Theyarejustsuch，asareusuallygrantedtostatebanks；andjustsuch，asgiveincreasedfacilitiestoallitsoperations。Tosay，thatthebankmighthavegoneonwithoutthisorthatfaculty，isnothing。Who，butcongress，shallsay，howfew，orhowmanyitshallhave，ifallarestillappropriatetoit，asaninstrumentofgovernment，andmaymakeitmoreconvenient，andmoreusefulinitsoperations？Nomancansay，thatasinglefacultyinanynationalcharterisuseless，orirrelevant，orstrictlyimproper，thatisconducivetoitsend，asanationalinstrument。Depriveabankofitstradeandbusiness，anditsvitalprinciplesaredestroyed。Itsformmayremain，butitssubstanceisgone。Allthepowersgiventothebankaretogiveefficacytoitsfunctionsoftradeandbusiness。27
§；1265。Astoanothersuggestion，thatthesameobjectsmighthavebeenaccomplishedthroughthestatebanks，itissufficienttosay，thatnotracecanbefoundintheconstitutionofanyintentiontocreateadependenceonthestates，orstateinstitutions，fortheexecutionofitsgreatpowers。Itsownmeansareadequatetoitsend；andonthosemeansitwasexpectedtorelyfortheiraccomplishment。
Itwouldbeutterlyabsurdtomakethepowersoftheconstitutionwhollydependentonstateinstitutions。Butifstatebanksmightbeemployed，ascongresshaveachoiceofmeans，theyhadarighttochooseanationalbank，inpreferencetostatebanks，forthefinancialoperationsofthegovernment。28Proof，thattheymightuseonemeans，isnoproof，thattheycannotconstitutionallyuseanothermeans。
§；1266。Afterall，thesubjecthasbeensettledrepeatedlybyeverydepartmentofthegovernment，legislative，executive，andjudicial。Thestateshaveacquiesced；andamajorityhaveconstantlysustainedthepower。Ifitisnotnowsettled，itnevercanbe。Ifitissettled，itwouldbetoomuchtoexpectare—argument，wheneveranypersonmaychoosetoquestionit。29
1。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence，523，526；Id。506。
2。Ibid；4Elliot’sDebates，219。
3。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence，523，525，526；5Marsh。Wash。App。Note3。
4。Ibid；4Elliot’sDebates，220。
5。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence，523，526，527；5Marsh。Wash。App。Note3；1Hamilton’sWorks，130。
6。4Elliot’sDebates，217，219，224，225。
7。4Elliot’sDebates，219，220，223。
8。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，113；4Wheat。R。405，406，409，410。
9。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。
R。409。
10。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，113，114，124。
11。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，113，114，131。
12。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，115，116，130，131，136。
13。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。411；HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，116，117，136。
14。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。406，407，408，409，410，411。
15。Journ。ofConvention，p。200。
16。Journ。ofConvention，p。376。？
Inthefirstcongressof1789，whentheamendmentsproposedbycongresswerebeforetheHouseofRepresentativesforconsideration，Mr。Gerrymovedtoaddaclause，\"Thatcongresserectnocompanyofmerchantswithexclusiveadvantagesofcommerce。\"Thepropositionwasnegatived。2Lloyd’sDeb。
257。
17。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。421，422。
18。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。422；HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，135，136。
19。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，128，129，135。
20。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，p。138。
21。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，p。152，153。
22。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。422，423。
23。InMr。Hamilton’scelebratedArgumentontheConstitutionalityoftheBankoftheUnitedStates，inFeb。1791，thereisanadmirableexpositionofthewholeofthisbranchofthesubject。
Asthedocumentisrare，thefollowingpassagesareinserted：
\"Itispresumedtohavebeensatisfactorilyshown，inthecourseoftheprecedingobservations，1。Thatthepowerofthegovernment，astotheobjectsintrustedtoitsmanagement，is，initsnature，sovereign2。Thattherightoferectingcorporations，isone，inherentin，andinseparablefrom，theideaofsovereignpower。3。Thattheposition，thatthegovernmentoftheUnitedStatescanexercisenopower，butsuchasisdelegatedtoitbyitsconstitution，doesnotmilitateagainstthisprinciple。4。Thatthewordnecessary，inthegeneralclause，canhavenorestrictiveoperation，derogatingfromtheforceofthisprinciple；indeed，thatthedegree，inwhichameasureis，orisnotnecessary，cannotbeatestofconstitutionalright，butofexpediencyonly。5。Thatthepowertoerectcorporationsisnottobeconsidered，asanindependentandsubstantivepower，butasanincidentalandauxiliaryone；andwas，therefore，moreproperlylefttoimplication，thanexpresslygranted。6。Thattheprincipleinquestiondoesnotextendthepowerofthegovernmentbeyondtheprescribedlimits，becauseitonlyaffirmsapowertoincorporateforpurposeswithinthesphereofthespecifiedpowers。Andlastly，thattherighttoexercisesuchapower，incertaincases，isunequivocallygrantedinthemostpositiveandcomprehensiveterms。Toallwhichitonlyremainstobeadded，thatsuchapowerhasactuallybeenexercisedintwoveryeminentinstances，namely，intheerectionoftwogovernments；onenorthwestoftheriverOhio，andtheothersouthwest；thelast，independentofanyantecedentcompact。Andthereresultsafullandcompletedemonstration，thatthesecretaryofstateandattorney—generalaremistaken，whentheydenygenerallythepowerofthenationalgovernmenttoerectcorporations。
\"Itshallnowbeendeavouredtobeshown，thatthereisapowertoerectoneofthekindproposedbythebill。Thiswillbedonebytracinganaturalandobviousrelationbetweentheinstitutionofabank，andtheobjectsofseveraloftheenumeratedpowersofthegovernment；
andbyshowing，that，politicallyspeaking，itisnecessarytotheeffectualexecutionofoneormoreofthosepowers。Inthecourseofthisinvestigationvariousinstanceswillbestated，bywayofillustration，ofarighttoerectcorporationsunderthosepowers。Somepreliminaryobservationsmaybeproper。Theproposedbankistoconsistofanassociationofpersonsforthepurposeofcreatingajointcapitaltobeemployed，chieflyandessentially，inloans。Sofartheobjectisnotonlylawful，butitisthemereexerciseofaright，whichthelawallowstoeveryindividual。
ThebankofNew—York，whichisnotincorporated，isanexampleofsuchanassociation。Thebillproposes，inaddition，thatthegovernmentshallbecomeajointproprietorinthisundertaking；andthatitshallpermitthebillsofthecompany，payableondemand，tobereceivableinitsrevenues；
andstipulates，thatitshallnotgrantprivileges，similartothose，whicharetobeallowedtothiscompany，toanyothers。Allthisisincontrovertiblywithinthecompassofthediscretionofthegovernment。Theonlyquestionis，whetherithasarighttoincorporatethiscompany，inordertoenableitthemoreeffectuallytoaccomplishends，whichareinthemselveslawful。
Toestablishsucharight，itremainstoshowtherelationofsuchaninstitutiontooneormoreofthespecifiedpowersofthegovernment。Accordingly，itisaffirmed，thatithasarelation，moreorlessdirect，tothepowerofcollectingtaxes；tothatofborrowingmoney；tothatofregulatingtradebetweenthestates；andtothoseofraisingandmaintainingfleetsandarmies。Tothetwoformer，therelationmaybesaidtobeimmediate。
And，inthelastplace，itwillbeargued，thatitisclearlywithintheprovision，whichauthorizesthemakingofallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningthepropertyoftheUnitedStates，asthesamehasbeenpracticeduponbythegovernment。
\"Abankrelatestothecollectionoftaxesintwoways。Indirectly，byincreasingthequantityofcirculatingmedium，andquickeningcirculation，whichfacilitatesthemeansofpaying；directly，bycreatingaconvenientspeciesofmedium，inwhichtheyaretobepaid。Todesignateorappointthemoneyorthing，inwhichtaxesaretobepaid，isnotonlyaproper，butanecessary，exerciseofthepowerofcollectingthem。Accordingly，congress，inthelawconcerningthecollectionofthedutiesonimpostsandtonnage，haveprovided，thattheyshallbepayableingoldandsilver。Butwhileitwasanindispensablepartoftheworktosayinwhattheyshouldbepaid，thechoiceofthespecificthingwasmerematterofdiscretion。Thepaymentmighthavebeenrequiredinthecommoditiesthemselves。Taxesinkind，howeverill—judged，arenotwithoutprecedentsevenintheUnitedstates；oritmighthavebeeninthepapermoneyoftheseveralstates，orinthebillsofthebankofNorth—America，New—York，andMassachusetts，alloreitherofthem；oritmighthavebeeninbillsissuedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。
Nopartofthiscan，itispresumed，bedisputed。Theappointment，then，ofthemoneyorthing，inwhichthetaxesaretobepaid，isanincidenttothepowerofcollection。Andamongtheexpedients，whichmaybeadopted，isthatofbillsissuedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。
Nowthemannerofissuingthesebillsisagainmatterofdiscretion。Thegovernmentmight，doubtless，proceedinthefollowingmanner：Itmightprovidethattheyshouldbeissuedunderthedirectionofcertainofficers，payableondemand；andinordertosupporttheircredit，andgivethemareadycirculation，itmight，besidesgivingthemacurrencyinitstaxes，setapart，outofanymoniesinitstreasuryagivensum，andappropriateit，underthedirectionofthoseofficers，asafundforansweringthebills，aspresentedforpayment。
\"Theconstitutionalityofallthiswouldnotadmitofaquestion，andyetitwouldamounttotheinstitutionofabank，withaviewtothemoreconvenientcollectionoftaxes。Forthesimplestandmostpreciseideaofabankis，adepositofcoinorotherproperty，asafundforcirculatingacredituponit，whichistoanswerthepurposeofmoney。Thatsuchanarrangementwouldbeequivalenttotheestablishmentofabank，wouldbecomeobvious，iftheplace，wherethefundtobesetapartwaskept，shouldbemadeareceptacleofthemoniesofallotherpersons，whoshouldinclinetodepositthemthereforsafekeeping；andwouldbecomestillmoreso，iftheofficers，chargedwiththedirectionofthefundwereauthorizedtomakediscountsattheusualrateofinterest，upongoodsecurity。Todenythepowerofthegovernmenttoaddthisingredienttotheplan，wouldbetorefineawayallgovernment。Afurtherprocesswillstillmoreclearlyillustratethepoint。Suppose，whenthespeciesofbank，whichhasbeendescribed，wasabouttobeinstituteditweretobeurged，thatinordertosecuretoitaduedegreeofconfidence，thefundoughtnotonlytobesetapartandappropriatedgenerally，butoughttobespecificallyvestedintheofficers，whoweretohavethedirectionofit，andintheirsuccessorsinoffice，totheend，thatitmightacquirethecharacterofprivateproperty，incapableofbeingresumedwithoutaviolationofthesanction，bywhichtherightsofpropertyareprotected；
andoccasioningmoreseriousandgeneralalarm：theapprehensionofwhichmightoperateasacheckuponthegovernment。Suchapropositionmightbeopposedbyargumentsagainsttheexpediencyofit，orthesolidityofthereasonassignedforit；butitisnotconceivable，whatcouldbeurgedagainstitsconstitutionality。Andyetsuchadispositionofthethingwouldamounttotheerectionofacorporation；forthetruedefinitionofacorporationseemstobethis：Itisalegalperson，orapersoncreatedbyactoflaw；consistingofoneormorenaturalpersons，authorizedtoholdpropertyorafranchiseinsuccession，inalegal，ascontradistinguishedfromanaturalcapacity。Lettheillustrationproceedastepfurther。Supposeabank，ofthenature，whichhasbeendescribed，withoutorwithincorporation，hadbeeninstituted，andthatexperiencehadevinced，asitprobablywould，thatbeingwhollyunderapublicdirection，itpossessednottheconfidencerequisitetothecreditofitsbills。Supposealso，thatbysomeofthoseadverseconjunctures，whichoccasionallyattendnations，therehadbeenaverygreatdrainofthespecieofthecountry，soasnotonlytocausegeneraldistressforwantofanadequatemediumofcirculation；buttoproduce，inconsequenceofthatcircumstance，considerabledefalcationsinthepublicrevenues。Suppose，also，thattherewasnobankinstitutedinanystate；insuchapostureofthings，woulditnotbemostmanifest，thattheincorporationofabank，likethatproposedbythebill，wouldbeameasureimmediatelyrelativetotheeffectualcollectionofthetaxes，andcompletelywithintheprovinceofasovereignpowerofproviding，byalllawsnecessaryandproper，forthatcollection。
\"Ifitbesaid，thatsuchastateofthingswouldrenderthatnecessary，andthereforeconstitutional，whichisnotsonow；theanswertothis，andasolidoneitdoubtlessis，muststillbe，thatwhichhasbeenalreadystated；circumstancesmayaffecttheexpediencyofthemeasure，buttheycanneitheraddto，nordiminishitsconstitutionality。Abankhasadirectrelationtothepowerofborrowingmoney，becauseitisanusual，andinsuddenemergencies，anessentialinstrument，intheobtainingofloanstogovernment。Anationisthreatenedwithawar；largesumsarewantedonasuddentomaketherequisitepreparations；taxesarelaidforthepurpose；butitrequirestimetoobtainthebenefitofthem；
anticipationisindispensable。Iftherebeabank，thesupplycanatoncebehad；iftherebenone，loansfromindividualsmustbesought。Theprogressoftheseisoftentooslowfortheexigency；insomesituationstheyarenotpracticableatall。Frequentlywhentheyare，itisofgreatconsequencetobeabletoanticipatetheproductofthembyadvancesfromabank。Theessentialityofsuchaninstitution，asaninstrumentofloans，isexemplifiedatthisverymoment。AnIndianexpeditionistobeprosecuted。Theonlyfund，outofwhichthemoneycanariseconsistentlywiththepublicengagements，isatax，whichonlybeginstobecollectedinJulynext。Thepreparations，however，areinstantlytobemade。Themoneymust，therefore，beborrowed；
andofwhomcoulditbeborrowed，iftherewerenopublicbanks？Ithappens，thatthereareinstitutionsofthiskind；butiftherewerenone，itwouldbeindispensabletocreateone。Letitthenbesupposed，thatthenecessityexisted，asbutforacasualtywouldbethecase，thatproposalsweremadeforobtainingaloan；thatanumberofindividualscameforwardandsaid，wearewillingtoaccommodatethegovernmentwiththismoney；withwhatwehaveinhand，andthecreditwecanraiseuponit，wedoubtnotofbeingabletofurnishthesumrequired。Butinordertothis，itisindispensable，thatweshouldbeincorporatedasabank。Thisisessentialtowardsputtingitinourpowertodowhatisdesired，andweareobliged，onthataccount，tomakeittheconsiderationorconditionoftheloan。Canitbebelieved，thatacompliancewiththispropositionwouldbeunconstitutional？Doesnotthisaloneevincethecontrary？Itisanecessarypartofapowertoborrow，tobeabletostipulatetheconsiderationsorconditionsofaloan。Itisevident，ashasbeenremarkedelsewhere，thatthisisnotconfinedtothemerestipulationofafranchise。Ifitmay，anditisnotperceivedwhyitmaynot，thenthegrantofacorporatecapacitymaybestipulated，asaconsiderationoftheloan。Thereseemstobenothingunfit，orforeignfromthenatureofthething，ingivingindividuality，oracorporatecapacity，toanumberofpersons，whoarewillingtolendasumofmoneytothegovernment，thebettertoenablethemtodoit，andmakethemanordinaryinstrumentofloansinfutureemergenciesofstate。
\"Butthemoregeneralviewofthesubjectisstillmoresatisfactory。Thelegislativepowerofborrowingmoney，andofmakingalllawsnecessaryandproperforcarryingintoexecutionthatpower，seemsobviouslycompetenttotheappointmentoftheorgan，throughwhichtheabilitiesandwillsofindividualsmaybemostefficaciouslyexerted，fortheaccommodationofthegovernmentbyloans。Theattorney—generalopposestothisreasoningthefollowingobservation。Borrowingmoneypresupposestheaccumulationofafundtobelent；andissecondarytothecreationofanabilitytolend。Thisisplausibleintheory，butitisnottrueinfact。Inagreatnumberofcases，apreviousaccumulationofafund，equaltothewholesumrequired，doesnotexist；andnothingmorecanbeactuallypresupposed，thanthatthereexistsresources，which，putintoactivitytothegreatestadvantage，bythenatureoftheoperationwiththegovernment，willbeequaltotheeffectdesiredtobeproduced。Alltheprovisionsandoperationsofgovernmentmustbepresumedtocontemplatethingsastheyreallyare。Theinstitutionofabankhasalsoanaturalrelationtotheregulationoftradebetweenthestates，insofarasitisconducivetothecreationofaconvenientmediumofexchangebetweenthem，andtothekeepingupafullcirculation，bypreventingthefrequentdisplacementofthemetalsinreciprocalremittances。Moneyistheveryhingeonwhichcommerceturns。Andthisdoesnotmeanmerelygoldandsilver；
manyotherthingshaveservedthepurposewithdifferentdegreesofutility。
Paperhasbeenextensivelyemployed。Itcannot，therefore，beadmittedwiththeattorney—general，thattheregulationoftradebetweenthestates，asitconcernsthemediumofcirculationandexchange，oughttobeconsideredasconfinedtocoin。Itisevensupposable，thatthewhole，orthegreatestpart，ofthecoinofthecountry，mightbecarriedoutofit。Thesecretaryofstateobjectstotherelationhereinsistedupon，bythefollowingmodeofreasoning：Toerectabank，sayshe，andtoregulatecommerce，areverydifferentacts。Hewhoerectsabank，createsasubjectofcommerce。Sodoeshe，whoraisesabushelofwheat，ordigsadollaroutofthemines；
yetneitherofthesepersonsregulatescommercethereby。Tomakeathing，whichmaybeboughtandsold，isnottoprescriberegulationsforbuyingandselling。Thisismakingtheregulationofcommercetoconsistinprescribingrulesforbuyingandselling。This，indeed，isaspeciesofregulationoftrade，butitisone，whichfallsmoreaptlywithintheprovinceofthelocaljurisdictions，thanwithinthatofthegeneralgovernment，whosecaretheymusthavepresumedtohavebeenintendedtobedirectedtothosegeneralpoliticalarrangementconcerningtrade，onwhichitsaggregateinterestsdepend，ratherthantothedetailsofbuyingandselling。Accordingly，suchonlyaretheregulationstobefoundinthelawsoftheUnitedStates；
whoseobjectsaretogiveencouragementtotheenterpriseofourownmerchants，andtoadvanceournavigationandmanufactures。Anditisinreferencetothesegeneralrelationsofcommerce，thatanestablishment，whichfurnishesfacilitiestocirculation，andaconvenientmediumofexchangeandalienation，istoberegardedasaregulationoftrade。
\"Thesecretaryofstatefurtherurges，thatifthiswasaregulationofcommerce，itwouldbevoid，asextendingasmuchtotheinternalpartofeverystate，astoitsexternal。Butwhatregulationofcommercedoesnotextendtotheinternalcommerceofeverystate？Whatareallthedutiesuponimportedarticles，amounting，insomecases，toprohibitions，butsomanybountiesupondomesticmanufactures，affectingtheinterestofdifferentclassesofcitizensindifferentways？
Whatarealltheprovisionsinthecoastingact，whichrelatetothetradebetweendistrictanddistrictofthesamestate？Inshort，whatregulationoftradebetweenthestates，butmustaffecttheinternaltradeofeachstate？Whatcanoperateuponthewhole，butmustextendtoeverypart？
Therelationofabanktotheexecutionofthepowers，thatconcernthecommondefence，hasbeenanticipated。Ithasbeennoted，thatatthisverymoment，theaidofsuchaninstitutionisessentialtothemeasuretobepursuedfortheprotectionofourfrontiers。
\"Itnowremainstoshow，thattheincorporationofabankiswithintheoperationoftheprovision，whichauthorizescongresstomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningthepropertyoftheUnitedStates。Butitispreviouslynecessarytoadverttoadistinction，whichhasbeentakenupbytheattorney—general。Headmits，thatthewordpropertymaysignifypersonalproperty，howeveracquired；andyetasserts，thatitcannotsignifymoneyarisingfromthesourcesofrevenuepointedoutintheconstitution，’because，’sayshe，’thedisposalandregulationofmoneyisthefinalcauseforraisingitbytaxes。’Butitwouldbemoreaccurate，tosay，thattheobjecttowhichmoneyisintendedtobeapplied，isthefinalcauseforraisingit，thanthatthedisposalandregulationofit，issuch。Thesupportofagovernment，thesupportoftroopsforthecommondefence，thepaymentofthepublicdebt，arethetruefinalcausesforraisingmoney。Thedispositionandregulationofit，whenraised。arethesteps，bywhichitisappliedtotheends，forwhichitwasraised，nottheendsthemselves。Hence，thereforethemoneytoberaisedbytaxes，aswellasanyotherpersonalproperty，mustbesupposedtocomewithinthemeaning，astheycertainlydowithintheletter，ofauthoritytomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningthepropertyoftheUnitedStates。Acasewillmakethisplainer。Supposethepublicdebtdischarged，andthefundsnowpledgedforit，liberated。
Insomeinstancesitwouldbefoundexpedienttorepealthetaxes；inothers，therepealmightinjureourownindustry，ouragriculture，andmanufactures。
Inthesecases，theywould，ofcourse，beretained。Here，then，wouldbemoniesarisingfromtheauthorizedsourcesofrevenue，whichwouldnotfallwithintherule，bywhichtheattorney—generalendeavourstoexceptthemfromotherpersonalproperty，andfromtheoperationoftheclauseinquestion。Themoniesbeinginthecoffersofgovernment，whatistohindersuchadispositiontobemadeofthem，asiscontemplatedinthebill；orwhatanincorporationofthepartiesconcerned，undertheclause，whichhasbeencited。
\"Itisadmitted，that，withregardtothewesternterritory，theygiveapowertoerectacorporation；thatis，toconstituteagovernment。
Andbywhatruleofconstructioncanitbemaintained，thatthesamewords，inaconstitutionofgovernment，willnothavethesameeffect，whenappliedtoonespeciesofpropertyastoanother，asfarasthesubjectiscapableofit？Orthatalegislativepowertomakeallneedfulrulesandregulations，ortopassalllawsnecessaryandproperconcerningthepublicproperty，whichisadmittedtoauthorizeanincorporation，inonecase，willnotauthorizeitinanother？WilljustifytheinstitutionofagovernmentovertheWesternTerritory，andwillnotjustifytheincorporationofabank，forthemoreusefulmanagementofthemoneyofthenation？Ifitwilldothelastaswellasthefirst，then，underthisprovisionalone，thebillisconstitutional，becauseitcontemplates，thattheUnitedStatesshallbejointproprietorsofthestockofthebank。Thereisanobservationofthesecretaryofstate，tothiseffect，whichmayrequirenoticeinthisplace。？Congress，sayshe，arenottolaytaxesadlibitum，foranypurposetheyplease，butonlytopaythedebts，orprovideforthewelfareoftheUnion。Certainly，noinferencecanbedrawnfromthis，againstthepowerofapplyingtheirmoneyfortheinstitutionofabank。
Itistrue，thattheycannot，withoutbreachoftrust，laytaxesforanyotherpurpose，thanthegeneralwelfare；butsoneithercananyothergovernment。
Thewelfareofthecommunityistheonlylegitimateend，forwhichmoneycanberaisedonthecommunity。Congresscanbeconsideredasonlyunderonerestriction，whichdoesnotapplytoothergovernments。Theycannotrightfullyapplythemoneytheyraisetoanypurpose，merelyorpurelylocal，Butwiththisexception，theyhaveaslargeadiscretion，inrelationtotheapplicationofmoney，asanylegislaturewhatever。
\"Theconstitutionaltestofarightapplication，mustalwaysbe，whetheritbeforapurposeofgeneralorlocalnature。Iftheformer，therecanbenowantofconstitutionalpower。Thequalityoftheobjectashowfaritwillreallypromote，ornot，thewelfareoftheUnion，mustbematterofconscientiousdiscretion；andtheargumentsfororagainstameasure，inthislight，mustbeargumentsconcerningexpediencyorinexpediency，notconstitutionalright；whateverrelatestothegeneralorderofthefinances，tothegeneralinterestsoftrade，&；c。，beinggeneralobjects，areconstitutionalones，fortheapplicationofmoney。Abank，then，whosebillsaretocirculateinalltherevenuesofthecountry，isevidentlyageneralobject；andforthatveryreason，aconstitutionalone，asfarasregardstheappropriationofmoneytoit，whetheritwillreallybeabeneficialoneornot，isworthyofcarefulexamination；butisnomoreaconstitutionalpoint，intheparticularreferredto，thanthequestion，whetherthewesternlandsshallbesoldfortwentyorthirtycentsperacre？Ahopeisentertained，that，bythistime，ithasbeenmadetoappeartothesatisfactionofthePresident，thatthebankhasanaturalrelationtothepowerofcollectingtaxes；tothatofregulatingtrade；tothatofprovidingforthecommondefence；andthat，asthebillunderconsiderationcontemplatesthegovernmentinthelightofajointproprietorofthestockofthebank，itbringsthecasewithintheprovisionoftheclauseoftheconstitution，whichimmediatelyrespectsthepropertyoftheUnitedStates。Underaconviction，thatsucharelationsubsists，thesecretaryofthetreasury，withalldeference，conceives，thatitwillresult，asanecessaryconsequencefromtheposition，thatallthespecifiedpowersofgovernmentaresovereign，astotheproperobjects，thattheincorporationofabankisaconstitutionalmeasure：andthattheobjections，takentothebillinthisrespect，areill—founded。
\"But，fromanearnestdesiretogivetheutmostpossiblesatisfactiontothemindofthepresident，onsodelicateandimportantasubject，thesecretaryofthetreasurywillaskhisindulgence，whilehegivessomeadditionalillustrationsofcases，inwhichapoweroferectingcorporationsmaybeexercised，undersomeofthoseheadsofthespecifiedpowersofthegovernment，whichareallegedtoincludetherightofincorporatingabank。1。Itdoesnotappearsusceptibleofadoubt，thatifcongresshadthoughtpropertoprovideinthecollectionlaw，thatthebonds，tobegivenfortheduties，shouldbegiventothecollectorofthedistrictA。orB。asthecasemightrequire，toinuretohimandhissuccessorsinoffice，intrustfortheUnitedStates；thatitwouldhavebeenconsistentwiththeconstitutiontomakesuchanarrangement。Andyetthis，itisconceived，wouldamounttoanincorporation。2。Itisnotanunusualexpedientoftaxation，tofarmparticularbranchesofrevenue；thatis，tosellormortgagetheproductofthemforcertaindefinitesums，leavingthecollectiontotheparties，towhomtheyaremortgagedorsold。ThereareevenexamplesofthisintheUnitedStates。Supposethattherewasanyparticularbranchofrevenue，whichitwasmanifestlyexpedienttoplaceonthisfooting，andtherewereanumberofpersonswillingtoengagewiththegovernment，uponconditionthattheyshouldbeincorporated，andthefundsvestedinthem，aswellfortheirgreatersafety，asforthemoreconvenientrecoveryandmanagementofthetaxes；isitsupposablethattherecouldbeanyconstitutionalobstacletothemeasure？Itispresumed，thattherecouldbenone。Itiscertainlyamodeofcollection，whichitwouldbeinthediscretionofthegovernmenttoadopt；thoughthecircumstancesmustbeveryextraordinary，thatwouldinducethesecretarytothinkitexpedient。3。Supposeanewandunexploredbranchoftradeshouldpresentitselfwithsomeforeigncountry。Supposeitwasmanifest，thattoundertakeitwithadvantage，requiredaunionofthecapitalsofanumberofindividuals，andthatthoseindividualswouldnotbedisposedtoembarkwithoutanincorporation，aswelltoobviatetheconsequencesofaprivatepartnership，whichmakeseveryindividualliableinhiswholeestateforthedebtsofthecompanytotheirutmostextent，asforthemoreconvenientmanagementofthebusiness；
whatreasoncantherebetodoubt，thatthenationalgovernmentwouldhaveaconstitutionalrighttoinstituteandincorporatesuchacompany？None。
Theypossessageneralauthoritytoregulatetradewithforeigncountries。
Thisisamean，whichhasbeenpracticedtothatendbyalltheprincipalcommercialnations，whohavetradingcompaniestothisday，whichhavesubsistedforcenturies。WhymaynottheUnitedStatesconstitutionallyemploythemeansusualinothercountriesforattainingtheendsintrustedtothem？Apowertomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningterritory，hasbeenconstruedtomeanapowertoerectagovernment。Apowertoregulatetradeisapowertomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningtrade。
Whymayitnot，then，includethatoferectingatradingcompany，aswellasinothercasestoerectagovernment？
\"Itisremarkable，thatthestateconventions，whohaveproposedamendmentsinrelationtothispoint，havemost，ifnotallofthem，expressedthemselvesnearlythus：Congressshallnotgrantmonopolies，norerectanycompanywithexclusiveadvantagesofcommerce！Thusatthesametimeexpressingtheirsense，thatthepowertoerecttradingcompanies，orcorporations，wasinherentincongress，andobjectingtoitnofurther，thanastothegrantofexclusiveprivileges。Thesecretaryentertainsallthedoubts，whichprevailconcerningtheutilityofsuchcompanies；buthecannotfashiontohisownmindareasontoinduceadoubt，thatthereisaconstitutionalauthorityintheUnitedStatestoestablishthem。Ifsuchareasonweredemanded，nonecouldbegiven，unlessitwerethis？thatcongresscannoterectacorporation；whichwouldbenobetter，thantosay，theycannotdoit，becausetheycannotdoit。
First，presuminganinabilitywithoutreason，andthenassigningthatinability，asthecauseofitself。Illustrationsofthiskindmightbemultipliedwithoutend。Theywill，however，bepursuednofurther。
\"Thereisasortofevidenceonthispoint，arisingfromanaggregateviewoftheconstitution，whichisofnoinconsiderableweight。
Theverygeneralpoweroflayingandcollectingtaxes，andappropriatingtheirproceeds；thatofborrowingmoneyindefinitely；thatofcoiningmoneyandregulatingforeigncoins；thatofmakingallneedfulrulesandregulationsrespectingthepropertyoftheUnitedStates；？thesepowerscombined，aswellasthereasonandnatureofthething，speakstronglythislanguage；
thatitisthemanifestdesignandscopeoftheconstitutiontovestincongressallthepowersrequisitetotheeffectualadministrationofthefinancesoftheUnitedStates。Asfarasconcernsthisobject，thereappearstobenoparsimonyofpower。Tosuppose，then，thatthegovernmentisprecludedfromtheemploymentofsousual，andsoimportantaninstrumentfortheadministrationofitsfinances，asthatofabank，istosuppose，whatdoesnotcoincidewiththegeneraltenourandcomplexionoftheconstitution，andwhatisnotagreeabletoimpressions，thatanymerespectatorwouldentertainconcerningit。Littleless，thanaprohibitoryclause，candestroythestrongpresumptions，whichresultfromthegeneralaspectofthegovernment。
Nothingbutdemonstrationshouldexcludetheidea，thatthepowerexists。
\"Inallquestionsofthisnature，thepracticeofmankindoughttohavegreatweightagainstthetheoriesofindividuals。Thefact，forinstance，thatalltheprincipalcommercialnationshavemadeuseoftradingcorporationsorcompanies，forthepurposeofexternalcommerce，isasatisfactoryproof，thattheestablishmentofthemisanincidenttotheregulationofcommerce。Thisotherfact，thatbanksareanusualengineintheadministrationofnationalfinances，andanordinary，andthemosteffectualinstrumentofloans，andone，which，inthiscountry，hasbeenfoundessential，pleadsstronglyagainstthesupposition，thatagovernmentclothedwithmostoftheimportantprerogativesofsovereignty，inrelationtoitsrevenues，itsdebt，itscredit，itsdefence，itstrade，itsintercoursewithforeignnations，isforbiddentomakeuseofthatinstrument，asanappendagetoitsownauthority。Ithasbeenusual，asanauxiliarytestofconstitutionalauthority，totry，whetheritabridgesanypre—existingrightofmystate，oranyindividual。Theproposedmeasurewillstandthemostsevereexaminationonthispoint。Eachstatemaystillerectasmanybanks，asitpleases；everyindividualmaystillcarryonthebankingbusinesstoanyextenthepleases。Anothercriterionmaybethis；whethertheinstitutionorthinghasamoredirectrelation，astoitsuses，totheobjectsofthereservedpowersofthestategovernment，thantothoseofthepowersdelegatedbytheUnitedStates？Thisrule，indeed，islessprecise，thantheformer；butitmaystillserveassomeguide。Surely，abankhasmorereferencetotheobjects，intrustedtothenationalgovernment，thantothoselefttothecareofthestategovernments。
Thecommondefenceisdecisiveinthiscomparison。\"1Hamilton’sWorks，138to154。
24。JournalofConvention，p。376。
25。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，127。
26。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，127，128。
27。Osbornv。BankofUnitedStates，9Wheat。R。861，862to865。
28。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4
Wheat。R。424。
29。See4Elliot’sDebates，216to229；M’Cullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。316；Osbornv。BankofUnitedStates，9Wheat。R。738，859；1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。233to239；
SergeantonConstitution，ch。28，[ch。30；]5Marsh。Wash。App。Note3。
JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
Book3Chapter26CHAPTERXXVI。POWERSOFCONGRESS？INTERNALIMPROVEMENTS。§；1267。ANOTHERquestion，whichhasforalongtimeagitatedthepubliccouncilsofthenation，is，astotheauthorityofcongresstomakeroads，canals，andotherinternalimprovements。
§；1268。Sofar，asregardstherighttoappropriatemoneytointernalimprovementsgenerally，thesubjecthasalreadypassedunderreviewinconsideringthepowertolayandcollecttaxes。Thedoctrinetherecontendedfor，whichhasbeeninagreatmeasureborneoutbytheactualpracticeofthegovernment，is，thatcongressmayappropriatemoney，notonlytoclearobstructionstonavigablerivers；
toimproveharbours；tobuildbreakwaters；toassistnavigation；toerectforts，light—houses，andpiers；andforotherpurposesalliedtosomeoftheenumeratedpowers；butmayalsoappropriateitinaidofcanals，roads，andotherinstitutionsofasimilarnature，existingunderstateauthority。
Theonlylimitationsuponthepowerarethoseprescribedbythetermsoftheconstitution，thattheobjectsshallbeforthecommondefence，orthegeneralwelfareoftheUnion。Thetruetestis，whethertheobjectbeofalocalcharacter，andlocaluse；or，whetheritbeofgeneralbenefittothestates。1Ifitbepurelylocal，congresscannotconstitutionallyappropriatemoneyfortheobject。But，ifthebenefitbegeneral，itmattersnot，whetherinpointoflocalityitbeinonestate，orseveral；whetheritbeoflargeorofsmallextent；
itsnatureandcharacterdeterminetheright，andcongressmayappropriatemoneyinaidofit；foritistheninajustsenseforthegeneralwelfare。
§；1269。Butithasbeencontended，thattheconstitutionisnotconfinedtomereappropriationsofmoney；butauthorizescongressdirectlytoundertakeandcarryonasystemofinternalimprovementsforthegeneralwelfare；whereversuchimprovementsfallwithinthescopeofanyoftheenumeratedpowers。Congressmaynot，indeed，engageinsuchundertakingsmerelybecausetheyareinternalimprovementsforthegeneralwelfare，unlesstheyfallwithinthescopeoftheenumeratedpowers。Thedistinctionbetweenthispower，andthepowerofappropriationis，thatinthelatter，congressmayappropriatetoanypurpose，whichisforthecommondefenceorgeneralwelfare；butintheformer，theycanengageinsuchundertakingsonly，asaremeans，orincidentstoitsenumeratedpowers。
Congressmay，therefore，authorizethemakingofacanal，asincidenttothepowertoregulatecommerce，wheresuchcanalmayfacilitatetheintercoursebetweenstateandstate。Theymayauthorizelight—houses，piers，buoys，andbeaconstobebuiltforthepurposesofnavigation。Theymayauthorizethepurchaseandbuildingofcustom—houses，andrevenuecutters，andpublicwarehouses，asincidentstothepowertolayandcollecttaxes。Theymaypurchaseplacesforpublicuses；anderectforts，arsenals，dock—yards，navy—yards，andmagazines，asincidentstothepowertomakewar。
§；1270。Forthesamereasoncongressmayauthorizethelayingoutandmakingofamilitaryroad，andacquirearightoverthesoilforsuchpurposes；andasincidenttheretotheyhaveapowertokeeptheroadinrepair，andpreventallobstructionsthereto。
Butinthese，andthelikecases，thegeneraljurisdictionofthestateoverthesoil，subjectonlytotherightsoftheUnitedStates，isnotexcluded。As，forexample，incaseofamilitaryroad；althoughastatecannotpreventrepairsonthepartoftheUnitedStates，orauthorizeanyobstructionsoftheroad，itsgeneraljurisdictionremainsuntouched。Itmaypunishallcrimescommittedontheroad；anditretainsinotherrespectsitsterritorialsovereigntyoverit。Therightofsoilmaystillremaininthestate，orinindividuals，andtherighttotheeasementonlyinthenationalgovernment。Thereisagreatdistinctionbetweentheexerciseofapower，excludingaltogetherstatejurisdiction，andtheexerciseofapower，whichleavesthestatejurisdictiongenerallyinforce，andyetincludes，onthepartofthenationalgovernment，apowertopreserve，whatithascreated。2
§；1271。Inallthese，andothercases，inwhichthepowerofcongressisasserted，itissouponthegeneralgroundofitsbeinganincidentalpower；andthecourseofreasoning，bywhichitissupported，ispreciselythesame，asthatadoptedinrelationtoothercasesalreadyconsidered。Itis，forinstance，admitted，thatcongresscannotauthorizethemakingofacanal，exceptforsomepurposeofcommerceamongthestates，orforsomeotherpurposebelongingtotheUnion；anditcannotmakeamilitaryroad，unlessitbenecessaryandproperforpurposesofwar。Togooverthereasoningatlargewould，therefore，belittlemore，thanarepetitionofwhathasbeenalreadyfullyexpounded。3TheJournaloftheConventionisnotsupposedtofurnishanyadditionallightsonthesubject，beyondwhathavebeenalreadystated。4
§；1272。Theresistancetothisextendedreachofthenationalpowersturnsalsouponthesamegeneralreasoning，bywhichastrictconstructionoftheconstitutionhasbeenconstantlymaintained。Itissaid，thatsuchapowerisnotamongthoseenumeratedintheconstitution；norisitimplied，asameansofexecutinganyofthem。Thepowertoregulatecommercecannotincludeapowertoconstructroadsandcanals，andimprovethenavigationofwater—coursesinordertofacilitate，promote，andsecuresuchcommerce，withoutalatitudeofconstructiondepartingfromtheordinaryimportoftheterms，andincompatiblewiththenatureoftheconstitution。5Theliberalinterpretationhasbeenveryuniformlyassertedbycongress；
thestrictinterpretationhasnotuniformly，buthasuponseveralimportantoccasionsbeeninsisteduponbytheexecutive。6Inthepresentstateofthecontroversy，thedutyofforbearanceseemsinculcateduponthecommentator；andthereadermustdecideforhimselfuponhisownviewsofthesubject。
§；1273。Anotherquestionhasbeenmade，howfarcongresscouldmakealawgivingtotheUnitedStatesapreferenceandpriorityofpaymentoftheirdebts，incasesofthedeath，orinsolvency，orbankruptcyoftheirdebtors，outoftheirestates。Ithasbeensettled，upondeliberateargument，thatcongresspossesssuchaconstitutionalpower。
Itisanecessaryandproperpowertocarryintoeffecttheotherpowersofthegovernment。ThegovernmentistopaythedebtsoftheUnion；andmustbeauthorizedtousethemeans，whichappeartoitselfmosteligibletoeffectthatobject。Itmaypurchase，andremitbillsforthisobject；
anditmaytakeallthoseprecautions，andmakeallthoseregulations，whichwillrenderthetransmissionsafe。Itmay，inlikemanner，passalllawstorendereffectualthecollectionofitsdebts。Itisnoobjectiontothisrightofpriority，thatitwillinterferewiththerightsofthestatesovereigntiesrespectingthedignityofdebts，andwilldefeatthemeasures，whichtheyhavearighttoadopttosecurethemselvesagainstdelinquenciesonthepartoftheirownrevenueorotherofficers。Thisobjection，ifofanyavail，isanobjectiontothepowersgivenbytheconstitution。Themischiefsuggested，sofarasitcanreallyhappen，isthenecessaryconsequenceofthesupremacyofthelawsoftheUnitedStatesonallsubjects，towhichthelegislativepowerofcongressextends。7
§；1274。Itisunderthesameimpliedauthority，thattheUnitedStateshaveanyrighteventosueintheirowncourts；foranexpresspowerisnowheregivenintheconstitution，thoughitisclearlyimpliedinthatpartrespectingthejudicialpower。AndcongressmaynotonlyauthorizesuitstobebroughtinthenameoftheUnitedStates，butinthenameofanyartificialperson，suchasthePostmaster—General，8ornaturalpersonfortheirbenefit。9Indeed，alltheusualincidentsappertainingtoapersonalsovereign，inrelationtocontracts，andsuing，andenforcingfights，sofarastheyarewithinthescopeofthepowersofthegovernment，belongtotheUnitedStates，astheydotoothersovereigns。10Therightofmakingcontractsandinstitutingsuitsisanincidenttothegeneralrightofsovereignty；andtheUnitedStates，beingabodypolitic，may，withinthesphereoftheconstitutionalpowersconfidedtoit，andthroughtheinstrumentalityoftheproperdepartment，towhichthosepowersareconfided，enterintocontractsnotprohibitedbylaw，andappropriatetothejustexerciseofthosepowers；
andenforcetheobservanceofthembysuitsandjudicialprocess。11
§；1275。Therearealmostinnumerablecases，inwhichtheauxiliaryandimpliedpowersbelongingtocongresshavebeenputintooperation。ButtheobjectoftheseCommentariesis，rathertotakenoticeofthose，whichhavebeenthesubjectofanimadversion，thanofthose，whichhavehithertoescapedreproof，orhavebeensilentlyapproved。
§；1276。Uponthegroundofastrictinterpretation，someextraordinaryobjectionshavebeentakeninthecourseofthepracticaloperationsofthegovernment。Theveryfirstact，passedunderthegovernment，whichregulatedthetime，form，andmanner，ofadministeringtheoathsprescribedbytheconstitution，12wasdeniedtobeconstitutional。Buttheobjectionhaslongsincebeenabandoned。13Ithasbeendoubted，whetheritisconstitutionaltopermitthesecretariestodraftbillsonsubjectsconnectedwiththeirdepartments，tobepresentedtothehouseofrepresentativesfortheirconsideration。14Ithasbeendoubted，whetheranactauthorizingthepresidenttolay，regulate，andrevoke，embargoeswasconstitutional。15Ithasbeendoubted，whethercongresshaveauthoritytoestablishamilitaryacademy。16Buttheseobjectionshavebeensilently，orpracticallyabandoned。
1。Hamilton’sReportonManufactures，1791，1Hamilton’sWorks，231，232；1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。250，251，2ed。p。267，268；SergeantonConstitution，ch。28，[ch。30；]PresidentMonroe’sExpositionandMessage，4thMay，1822，p。38，39。
2。See1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。250，251；SergeantonConstitution，ch。28，[ch。30，ed。1830；]2U。S。LawJournal，April，1826，p。251，&；c。；3Elliot’sDebates，309，310；4Elliot’sDebates，244，265，279，291，356；Webster’sSpeeches，p。392to397。
3。SeeM’Cullochv。Maryland，4WheatR。406，407，413to421；Webster’sSpeeches，p。392to397；4Elliot’sDebate。280。
4。JournalofConvention，p。260，376。
5。PresidentMadison’sMessage。3dMarch，1817；4Elliot’sDebates，280，281；PresidentMonroe’sMessage，4thMay，1822，p。22to35；PresidentJackson’sMessage，27thMay，1830；4Elliot’sDebates，333，334。335；1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。250，251；4Elliot’sDebates，291，292，354，355；SergeantonConstitution，ch。28，[ch。30
；]4Jefferson’sCorresp。421。？PresidentMonroe，inhiselaborateExpositionaccompanyinghisMessageofthe4thofMay，1822，deniestheindependentrightofcongresstoconstructroadsandcanals；butassertsinthestrongestmannertheirrighttoappropriatemoneytosuchobjects。Hisreasoningforthelatteristhoughtbymanytobequiteirresistibleinfavouroftheformer。Seethemessagefrompage。35topage47。Oneshortpassagemaybequoted。\"Goodroadsandcanalswillpromotemanyveryimportantnationalpurposes。Theywillfacilitatetheoperationsofwar；themovementsoftroops；thetransportationofcannon，ofprovisionsandeverywarlikestore，muchtoouradvantage，andthedisadvantageoftheenemyintimeofwar。Goodroadswillfacilitatethetransportationofthemail，andtherebypromotethepurposesofcommerceandpoliticalintelligenceamongthepeople。Theywill，bybeingproperlydirectedtotheseobjects，enhancethevalueofourvacantlands，atreasureofvastresourcetothenation。\"
Thisistheveryreasoning，bywhichthefriendsof：。thegeneralpowersupportitsconstitutionality。
6。4Jefferson’sCorresp。421；1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。250，251。
7。UnitedStatesv。Fisher，2
Cranch，358；1Peters’sCondensedRep。421；Harrisonv。Sterry，5Cranch，289；2Peters’sCondensedRep。260；1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。229to233。
8。Postmaster—Generalv。Early，12Wheat。R。136。
9。SeeDuganv。UnitedStates，3Wheat。R。173，179；UnitedStatesv。Buford，3Peters’sR。12，30；UnitedState：v。Tingey，5Peters’sR。115，127，128。
10。Coxv。UnitedStates，6Peters’sR。172。
11。UnitedStatesv。Tingey，5Peters’sR。115，128。
12。Actof1stJune，1789，ch。1。
13。4Elliot’sDeb。139，140，141；1
Lloyd’sDeb。218to225。
14。4Elliot’sDebates，238，239，240。
15。Elliot’sDebates，240。SeeId。265。
16。4Jefferson’sCorresp。499。
JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
Book3Chapter27CHAPTERXXVII。POWERSOFCONGRESS——PURCHASESOFFOREIGNTERRITORY——EMBARGOES。§；1277。BUTthemostremarkablepowers，whichhavebeenexercisedbythegovernment，asauxiliaryandimpliedpowers，andwhich，ifany，gototheutmostvergeofliberalconstruction，arethelayingofanunlimitedembargoin1807，andthepurchaseofLouisianain1803，anditssubsequentadmissionintotheUnion，asastate。Thesemeasureswerebroughtforward，andsupported，andcarried，bytheknownandavowedfriendsofastrictconstructionoftheconstitution；
andtheywerejustifiedatthetime，andcanbenowjustified，onlyuponthedoctrinesofthose，whosupportaliberalconstructionoftheconstitution。
Thesubjecthasbeenalreadyhintedat；butitdeservesamoredeliberatereview。
§；1278。InregardtotheacquisitionofLouisiana：Thetreatyof1803containsacessionofthewholeofthatvastterritorybyFrancetotheUnitedStates，forasumexceedingelevenmillionsofdollars。ThereisastipulationinthetreatyonthepartoftheUnitedStates，thattheinhabitantsofthecededterritoryshallbeincorporatedintotheUnion，andadmitted，assoonaspossible，accordingtotheprinciplesofthefederalconstitution，totheenjoymentofalltherights，advantages，andimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStates。1
§；1279。Itisobvious，thatthetreatyembracedseveralveryimportantquestions，eachofthemuponthegroundsofastrictconstructionfullofdifficultyanddelicacy。Inthefirstplace，hadtheUnitedStatesaconstitutionalauthoritytoacceptthecessionandpayforit？Inthenextplace，iftheyhad，wasthestipulationfortheadmissionoftheinhabitantsintotheUnion，asastate，constitutional，orwithinthepowerofcongresstogiveiteffect？
§；1280。Thereisnopretence，thatthepurchase，orcessionofanyforeignterritoryiswithinanyofthepowersexpresslyenumeratedintheconstitution。Itisnowhereinthatinstrumentsaid，thatcongress，oranyotherdepartmentofthenationalgovernment，shallhavearighttopurchase，oracceptofanycessionofforeignterritory。
Thepoweritselfithasbeensaidcouldscarcelyhavebeeninthecontemplationoftheframersofit。Itis，initsownnature，asdangeroustoliberty，assusceptibleofabuseinitsactualapplication，andaslikelyasany，whichcouldbeimagined，toleadtoadissolutionoftheUnion。Ifcongresshavethepower，itmayuniteanyforeignterritorywhatsoevertoourown，howeverdistant，howeverpopulous，andhoweverpowerful。Undertheformofacession，wemaybecomeunitedtoamorepowerfulneighbourorrival；
andbeinvolvedinEuropean，orotherforeigninterests，andcontests，toaninterminableextent。AndiftheremaybeastipulationfortheadmissionofforeignstatesintotheUnion，thewholebalanceoftheconstitutionmaybedestroyed，andtheoldstatessunkintoutterinsignificance。Itisincredible，thatitshouldhavebeencontemplated，thatanysuchoverwhelmingauthorityshouldbeconfidedtothenationalgovernmentwiththeconsentofthepeopleoftheoldstates。Ifitexistsatall，itisunforeseen，andtheresultofasovereignty，intendedtobelimited，andyetnotsufficientlyguarded。TheverycaseofthecessionofLouisianaisastrikingillustrationofthedoctrine。Itadmits，byconsequence，intotheUnionanimmenseterritory，equalto，ifnotgreater，thanthatofalltheUnitedStatesunderthepeaceof1783。Inthenaturalprogressofevents，itmust，withinashortperiod，changethewholebalanceofpowerintheUnion，andtransfertotheWestalltheimportantattributesofthesovereigntyofthewhole。
If，asiswellknown，oneofthestrongobjectionsurgedagainsttheconstitutionwas，thattheoriginalterritoryoftheUnitedStateswastoolargeforanationalgovernment；itisinconceivable，thatitcouldhavebeenwithintheintentionofthepeople，thatanyadditionsofforeignterritoryshouldbemade，whichshouldthusdoubleeverydangerfromthissource。Thetreaty—makingpowermustbeconstrued，asconfinedtoobjectswithinthescopeoftheconstitution。And，althoughcongresshaveauthoritytoadmitnewstatesintothefirm，yetitisdemonstrable，thatthisclausehadsolereferencetotheterritorythenbelongingtotheUnitedStates；andwasdesignedfortheadmissionofthestates，which，undertheordinanceof1787，werecontemplatedtobeformedwithinitsoldboundaries。Inregardtotheappropriationofmoneyforthepurposesofthecessionthecaseisstillstronger。Ifnoappropriationofmoneycanbemade，exceptforcaseswithintheenumeratedpowers，andthisclearlyisnotone，howcantheenormoussumofelevenmillionsbejustifiedforthisobject？Ifitbesaid，thatitwillbe\"forthecommondefence，andgeneralwelfare\"topurchasetheterritory，howisthisreconcileablewiththestrictconstructionoftheconstitution？
Ifcongresscanappropriatemoneyforoneobject，becauseitisdeemedforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare，whymaytheynotappropriateitforallobjectsofthesamesort？Iftheterritorycanbepurchased，itmustbegoverned；andaterritorialgovernmentmustbecreated。Butwherecancongressfindauthorityintheconstitutiontoerectaterritorialgovernment，sinceitdoesnotpossessthepowertoerectcorporations？
§；1281。Suchweretheobjections，whichhavebeen，andinfactmaybe，urgedagainstthecession，andtheappropriationsmadetocarrythetreatyintoeffect。Thefriendsofthemeasureweredriventotheadoptionofthedoctrine，thattherighttoacquireterritorywasincidenttonationalsovereignty；thatitwasaresultingpower，growingnecessarilyoutoftheaggregatepowersconfidedbythefederalconstitution；
thattheappropriationmightjustlybevindicateduponthisground，andalsoupontheground，thatitwasforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。
Inshort，thereisnopossibilityofdefendingtheconstitutionalityofthismeasure，butupontheprinciplesoftheliberalconstruction，whichhasbeen，uponotheroccasions，soearnestlyresisted。2
§；1282。Asanincidentalpower，theconstitutionalrightoftheUnitedStatestoacquireterritorywouldseemsonaturallytoflowfromthesovereigntyconfidedtoit，asnottoadmitofveryseriousquestion。TheconstitutionconfersonthegovernmentoftheUnionthepowerofmakingwar，andofmakingtreaties；anditseemsconsequentlytopossessthepowerofacquiringterritoryeitherbyconquestoftreaty。3Ifthecessionbebytreaty，thetermsofthattreatymustbeobligatory；
foritisthelawoftheland。Andifitstipulatesfortheenjoymentbytheinhabitantsoftherights，privileges，andimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStates，andfortheadmissionoftheterritoryintotheUnion，asastate，thesestipulationsmustbeequallyobligatory。Theyarewithinthescopeoftheconstitutionalauthorityofthegovernment，whichhastherighttoacquireterritory，tomaketreaties，andtoadmitnewstatesintotheUnion。4
§；1283。ThemererecentacquisitionofFlorida，whichhasbeenuniversallyapproved，oracquiescedinbyallthestates，canbemaintainedonlyonthesameprinciples；andfurnishesastrikingillustrationofthetruth，thatconstitutionsofgovernmentrequirealiberalconstructiontoeffecttheirobjects，andthatanarrowinterpretationoftheirpowers，howeveritmaysuittheviewsofspeculativephilosophers，ortheaccidentalinterestsofpoliticalparties，isincompatiblewiththepermanentinterestsofthestate，andsubversiveofthegreatendsofallgovernment，thesafetyandindependenceofthepeople。
§；1284。Theotherinstanceofanextraordinaryapplicationoftheimpliedpowersofthegovernment，abovealludedto，istheembargolaidintheyear1807，bythespecialrecommendationofPresidentJefferson。Itwasavowedlyrecommended，asameasureofsafetyforourvessels，ourseamen，andourmerchandisefromthethenthreateningdangersfromthebelligerentsofEurope；5anditwasexplicitlystated\"tobeameasureofprecautioncalledforbytheoccasion；\"and\"neitherhostileinitscharacter，norasjustifying，orinciting，orleadingtohostilitywithanynationwhatever。\"6Itwasinnosense，then，awarmeasure。Ifitcouldbeclassedatall，asflowingfrom，orasanincidentto，anyoftheenumeratedpowers，itwasthatofregulatingcommerce。Initsterms，theactprovided，thatanembargobe，andherebyis，laidonallshipsandvesselsintheports，orwithinthelimitsorjurisdiction，oftheUnitedStates，&；c。boundtoanyforeignportorplace。7Itwasinitstermsunlimitedinduration；andcouldberemovedonlybyasubsequentactofcongress，havingtheassentofalltheconstitutionalbranchesofthelegislature。8
§；1285。Noonecanreasonablydoubt，thatthelayingofanembargo，suspendingcommerceforalimitedperiod，iswithinthescopeoftheconstitution。Butthequestionofdifficultywas，whethercongress，underthepowertoregulatecommercewithforeignnations，couldconstitutionallysuspendandinterdictitwhollyforanunlimitedperiod，thatis，byapermanentact，havingnolimitationastoduration，eitheroftheact，oroftheembargo。Itwasmostseriouslycontroverted，anditsconstitutionalitydeniedintheEasternstatesoftheUnion，duringitsexistence。Anappealwasmadetothejudiciaryuponthequestion；andithavingbeensettledtobeconstitutionalbythatdepartmentofthegovernment，thedecisionwasacquiescedin，thoughthemeasureborewithalmostunexampledseverity，upontheEasternstates；anditsruinouseffectscanstillbetracedalongtheirextensiveseaboard。Theargumentwas，thatthepowertoregulatedidnotincludethepowertoannihilatecommerce，byinterdictingitpermanentlyandentirelywithforeignnations。
Thedecisionwas，thatthepowerofcongresswassovereign，relativetocommercialintercourse，qualifiedbythelimitationsandrestrictionscontainedintheconstitutionitself。Non—intercourseandEmbargolawsarewithintherangeoflegislativediscretion；andifcongresshavethepower，forpurposesofsafety，ofpreparation，orcounteraction，tosuspendcommercialintercoursewithforeignnations，theyarenotlimited，astotheduration，anymore，thanastothemannerandextentofthemeasure。9
§；1286。Thatthismeasurewenttotheutmostvergeofconstitutionalpower，andespeciallyofimpliedpower，hasneverbeendenied。Thatitcouldnotbejustifiedbyany，butthemostliberalconstructionoftheconstitution，isequallyundeniable。Itwasthefavouritemeasureofthose，whoweregenerallytheadvocatesofthestrictestconstruction。Itwassustainedbythepeoplefromabelief，thatitwaspromotiveoftheinterests，andimportanttothesafetyoftheUnion。
§；1287。Atthepresentday，fewstatesmenaretobefound，whoseriouslycontesttheconstitutionalityoftheactsrespectingeithertheembargo，orthepurchaseandadmissionofLouisianaintotheUnion。Thegeneralvoiceofthenationhassustained，andsupportedthem。Why，then，shouldnotthatgeneralvoicebeequallyrespectedinrelationtoothermeasuresofvastpublicimportance，andbymanydeemedofstillmorevitalinteresttothecountry，suchasthetarifflaws，andthenationalbankcharter？Cananymeasuresfurnishamoreinstructivelesson，oramoresalutaryadmonition，inthewholehistoryofparties，atoncetomoderateourzeal，andawakenourvigilance，thanthose，whichstanduponprinciplesrepudiatedatonetimeuponconstitutionalscruples，andsolemnlyadoptedatanothertime，tosubserveapresentgood，orfostertheparticularpolicyofanadministration？Whiletheprinciplesoftheconstitutionshouldbepreservedwithamostguardedcaution，andamostsacredregardtotherightsofthestates；itisatoncethedictateofwisdom，andenlightenedpatriotismtoavoidthatnarrownessofinterpretation，whichwoulddryupallitsvitalpowers，orcompelthegovernmentaswasdoneundertheconfederation，tobreakdownallconstitutionalbarriers，andtrustforitsvindicationtothepeople，uponthedangerouspoliticalmaxim，thatthesafetyofthepeopleisthesupremelaw，saluspopulisupremalex；amaxim，whichmightbeusedtojustifytheappointmentofadictator，oranyotherusurpation。10
§；1288。Thereremainoneortwoothermeasuresofapoliticalnature，whoseconstitutionalityhasbeendenied；
butwhich，beingofatransientcharacter，haveleftnopermanenttracesintheconstitutionaljurisprudenceofthecountry。ReferenceisheremadetotheAlienandSeditionlaws，passedin1798，bothofwhichwerelimitedtoashortduration，andexpiredbytheirownlimitation。11OnetheAlienactauthorizedthepresidenttoorderoutofthecountrysuchaliens，asheshoulddeemdangeroustothepeaceandsafetyoftheUnitedStates；orshouldhavereasonablegroundstosuspecttobeconcernedinanytreasonable，orsecretmachinationsagainstthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，underseverepenaltiesfordisobedience。Theotherdeclareditapubliccrime，punishablewithfineandimprisonment，foranypersonsunlawfullytocombine，andconspiretogether，withintenttoopposeanymeasureormeasuresoftheUnitedStates，&；c。；orwithsuchintent，tocounsel，advise，orattempttoprocureanyinsurrection，unlawfulassembly，orcombination；ortowrite，print，utter，orpublish，orcause，orprocuretobewritten，&；c。，orwillinglytoassistinwriting，&；c。，anyfalse，scandalous，andmaliciouswritingorwritingsagainstthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，oreitherhouseofcongress，orthepresident，withintenttodefamethem，ortobringthemintocontempt，ordisrepute，ortoexciteagainstthemthehatredofthepeople，ortostirupsedition；
ortoexciteanyunlawfulcombinationforopposing，orresistinganylaw，oranylawfulactofthepresident，ortoresist，oppose，ordefeatanysuchlaworact；ortoaid，encourage，orabetanyhostiledesignsofanyforeignnationsagainsttheUnitedStates。Itprovided，however，thatthetruthofthewritingorlibelmightbegiveninevidence；andthatthejury，whotriedthecause，shouldhavearighttodeterminethelawandthefact，underthedirectionofthecourt，asinothercases。
§；1289。Theconstitutionalityofboththeactswasassailedwithgreatearnestnessandabilityatthetime；andwasdefendedwithequalmasculinevigour。Thegroundoftheadvocates，infavouroftheselaws，was，thattheyresultedfromtherightanddutyinthegovernmentofself—preservation，andthelikedutyandprotectionofitsfunctionariesintheproperdischargeoftheirofficialduties。
Theywereimpugned，asnotconformabletotheletterorspiritoftheconstitution；
andasinconsistentintheirprincipleswiththerightsofcitizens，andthelibertyofthepress。TheAlienactwasdenounced，asexercisingapowernotdelegatedbytheconstitution；asunitinglegislativeandjudicialfunctions，withthatoftheexecutive；andbythisUnionassubvertingthegeneralprinciplesoffreegovernment，andtheparticularorganizationandpositiveprovisionsoftheconstitution。Itwasadded，thattheSeditionactwasopentothesameobjection，andwasexpresslyforbiddenbyoneoftheamendmentsoftheconstitution，onwhichtherewillbeoccasionhereaftertocomment。12Atpresentitdoesnotseemnecessarytopresentmorethanthisgeneraloutline，asthemeasuresarenotlikelytoberenewed；andasthedoctrines，onwhichtheyaremaintained，anddenounced，arenotmateriallydifferentfromthose，whichhavebeenalreadyconsidered。13
1。Art。3。
2。SeetheDebatesin1803，ontheLouisianaTreaty，printedbyT。&；G。PalmerinPhiladelphia，in1804，and4Elliot’sDebates257to260。——Theobjectionswerenottakenmerelybypersons，whowereatthattimeinoppositiontothenationaladministration。PresidentJeffersonhimselfunderwhoseauspicesthetreatywasmade，wasofopinion，thatthemeasurewasunconstitutional，andrequiredanamendmentoftheconstitutiontojustifyit。Heaccordinglyurgedhisfriendsstrenuouslytothatcourse；atthesametimeheadded，\"thatitwillbedesirableforcongresstodowhatisnecessaryinsilence\"；\"whatevercongressshallthinknecessarytodoshouldbedonewithaslittledebateaspossible，andparticularlysofarasrespectstheconstitutionaldifficulty。\"
\"Iconfess，then，Ithinkitimportantinthepresentcase，tosetanexampleagainstbroadconstructionbyappealingfornewpowertothepeople。If，however，ourfriendsshallthinkdifferently，certainlyIshallacquiescewithsatisfaction；confiding，thatthegoodsenseofourcountrywillcorrecttheevilofconstruction，whenitshallproduceilleffects。\"Whatalatitudeofinterpretationisthis！Theconstitutionmaybeover—leaped，andabroadconstructionadoptedforfavouritemeasures，andresistanceistobemadetosuchaconstructiononly，whenitshallproduceilleffects！HislettertoDr。SibleyinJune，1803}recentlypublishedisdecisive，thathethoughtanamendmentoftheconstitutionnecessary。Yethedidnothesitatewithoutsuchamendmenttogiveeffecttoeverymeasuretocarrythetreatyintoeffectduringhisadministration。See4Jefferson’sCorresp。p。It2，3，LettertoDr。Sibley，andMr。3。Q。Adams’sLettertoMr。SpeakerStevenson，July11，1832。
3。Amer。Insur。Co。v。Canter，1Peters’sSup。R。511，542；Id。517，note，Mr。JusticeJohnson’sOpinion。
4。Ibid。——InthecelebratedHartfordConvention，inJanuary，1815，apropositionwasmadetoamendtheconstitutionso，astoprohibittheadmissionofnewstatesintotheUnionwithouttheconsentoftwo—thirdsorbothhousesofcongress。IntheaccompanyingreportthereisastrongthoughindirectdenialofthepowertoadmitnewstateswithouttheoriginallimitsoftheUnitedStates。
5。6Wait’sStatePapers，57。
6。7Wait’sStatePapers，25，Mr。Madison’sLettertoMr。Pinkney；Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。191，192，193。
7。Act，22dDecember，1807，ch。5。
8。Inpointoffact，itremainedinforceuntilthe29thofJune，1809，beingrepealedbyanactpassedonthefirstofMarch，1809：totakeeffectattheendofthenextsessionofcongresswhichterminatedonthe28thofJune，1809。
9。UnitedStatesv。TheBrigWilliam，2Hall’sLawJournal，255；1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。405；SergeantonConst。Law，ch。28，ch。30；Gibbonsv。Ogden，9Wheat。R。1，191
to193。
10。Mr。Jefferson，onmanyoccasions，wasnotslowtopropose，orjustifymeasuresofaverystrongcharacter；
andsuchasproceededaltogetheruponthegroundofimpliedpowers。Thus，inwritingtoMr。Crawford，on20thofJune，1816，hedeliberatelyproposed，withaviewtoenableusinfuturetomeetanywar，toadopt\"thereportofthethensecretaryofthewardepartment，forplacingtheforceofthenationateffectualcommand，\"andto\"ensureresourcesformoneybythesuppressionofallpapercirculationduringpeace，andlicensingthatofthenationaloneduringwar。\"4Jefferson’sCorresp。285。Whencearethesevastpowersderived？Thelatterwouldamounttoadirectprohibitionofthecirculationofanybanknotesofthestatebanks；andinfactwouldamounttoasuppressionofthemosteffectivepowersofthestatebanks。
11。Actof25thofJune，1798，ch。75；
Actof14thofJuly，1798，ch。91；1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。part2，noteG，p。11to30。
12。TheAlien，andSeditionActsweretheimmediatecauseoftheVirginiaResolutionsofDecember，1798，andoftheelaboratevindicationofthem，inthecelebratedReportofthe7thofJanuary，1800。Thelearnedreaderwilltherefindanampleexpositionofthewholeconstitutionalobjections。Seealso4Jefferson’sCorrespondence，93，27。ThereasoningontheothersidemaybefoundintheDebatesinCongress，atthetimeofthepassageoftheseacts。Itisgreatlytobelamented，thatthereisnoauthenticcollectionofalltheDebatesincongress，inaform，likethatoftheParliamentaryDebates。Seealso4Elliot’sDeb。251，252；DebatesontheJudiciary，in1802，Mr。Bayard’sSpeech，p。371，372；Addison’sChargestotheGrandJury，No。25，p。270；Id。No。
26。p。289。ThesechargesarecommonlyboundwithAddison’sReports。Seealso1Tuck。Black。Comm。296to300；Id。Part2，App。note6，p。11to36；ReportofCommitteeofHouseofRepresentativesofcongress，25thFebruary，1799，andResolveofKentucky，of1798，andResolveofMassachusetts，of9thand13thofFebruary，1799，onthesamesubject。