andinmakingthisappealitseemsmostconvenienttobeginbyshowingtheinadequacyofallattemptstoexplainthepracticaljudgmentsorpropositionsinwhichthisfundamentalnotionisintroduced，withoutrecognisingitsuniquecharacterasabovenegativelydefined。Thereisanelementoftruthinsuchexplanations，insofarastheybringintoviewfeelingswhichundoubtedlyaccompanymoralorprudentialjudgments，andwhichordinarilyhavemoreorlesseffectindeterminingthewilltoactionsjudgedtoberight；butsofarastheyprofesstobeinterpretationsofwhatsuchjudgmentsmean，theyappeartometofailaltogether。
InconsideringthisquestionitisimportanttotakeseparatelythetwospeciesofjudgmentswhichIhavedistinguishedas``moral’’and``prudential’’。Bothkindsmight，indeed，betermed``moral’’
inawidersense；and，aswesaw，itisastronglysupportedopinionthatallvalidmoralruleshaveultimatelyaprudentialbasis。Butinordinarythoughtweclearlydistinguishcognitionsorjudgmentsofdutyfromcognitionsorjudgmentsastowhat``isright’’or``oughttobedone’’inviewoftheagent’sprivateinterestorhappinessandthedepthofthedistinctionwillnot，Ithink，bediminishedbythecloserexaminationofthesejudgmentsonwhichwearenowtoenter。
Thisverydistinction，however，suggestsaninterpretationofthenotionofrightnesswhichdeniesitspeculiarsignificanceinmoraljudgments。Itisurgedthat``rightness’’
isproperlyanattributeofmeans，notofends:sothattheattributionofitmerelyimpliesthattheactjudgedrightisthefittestoronlyfitmeanstotherealisationofsomeendunderstoodifnotexpresslystated: