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　　Stewartconsidershimselftobeaninductivephilosopherappealingfranklytoexperienceandreason；andwasinpracticeamanofthoroughlyliberalandgenerousfeelings。Hewasheartilyinfavourofprogressasheunderstoodit。Onlyhewillnotsacrificecommonsense；thatistosay，thebeliefswhichareinfactprevalentandcongenialtoexistinginstitutions。Commonsense，ofcourse，condemnsextremes：andiflogicseemstobepushingamantowardsscepticisminphilosophyorrevolutioninpractice，hecanalwaysprotestbytheconvenientdeviceofintuitions。

　　IhavegonesofarinordertoillustratethenatureofthesystemwhichtheUtilitarianstooktobetheantithesisoftheirown。ItmaybefinallyremarkedthatatpresentbothsideswereequallyignorantofcontemporarydevelopmentsofGermanthought。WhenStewartbecameawarethattherewassuchathingasKant’sphilosophy，hetriedtoreaditinaLatinversion。

　　Parr，Imayobserve，apparentlydidnotknowofthisversion，andgaveupthetaskofreadingGerman。Stewart’sexamplewasnotencouraging。Hehadabandonedthe’undertakingindespair’partlyfromthescholasticbarbarismofthestyle，partly’myutterinabilitytocomprehendtheauthor’smeaning。’

　　HerecognisessimilaritybetweenKantandReid，butthinksReid’ssimplestatementofthefactthatspacecannotbederivedfromthesensesmorephilosophicalthanKant’s’superstructureoftechnicalmystery。’57*

　　IhavedweltuponthesideinwhichStewart’sphilosophyapproximatestotheempiricalschool，becausetheUtilitarianswereapttomisconceivetheposition。TheytookStewarttobetheadequaterepresentativeofallwhoacceptedonebranchofaninevitabledilemma。Theacceptanceof’intuitions，’

　　thatis，wastheonlyalternativetothorough-goingacceptanceof’experience。’

　　Theysupposed，too，thatpersonsvaguelydescribedas’KantandtheGermans’

　　taughtsimplyamodificationofthe’intuitionist’view。IhavenoticedhowemphaticallyStewartclaimedtorelyuponexperienceandtobasehisphilosophyuponinductivepsychology，andwassofaradmittingthefirstprinciplesandthegeneralmethodsofhisopponents。TheScottishphilosophy，however，naturallypresenteditselfasanantagonisticforcetotheUtilitarians。

　　The’intuitions’representedtheultimategroundtaken，especiallyinreligiousandethicalquestions，bymenwhowishedtobeatonceliberalphilosophersandyettoavoidrevolutionaryextremes。’Intuitions’hadinanycaseanegativevalue，asprotestsagainstthesufficiencyoftheempiricalanalysis。Itmightbequitetrue，forexample，thatHume’sanalysisofcertainprimarymentalphenomena——ofourbeliefintheexternalworldoroftherelationofcauseandeffect——wasradicallyinsufficient。Hehadnotgivenanadequateexplanationofthefacts。Therecognitionoftheinsufficiencyofhisreasoningwashighlyimportantifonlyasastimulustoinquiry。ItwasawarningtohisandtoHartley’sfollowersthattheyhadnotthoroughlyunravelledtheperplexitybutonlycuttheknot。Butwhentheinsufficiencyoftheexplanationwasinterpretedasademonstrationthatallexplanationwasimpossible，andthe’intuition’anultimate’self-evident’truth，itbecamearefusaltoinquirejustwhereinquirywaswanted；apositivecommandtostopanalysisatanarbitrarypoint；andaroundassertionthattheadversarycouldnothelpbelievingpreciselythedoctrinewhichhealtogetherdeclinedtobelieve。

　　Naturallytheempiricistsrefusedtobowtoanauthoritywhichwassimplysaying，’Don’tinquirefurther，’withoutanygroundfortheprohibitionexceptthe’ipsedixitism’whichdeclaredthatinquirymustbefruitless。Stewart，infact，reallyillustratedtheequivocationbetweenthetwomeaningsof’commonsense。’Ifbythatnameheunderstood，asheprofessedtounderstand，ultimate’lawsofthought，’hispositionwasjustifiableassoonashecouldspecifythelawsandprovethattheywereultimate。Butsofarashevirtuallytookforgrantedthattheaveragebeliefsofintelligentpeopleweresuchlaws，andonthatgroundrefundtoexaminetheevidenceoftheirvalidity，hewasinconsistent，andhispositiononlyinvitedassault。Asafact，I

　　believethathis’intuitions’coveredmanymostdisputablepropositions；

　　andthatthemoreclearlytheywerestated，themoretheyfailedtojustifyhisinterpretations。Hewasnotreallyansweringthemostvitalandcriticalquestions，butimplicitlyreservingthem，andputtinganarbitrarystoptoinvestigationsdesirableonhisownprinciples。

　　TheScottishphilosophywas，however，acceptedinEngland，andmadeaconsiderableimpressioninFrance，asaffordingatenablebarrieragainstscepticism。Itwas，asIhavesaid，inphilosophywhatWhiggismwasinpolitics。

　　LikepoliticalWhiggismitincludedalargeelementofenlightenedandliberalrationalism；butlikeWhiggismitcoveredanaversiontothorough-goinglogic。

　　TheEnglishpoliticianwassuspiciousofabstractprinciples，butcouldcoverhisacceptanceoftraditionandruleofthumbbygeneralphrasesaboutlibertyandtoleration。TheWhiginphilosophyequallyacceptedthetraditionalcreed，sufficientlypurifiedfromcruderelements，andshelteredhisdoctrinebyspeakingof’intuitionsandlawsofthought。’Inbothpositionstherewasreally，Itakeit，agreatdealofsoundpracticalwisdom；buttheyalsoimpliedamarkedreluctancetopushinquirytoofar，andatacitagreementtobecontentwithwhattheUtilitariansdenouncedas’vaguegeneralities’——

　　phrases，thatis，whichmightbeusedeithertoconcealanunderlyingscepticism，orreallytostopshortinthepathwhichledtoscepticism。

　　Inphilosophyasinpolitics，theUtilitariansboastedofbeingthorough-goingRadicals，andhatedcompromises，whichtothemappearedtobesimplyobstructive。

　　Ineednotelaborateapointwhichwillmeetusagain。IfIwerewritingahistoryofthoughtingeneralIshouldhavetonoticeotherwriters，thoughtherewerenoneofmuchdistinction，whofollowedtheteachingofStewartorofhisopponentsoftheHartleyandDarwinschool。Itwouldbenecessaryalsotoinsistuponthegrowinginterestinthephysicalsciences，whichwerebeginningnotonlytomakeenormousadvances，buttoattractpopularattention。Formypurpose，however，itisIthinksufficienttomentionthesewriters，eachofwhomhadaveryspecialrelationtotheUtilitarians。I

　　turn，therefore，toBentham。

　　NOTES：

　　1。Publishedoriginallyin1778；reprintedineditionof{EPSILONPIEPSILON

　　ALPHA}{PITAUEPSILONRHOOMICRONEPSILONNUTAUALPHA}orDiversionsofPurley，byRichardTaylor1829，towhichIrefer。ThefirstpartoftheDiversionsofPurleyappearedin1786；andthesecondpartwithaneweditionofthefirstin1798。

　　2。DiversionsofPurley1829，i，12，131。

　　3。Ibid。，ii，362。Locke’swork，saysProf。MaxM&uuml；llerinhisScienceofThought，p。295，’is，asLangeinhisHistoryofMaterialismrightlyperceived，acritiqueoflanguagewhich，togetherwithKant’sCritiqueofthePureReason，formsthestartingpointofmodernphilosophy。’SeeLange’sMaterialism，1873i，271。

　　4。Ibid。，i，49。

　　5。DiversionsofPurley，i，36，42。

　　6。Ibid。，i，373。

　　7。Ibid。，i，374。

　　8。DiversionsofPurley，ii，18。Cf。Mill’sstatementinAnalysis，i，304，that’abstracttermsareconcretetermswiththeconnotationdropped。’

　　9。Ibid。ii，9，etc。

　　10。Ibid。ii，399。

　　11。Stephens，ii，497。

　　12。LifeofMackintosh，ii，235-57。

　　13。BegunfortheEncyclopediaMetropolitanain1818；andpublishedin1835-37。DugaldStewart’schiefcriticismisinhisEssaysWorks，v，149-188。

　　JohnFearnpublishedhisAnti-Tookein1820。

　　14。NinevolumesofDugaldStewart’sworks，editedbySirW。Hamilton，appearedfrom1854to1856；atenth，includingalifeofStewartbyJ。Veitch，appearedin1858，andaneleventh，withanindextothewhole，in1860。ThechiefbooksaretheElementsofthePhilosophyoftheHumanMindinvols。

　　ii，iiiandiv，originallyin1792，1814，1827；PhilosophicalEssaysinvol。v，originally1810；PhilosophyoftheActiveandMoralPowersofManyvolsviandvii，originallyin1828；DissertationontheProgressofPhilosophyinvol。i；originallyinEncyclopediaBritannica，in1815and1821。ThelecturesonPoliticalEconomyfirstappearedintheWorks，vols。viiiandix。

　　15。Works，vi。’Preface’。

　　16。WorksLifeofReid，x，304-8。

　　17。Reid’sWorksHamilton，p。302。

　　18。Reid’sWorksHamilton，p。88。

　　19。Ibid。206。

　　20。Ibid。267。

　　21。Stewart’sremarksonhislifeofReid。Reid’sWorks，p。12，etc。

　　22。TheWorldasWillandIdeaHaldane&amp；Kemp，ii，186。Reid’s”Inquiry’

　　headds，istentimesbetterworthreadingthanallthephilosophytogetherwhichhasbeenwrittensinceKant。

　　23。’Weareinspiredwiththesensation，asweareinspiredwiththecorrespondingperception，bymeansunknown。’——Reid’sWorks，188。’This，’saysStewart，’isaplainstatementoffact。’——Stewart’sWorks，ii，111-12。

　　24。SeeRosmini’sOriginofIdeasEnglishTranslationi，p。91，where，thoughsympathisingwithReid’saim，headmitsa’greatblunder。’

　　25。Stewart’sWorks，v。24-53。Hamiltonsaysinanotep。41thatJeffreycandidlyconfessedStewart’sreplytobesatisfactory。

　　26。Ibid。，ii。46。