IntheprecedingchapterIhaveleftundeterminedtheemotionalcharacteristicsoftheimpulsethatpromptsustoobeythedictatesofReason。Ihavedonesobecausetheseseemtobeverydifferentindifferentminds，andeventovarymuchandrapidlyinthesamemind，withoutanycorrespondingvariationinthevolitionaldirectionoftheimpulse。Forinstance，inthemindofarationalEgoisttherulingimpulseisgenerallywhatButlerandHutchesoncalla``calm’’
or``cool’’self-love:whereasinthemanwhotakesuniversalhappinessastheendandstandardofrightconduct，thedesiretodowhatisjudgedtobereasonableassuchiscommonlyblendedinvaryingdegreeswithsympathyandphilanthropicenthusiasm。Again，ifoneconceivesthedictatingReason——whateveritsdictatesmaybe——asexternaltooneself，thecognitionofrightnessisaccompaniedbyasentimentofReverenceforAuthority；whichmaybysomebeconceivedimpersonally，butismorecommonlyregardedastheauthorityofasupremePerson，sothatthesentimentblendswiththeaffectionsnormallyexcitedbypersonsindifferentrelations，andbecomesReligious。ThisconceptionofReasonasanexternalauthority，againstwhichtheself-willrebels，isoftenirresistiblyforcedonthereflectivemind:atothertimes，however，theidentityofReasonandSelfpresentsitselfasanimmediateconviction，andthenReverenceforAuthoritypassesoverintoSelf-respect；
andtheoppositeandevenmorepowerfulsentimentofFreedomiscalledin，ifweconsidertherationalSelfasliabletobeenslavedbytheusurpingforceofsensualimpulses。QuitedifferentagainaretheemotionsofAspirationorAdmirationarousedbytheconceptionofVirtueasanidealofMoralBeauty。Otherphasesofemotionmightbementioned，allhavingwiththesethecommoncharacteristicthattheyareinseparablefromanapparentcognition——implicitorexplicit，directorindirect——ofrightnessintheconducttowhichtheyprompt。Thereare，nodoubt，importantdifferencesinthemoralvalueandefficacyofthesedifferentemotions，towhichIshallhereaftercallattention；buttheirprimarypracticaleffectdoesnotappeartovarysolongasthecognitionofrightnessremainsunchanged。ItisthenwiththesecognitionsthatEthics，inmyview，isprimarilyconcerned:itsobjectistofreethemfromdoubtanderror，andsystematisethemasfaraspossible。
Thereis，however，oneviewofthefeelingswhichprompttovoluntaryaction，whichissometimesthoughttocutshortallcontroversyastotheprinciplesonwhichsuchactionoughttoberegulated。
Imeantheviewthatvolitionisalwaysdeterminedbypleasuresorpainsactualorprospective。Thisdoctrine——whichImaydistinguishasPsychologicalHedonism——isoftenconnectedandnotseldomconfoundedwiththemethodofEthicswhichIhavecalledEgoisticHedonism；andnodoubtitseemsatfirstsightanaturalinferencethatifoneendofaction——myownpleasureorabsenceofpain——isdefinitelydeterminedformebyunvaryingpsychologicallaws，adifferentendcannotbeprescribedformebyReason。