofficercaninsidiouslycreepintothenumberofourlegislativerepresentatives。Theopenandunfetteredchoiceofthepeopleonlycanplacehimthere。
Butwouldsuchachoicebeconsistentwithsoundpolicy，andthespiritoftheConstitution?
Theadvantagesderivedtothepeopleseemtobefew?theobjectionsmany。Themeasuresoftheexecutivegovernment，sofarastheyfallwithintheimmediatedepartmentofaparticularofficer，might，itistrue，bemoredirectlyandfullyexplainedonthefloorofthehouse；butwenoticeherealsoastrikingdifferencebetweenthetwogovernments。InEngland，themeasuresofgovernmentarepracticallyconsideredthemeasuresoftheministers?itisnotevenallowedtointroducetheking\'snameintoadebate。3Buttheexecutiveactsofthepresident，exceptinthetwoinstanceswherethesenateparticipates，areunsharedwithothers，andthehighestofficerunderhimcanconstitutionallynomoreexplainoraccountforthemthananyotherindividual。Besides，suchmodesofcommunicationoughtnottobeencouraged，weretheyinuse。
TheregularchannelsofcommunicationfromthepresidentarepointedoutintheConstitution，andiffurtherinformationisdesired，itissoughtforinanopenandpublicapplication，leavingittothepresidenttowithholdwhathemaydeemitinjurioustodisclose，andprotectinghimfromthemisapprehensionsofothers，bythenecessityofreducinghiscommunicationstowriting。Suchamodeofobtaininginformationisinfinitelysuperiortothesudden，andsometimesunguarded，answersreturnedtotheverbalinterrogationsofthemembersofthehouseofcommonsinGreatBritain。
But，amongmanyotherobjectionstotheintroductionofanyofthegreatpublicofficersintoeitherhouseofcongress，wemustkeepinviewagreatprincipleofallrepublicangovernments，thatpublicofficesareintendedtobeforthepublicservice，andnotforthebenefitandemolumentoftheindividualswhofillthem。Nomoreofficesarecreatedthanthepublicneedsrequire。Ifthedutiesaretoofewtooccupythetimeoftheindividual，theofficeisincorporatedwithanother，unlesstheunitedweightofbothshouldbetoogreat。Ontheotherhand，ifthequantityofpublicbusinessshouldsoincreaseastorenderitnecessarytoincreasethenumberofpersonswhoaretotransactit，newofficesarecreated。Thewholesystemhasaviewonlytothepublicbenefit。Wedonotcontinueanofficewhenitsdutieshaveexpired。AsBurkehasjustlyobserved，\"whenthereasonofoldestablishmentsisgone，itisabsurdtopreservenothingbuttheburthenofthem。Thisissuperstitiouslytoembalmacarcasenotworththegumsthatareusedtopreserveit。\"4
Thepublicofficerbeingthereforeconsideredwithusashavingactuallivingdutieswhichheisboundtoperform，andashavingnomoretimethanisnecessarytoperformthem，theConstitutionexpresslyexcludeshimfromaseat。Butafurthercautionisintroducedintoit。Amemberofeitherhousemaybeappointedtoanofficeexistingpreviouslytohisbeingelected，iftheemolumentsofithavenotbeenincreasedduringthetimeforwhichhewaselected。Butifanewofficehasbeencreated，ortheemolumentsofanoldoneincreasedduringthattime，thepromiseorthechanceofreceivinganappointmenttoit，mayhaveanundueinfluenceonhismind。SuchanappointmentisthereforeforbiddenbytheConstitutionduringthetimeforwhichhewaselected；anditisonlytoberegrettedthatitwasnotforbiddenaltogether。Adishonourabletrafficinvotes，shoulditeverbecomeacharacteristicofourcountry，wouldbemorecompletelyprevented，iftoanofficesocreated，orrenderedmoreprofitable，noonewhohadhadanagencyineitherrespect，couldeverbeappointed。
TheConstitutioncontainsnoprovisionadvertingtotheexerciseofofficesundertheUnitedStatesandseparatestatesatthesametime，bythesamepersons。Insomeofthestatesithasbeenthoughtexpedienttoprovideagainstit。
Thosestatesappeartohaveactedundertheapprehensionofapossiblecollisionbetweenthetwogovernments，andajealousylesttheadmissionoftheofficersoftheUnitedStatesintoplacesoftrustandpowerinastate，mightleadtoapreferenceinthemindsofthosewhoholdofficesunderbothtotheprejudiceofthestategovernments。5Acounterapprehensiondidnotexistinthepeople，whentheyformedtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，althoughithasbeentheopinionofsomeenlightenedmenthattherewasmoreprobabilitythatifthebalanceevershouldbedisturbed，itwouldbebythepreponderancyofthestategovernments。Ithasbeenobserved，thatthestategovernmentsareconstituentandessentialpartsoftheUnitedStatesgovernment，whilethelatterisinnowiseessentialtotheorganizationoroperationsoftheformer。Withouttheinterventionofthestatelegislatures，thepresidentoftheUnitedStatescannotbeelected。Thesenateiselectedimmediatelybythestatelegislatures。Eventhehouseofrepresentatives，thoughdrawnimmediatelyfromthepeople，willbechosenverymuchundertheinfluenceofthosewhoseowninfluenceoverthepeopleobtains，forthemselvesanelectionintothestatelegislatures。Ontheotherhand，thecomponentpartsofthestategovernmentswillinnoinstancebeindebtedfortheirappointmentsortheirpowertothedirectagencyofthegeneralgovernment。
Thepowersofthegeneralgovernmentarefewanddefined，thosewhichremaintothestategovernment，numerousandindefinite。
Thefirstandmostnaturalattachmentofthepeoplewillthereforebetotheirstategovernments，butinthegeneralgovernmenttheywillseenotarivaloranenemytothestategovernment，buttheultimateauthorityandcommonpower，whichtheyhavethemselvesconcurredtocreate，andtherefore，asitwillbetheirinterest，itfinallywillbetheirendeavourtosupportandrestrainbothwithintheirjustconstitutionalbounds。6
ItwillnotbeforeigntothisheadtonoticetheoathsofofficerequiredbytheConstitution。
Thepresidentisrequiredbyittotakeanoath，oraffirmation，thathewillfaithfullysecurethedutiesofhisoffice，andthathewillpreserve，protect，anddefendtheConstitution。Thesenators，representatives，themembersoftheseveralstatelegislatures，andallexecutiveandjudicialofficers，bothoftheUnitedStatesandoftheseveralstates，shallbeboundbyoathoraffirmationtosupportthisConstitution。
Althoughapromissoryoathisnotinpointoflaw，rankedsohighasajudicialoath；thatis，itdoesnotfallwithinthegeneralprovisionsofthelawinrespecttoperjury，yetitgreatlyincreasesthemoralobligationoftheparty，andoughttomakeadeepimpressiononhim。Everystateofficer，andeveryofficeroftheUnitedStates，onbeingelectedorappointed，bindshimselfthereby，notonlytoabstainfromalloppositiontotheConstitution，buttogiveithisfirmandactiveassistance。
Ithasbeenasked，whyitwasthoughtnecessarythatthestatemagistracyshouldbeboundtosupporttheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，andunnecessarytoimposeanoathontheofficersoftheUnitedStatesinfavourofthestateconstitutions。Thereasonassigned，asoneofmany，bytheauthorsoftheFederalist，is，thatthemembersofthegeneralgovernmentwillhavenoagencyincarryingthestategovernments，intoeffect，butthemembersandofficersofthestategovernmentswillhaveanessentialagencyingivingeffecttothegeneralgovernment。7
Thisanswerisasolidone。Anofficialoathoughttobeconfinedtothedutiesoftheoffice。Itisnotsobroadandcomprehensiveasageneraloathofallegianceandfidelitywhichembracesallthedutiesofacitizenorsubject。AnofficerappointedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，istoperformonlythosedutieswhichemanatefromit；hisobligationislimitedbythatauthority，which，asrepeatedlyheretoforeobserved，isnotcontrolledbytheconstitutionsoftheseveralstates。Anofficerappointedundertheauthorityofastate，isboundtosupportitsconstitution，butsofarastheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesinanyrespectsupersedesit，anotherruleofobligationarises，whichheisequallyboundtocomplywith；and，asitisessentialtothetrueinterestsofallthestates，thatthepowersgrantedtothegeneralgovernmentshouldbefullyeffectuated，alltheirofficers，legislative，executive，andjudicial，shouldexpresslyundertaketodoso。
Theremarksonthissubjectmaybeconcludedbydrawingtheattentionofthereadertotheliberalalternativeofanoathoraffirmation。Noreligioustest，itisdeclaredinthesamesentence，shalleverberequiredasaqualificationtoanyofficeorpublictrustundertheUnitedStates。
Notonlyanumerousandrespectablesect，butmanyotherpersonsnotofthepeoplecalledQuakers，feelaninvinciblerepugnancetotakinganoathinanyform。Ifthetermaffirmationhadbeenomitted，allsuchpersonswouldhavebeenexcludedfrompublictrustsonaccountofreligiousopinion。
Theabstractdeclarationofperfectequalityinmattersofreligionisthusrealized。
1。2Rolle\'sReports，452。Brooke\'sab。
Commissions，25。3Burr，616。2Durn。&；East，85。
2。4Serg。&；Rawle，275。
3。Itisaconstantrule，\"saysDelolme，\"nevertomentionhimwhentheymeantoblametheadministration。\"Andwemayobserveonalloccasionswhenamajorityadversetothepoliticalmeasuresofthedayhappenstoprevailinthehouseofcommons，thatthelanguageofresolutionsandaddressesisscrupulouslypointedagainsttheministerswhohaveadvisedthecrowntoadoptthem?notagainstthemonarchhimself。
4。SeehisadmirablespeechonEconomicalReform，in1780。
5。PerShippen，C。J。3Yeates\'sReports，315。
6。Seethe45thand46thnumbersoftheFederalist，inwhichthissubjectisfullydiscussed。
7。Federalist，No。44。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXCHAPTERXX。OFSOMEARDUOUSPARTSOFTHEPRESIDENT\'SDUTIES。ONafullviewofthepowersanddutiesofthepresident，thereaderwillprobablyperceivethattheyareofmoreimportanceinrespecttoforeignrelationsthantotheinternaladministrationofgovernment。
Athomehispath，thoughdignified，isnarrow。Inthetranquillitywhichwehavehithertointimeofpeaceenjoyed，littlemorehasbeenrequisite，ineitherhislegislativeorexecutivefunctions，thanregularlytopursuetheplainmandatesoflaws，andthecertaintextoftheConstitution。
Inhislegislativecapacity，thepowerofobjectingtoactsofcongress，hasbeenfairlyexercisedandrespectfullysubmittedto。Intheexecutivedepartmenthehashadindeedtwoinsurrectionstocopewith，oneofwhichwasinconsiderable，andtheother，thoughmoreextensive，disappearedbeforethemeredisplayoftheforcecollectedtosubdueit。Thetransactionitselfaffordedavaluableproofofthepatriotismofthepeople，andtheirattachmenttotheConstitution。Theregularmilitiaofthethreeadjoiningstates，NewJersey，Maryland，andVirginia，cheerfullyco-operatedwiththatofPennsylvania，inwhichtheoppositionexisted，andthegovernorofPennsylvania，asamilitaryofficer，obeyedtheordersofthegovernorofVirginia，onwhomthepresidentconferredthechiefcommand。Agreatproportionofthisforceconsistedofvolunteers；numbersofwhomweremenofconsiderablepropertyandcivileminence，andthegovernorsofthestateswehavementioned，exceptthatofMaryland，whowaspreventedbyparticularcircumstances，voluntarilytookthefieldinperson。
IfthepagesofourhistoryaresoiledinanydegreebytransientresistancetothelawsoftheUnion，thedisgraceisredeemedbytheproofofthatwisdom，bywhichthegeneralConstitutionnowappearedtohavebeenframed，andofthatdeterminationtosupportit，bywhichthemajoritywereactuated。
Andshouldinstancesofinsurrectionagainoccur，eitheragainstthelawsoftheUnion，orthegovernmentofanyparticularstate，itcannotbedoubtedthatthesamegeneralandnobleanimationwouldbeagaindisplayedinsupportofthegreatpoliticalarkofoursafetyandhappiness。
Butitisinrespecttoexternalrelations；totransactionswithforeignnations，andtheeventsarisingfromthem，thatthepresidenthasanarduoustask。Herehemustchieflyactonhisownindependentjudgment。TheConstitutionauthorizeshimindeedtorequiretheopinionsoftheprincipalofficersintheexecutivedepartments；buthoweverusefulthoseopinionsmaybe，theywouldaffordnosanctionforanyerrorshemightcommit。Andalthoughifrequired，theyaretobegiveninwriting，theywouldinvolvetheofficersinnoresponsibility。
Inrespecttotreaties，itisonlyaftertheyhavereceivedtheapprobationofthesenate，thathisresponsibilityisdiminishedbybeingdivided。
Butheisnotobligedtosubmittheinchoatetreatytothem。Hisinstructionstotheministerwhonegotiateditmayhavebeenmisunderstood，orwilfullydisregarded；thenationalinterestsmayhavebeenplainlyneglected，anditmaybealtogethersuchacompactashewouldnotratifyifhestoodalone。Undersuchcircumstances，itwouldbeatimorouspolicytoendeavourtofortifyhisowndisapprobationbyobtainingtheconcurrenceofthesenate。
Andifheshouldcontinuetodisapproveit，althoughitmettheirapprobation，hewouldnotbejustifiedingivingithisfurtheraction。ForbytheexpresswordsoftheConstitution，heinconcurrencewiththesenate，andnotthesenatealone，istomaketreaties。Incaseofanimpeachment，itwouldbenovaliddefence，forhimtoallegethathesubmittedhisownopiniontothatofthesenate。Ifindeedthecasewasatfirstofadoubtfulnature，ifheconscientiouslydesiredthedeliberateassistanceofthesenate，andifanhonestconvictionwasproducedinhisownmindbytheadvicehereceivedfromthem；hiscompliancewithitwouldbepersonallyhonourabletohim，andclearlyconsistentwiththeConstitution。
Thepowerofreceivingforeignambassadors，carrieswithitamongotherthings，therightofjudginginthecaseofarevolutioninaforeigncountry，whetherthenewrulersoughttoberecognised。Thelegislatureindeedpossessesasuperiorpower，andmaydeclareitsdissentfromtheexecutiverecognitionorrefusal，butuntilthatsenseisdeclared，theactoftheexecutiveisbinding。Thejudicialpowercantakenonoticeofanewgovernment，tilloneortheotherofthosetwodepartmentshasactedonit。1Circumstancesmayrenderthedecisionofgreatimportancetotheinterestsandpeaceofthecountry。Aprecipitateacknowledgementoftheindependenceofpartofaforeignnation，separatingitselffromitsformer，head，mayprovoketheresentmentofthelatter:arefusaltodoso，maydisgusttheformer，andpreventtheattainmentofamityandcommercewiththem，iftheysucceed。Theprinciplesonwhichtheseparationtakesplacemustalsobetakenintoconsideration，andiftheyareconformabletothosewhichledtoourownindependence，andappearlikelytobepreserved，astrongimpulsewillariseinfavourofarecognition；becauseitmaybeforournationalinterest，whichthepresidentisboundpre-eminentlytoconsult，topromotethedisseminationandestablishment，atleastinourownneighbourhood，ofthoseprincipleswhichformthestrongestfoundationsofgoodgovernment。
Butthemostaccurateandauthenticinformationshouldbeprocuredoftheactualstateandprospectofsuccessofsuchnewlyerectedstates，foritwouldnotbejustifiableinthepresidenttoinvolvethecountryindifficulties，merelyinsupportofanabstractprinciple，iftherewasnotareasonableprospectofperseveranceandsuccessonthepartofthosewhohaveembarkedintheenterprise。ThecautionofPresidentMonroeinsendingcommissionerstoSouthAmerica，forthepurposeofmakinginquiriesonthespot，inpreferencetoarelianceonvaguerumorsandpartialrepresentations，washighlycommendable。
Thepowerofcongressonthissubjectcannotbecontrolled；theymay，iftheythinkproper，acknowledgeasmallandhelplesscommunity，thoughwithacertaintyofdrawingawaruponourcountry；butgreatercircumspectionisrequiredfromthepresident，who，nothavingtheconstitutionalpowertodeclarewar，oughtevertoabstainfromameasurelikelytoproduceit。
Amongotherincidentsarisingfromforeignrelations，itmaybenoticedthatcongress，whichcannotconvenientlybealwaysinsession，maydevolveonthepresident，dutiesthatatfirstviewseemtobelongonlytothemselves。
Ithasbeendecided，thatapowergiventothepresidenttoreviveanactrelatingtoforeignintercourse，whencertainmeasures，havingadescribedeffectshouldtakeplaceonthepartoftwoforeignnations，wasperfectlyconstitutional。Thelawthusrenderedhimtheresponsiblejudgeofthateffect。2
Incaseofwarbreakingoutbetweentwoormoreforeignnations，inwhichtheUnitedStatesarenotboundbytreatytobearapart，itisthedutyoftheexecutivetotakeeveryprecautionforthepreservationoftheirneutrality；anditisamatterofjustice，bothtothosenationsandtoourowncitizens，tomanifestsuchintentioninthemostpublicandsolemnmanner。Thedisquietudeofthebelligerentpartiesisthusobviated，ourowncitizensarewarnedofthecourseitbecomestheirdutytopursue，andtheUnitedStatesavoidallresponsibilityforactscommittedbythecitizensincontraventionoftheprinciplesofneutrality。Itistheofficeofthelegislaturetodeclarewar；thedutyoftheexecutive，solongasitispracticabletopreservepeace。