。Itseemsthenthatthenotionof`ought’or`moralobligation’asusedinourcommonmoraljudgments，doesnotmerelyimport1thatthereexistsinthemindofthepersonjudgingaspecificemotionwhethercomplicatedornotbysympatheticrepresentationofsimilaremotionsinotherminds；nor2thatcertainrulesofconductaresupportedbypenaltieswhichwillfollowontheirviolationwhethersuchpenaltiesresultfromthegenerallikingoraversionfeltfortheconductprescribedorforbidden，orfromsomeothersource。Whatthen，itmaybeasked，doesitimport？Whatdefinitioncanwegiveof`ought’，`right’，andothertermsexpressingthesamefundamentalnotion？
TothisIshouldanswerthatthenotionwhichthesetermshaveincommonistooelementarytoadmitofanyformaldefinition。Insosaying，Idonotmeantoimplythatitbelongstothe``originalconstitutionofthemind’’；i。e。thatitspresenceinconsciousnessisnottheresultofaprocessofdevelopment。Idonotdoubtthatthewholefabricofhumanthought——includingtheconceptionsthatpresentthemselvesasmostsimpleandelementary——hasbeendeveloped，throughagradualprocessofpsychicalchange，outofsomelowerlifeinwhichthought，properlyspeaking，hadnoplace。Butitisnotthereforetobeinferred，asregardsthisoranyothernotion，thatithasnotreallythesimplicitywhichitappearstohavewhenwenowreflectuponit。Itissometimesassumedthatifwecanshowhowthoughtshavegrownup——ifwecanpointtothepsychicalantecedentsofwhichtheyarethenaturalconsequents——wemayconcludethatthethoughtsinquestionarereallycompoundscontainingtheirantecedentsaslatentelements。ButIknownojustificationforthistransferenceoftheconceptionsofchemistrytopsychology；IIknownoreasonforconsideringpsychicalantecedentsasreallyconstitutiveoftheirpsychicalconsequents，inspiteoftheapparentdissimilaritybetweenthetwo。Indefaultofsuchreasons，apsychologistmustacceptaselementarywhatintrospectioncarefullyperformeddeclarestobeso；and，usingthiscriterion，Ifindthatthenotionwehavebeenexamining，asitnowexistsinourthought，cannotberesolvedintoanymoresimplenotions:itcanonlybemadeclearerbydeterminingaspreciselyaspossibleitsrelationtoothernotionswithwhichitisconnectedinordinarythought，especiallytothosewithwhichitisliabletobeconfounded。
Inperformingthisprocessitisimportanttonoteanddistinguishtwodifferentimplicationswithwhichtheword``ought’’isused；inthenarrowestethicalsensewhatwejudge`oughttobe’done，isalwaysthoughtcapableofbeingbroughtaboutbythevolitionofanyindividualtowhomthejudgmentapplies。IcannotconceivethatI`ought’todoanythingwhichatthesametimeIjudgethatIcannotdo。Inawidersense，however，——whichcannotconvenientlybediscarded——IsometimesjudgethatI`ought’toknowwhatawisermanwouldknow，orfeelasabettermanwouldfeel，inmyplace，thoughImayknowthatIcouldnotdirectlyproduceinmyselfsuchknowledgeorfeelingbyanyeffortofwill。InthiscasethewordmerelyimpliesanidealorpatternwhichI`ought’——inthestrictersense——toseektoimitateasfaraspossible。AndthiswidersenseseemstobethatinwhichthewordisnormallyusedinthepreceptsofArtgenerally，andinpoliticaljudgments:whenIjudgethatthelawsandconstitutionofmycountry`oughttobe’otherthantheyare，Idonotofcourseimplythatmyownoranyotherindividual’ssinglevolitioncandirectlybringaboutthechange。Ineithercase，however，Iimplythatwhatoughttobeisapossibleobjectofknowledge:i。e。thatwhatIjudgeoughttobemust，unlessIaminerror，besimilarlyjudgedbyallrationalbeingswhojudgetrulyofthematter。
Inreferringsuchjudgmentstothe`Reason’，Idonotmeanheretoprejudgethequestionwhethervalidmoraljudgmentsarenormallyattainedbyaprocessofreasoningfromuniversalprinciplesoraxioms，orbydirectintuitionoftheparticulardutiesofindividuals。Itisnotuncommonlyheldthatthemoralfacultydealsprimarilywithindividualcasesastheyarise，applyingdirectlytoeachcasethegeneralnotionofduty，anddecidingintuitivelywhatoughttobedonebythispersonintheseparticularcircumstances。
AndIadmitthatonthisviewtheapprehensionofmoraltruthismoreanalogoustoSenseperceptionthantoRationalIntuitionascommonlyunderstood: