WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXICHAPTERXI。OFTREASONAGAINSTTHEUNITEDSTATES。THEimportanceofthissubjectmeritsaseparatechapter。
Itwashighlyproper，perhapsabsolutelynecessary，thatacrime，thecommissionofwhichmustoweitsexistencetotheformationofthegovernment，shouldbebothrecognisedanddefinedintheConstitution。
Althoughitisageneralprinciplethatallgovernmentsmustbeunderstoodtocontainwithinthemselvesthematerialsfortheirownpreservation，anditcouldnotbesupposedthatthenationalgovernmentnowcreatedwastodependontheindividualstatesforprotectionagainsttraitors，yettohaveleftthepowerofself-defencetoinferenceandtoargument，wouldhavebeenunwise。
Theunityofthegovernmentinitslimitedcharacterrequiredfromthejudicialauthority，whichappertainedtoit，aconcurrentaid，simpleanduniforminitsnature，andadequateinitseffect。Toleavethisoffenceliabletoprosecutioninthestatecourtsonly，wouldhavebeentohazardtheconsequencesofavarietyofopinionsanddiscordancesofadjudication，and，perhaps，occasionally，totheinconvenienceofencounteringsomepoliticalreluctanceordissatisfactiononthepartofthestates。Foralthough，aswillbehereaftermorefullyshown，thejudicialpoweris，initsnature，superiortothebiasofpartyorpersonalmotives；yetitisprudent，wheneveritispracticable，toguardagainstthepossiblerelaxationofthisexaltedprinciple。Itwasalsorecollectedthatintheproceedingspreparatorytothetrial，muchistobedonebyinferiorofficers，amongwhomsuchindependenceisnotalwaystobefound。
TheUnitedStates，therefore，justlyreservedtothemselvestherighttopunishthishighoffence，andthestatecourts，sincetheadoptionoftheConstitution，haveabstainedfromintermeddlingwithprosecutionsonaccountofit。1
Butsomething。morethantherecognitionofthecrime，andtheprovisionofexclusivetribunalsforitspunishment，wasrequisiteforthesecurityofthepeople。Itisofalloffencesthatwhichitisthemostnecessarytodefinewithprecision。
Thenaturalinclinationofthosewhopossesspower，istoincreaseit。
Historyshowsthattoenlargethedescriptionoftreasonhasoftenbeenresortedtoasoneofthemeansofincreasingpower。Tohavelefttothelegislatureanunlimitedrighttodeclarewhatshouldamounttothiscrimewouldhavebeenlessconsistentwithpublicsafety，thantofix，bycommonconsent，itsplaindefinitionandexactlimits。Itis，sofar，withheldfromthepowerofthosewho，undertheinfluenceofsuddenresentmentorambitiousviews，mightunreasonablyextenditscharacter；while，ontheotherhand，exceptbythevoiceofthepeopleatlarge，actingthroughthemediumofachangeoftheConstitutionitself，itcannotbecontractedtoanarrowercompass，whichmightweakenthesafeguardsofthegeneralsystem。
Ingivingthedefinition，generalprinciplesonlycanbeadopted；itrestswiththejudicialpowertodeterminewhethertheactsthatmaybecommitted，fallwithintheseprinciples。
Treasonistheattemptofoneormoreindividuals，whoarecitizensorsubjectsofagovernment，tosubvertanddestroyit。Theintentionmustbethatthisendshallbeeffectedbyforce，insomestageoftheproceeding，buttheoffencemaybecompletebeforeanyforceisactuallyused。
Itisoneofthosecrimeswhichmaynotbeaccomplishedbyasingleact；but，onthecontrary，isinitsverynatureprogressiveyetcontinuous。
Robbery，murder，andmanyothercrimes，areormaybeeffectuatedinashortspaceoftime；andwhenthebodyisdeprivedoflifeorthegoodsaretakenfromthespot，theperpetrationoftheguiltisfullandentire:
buttheattempttosubvertagovernmentisnotamomentaryact；combinationsareformed，unlawfulschemesdevisedandpursued；oppositioniscommencedandcarriedon，andthecrimeiseverthesame；theprotractionoftimemayincreasetheterrorandtheinjury，butinalegalviewtheydonotenhancetheguilt:initsoutsetitisdeemedthehighestcrimethatcanbecommitted，andofcourse，nosubsequentcircumstancescanraiseithigher。
But，fromthedifferentnatureofgovernments，thereisadifferenceinthemanifestationsoftreasoninamonarchyandinarepublic。Intheformer，itisconsideredasanoffenceagainstthesupremeexecutivemagistrate；
inthelatteritisanoffenceagainstthebodyofthepeople。Hence，toslayortoendeavourtoslaytheking，is，initself，high-treason，althoughitmaybetheuncounselledthoughtandunassistedactofasingleindividual；
butinarepublic，notthelifeofamonarch，butthelifeoftherepublicisatstake。Theremustinthelattercasebeacombinationwithothers；
fornomancouldbesupposedcapableofintendingsinglyandalonetosubvertagovernmentformedontheauthorityofthepeople。Butthosewithwhomhecombinesmaynot，themselves，beguiltyoftreason。Thecitizenwhouniteshimselfwithahostilenation，wagingwaragainsthiscountry，isguiltyofacrimeofwhichtheforeignarmyisinnocent；withhimitistreason，withhisassociatesitis，inthecodeofnations，legitimatewarfare。Ifheshouldbemadeprisonerandproceededagainstasatraitor，itisagainsttheusageofnationsforthosewhohaveacceptedhisco-operationtoobjecttothecoursewhichthelawsofhisowncountryimposeonhim。
TreasonisdeclaredtoconsistonlyinlevyingwaragainsttheUnitedStates，orinadheringtotheirenemies，givingthemaidandcomfort。
ThetermlevyingwarisunderstoodtohavebeentakenfromtheEnglishstatuteof25thEdwardIII。，andreceivesthesameconstructionwithuswhichisgiventoitinthatcountry。
Thewarwhichisspokenofembraces，asbeforeobserved，bothhostilitiesfromabroadandinternalrebellion。
Allinsurrection，theobjectofwhichwastosuppressanofficeofexciseestablishedunderalawoftheUnitedStates，andthemarchingwithapartyinarmstothehouseoftheexciseofficer，andcommittingactsofviolenceandoutragethere，withaviewbyforceandintimidationtopreventtheexecutionofthelaw，hasbeenheldtoamounttoalevyingofwaragainsttheUnitedStates。2AconspiracytosubvertbyforcethegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，violentlytodismembertheUnion，tocoercerepealofagenerallaw，ortorevolutionizeaterritorialgovernmentbyforce，ifcarriedintoeffect，byembodyingandassemblingamilitarybodyinamilitaryposture，isanovertactoflevyingwar；
andnotonlythosewhobeararms，butthosewhoperformthevariousandessentialpartswhichmustbeassignedtodifferentpersons，forthepurposeofprosecutingthewar，areguiltyofthecrime。3
Similaractscommittedagainstthelawsorgovernmentofaparticularstate，arepunishableaccordingtothelawsofthatstate，butdonotamounttotreasonagainsttheUnitedStates；andontheotherhand，incaseofawarbetweentheUnitedStatesandaforeignnation，adheringtosuchforeignnation，andgivingthemaidandcomfortintheprosecutionofthewar，amountstotreasonagainsttheUnitedStates，andnotagainstthestateofwhichthepartyisacitizen。4
Therestrictionsaredictatedbyaspiritofhumanity。Nopersonshallbeconvictedofthiscrime，unlessonthetestimonyoftwowitnessestothesameovertact，oronconfessioninopencourt。Aconfessionoutofcourt，althoughbeforeamagistrate，isnotsufficient；butaftertheovertactoftreasonisprovedbytwowitnesses，itmaybegiveninevidencebywayofcorroboration。5Thetestimonyofthetwowitnessesmustbetothesameovertact，andnot，asinEnglanditmaybe，totwodifferentactsofthesamespeciesoftreason。
Itisnotwithinthescopeofthisworktonoticeallthelegislativeprovisionswhichhavesincebeenmadeinrespecttotrialsfortreason；
itissufficienttosay，thattheypursuethesameliberalandhumanespiritforthepurposeofaffordingtotheaccusedtheutmostlatitudeofdefence，butincaseofhisconviction，congress，whichhasthepowertodeclarethepunishmentshasimposedthatofdeath。Buttheforfeitureoflifeisnot，withus，aggravatedbyrefinedanduselesscruelty。WhocanreadwithouthorrorthepunishmentsofRavaillacandDamiens，orthesentences，inmoderntimesdeemedtoobarbaroustobeenforced，againsttraitorsinEngland?
Therestrictiononcongressinrespecttothepunishmentis，thatnoattainderoftreasonshallworkcorruptionofblood，orforfeiture，exceptduringthelifeofthepersonattainted。
CorruptionofbloodisderivedfromthecommonlawofEngland，andsignifiesthatanattaintedpersoncanneitherinheritlandfromhisancestors，norretainwhatheisinpossessionof，nortransmititbydescenttohisheirs，norshallanypersonmaketitlebydescentthroughhim，thoughfromamoreremoteancestor。
Inrespecttotheforfeiture，themeaningseemstobe，thatcongressshallnotimposeaforfeiturebeyondthetermoftheoffender\'slife，butitmaybeabolishedaltogether，andinthissense，ithasbeenunderstoodandactedoninthelaw，forthepunishmentofcertaincrimesagainsttheUnitedStates，passedonthe30thofApril，1790，thelanguageofwhichisasfollows:?noconvictionorjudgmentforanyoftheoffencesaforesaid，inwhichareincludedtreason，murder，robbery，piracy，andothercrimes，shallworkcorruptionofbloodoranyforfeitureofestate。
Butafuturelegislatureisneitherboundtoenforcethishumanepartoftheact，nortocontinueotherpartswhichbearthecastofsomeseverity。
Theimmediateforfeitureofthepossessionsofanoffender，althoughitshardshipincapitalcasesisfelt，notbyhimself，butbyhisfamilyreducedtowant，hasbeenvindicatedonthesupposition，thatitwouldtendtosetthepaternalfeelingsinmotiononthesideofthecommonwealth；acerbum，saysCiceroinalettertoBrutus，parentumscelerafiliorumpoenislui，sedhocpreclarelegibuscomparatumest，utcaritasliberorumamicitioresparentesreipublicæ；redderet。
Andsuchconsiderationsmayhavesomeeffect；butthedepravitythatleadstothehazardoflife，seldomrefrainsfromthecommissionofcrimebyadvertingtothesufferingsofchildren。Thebadcitizenismostcommonlyabadparent。
Theafflictionfeltbysuchnearrelations，bothfortheguiltandthelossoftheparent，isunreasonablyaggravatedbytheirbeingthussubjectedtopartake，thoughinadifferentform，ofthepunishmentinflicted，when，incommonwiththeirfellowcitizens，theymayhavesincerelyabhorredthecrime。
Butwhileinthisparticular，opinionhasbeendivided，allseemtohavecondemned，andmanytohavebeenatalosstoaccountfortheextensionofthispenalprincipletothedestructionofthepowertoinheritthroughthepersonattainted。
Wecannotbereconciledtoit，bybeingtoldthatpropertybeingthecreatureofsociety，wehavenorighttocomplainofthemannerinwhichitisregulated，6for，onsuchgrounds，themostunjustlawsmightbedefended。
Butwemayaccountforitsoriginfromaformerstateofsociety，whichhasbeengreatlyalteredinmoderntimes。Itisanancientfeudalprinciple，thatwherethereisnoinheritableblood，thelandshallescheattothelordofthefee。Applying，orratherpervertingthedoctrineofpresentforfeituretotheincapacityoftakingbydescent，wasthefirstandveryeasystepinaprocess，bywhichallthatwouldhavevestedinthecriminal，becamethepropertyofthelord。Theavidityofthelord，whichwasthusgratified，castaboutforstillmorepreyandastheattainderoftheoffenderremovedhimfrombeingtheimmediateobjectofadescent，theprinciple，itwasfound，couldalsobesuccessfullyappliedtohisbeingthechannelthroughwhichothersmightinherit。Ifthegrandfather，aftertheattainderofthesonfortreasonorfelony，diedseizedoflandandintestate，thegrandsoncouldnotinherit，becausehecouldnotbehisheir，ashewasnottheheirofhisownfather。Byafictionengraftedonthesubstantialpunishmentofthefather，thegrandfatherwasconsideredasdyingwithoutheirs，andhislandsalsoescheatedtothelord。
Thusthedoctrineisresolvedintoanodiousfiction，foundedonacompoundofcrueltyandavarice，springingfromaperversionofthesystemoftenures，andatvariancewiththeliberalprinciplesofmoderntimesandtheveryelementsofjustice。
HaditbeenprohibitedbytheConstitutioninregardtoalloffenceswhatever，itwouldhavemeritedpublicapprobation。
1。Ifthisprovisionhadnotbeenmade，thestatecourtswouldnothaverefusedtosustainsuchprosecutions。Seepostch。xxix。
2。UnitedStatesv。Vigol，2Dallas，346。UnitedStatesv。Mitchell，ib。348。
3。4Cranch，470。Unitedstatesv。
Burretal。
4。Lynch\'scaseinNewYork，11
Johnson，553。
5。UnitedStatesv。Fries，printedreportofthetrial，p。171。
6。Considerationsonthelawofforfeitures，attributedtoCharlesYorke。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIICHAPTERXII。OFTHEEXECUTIVEPOWER。INtheformationofarepublicthereisperhapsnopartmoredifficultthantherightconstitutionoftheexecutiveauthority。Thethreequalitiesofpromptness，vigour，andresponsibility，oughttobecombinedinit。Inthetwootherbranches，moredeliberationisnecessary。Whethertomakelawsortoexpoundthem，themotionsshould，ingeneral，beslowandcautious。Theactsofeither，whenconstitutionallyconsummate，areobligatoryonthose，whoseduty，itistoenforcethem。Theofficeofexecutingalaw，excludestherighttojudgeofit，andofcoursedoesnotrequirethattheexecutivepowershouldconcurinopiniononitsutility。Whenthemeaningandintentionofthelegislatureareascertained，andthelawitselfisconstitutional，delayintheexecutionofitisculpable。Thepublic，whichmayblamethelegislator，requiresoftheexecutiveofficertocarryitintoeffect，becausetosubverttheorderofgovernment，isoneofthegreatestevilsthatcanbefallit。Everyindividualisboundtoobeythelaw，howeverobjectionableitmayappeartohim:theexecutivepowerisboundnotonlytoobey，buttoexecuteit。Tohesitate，todelay，perhapstolosethepropermomentofaction，wouldapproachtoentiredisobedience。Apromptsubmissiontothelaw，andanimmediatepreparationtoenforceit，arethereforeabsolutelynecessaryinrelationtotheauthorityfromwhichthelawhasemanated。Butwemustalsoconsiderthisqualityinrespecttoitseffect。Theoperationofalaw，wheneverthetimeofactinguponithasarrived，shouldbeimmediateanddecisive。Thelawisapowerofwhichtheforceandexistenceshouldneverbeunfeltorforgotten。LikethepillarwhichledtheIsraelitesthroughthewilderness，itshouldalwaysbeinsight。Thecommonwealthinwhichitspre-eminenceisnotconstantlypresenttothemind，isindanger。Butthesensationofitscontinuedpresence，anduncontrollablepower，willbegreatlyweakened，iftimeissufferedtoelapsewithoutnecessity，afteritsactionoughttotakeplace。
Ongeneralpoliticalprinciplestherefore，asdelayisreprehensible，promptnessisaduty，thenon-performanceofwhichmayenabletransgressorstoescape。Forthisreason，itisbothwiseandhumanethattheexecutionoflawsshouldbespeedy；thatis，thatnounreasonableintervalshouldbeallowedbetweentheviolationofthelawandtheadoptionofsuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoenforceit。
Forthispurposetheexecutivemustalsobeendowedwithsufficientenergy。Ithasbeenjustlysaidthatafeebleexecutiveimpliesafeebleexecutionofthegovernment。Afeebleexecutionisbutanotherphraseforabadexecution；andagovernmentillexecuted，whateveritmaybeintheory，mustinpractice，beabadgovernment。1ItisinfactonlybytheexecutionoftheConstitutionandthelaws，thatthetruevalueofeitherisknown。Iftheyareleftasdeadletters，theyconfernobenefit，andavertnoevil。Principleswithoutpracticeareliketheintentionsofanindividualwithoutacts。Anenergyofaction，dulyproportionedtotheexigenciesthatarise，mustbeseatedintheexecutivepower。Theproportionofthepowertotheoccasionsthatareexpectedtorequireitsuse，shouldbeasexactaspossible。Ifitfallsshort，theevilswehavealreadyadvertedtowillensue；ifitexceedsthem，thelibertyofthepeopleisendangered。Itisdifficulttoadoptgeneralexpressionsexactlydescriptiveoftheproperextentandlimitationofthispower。
PerhapsthosewefindintheConstitutionareascompetentasanythatcouldbeapplied。\"Thepresidentshalltakecarethatthelawsshallbefaithfullyexecuted。\"Thesimplicityofthelanguageaccordswiththegeneralcharacteroftheinstrument。Itdeclareswhatishisduty，anditgiveshimnopowerbeyondit。TheConstitution，treaties，andactsofcongress，aredeclaredtobethesupremelawoftheland。Heisboundtoenforcethem；ifheattemptstocarryhispowerfurther，heviolatestheConstitution。
Butalthoughanexactspecificationofthemannerinwhichtheexecutivepowershallbeexercised，isnot，andcouldnotbeintroducedinto，theConstitution，althoughitwouldbeatonceunnecessaryandimpossibletodefineallthemodesinwhichitmaybeexecuted，yettheauxiliarymeansarenotwhollyomitted，andwillbenoticedafterwehaveconsideredthecompositionoftheexecutive。
Insomerepublics，thefearofevilfromasinglehead，hasledtothecreationofcouncilsandothersubdivisionsoftheexecutivepower，andtheconsequentimbecilityanddistractionsofthosegovernmentshaveprobablycontributedtoleadmostofthenationsofEuropetothepreferencegiventomonarchies。Itwasfalselyconceivedthattovesttheexecutivepowerinasingleperson，wasinconsistentwiththenatureofarepublic，oritwassupposedthatarepublicsoconstitutedcouldnotlongretainitsfreedom，againsttheambitiousviews，andalarmingdominationofasinglemagistrate。ButinAmerica，neitherthefervourofrepublicanprinciples，northeodiumofmonarchy，theninhostilearrayagainstus，overpoweredthecalmanddeliberateexerciseofasoundjudgmentinthisrespect，andineverystatebutone，theunityoftheexecutivepowerwasadoptedasaprinciple。Pennsylvaniaalone，whoseoriginalconstitutionhassincebeenalteredbythepeople，createdanexecutivecouncil，formedofamemberfromeachcounty，andwehaveheretoforenoticeditsfeeblenessandinefficiencyonadistressingoccasion。2
Theexperienceofnearlyhalfacenturyinrespecttothesestategovernments；
theexperienceofupwardsofathirdofacenturyinrespecttotheUnitedStatesgovernment，evincethatunderproperregulationsnoabuseofsuchpowersistobefeared。Limitedandrestrainedasthepresidentis，creatureofthepeople，andsubjecttothelaw，withallpowertodoright，hepossessesnonetodowrong；hisgeneralresponsibilitybybeingundivided，iscomplete，hisliabilitytoimpeachment，byaccusers，inwhoseappointmenthehasnoshare，beforeacourtwhichhedoesnotcreate，bothemanatingfromthesamesourcetowhichheoweshisownexistence；histermofofficeexactlylimited，hisofficialpowerentirelygonethemomentthatofhissuccessorcommences，orthemomentwhenthesenateshallpassonhimasentenceofdeprivationofoffice；hisonlysafetyconsistsindoingwhatisright；hisspeedyandcertaindestitutionwouldfollowacontraryconduct。
1。Fed。No。70。
2。P。108。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIIICHAPTERXIII。OFTHEMEANSPROVIDEDFORTHEPERFORMANCEOFTHEEXECUTIVEDUTIES。AMONGthemeansprovidedtoenablethepresidenttoperformhispublicduties，thecommandofthemilitaryforcewillfirstbeconsidered。
TheprincipalclausesintheConstitutionwhichaffectthesubjectarethefollowing:?
TheCongressshallhavepowertoraiseandsupportarmies，toprovideandmaintainanavy，tomakerulesforthegovernmentandregulationofthearmy，thenavy，andalsoofthemilitia，whenthelatterareintheserviceoftheUnitedStates。
Thepresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofthearmyandnavy，andofthemilitiaoftheseveralstateswhencalledintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates。
Thesearethemodesofactionexpresslyprovidedfortheexecutivemagistrate，wheneverhisfunctionsassumeamilitarycast。Inrelationtothoseofanaturemerelycivil，theConstitutionissilent，becauseparticulardescriptionwouldnotbeequallypracticable，andhenceasbeforeobserved，congressisempoweredtopasssuchlawsasmayberequisiteandproperforcarryingintoexecutionthepowersvestedintheofficersofgovernment。
Subordinateofficesarethereforecreatedbycongresswhennecessary，whosefunctionsareeitherexpresslydefined，orimpliedfromthenatureoftheoffice，orleftwhollyorinparttothedirectionofthepresident。
Butthemilitarypowerisatpresenttobeconsidered，andthis，itappears，consistsoftwoclasses；first，thosewhoareregularlyretainedonstipulatedcompensationstoserveinthearmyornavy，andsecondly，themilitiawhoarecalledforthasoccasionmayrequire，butwheninservicearesubjecttothesameregulationsasregulartroops。
Onthenatureandcharacterofthefirst，littleneedsatpresenttobesaid。Thecautionthatnoappropriationofmoneyforthesupportofanarmyforalongertermthantwoyearshasbeenmentioned。Themannerofemploymentmaybedirectedbycongress，orconfidedtothepresident。
Congress，whichmaydirectwhenandwherefortsshallbebuilt，mayalsoprescribethattheyshallbegarrisonedeitherwithspecificnumbers，orwithsuchanumberasthepresidentmaythinkproper。Sointimesofpeace，troopsmaybestationedbycongressinparticularpartsoftheUnitedStates，havingavieweithertotheirhealthandeasysubsistence，ortothesecurityofdistantandfrontierstations；butduringtheemergenciesofawar，whenthedefenceofthecountryiscastonthepresident，anddangersnotforeseenmayrequiremeasuresofdefencenotprovidedfor，thepresidentwouldcertainlybejustifiedinpreferringtheexecutionofhisconstitutionalduties，totheliteralobedienceofalaw，theoriginalobjectofwhichwasoflessvitalimportancethanthatcreatedbysubsequentexigencies，andtherecanbenodoubt，thatthisnecessarypowerwouldextendtotheerectingofnewfortresses，andtotheabandoningofthoseerectedbyorderofcongress，aswellastotheconcentration，divisionorotherlocalemploymentofthetroops，whichinhisjudgmentorthatoftheofficersunderhiscommand，becameexpedientfromcircumstances。Thiswouldnotbeaviolationoftheruleslaiddownintheprecedingpages，sincetheobligationofthelawislostinthesuccessionofcausesthatpreventitsoperation，andtheConstitutionitselfmaybeconsideredasthussupersedingit。
Thepowerofthepresidentoverthemilitiadependsonthesameprinciple；
thenecessarysupplyofthemeanstoenablehimtoperformhisexecutiveduties。
Inapeoplepermittedandaccustomedtobeararms，wehavetherudimentsofamilitia，whichproperlyconsistsofarmedcitizens，dividedintomilitarybands，andinstructedatleastinpartintheuseofarmsforthepurposesofwar。Theirciviloccupationsarenotrelinquished，exceptwhiletheyareactuallyinthefield，andtheinconvenienceofwithdrawingthemfromtheiraccustomedlabours，abridgesthetimerequiredformilitaryinstruction。
Militiathereforeneveramounttoperfectsoldiers，unlessthepublicexigenciesshallhavekeptthemsolongtogetherastoabsorbthecivil，inthemilitarycharacter。
Thehumanmindisofanaturesoflexible，thatitmaybyperseverance，bedisciplinedtoresults，whichatfirstviewwouldbedeemedalmostimpossible。
Thefearofdeathiscertainlyoneoftheearliest，andmostnaturalpassions；
yetinawellregulatedarmy，itgiveswaytothefearofdisgrace；andthesoldierbecomesmoreapprehensiveofthedispleasureofhiscommanders，thanofthefireoftheenemy。Anothersortofmechanismalsocontributestoactuateadisciplinedarmy；itisthevoluntaryandentiresurrenderofitsownjudgmenttothatofthecommander。Obediencewouldbeslowanduncertain，ifthesoldierwastoallowhimselftoreflectontheproprietyoftheordersgiven:heishabituatedtodeemthemright，merelybecausetheyareorders，andfromthecommonsoldiertothehighestsubordinateofficer，nootherruleisknownthanthatofimplicitobedience。Theconfidencethusreposedisnotofapersonalnature；itdoesnotdependmerelyonthecharacteroftheindividualincommand。Ifthecommandershouldfallduringanengagement，itisimmediatelytransferredtohissuccessor，whoonhispart，atonceassumesthesuspendedfacultyofdecidingwhatispropertobedone，inlieuoftheimplicitobediencewithoutinquiry，underwhichtillthatmomenthehadacted。Thisatfirstviewappearsinconsistentwithindividualfreedomandindependence，andhenceitisthatmilitiaaresystematicallylesstractablethanregulartroops。Devotedpatriotismandpersonalcourage，althoughtheyfrequentlyproducefeatsofexaltedmen，areinsufficientforthecombinationsofanarmy。TheconquestsoftheMacedonianAlexandermayeasilybeaccountedforonthisground；hehadreceivedfromhisfatherPhilipthefirstregulararmyofwhichwehaveanaccountinhistory，andwiththesehefearlesslyadvancedintodistantcountries，andsuccessivelydefeatedimmensemultitudesofthePersianandIndianmilitia，amongwhomthereweredoubtlessmuchindividualbravery，andstrongdesiresofdefendingtheircountry。1
Butnotwithstandingtheirinferioritytosoldiersschooledandpractisedinthefield，gallantactionshavebeenperformedbyourmilitiacollectively。
ThecaptureofanentirearmyunderGeneralBurgoynein1777，andthecelebrateddefenceofNewOrleansin1814，werechieflyeffectedbymilitia。
Buthoweverinferiorinmilitaryestimatetoarmiesregularlytrained，themilitiaconstitutesoneofthegreatbulwarksofthenation，andnothingwhichtendstoimproveandsupportitshouldbeneglected。
Thepowergiventocongressoveritisfromitsnatureexclusive，totheextentthatitiscarriedintheConstitution。
Duringthelatewar，aconstructionofthispartoftheConstitutionwasgiveninahighlyrespectablestate，whichexcitednosmalluneasinessatthetime，andoughtnottobepassedoverinsilence。Theactofcongressdeclaringwartookplaceonthe18thofJune，1812，andthepresidentwasexpresslyauthorizedbytheacttousethewholelandandnavalforcestocarryitintoeffect。Ordersweresoonafterwardsissuedbyhimforcallingoutcertainportionsofthemilitiafromeachstate。TheopinionsofthejudgesofthesupremejudicialcourtofMassachusettswererequiredbythegovernor，andthreeofthemintheabsenceoftheothers，declaredtheirsentimentsthatthecommanderinchiefofthemilitiaofastatehadarighttodecidewhetherornottheexigenciestowarrantthecallexisted。Ofcourse，thatwhateverwerethedeclarationsofcongress，orthecoursepursuedbythepresident，ifthegovernorofastatethoughtdifferently；ifhethoughttherewasnowar，noinsurrection，noinvasion，hewasnotobligedtoobeysuchrequisitions。Thegovernorexpressedthesameopinioninamessagetothelegislature；andalineofconductwasadopted，greatlytendingtoimpairtheenergiesofthecountry，andencouragethehopesoftheenemy。
Theapprehensionprofessedwas，thatifcongressbydeterminingthatthosespecialcasesexisted，couldatanytimecallforththewholeofthemilitiaandsubjectthemtothecommandofthepresident，itmightproducea\"militaryconsolidationofthestates，\"withoutanyconstitutionalremedy。AndthatundertheactofFebruary28th，1795，themilitiaoftheseveralstateswouldbeinfactathiscommandatanytimewhenhethoughtproper，whethertheexigencyexistedornot。2
ButwhateverweightmighthavebeenfoundinsuchobjectionsagainstadoptingtheConstitution，theyceasedwhenitwasadopted。Itwasthenthechoiceofthepeopletoreposethisconfidenceincongresstoenablethemtoprovideforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。Ifithadbeenthoughtnecessarytoimposeanycheckorcontrol；ifinoppositiontothewholespiritoftheinstrument，ithadbeendeemedexpedienttodisunitethesystem，byrequiringtheconcurrenceofthestates，itcouldundoubtedlyhavebeensoexpressed，andinthisrespectatleastweshouldnothaveadvancedastepbeyondtheimbecilityoftheoldgovernment。NothingwouldbemorelikelytoenfeebletheUnionthantohavesubjectedtherightofexercisingthesepowerstothegovernors，oreventhelegislaturesofthedifferentstates，someofwhichmightholdoneopinion，andsomeinsistuponanother；anditisbynomeansclearthatthepeopledidnotapprehendagreaterdangerofabuseofconfidencefromthegovernorandlegislatureofastate，thanfromthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。
TheactofFebruary28th，1795，certainlyvestsinthepresidentalonethepowertocalloutandemploythemilitia，withoutwaitingfor，orpointingoutanyparticularmodebywhichtheevidenceofthenecessityforitshallbefurnished。Theformeracthadrequiredthatbeforethemilitiawascalledouttosuppressaninsurrection，acertificateshouldbegiventothepresidentbyanassociatejudgeofthesupremecourt，orthejudgeofthedistrictcourt，thatthelawsoftheUnitedStateswereopposedbycombinationstoopowerfultobesuppressedbytheordinarycourseofjudicialproceedings，&；c。Butbesidestheincongruityofthusrequiringmembersofthejudicialauthoritytodecideinthismanneruponfacts，itwasshiftingaresponsibilityfromtheproperofficer，thepresident，andthrowingituponthosewhowerelessamenable，ifamenableatall，insuchacase。Thesecondact，therefore，veryproperlyleavesitwiththepresidenttodetermineontheexigencywhichshallauthorizethemeasure。Powersoseriousandimportant，itwasbelievedwouldnotbelightlyorprematurelyexercisedbyhim。HewhoischargedwithexecutingthelawsoftheUnion，isnaturallythebestapprizedofresistancetothem，andforhisownjustificationhewilltakecaretobepreparedwithadequateproofofthefact。
Inrespecttoforeigninvasion，itspublicnotoriety，whenitactuallytakesplace，rendersnoformofevidencenecessary，andhispoweronsuchanoccasiontocallforththemilitia，notmerelyofthestateinvaded，butfromotherparts，toassistinrepellinganenemy，who，bythetermsandspiritofourConstitution，istheenemyofthewhole，issurelytoosalutarytobedenied。Ofthedangerofaninvasionbeforeithappens，noonecanbeabetterjudgethanhe，who，beingchargedwithallourforeignrelations，mustbethebestinformedoftheproceedingsofforeignpowers。
Butinthecaseofwaractuallydeclaredbylaw，itisdifficulttoconceiveevenaplausibledoubt。Thelawitselfconstitutesthefact，andunlessitshouldbeseriouslycontendedthatcongresswasbound，beforeitdeclaredwar，toobtaintheconsentoftheseveralstates，therecanbenopretenceforsayingthatthecommandersinchiefofthemilitiaintheseveralstateswerenotrequiredorauthorizedbytheConstitutiontoobeyhismilitaryorders。
Itfortunatelyhappenedthatnomilitaryoperationsofaseriouscharacteroccurredinthatpartofthecountryduringthewar。Ifaninvasioninmuchforcehadtakenplace，theprobabilityis，thatwithapaternaldisregardoftheseunconstitutionalopinions，thepresidentwouldhaveemployedtheforceoftheUniontorepelit，andthetemporaryexhibitionoflocaljealousy，wouldhavebeenlostinthesenseofthenecessityofacommonexertion，andthegratitudefortheaidwhichproducedasuccessfuldefence。
Asitistheonlyinstanceinwhichaconstructionhostiletothefullexerciseofthepresident\'sauthorityhasbeendistinctlyavowed，andasitpresentstheopportunityofshortlyelucidatingthispartoftheConstitution，theauthorhasfeltitadutytotakesomenoticeofit，thoughwithoutthesmallestintentiontoreviveheats，nowhappilyextinguished。
Thegovernorsoftheseveralstatesarecommandersinchiefoftheirmilitia，exceptwhentheyshallbecalledintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates。Infixingthemomentwhenthispoweroverthemceases，andthatofthepresidentcommences，thelanguageusedinsomeofthestateconstitutions，andintheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，isthesame。
Thecallingintoactualservice，andnottheactualcommencementoftheservice，istheperiodalludedto，anditwouldinsomedegreeimpairtheenergeticpower，whichintimesofpublicdangeristobeexercisedbythepresident，ifhepossessednorighttoenforceobediencetothecall。
Itmaythereforebedoubted，whetheranactofCongresspostponingthecommencementofthepresident\'sauthoritytillthemilitiashallhaveobeyedthecall，isperfectlyconsistentwiththeConstitution。Thelegislaturecannomoreabridge，thanitcanenlargetheexecutivepowers，undertheConstitution。Thisquestionwasdiscussed，butnotdirectlydecidedinthecaseofHoustonv。Moore。3
ThepresidentduringthewarhadcalleduponthestateofPennsylvania，aswellasonotherstates，foraportionofthemilitia。Apersonwhowasdraughtedforthatpurpose，disobeyedthesummonsandwasfinedbyacourtmartialheldundertheauthorityofanactofassemblyofPennsylvania。
Themainquestionwas，whetherthecourtmartialoughttohavebeenconvenedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，orofthestate。Theactsofcongressof28thFebruary，1776，andofthe10thApril，1814，weremuchconsidered。Itwasheldthatcongressnothavinglegislatedonthesubjectofholdingcourtsmartialinsuchcases，anactofthestatelegislaturetothateffectwasconstitutional。The10thsectionofthelatterprovidesfortheexpenseofmarchingthemilitiatotheplaceofrendezvous。Immediatelyonarrivingthere，theyareundoubtedlyinactualservice，andifintheirwaytoittheyareunderanymilitarycommandwhatever，itmustbethatofthepresident。
Circumstancesmayrenderitnecessaryforthepresidenttoappointanotherplaceofrendezvous，beforethatpreviouslyappointedhasbeenreached，andmilitaryoperationsmay，fromachangeoftheenemy\'sposition，becomenecessaryevenonthemarch；surelyinanysuchcase，themilitarypowerofthepresidentaloneoughttobeexercisedoverthem。Considerationsofeconomyinrespecttotheirpayoughtinsuchcasestobedisregarded。
Acasewhichin1818wasdecidedinthesupremecourtofPennsylvania，supportsmostoftheseprinciples，andisnotatvariancewithanyofthem。
ThathighlyrespectablecourtadoptedthefollowingconstructionoftheConstitutionandthepowersofcongressunderit。Thepresidenthasarighttoissuehisordersforcallingoutthemilitia，notthroughthemediumofthegovernoronly，butdirectlytoanyofficerhethinksproper。Ifhemakesarequisitiononthegovernorinthefirstinstance，andthelatterdeclinestocomplywithit，thepresidentmayissuehiscommandtoanyofficerofthemilitia。Thegovernorisnotjustifiedindisobeyingtherequisition，becausehediffersinopinionastothenecessityofcallingforththemilitia。Thegovernorwithouttheauthorityofcongress，orofthestatelegislature，hasnorighttodirectcourtsmartialaffectingthosewhodisobeythecallofthepresident。Apersonenrolled，draughted，andregularlynotifiedwhenandwheretoattendformusterandinspection，isliabletoapenaltyonthejudgmentofacourtmartialconstitutedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates?althoughsuchperson，beforeheappearsattheplaceofrendezvous，maynotbejustlyconsideredasinactualservice。Thecallingforthmustprecedetheactualservice。ItwouldrendertheConstitutionadeadletter，tosupposethathewhoisenrolledanddraughted，butrefusestoappear，shallbeexemptedfrompunishmentbecausehehasrefused。Itisnoinfringementoftherightsofcitizenstoproceedtothetrialofdelinquentmilitia-menbycourtsmartial。4TheregulartroopsoftheUnitedStatesareundertheimmediatecommandofthepresidentfromthetimeoftheirenlistment；theymaybemarchedto，orstationedatanypartoftheUnitedStates，athisdiscretion，unlesspreventedbysomespeciallegislativeact:Andalthoughthegeniusofarepublicandthepeculiarcharacterofourcountrywouldindicatethattheiremploymentshouldbeonlyinitsdefence，yetsinceadefensivewarissometimesbestcarriedonbyinvadingtheterritoryoftheaggressor，thepresidentmaycausethemtobemarchedoutoftheUnitedStatestoeffectthispurpose，andtherecanbenodoubt，thatinsuchacase，hewouldpossessthesamepoweroverthemilitia。
Itmayperhapsbemadeaquestion，whetherforthesuppressionofinsurrection，andincasesofasimilarnature，thepresidentcanemploytheregulartroopsinaidofthecivilauthority。Theactsofcongressaresilentonthesubject，andnopowergivenbythemwouldbevalidunlessitcouldbesupportedbytheprinciplesoftheConstitution。Itmustbeadmittedtobeaquestionofgreatdelicacyandimportance。Nopowerissolikelytobeabusedasthecommandofaregulararmy?nomeasurewouldbe，moredangeroustocivillibertythananhabitualrecurrencetomilitaryforceinothercasesthanactualwar；yetontheotherhand，intimesofdangerouscommotion，whenlawisprostratedandthecivilpowerisfelttobeinadequate，thepublicgoodwouldappeartojustifythemostpromptandefficientremedy。
Soldiersdonotceasetobecitizensbybeingincorporatedintoaregulararmy，anditisthedutyofeverycitizenincasesofthissort，torenderhisbestservicestohiscountry。Itcanbenoobjectiontothefulfilmentofthisduty，thatitisrenderedmoreefficaciousbypreviousdiscipline，andbybeingperformedinaregularandnotadesultorymanner。Itis，however，alwaystobekeptinmind，thatthemilitaryshouldbesubordinatetothecivilpower。Theordersfortheemploymentofthisforceonsuchoccasionsmustemanatefromthepresidentinhiscivilcapacity，orfromcivilofficersoftheUnitedStates，possessingtheauthorityofconservatorsofthepeace，ifanysuchtherebe。
Thattheexerciseofthispowershouldbeattendedwithgreatcaution，noonewilldeny；realnecessityalonewilljustifyitsbeingexercisedatall。Therecanbenodoubtthat，ifitoccasionedthelossofhumanlife，thewholemeasurewouldbeliabletoseverejudicialscrutiny。
1。HowwellthisisexplainedbyAdamSmithinhisWealthofNations，vol。3。p。56。
2。See8Mass。Reports，551。Niles\'Reg。
vol。3，116。
3。8Wheaton，p。1，and3Serg。&；
Rawle，169。
4。3Sergeant&；Rawle，590。Duffieldv。Smith。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIVCHAPTERXIV。OFTHEAPPOINTMENTTOOFFICES。INadditiontothepoweroverthearmy，navy，andmilitia，alreadynoticed，thepresidenthasaqualifiedpowerofappointingtheexecutiveandjudicialofficers。Theformeroftheseareheldduringhispleasure；thelatterduringgoodbehaviour。Inrespecttoboth，thecommissionsaregrantedbythepresident，buttheyspecifythatitisbyandwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenate。Itwasdeemedexpedientthattheapprobationofthesenateshouldbegiven，unlessavacancyhappenedduringitsrecess，inwhichcasecommissionsaregrantedwhichexpireattheendofthenextsession。
Itmay，however，bequestioned，whetherthisrestraintonthepowerofthepresidentfullycorrespondswiththeconfidencewhichisotherwisereposedinhim，andwhetheritdoesnotinsomedegreeaffecttheresponsibilitytopublicopinionwhichwouldaccompanyanunlimitedpowerofappointments。
Ifitwereleftentirelytohimselftoselectsuchagentsashemightdeemqualifiedforpublicduties，hewouldofcoursebescrupulousinhischoice；butifasenate，eitheractuatedbypartymotives，orforwantofinformationofthefitnessoftheindividual，rejectsthenomination，notonlymaythepublicinterestssufferintheimmediatecase，butthepresidentbeimpelledtoinadequatesubstitutions。Itistrue，thattheconverseofthispropositionmayalsobeadmitted。Impropernominations，proceedingfrompersonalorpartyinfluence，maybeproperlyrejectedbyavirtuousandinflexiblesenate；butinthelattercase，ifitevershouldbeourmisfortunetohaveamansoactuated，inpossessionofthishighoffice，wemayseehimimmediatelyaftertherisingofthesenate，dismisstheincumbent，orincaseoftheirrejectingonenomination，withholdinganother，andavailinghimselfofthepowertoappointduringtherecess。
Itwould，therefore，appearuponthewhole，thatwiththepossibilityofanevasionwhichwouldrendertheconstitutionalprovisionsoentirelynugatory，itwouldhavebeenmorebeneficialtohaveleftthispowerinthepresidentwithoutrestraint，andthemoreso，astheconsentofthesenateisnotrequiredforthedismissionoftheofficer。
Itwouldbeimpropertopassovertheconstructiongivenbythesenatetothepowerofappointingduringtheirrecess。Ithasbeenheldbythatvenerablebody，thatifnewofficesarecreatedbycongress，thepresidentcannotaftertheadjournmentofthesenate，makeappointmentstofillthem。
Thevacanciesdonothappenduringtherecessofthesenate。1
Thetextisnotveryexplicitastotheofficerswhoseappointmentsrequiretheconsentofthesenate:itenumeratesambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls，judgesofthesupremecourt，andallotherofficersoftheUnitedStates，whoseappointmentsarenotthereinotherwiseprovidedfor，andwhichshallbeestablishedbylaw；butthecongressmaybylawvesttheappointmentofsuchinferiorofficersastheythinkproperinthepresidentalone，inthecourtsoflaw，orintheheadsofdepartments。
Theterm\"inferior\"issomewhatvague，anditisperhapslefttocongresstodeterminehowtoapplyit；iftheydonototherwisedirect，theconsentofthesenateisnecessaryunderthequalificationsdescribed。
Aproperselectionandappointmentofsubordinateofficers，isoneofthestrongestmarksofapowerfulmind。Itisadutyofthepresidenttoacquire，asfaraspossible，anintimateknowledgeofthecapacitiesandcharactersofhisfellowcitizens；todisregardtheimportunitiesoffriends；
thehintsormenacesofenemies；thebiasofparty，andthehopeofpopularity。
Thelatterissometimestherefugeoffeeble-mindedmen，butitsgleamistransientifitisobtainedbyaderelictionofhonestdutyandsounddiscretion。Popularfavourisbestsecuredbycarefullyascertainingandstrictlypursuingthetrueinterestsofthepeople。Thepresidenthimselfiselectedonthesuppositionthatheisthemostcapablecitizentounderstandandpromotethoseinterests，andineveryappointmentheoughttoconsiderhimselfasexecutingapublictrustofthesamenature。
Neithershouldthefearofgivingoffencetothepublic，orpaintotheindividual，deterhimfromtheimmediateexerciseofhispowerofremovalonproofofincapacityorinfidelityinthesubordinateofficer。Thepublic，uninformedofthenecessity，maybesurprised，andatfirstdissatisfied；
butpublicapprobationultimatelyaccompaniesthefearlessanduprightdischargeofduty。Ontheotherhand，hastyandcapriciousdismissionsfromofficeareequallyreprehensible。Althoughtheofficermaybedependentonthepleasureofthepresident，asounddiscretionisexpectedtoregulatethatpleasure。Themotivestoattainadegreeofexcellenceintheknowledgeandperformanceofofficialdutiesaregreatlyabated，ifthetenureisrenderedaltogetheruncertain；andifhewhobyindustry，capacity，andfidelity，hasprovedhimselfausefulservantofthepublic，iscauselesslyremoved，thepublicwillhavemuchreasontocomplain。
Amodeofproceedingisinterwovenwiththemilitaryorganizationofgreatbenefittothesoundconstitutionofthearmy。Althoughthepresidentisunquestionablyauthorizedtodepriveanymilitaryofficerofhiscommissionatpleasure，yettheestablishedpracticeis，toallowtheindividual，whoseconducthasgivendissatisfaction，anopportunityofexplainingandvindicatingit，bymeansofaregulartribunal，beforehe，isdismissed，suspended，orevenreproved。Thesameusageprevailsinthenavy。Thusasort，oftenureduringgoodbehavourisproduced，theeffectofwhich，withmenofintegrity，iseminentlyuseful。Inthediversifiedemploymentsofcivillife，nosimilarinstitutioncouldbesystematicallyadopted，andafullanalogy，therefore，cannotexist；butifwesometimesseeintherevolutionsofparty，aswellinothercountriesasinthis，wholehostsofmeritoriousofficerssuddenlysweptaway，andtheirplacesfilledbymenwithoutsuperiorqualifications，wemayregretthattheprincipleislostsightof，andthatnoremedycanbeapplied。
Fourexecutivedepartmentshavebeencreatedbycongressatdifferenttimes。Thedepartmentofstate?ofthetreasury?ofwar?andofthenavy?overeachofwhichaprincipalofficer，denominatedthesecretary，presides。Throughoneoftheseorgans，thedirectionsofthepresidentarecommunicated，inallmattersrelativetotheirrespectivedepartments。
Butithasbeendecidedthatthepresidentisnotconfinedinhisexecutivefunctionstotheuseofaparticulardepartment。Thusinacasewhereitwasobjectedthatanorderfromthesecretaryofstateoughtnottobeconsideredasanactofthepresident；itwasheldthatreferencemustbehadtothisdepartmentfortheofficialactsofthepresidentwhicharenotmoreimmediatelyconnectedwiththedutiesofsomeotherdepartment，but，nevertheless，thepresident，forthemoreeasyandexpeditiousdischargeofhisexecutiveduties，maydirectsomeotherdepartmenttomakeknownthemeasureswhichhemaythinkpropertotake。Theyareequallyhisacts，whethertheyemanatefromthedepartmentofstate，oranyotherdepartment。
Hisimmediatemandatetoaninferiorofficerisinnocasenecessary。2
Allcommissionstoofficersissuefrom，andaresignedbythepresident。
Whenthepresidenthasnominated，thesenateapproved，andthecommissionissigned，theappointmentiscomplete。Iftheofficerberemovableatthepleasureofthepresident，thecommissionmaybearrestedbyhim，ifitisintheofficeofthesecretaryofstate，but，ifitisanofficeduringgoodbehaviour，theappointmentisnotrevocable，and，afterithasreceivedtheapprobationofthesenate，cannotbeannulled。
Deliveryisnotessentialtothevalidityofacommission，norisitaffectedbydetentionafterithasbeensignedbythepresident，iftheofficerisnotremovableatpleasure。Ifinsuchcase，thesecretaryofstatebeingpossessedofthecommission，shouldrefusetodeliverit，thejudicialofficermayneverthelesslawfullyexercisehisfunctions，andwillbeentitledtohislegalcompensations。3
Sickness，absence，ordeath，mightdelaytheexecutingacommission，andthepublicinterestsinsomecases，asforinstancethejudgeofadistrictcourt，suffergreatinjuryduringthevacancyoftheoffice。
Thecommissionisnottheexclusiveevidenceoftheappointment。
Theappointmentsmade，andcommissionsissuedduringtherecessofthesenate，areinforceonlytilltheendoftheensuingsessionwhentheiradviceandconsentaregiven，itistobeconsiderednotasaconfirmationoftheprecedingappointmentmadeduringtherecess，butstrictlyasanewone；anewofficialoathmustbetaken；andifitisanofficeinwhichsecurityisrequired，anewsecuritymustbegiven。