1havestatedtheRelationofEthicstoPolitics——regardedfromanethicalpointofview——thatseemstometoaccordwiththedefinitionoftheformersubjectadoptedintheprecedingchapter。Somethinkers，however，takeaviewofEthicalTheorywhichinvolvesarelationtoPoliticalTheoryquitedifferentfromthatjust-setforth；regardingTheoreticalor``Absolute’’Ethicsasproperlyaninvestigationnotofwhatoughttobedonehereandnow，butofwhatoughttobetherulesofbehaviourinasocietyofideallyperfecthumanbeings。Thusthesubjectmatterofourstudywouldbedoublyideal:asitwouldnotonlyprescribewhatoughttobedoneasdistinctfromwhatis，butwhatoughttobedoneinasocietythatitselfisnot，butonlyoughttobe。InthisviewtheconclusionsofTheoreticalor``Absolute’’
EthicswouldhaveasindirectanduncertainarelationtothepracticalproblemsofactuallifeasthoseofTheoreticalPolitics:——orevenmoreso，asinsoberpoliticaltheoryitiscommonlyonlythegovernmentandnotthegovernedsocietythatisconceivedinanidealcondition。Stillthetwostudiesarenotunlikelytoblendinonetheoryofidealsocialrelations；-unlesstheidealsocietyisconceivedashavingnoneedofgovernment，sothatPolitics，intheordinarysense，vanishesaltogether。
ThosewhotakethisviewadducetheanalogyofGeometrytoshowthatEthicsoughttodealwithideallyperfecthumanrelations，justasGeometrytreatsofideallystraightlinesandperfectcircles。ButtheirregularlineswhichwemeetwithinexperiencehavespatialrelationswhichGeometrydoesnotignorealtogether；itcananddoesascertainthemwithasufficientdegreeofaccuracyforpracticalpurposes:thoughofcoursetheyaremorecomplexthanthoseofperfectlystraightlines。SoinAstronomy，itwouldbemoreconvenientforpurposesofstudyifthestarsmovedincircles，aswasoncebelieved:butthefactthattheymovenotincirclesbutinellipses，andeveninimperfectandperturbedellipses，doesnottakethemoutofthesphereofscientificinvestigation:bypatienceandindustrywehavelearnthowtoreducetoprinciplesandcalculateeventhesemorecomplicatedmotions。Itmaybeusefulforpurposesofinstructiontoassumethattheplanetsmoveinperfectellipses:butwhatwewant，asastronomers，toknowistheactualmotionofthestars，anditscauses:andsimilarlyasmoralistswenaturallyinquirewhatoughttobedoneintheactualworldinwhichwelive。Inneithercasecanwehopetorepresentinourgeneralreasoningsthefullcomplexityoftheactualconsiderations:butweendeavourtoapproximatetoitascloselyaspossible。Itisonlysothatwereallygrapplewiththequestiontowhichmankindgenerallyrequireananswer:`Whatisaman’sdutyinhispresentcondition？’Foritistooparadoxicaltosaythatthewholedutyofmanissummedupintheefforttoattainanidealstateofsocialrelations；andunlesswesaythis，wemustdetermineourdutiestoexistingmeninviewofexistingcircumstances:andthisiswhatthestudentofEthicsseekstodoinasystematicmanner。
Theinquiryintothemoralityofanidealsocietycanthereforebeatbestbutapreliminaryinvestigation，afterwhichthestepfromtheidealtotheactual，inaccordancewithreason，remainstobetaken。Wehavetoaskthen，howfarsuchapreliminaryconstructionseemsdesirable。AndinansweringthiswemustdistinguishthedifferentmethodsofEthics。ForitisgenerallyheldbyIntuitioniststhattruemoralityprescribesabsolutelywhatisinitselfright，underallsocialconditions；atleastasfarasdeterminatedutiesareconcerned:ase。g。
thattruthshouldalwaysbespokenandpromiseskept，and`Justicebedone，thoughtheskyshouldfall’。Andsofarasthisishelditwouldseemthattherecanbenofundamentaldistinctiondrawn，inthedeterminationofduty，betweentheactualstateofsocietyandanidealstate:atanyratethegeneraldefinitionofe。g。Justicewillbethesameforboth，nolessthanitsabsolutestringency。StillevenanextremeIntuitionistwouldadmitthatthedetailsofJusticeandotherdutieswillvarywithsocialinstitutions:anditisaplausiblesuggestion，thatifwecanclearlycontemplateasapatternthe``absolute’’Justiceofanidealcommunity，weshallbebetterabletoattainthemerely``relative’’Justicethatisalonepossibleunderexistingconditions。Howfarthisisso，weshallbeinabetterpositiontojudgewhenwehaveexaminedthedefinitionofJusticefromanIntuitionalpointofview。