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　　&sect；1215。Andyetthisclausedidnotescapethecommonfateofmostofthepowersofthenationalgovernment。Itwasrepresented，aspeculiarlydangerous。Itmay，itwassaid，becomeasoftofpublicsanctuary，withexclusiveprivilegesandimmunitiesofeverysort。Itmaybetheveryspotfortheestablishmentoftyranny，midofrefugeoftheoppressorsofthepeople。Theinhabitantswillbeanswerabletonolaws，exceptthoseofcongress。Apowerfularmymaybeherekeptonfoot；andthemostoppressiveandsanguinarylawsmaybepassedtogovernthedistrict。5Nay，atthedistanceoffourteenyearsaftertheconstitutionhadquietlygoneintooperation，andthispowerhadbeenacteduponwithamoderation，ascommendable，asitoughttobesatisfactory，alearnedcommentatorexpressedregretattheextentofthepower，andintimatedinnoinexplicittermshisfearsforthefuture。\"Asystemoflaws，\"sayshe，\"incompatiblewiththenatureandprinciplesofarepresentativedemocracy，thoughnotlikelytobeintroducedatonce，maybematuredbydegrees，anddiffuseitsinfluencethroughthestates，andfinallylaythefoundationofthemostimportantchangesinthenatureofthefederalgovernment。Letforeignersbeenabledtoholdlands，andtransmitthembyinheritance，ordevise；letthepreferencetomales，andtherightsorprimogenitureherevivedwiththedoctrineofentails；andaristocracywillneitherwantaladdertoclimbby，norabaseforitssupport。6\"

　　&sect；1216。Whatasuperstructuretobeerectedonsuchanarrowfoundation！Severalorthestatesnowpermitforeignerstoholdandtransmitlands；andyettheirlibertiesarenotoverwhelmed。

　　ThewholeSouth，beforetherevolution，allowedandcherishedthesystemofprimogeniture；andyettheypossessed，andtransmittedtotheirchildrentheircolonialrightsandprivileges，andachievedunderthisverysystemtheindependenceofthecountry。Thesystemofentailsisstillthelawofseveralofthestates；andyetnodangerhasyetassailedthem。Theypossess，andenjoythefruitsofrepublicanindustryandfrugality，withoutanylandedorotheraristocracy。Andyetthepettydistrictoftenmilessquareistooverruleinitspolicyandlegislationall，thatisvenerableandadmirableinstatelegislation！Thestates，andthepeopleofthestatesarerepresentedincongress。Thedistricthasnorepresentativesthere；

　　butissubjectedtotheexclusivelegislationoftheformer。Andyetcongress，athomerepublican，willherenourisharistocracy。Thestateswillherelaythefoundationforthedestructionoftheirowninstitutions，rights，andsovereignty。Athome，theywillfollowthelegislationofthedistrict，insteadofguidingitbytheirpreceptandexample。Theywillchoosetobetheenginesoftyrannyandoppressioninthedistrict，thattheymaybecomeenslavedwithintheirownterritorialsovereignty。What，butadispositiontoindulgeinallsortsofdelusionsandalarms，couldcreatesuchextraordinaryflightsofimagination？Cansuchthingsbe，andovercomeus，likeasummer’scloud，withoutourspecialwonder？Atthisdistanceoftime，itseemswhollyunnecessarytorefutethesuggestions，whichhavebeensoingeniouslyurged。

　　Iftheyproveanything，theyprove，thatthereoughttobenogovernment，becausenopersonscanbefoundworthyofthetrust。

　　&sect；1217。Theseatofgovernmenthasnow，formorethanthirtyyears，beenpermanentlyfixedontheriverPotomac，onatractoftenmilessquare，cededbythestatesofVirginiaandMaryland。

　　Itwasselectedbythatgreatman，theboastofallAmerica，thefirstinwar，thefirstinpeace，andthefirstintheheartsofhiscountrymen。

　　Itbearshisname；itisthemonumentofhisfameandwisdom。Mayitbeforeverconsecratedtoitspresentnoblepurpose，capitoliimmobilesaxum！

　　&sect；1218。Theinhabitantsenjoyalltheircivil，religious，andpoliticalrights。Theylivesubstantiallyunderthesamelaws，asatthetimeofthecession；suchchangesonlyhavingbeenmade，ashavebeendevised，andsoughtbythemselves。Theyarenotindeedcitizensofanystate，entitledtotheprivilegesofsuch；buttheyarecitizensoftheUnitedStates。Theyhavenoimmediaterepresentativesincongress。Buttheymayjustlyboast，thattheyliveunderapaternalgovernment，attentivetotheirwants，andzealousfortheirwelfare。They，asyet，possessnolocallegislature；andhave，asyet，notdesiredtopossessone。Alearnedcommentatorhasdoubted，whethercongresscancreatesuchalegislature，becauseitisthedelegationofadelegatedauthority。7AverydifferentopinionwasexpressedbytheFederalist；foritwassaid，that\"amunicipallegislatureforlocalpurposes，derivedfromtheirownsuffrages，willofcoursebeallowedthem。\"8Inpointoffact，thecorporationsofthethreecitieswithinitslimitspossessandexerciseadelegatedpoweroflegislationundertheircharters，grantedbycongress，tothefullextentoftheirmunicipalwants，withoutanyconstitutionalscruple，orsurmiseofdoubt。

　　&sect；1219。Theotherpartofthepower，givingexclusivelegislationoverplacescededfortheerectionofforts，magazines，&amp；c。，seemsstillmorenecessaryforthepublicconvenienceandsafety。Thepublicmoneyexpendedonsuchplaces，andthepublicpropertydepositedinthem，andthenatureofthemilitaryduties，whichmayberequiredthere，alldemand，thattheyshouldbeexemptedfromstateauthority。

　　Intruth，itwouldbewhollyimproper，thatplaces，onwhichthesecurityoftheentireUnionmaydepend，shouldbesubjectedtothecontrolofanymemberofit。Thepower，indeed，iswhollyunexceptionable；sinceitcanonlybeexercisedatthewillofthestate；andthereforeitisplacedbeyondallreasonablescruple。9Yet，itdidnotescapewithoutthescrutinizingjealousyoftheopponentsoftheconstitution，andwasdenounced，asdangeroustostatesovereignty。10

　　&sect；1220。Agreatvarietyofcessionshavebeenmadebythestatesunderthispower。Andgenerallytherehasbeenareservationoftherighttoserveallstateprocess，civilandcriminal，uponpersonsfoundtherein。Thisreservationhasnotbeenthoughtatallinconsistentwiththeprovisionoftheconstitution；forthestateprocess，quoadhoc，becomestheprocessoftheUnitedStates，andthegeneralpowerofexclusivelegislationremainswithcongress。Thus，theseplacesarenotcapableofbeingmadeasanctuaryforfugitives，toexemptthemfromactsdonewithin，andcognizableby，thestates，towhichtheterritorybelonged；andatthesametimecongressisenabledtoaccomplishthegreatobjectsofthepower。11

　　&sect；1221。ThepowerofCongresstoexerciseexclusivejurisdictionoverthesecededplacesisconferredonthatbody，asthelegislatureoftheUnion；andcannotbeexercisedinanyothercharacter。

　　Alawpassedinpursuanceofitisthesupremelawoftheland，andbindingonallthestates，andcannotbedefeatedbythem。Thepowertopasssuchalawcarrieswithitalltheincidentalpowerstogiveitcompleteandeffectualexecution；andsuchalawmaybeextendedinitsoperationincidentallythroughouttheUnitedStates，ifcongressthinkitnecessarysotodo。

　　But。ifintendedtohaveefficiencybeyondthedistrict，languagemustbeusedintheactexpressiveofsuchanintention；otherwiseitwillbedeemedpurelylocal。12

　　&sect；1222。Itfollowsfromthisreviewoftheclause，thatthestatescannottakecognizanceofanyactsdoneinthecededplacesafterthecession；and，ontheotherhand，theinhabitantsofthoseplacesceasetobeinhabitantsofthestate，andcannolongerexerciseanycivilorpoliticalrightsunderthelawsofthestate。13Butiftherehasbeennocessionbythestateoftheplace，althoughithasbeenconstantlyoccupiedandused，underpurchase，orotherwise，bytheUnitedStatesforafort，arsenal，orotherconstitutionalpurpose，thestatejurisdictionstillremainscompleteandperfect。14

　　&sect；1223。Uponarecentoccasion，thenatureandeffectoftheexclusivepoweroflegislation，thusgivenbytheconstitutioninthesecededplaces，cameundertheconsiderationoftheSupremeCourt，andwasmuchdiscussed。Itwasargued，thatallsuchlegislationbycongresswaspurelylocal，likethatexercisedbyaterritoriallegislature；andwasnottobedeemedlegislationbycongressinthecharacterofthelegislatureoftheUnion。Theobjectoftheargumentwastoestablish，thatalaw，madeinorforsuchcededplaces，hadnoextra—territorialforceorobligation，itnotbeingalawoftheUnitedStates。Thereasoningofthecourtaffirming，thatsuchanactwasalawoftheUnitedStates，andthatcongressinpassingitacted，asthelegislatureoftheUnion，canbebestconveyedintheirownlanguage，andwouldbeimpairedbyanabridgment。

　　&sect；1224。\"Intheenumerationofthepowersofcongress，whichismadeintheeighthsectionofthefirstarticle，wefindthatofexercisingexclusivelegislationoversuchdistrict，asshallbecometheseatofgovernment。Thispower，likeallothers，whicharespecified，isconferredoncongress，asthelegislatureoftheUnion；

　　for，stripthemofthatcharacter，andtheywouldnotpossessit。Innoothercharactercanitbeexercised。Inlegislatingforthedistrict，theynecessarilypreservethecharacterofthelegislatureoftheUnion；foritisinthatcharacteralone，thattheconstitutionconfersonthemthispowerofexclusivelegislation。Thispropositionneednotbeenforced。

　　Thesecondclauseofthesixtharticledeclares，that’thisconstitution，andthelawsoftheUnitedStates，whichshallbemadeinpursuancethereof，shallbethesupremelawoftheland。’Theclause，whichgivesexclusivejurisdiction，isunquestionablyapartoftheconstitution，and，assuch，bindsalltheUnitedStates。Those，whocontend，thatactsofcongress，madeinpursuanceofthispower，donot，likeactsmadeinpursuanceofotherpowers，bindthenation，oughttoshowsomesafeandclearrule，whichshallsupportthisconstruction，andprove，thatanactofcongress，clothedinalltheforms，whichattendotherlegislativeacts，andpassedinvirtueofapowerconferredon，andexercisedbycongress，asthelegislatureoftheUnion，isnotalawoftheUnitedStates，anddoesnotbindthem。

　　&sect；1225。\"Oneofthegentlemensoughttoillustratehisproposition，thatcongress，whenlegislatingforthedistrict，assumedadistinctcharacter，andwasreducedtoamerelocallegislature，whoselawscouldpossessnoobligationoutofthetenmilessquare，byareferencetothecomplexcharacterofthiscourt。Itis，theysay，acourtofcommonlaw，andacourtofequity。Itscharacter，whensittingasacourtofcommonlaw，isasdistinctfromitscharacter，whensittingasacourtofequity，asifthepowersbelongingtothosedepartmentswerevestedindifferenttribunals。Thoughunitedinthesametribunal，theyareneverconfoundedwitheachother。Withoutinquiring，howfartheunionofdifferentcharactersinonecourtmaybeapplicable，inprinciple，totheunionincongressofthepowerofexclusivelegislationinsomeplaces，andoflimitedlegislationinothers，itmaybeobserved，thattheformsofproceedingsinacourtoflawaresototallyunliketheformsofproceedingsinacourtofequity，thatamereinspectionoftherecordgivesdecisiveinformationofthecharacter，inwhichthecourtsits，andconsequentlyoftheextentofitspowers。Butiftheformsofproceedingwerepreciselythesame，andthecourtthesame，thedistinctionwoulddisappear。

　　&sect；1226。\"Sincecongresslegislatesinthesameforms，andinthesamecharacter，invirtueofpowersofequalobligationconferredinthesameinstrument，whenexercisingitsexclusivepowersoflegislation，aswellaswhenexercisingthose，whicharelimited，wemustinquire，whethertherebeanythinginthenatureofthisexclusivelegislation，whichnecessarilyconfinestheoperationofthelaws，madeinvirtueofthispower，totheplace，withaviewtowhichtheyaremade。

　　Connectedwiththepowertolegislatewithinthisdistrict，isasimilarpowerinforts，arsenals，dock—yards，&amp；c。Congresshasarighttopunishmurderin，afort，orotherplacewithinitsexclusivejurisdiction；butnogeneralrighttopunishmurdercommittedwithinanyofthestates。IntheactforthepunishmentofcrimesagainsttheUnitedStates，murdercommittedwithinafort，oranyotherplaceordistrictofcountry，underthesoleandexclusivejurisdictionoftheUnitedStates，ispunishedwithdeath。Thuscongresslegislatesinthesameact，underitsexclusiveanditslimitedpowers。

　　&sect；1227。\"Theactproceedstodirect，thatthebodyofthecriminal，afterexecution，maybedeliveredtoasurgeonfordissection，and，punishesanyperson，whoshallrescuesuchbodyduringitsconveyancefromtheplaceofexecutiontothesurgeon，towhomitistobedelivered。Lettheseactualprovisionsofthelaw，oranyotherprovisions，whichcanbemadeonthesubject，beconsideredwithaviewtothecharacter，inwhichcongressacts，whenexercisingitspowersofexclusivelegislation。

　　Ifcongressistobeconsideredmerelyasalocallegislature，invested，astothisobject，withpowerslimitedtothefort，orotherplace，inwhichthemurdermaybecommitted，ifitsgeneralpowerscannotcomeinaidoftheselocalpowers，howcantheoffencebetriedinanyothercourt，thanthatoftheplace，inwhichithasbeencommitted？Howcantheoffenderbeconveyedto，ortriedin，anyotherplace？Howcanhebeexecutedelsewhere？

　　Howcanhisbodybeconveyedthroughacountryunderthejurisdictionofanothersovereign，andtheindividualpunished，who，withinthatjurisdiction，shallrescuethebody？WereanyonestateoftheUniontopassalawfortryingacriminalinacourtnotcreatedbyitself，inaplacenotwithinitsjurisdiction，anddirectthesentencetobeexecutedwithoutitsterritory，weshouldallperceive，andacknowledgeitsincompetencytosuchacourseoflegislation。Ifcongressbenotequallyincompetent，itis，becausethatbodyunitesthepowersoflocallegislationwiththose，whicharetooperatethroughtheUnion，andmayusethelastinaidofthefirst；

　　or，becausethepowerofexercisingexclusivelegislationdrawsafterit，asanincident，thepowerofmakingthatlegislationeffectual；andtheincidentalpowermaybeexercisedthroughouttheUnion，becausetheprincipalpowerisgiventothatbody，asthelegislatureoftheUnion。

　　&sect；1228。\"So，inthesameact，aperson，who，havingknowledgeofthecommissionofmurder，orotherfelony，onthehighseas，orwithinanyfort，arsenal，dockyard，magazine，orotherplace，ordistrictofcountrywithinthesoleandexclusivejurisdictionoftheUnitedStates，shallconcealthesame，&amp；c。heshallbeadjudgedguiltyofmisprisionoffelony，andshallbeadjudgedtobeimprisoned，&amp；c。Itisclear，thatcongresscannotpunishfeloniesgenerally；and，ofconsequence，cannotpunishmisprisionoffelony。Itisequallyclear，thatastatelegislature，thestateofMarylandforexample，cannotpunishthose，who，inanotherstate，concealafelonycommittedinMaryland。How，then，isit，thatcongress，legislatingexclusivelyforafort，punishesthose，who，outofthatfort，concealafelonycommittedwithinit？

　　&sect；1229。\"Thesolution，andtheonlysolutionofthedifficulty，is，thatthepowervestedincongress，asthelegislatureoftheUnitedStates，tolegislateexclusivelywithinanyplacecededbyastate，carrieswithit，asanincident，therighttomakethatpowereffectual。Ifafelonescapeoutofthestate，inwhichtheacthasbeencommitted，thegovernmentcannotpursuehimintoanotherstate，andapprehendhimthere；butmustdemandhimfromtheexecutivepowerofthatotherstate。

　　Ifcongressweretobeconsideredmerely，asthelocallegislatureforthefort，orotherplace，inwhichtheoffencemightbecommitted，thenthisprinciplewouldapplytothem，astootherlocallegislatures；andthefelon，whoshouldescapeoutofthefort，orotherplace，inwhichthefelonymayhavebeencommitted，couldnotbeapprehendedbythemarshal，butmustbedemandedfromtheexecutiveofthestate。Butweknow，thattheprincipledoesnotapply；andthereasonis，thatcongressisnotalocallegislature，butexercisesthisparticularpower，likeallitsotherpowers，initshighcharacter，asthelegislatureoftheUnion。TheAmericanpeoplethoughtitanecessarypower，andtheyconferreditfortheirownbenefit。Beingsoconferred，itcarrieswithitallthoseincidentalpowers，whicharenecessarytoitscompleteandeffectualexecution。

　　&sect；1230。\"Whetheranyparticularlawbedesignedtooperatewithoutthedistrictornot，dependsonthewordsofthatlaw。Ifitbedesignedsotooperate，thenthequestion，whetherthepower，soexercised，beincidentaltothepowerofexclusivelegislation，andbewarrantedbytheconstitution，requiresaconsiderationofthatinstrument。Insuchcasestheconstitutionandthelawmustbecomparedandconstrued。Thisistheexerciseofjurisdiction。Itistheonlyexerciseofit，whichisallowedinsuchacase。\"15

　　1。Journ。ofConvent。222，260。328，329，358。

　　2。TheFederalist，No。43；2Elliot’sDeb。92，321，322，326。

　　3。TheFederalist，No。43；2Elliot’sDeb。92，321，322，326，327。

　　4。RawleonConst。ch。9，p。112，113。

　　5。2Elliot’sDebates，320，321，323，324，325，326；Id。115。？Amendmentslimitingthepowerofcongresstosuchregulations，asrespecttimepoliceandgoodgovernmentofthedistrict，wereproposedbyseveralorthestatesatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheconstitution。Buttheyhavebeensilentlyabandoned。1Tucker’sBlack。

　　Comm。App。276，374。

　　6。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。277。

　　7。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。278。

　　8。TheFederalist。No。43。

　　9。TheFederalist，No。43。SeealsoUnitedStatesv。Bevans，3Wheat。R。336，388。

　　10。2Elliot’sDebates，145。

　　11。Commonwealthv。Clary，8

　　Mass。R。72；UnitedStatesv。Cornell，2MasonR。60；RawleonConstitution，ch。27，p。238；SergeantonConstitution，ch。28，[ch。30；]1Kent’sComm。

　　Lect。19，p。402to404。

　　12。Cohensv。Virginia，6Wheat。

　　R。264，424，425，426，427，428；SergeantonConstitution，ch。28，[ch。

　　30；]1Kent。Comm。Lect。19，p。402to404；RawleonConstitution，ch。27，p。238，239；Loughboroughv。Blake，5Wheat。R。322，324。

　　13。8Mass。R。72；1Hall’sJournalofJurisp。53；1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。403，404。

　　14。ThePeoplev。Godfrey，17

　　Johns。R。225；Commonwealthv。Young，1Hall’sJournalofJurisp。

　　47；1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。401，404；SergeantonConstitution，ch。

　　28。[ch。30；]RawleonConstitution，ch。27，p。238to240。

　　15。Cohens，v。Virginia，6Wheat。

　　R。424to429。

　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：

　　Book3Chapter24CHAPTERXXIV。POWERSOFCONGRESS？INCIDENTAL。&sect；1231。THEnextpowerofcongressis，\"tomakealllaws，whichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoexecutiontheforegoingpowers，andallotherpowersvestedbythisconstitutioninthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，orinany，department，orofficerthereof。\"

　　&sect；1232。Fewpowersofthegovernmentwereatthetimeoftheadoptionoftheconstitutionassailedwithmoresevereinvective，andmoredeclamatoryintemperance，thanthis。1Andithaseversincebeenmadeathemeofconstantattack，andextravagantjealousy。2Yetitisdifficulttoperceivethegrounds，uponwhichitcanbemaintained，orthelogic，bywhichitcanbereasonedout。Itisonlydeclaratory，ofatruth，whichwouldhaveresultedbynecessaryandunavoidableimplicationfromtheveryactofestablishingthenationalgovernment，andvestingitwithcertainpowers。Whatisapower，buttheabilityorfacultyofdoingathing？Whatistheabilitytodoathing，butthepowerofemployingthemeansnecessarytoitsexecution？Whatisalegislativepower，butapowerofmakinglaws？Whatarethemeanstoexecutealegislativepower，butlaws？

　　Whatisthepowerforinstance，oflayingandcollectingtaxes，butalegislativepower，orapowertomakelawstolayandcollecttaxes？Whatarethepropermeansofexecutingsuchapower，butnecessaryandproperlaws？Intruth，theconstitutionaloperationofthegovernmentwouldbepreciselythesame，iftheclausewereobliterated，asifitwererepeatedineveryarticle。3Itwouldotherwiseresult，thatthepowercouldneverbeexercised；thatis，theendwouldberequired，andyetnomeansallowed。Thiswouldbeaperfectabsurdity。Itwouldbetocreatepowers，andcompelthemtoremainforeverinatorpid，dormant，andparalyticstate。Itcannot，therefore，bedenied，thatthepowers，givenbytheconstitution，implytheordinarymeansofexecution；4forwithoutthesubstanceofthepowertheconstitutionwouldbeadeadletter。Those，whoobjecttothearticle，mustthereforeobjecttotheform，orthelanguageoftheprovision。Letussee，ifanybettercouldbedevised。5

　　&sect；1233。Therearefourpossiblemethods，whichtheconventionmighthaveadoptedonthissubject。First，theymighthavecopiedthesecondarticleoftheconfederation，whichwouldhaveprohibitedtheexerciseofanypowernotexpresslydelegated。Iftheyhaddoneso，theconstitutionwouldhavebeenconstruedwithsomuchrigour，astodisarmitofallrealauthority；orwithsomuchlatitude，asaltogethertodestroytheforceoftherestriction。Itisobvious，thatnoimportantpowerdelegatedbytheconfederationwas，orindeedcouldbeexecutedbycongress，withoutrecurringmoreorlesstothedoctrineofconstructionorimplication。6Ithad，forinstance，powertoestablishcourtsforthetrialofprizesandpiracies，toborrowmoney，andemitbillsofcredit。Buthowcouldthesepowersbeputinoperationwithoutsomeotherimpliedpowersandmeans？Thetruthis，that，undertheconfederation，congresswasfromthisveryclausedrivento[thedistressingalternative，eithertoviolatethearticlesbyabroadlatitudeofconstruction，ortosufferthepowersofthegovernmenttoremainprostrate，andthepublicservicetobewhollyneglected。Itisnotorious，thattheyadopted，andwerecompelledtoadopttheformercourse；andthecountryborethemoutinwhatmightbedeemedanusurpationofauthority。7Thepastexperienceofthecountrywas，therefore，decisiveagainstanysuchrestriction。Itwaseitheruseless，ormischievous。8

　　&sect；1234。Secondly。Theconventionmighthaveattemptedapositiveenumerationofthepowerscomprehendedundertheterms，necessaryandproper。Theattemptwouldhaveinvolvedacompletedigestoflawsoneverysubject，towhichtheconstitutionrelates。

　　Itmusthaveembracedallfuture，aswellasallpresentexigencies，andbeenaccommodatedtoalltimes，andalloccasions，andallchangesofnationalsituationandcharacter。Everynewapplicationofthegeneralpowermusthavebeenforeseenandspecified；fortheparticularpowers，whicharethemeansofattainingtheobjectsofthegeneralpower，must，necessarily，varywiththoseobjects；andbeoftenproperlyvaried，whentheobjectsremainthesame。9Whodoesnotatonceperceive，thatsuchacourseisutterlybeyondhumanreachandforesight？10Itdemandsawisdomneveryetgiventoman；andaknowledgeofthefuture，whichbelongsonlytoHim，whoseprovidencedirects，andgovernsall。

　　&sect；1235。Thirdly。Theconventionmighthaveattemptedanegativeenumerationofthepowers，byspecifyingthepowers，whichshouldbeexceptedfromthegeneralgrant。Itwillbeatonceperceived，thatthistaskwouldhavebeenequallychimericalwiththeforegoing；andwouldhaveinvolvedthisadditionalobjection，thatinsuchacase，everydefectintheenumerationwouldhavebeenequivalenttoapositivegrantofauthority。If，toavoidthisconsequence，theyhadattemptedapartialenumerationoftheexceptions，anddescribedtheresidue，bythegeneralterms，\"notnecessaryorproper，\"itmusthavehappened，thattheenumerationwouldcomprehendafewexceptionsonly，andthoseonly，whichweremostprominent；andthereforetheleastlikelytobeabused；

　　andthatotherswouldbelessforciblyexceptedundertheresiduaryclause，thaniftherehadnotbeenanypartialenumerationofexceptions。11

　　&sect；1236。Fourthly。Theconventionmighthavebeenwhollysilentonthishead；andthenashasbeenalreadyseen

　　theauxiliarypowers，ormeanstocarryintoexecutionthegeneralpowers，wouldhaveresultedtothegovernmentbynecessaryimplication；forwherevertheendisrequired，themeansareauthorized；andwhereverageneralpowertodoathingisgiven，everyparticularpowernecessaryfordoingit，isincluded。Ifthislastcoursehadbeenadopted，everyobjection，nowurgedagainsttheclause，wouldhaveremainedinfullforce；andtheomissionmighthavebeenmadeincriticalperiodsagroundtoassailtheessentialpowersoftheUnion。12

　　&sect；1237。If，then，theclauseimportsnomore，thanwouldresultfromnecessaryimplication，itmaybeasked，whyitwasinsertedatall。Thetrueansweris，thatsuchaclausewaspeculiarlyuseful，inordertoavoidanydoubt，whichingenuityorjealousymightraiseuponthesubject。Muchplausiblereasoningmightbeemployedbythose，whowerehostiletotheUnion，andinfavourofstatepower，toprejudicethepeopleonsuchasubject，andtoembarrassthegovernmentinallitsreasonableoperations。Besides；astheconfederationcontainedapositiveclause，restrainingtheauthorityofcongresstopowersexpresslygranted，therewasafitnessindeclaring，thatthatruleofinterpretationshouldnolongerprevail。Theveryzeal，indeed，withwhichthepresentclausehasbeenalwaysassailed，isthehighestproofofitsimportanceandpropriety。

　　Ithasnarroweddownthegroundsofhostilitytothemereinterpretationofterms。13

　　&sect；1238。Theplainimportoftheclauseis，thatcongressshallhavealltheincidentalandinstrumentalpowers，necessaryandpropertocarryintoexecutionalltheexpresspowers。Itneitherenlargesanypowerspecificallygranted；norisitagrantofanynewpowertocongress。Butitismerelyadeclarationfortheremovalofalluncertainty，thatthemeansofcarryingintoexecutionthose，otherwisegranted，areincludedinthegrant。14Whenever，therefore，aquestionarisesconcerningtheconstitutionalityofaparticularpower，thefirstquestionis，whetherthepowerbeexpressedintheconstitution。Ifitbe，thequestionisdecided。Ifitbenotexpressed，thenextinquirymustbe，whetheritisproperlyanincidenttoanexpresspower，andnecessarytoitsexecution。Ifitbe，thenitmaybeexercisedbycongress。Ifnot，congresscannotexerciseit。15

　　&sect；1239。Butstillagroundofcontroversyremainsopen，astothetrueinterpretationofthetermsoftheclause；

　　andithasbeencontestedwithnosmallshareofearnestnessandvigour。

　　What，then，isthetrueconstitutionalsenseofthewords\"necessaryandproper\"inthisclause？Ithasbeeninsistedbytheadvocatesofarigidinterpretation，thattheword\"necessary\"ishereusedinitscloseandmostintensemeaning；sothatitisequivalenttoabsolutelyandindispensablynecessary。Ithasbeensaid，thattheconstitutionallowsonlythemeans，whicharenecessary；notthose，whicharemerelyconvenientforeffectingtheenumeratedpowers。Ifsuchalatitudeofconstructionbegiventothisphrase，astogiveanynon—enumeratedpower，itwillgofartogiveeveryone；forthereisnoone，whichingenuitymightnottortureintoaconvenienceinsomewayorothertosomeoneofsolongalistofenumeratedpowers。Itwouldswallowupallthedelegatedpowers，andreducethewholetoonephrase。Thereforeitis，thattheconstitutionhasrestrainedthemtothenecessarymeans；thatistosay，tothosemeans，withoutwhichthegrantofthepowerwouldbenugatory。Alittledifferenceinthedegreeofconveniencecannotconstitutethenecessity，whichtheconstitutionrefersto。16

　　&sect；1240。Theeffectofthismodeofinterpretationistoexcludeallchoiceofmeans；or，atmost，toleavetocongressineachcasethoseonly，whicharemostdirectandsimple。If，indeed，suchimpliedpowers，andsuchonly，ascanbeshowntobeindispensablynecessary，arewithinthepurviewoftheclause，therewillbenoendtodifficulties，andtheexpresspowersmustpracticallybecomeamerenullity。17Itwillbefound，thattheoperationsofthegovernment，uponanyofitspowers，willrarelyadmitofarigiddemonstrationofthenecessityinthisstrictsenseoftheparticularmeans。Inmostcases，varioussystemsormeansmayberesortedto，toattainthesameend；andyet，withrespecttoeach，itmaybeargued，thatitisnotconstitutional，becauseitisnotindispensable；andtheendmaybeobtainedbyothermeans。Theconsequenceofsuchreasoningwouldbe，that，asnomeanscouldbeshowntobeconstitutional，nonecouldbeadopted。18Forinstance，congresspossessthepowertomakewar，andtoraisearmies，andincidentallytoerectfortifications，andpurchasecannonandammunition，andothermunitionsofwar。Butwarmaybecarriedonwithoutfortifications，cannon，andammunition。Noparticularkindofarmscanbeshowntobeabsolutelynecessary；becausevarioussortsofarmsofdifferentconvenience，power，andutilityare，ormayberesortedtobydifferentnations。Whatthenbecomesofthepower？Congresshaspowertoborrowmoney，andtoprovideforthepaymentofthepublicdebt；yetnoparticularmethodisindispensabletotheseends。Theymaybeattainedbyvariousmeans。Congresshaspowertoprovideanavy；butnoparticularsize，orform，orequipmentofshipsisindispensable。Themeansofprovidinganavalestablishmentareveryvarious；andtheapplicationsofthemadmitofinfiniteshadesofopinion，astotheirconvenience，utility，andnecessity。Whatthenistobedone？

　　Arethepowerstoremaindormant？Woulditnotbeabsurdtosay，thatcongressdidnotpossessthechoiceofmeansundersuchcircumstances，andoughtnottobeempoweredtoselect，anduseanymeans，whichareinfactconducivetotheexerciseofthepowersgrantedbytheconstitution？19Takeanotherexample；congresshas，doubtless，theauthority，underthepowertoregulatecommerce，toerectlighthouses，beacons，buoys，andpublicpiers，andauthorizetheemploymentofpilots。20Butitcannotbeaffirmed，thattheexerciseofthesepowersisinastrictsensenecessary；orthatthepowertoregulatecommercewouldbenugatorywithoutestablishmentsofthisnature。21Intruth，noparticularregulationofcommercecaneverbeshowntobeexclusivelyandindispensablynecessary；andthusweshouldbedriventoadmit，thatallregulationsarewithinthescopeofthepower，orthatnoneare。Iftherebeanygeneralprinciple，whichisinherentintheverydefinitionofgovernment，andessentialtoeverystepoftheprogresstobemadebythatoftheUnitedStates，itis，thateverypower，vestedinagovernment，isinitsnaturesovereign，andincludes，byforceoftheterm，arighttoemployallthemeansrequisite，andfairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendofsuchpower；unlesstheyareexceptedintheconstitution，orareimmoral，orarecontrarytotheessentialobjectsofpoliticalsociety。22

　　&sect；1241。Thereisanotherdifficultyinthestrictconstructionabovealludedto，thatitmakestheconstitutionalauthoritydependuponcasualandtemporarycircumstances，whichmayproduceanecessityto—day，andchangeitto—morrow。Thisaloneshowsthefallacyofthereasoning。Theexpediencyofexercisingaparticularpowerataparticulartimemust，indeed，dependoncircumstances，buttheconstitutionalrightofexercisingitmustbeuniformandinvariable，thesameto—dayasto—morrow。23

　　&sect；1242。Neithercanthedegree，inwhichameasureisnecessary，everbeatestofthelegalrighttoadoptit。

　　Thatmustbeamatterofopinion，uponwhichdifferentmen，anddifferentbodiesmayformoppositejudgments，andcanonlybeatestofexpediency。

　　Therelationbetweenthemeasureandtheend，betweenthenatureofthemeansemployedtowardstheexecutionofapower，andtheobjectofthatpower，mustbethecriterionofconstitutionality；andnotthegreaterorlessofnecessityorexpediency。24Ifthelegislaturepossessesarightofchoiceastothemeans，whocanlimitthatchoice？Whoisappointedanumpire，orarbiterincases，whereadiscretionisconfidedtoagovernment？Theveryideaofsuchacontrollingauthorityintheexerciseofitspowersisavirtualdenialofthesupremacyofthegovernmentinregardtoitspowers。Itrepealsthesupremacyofthenationalgovernment，proclaimedintheconstitution。

　　&sect；1243。Itisequallycertain，thatneitherthegrammatical，northepopularsenseoftheword，\"necessary，\"requiresanysuchconstruction。Accordingtoboth，\"necessary\"oftenmeansnomorethanneedful，requisite，incidental，useful，orconduciveto。

　　Itisacommonmodeofexpressiontosay，thatitisnecessaryforagovernment，orapersontodothisorthatthing，whennothingmoreisintendedorunderstood，thanthattheinterestofthegovernmentorpersonrequires，orwillbepromotedbythedoingofthisorthatthing。Everyone’smindwillatoncesuggesttohimmanyillustrationsoftheuseofthewordinthissense。25Toemploythemeans，necessarytoanend，isgenerallyunderstood，asemployinganymeanscalculatedtoproducetheend，andnotasbeingconfinedtothosesinglemeans，withoutwhichtheendwouldbeentirelyunattainable。

　　&sect；1244。Suchisthecharacterofhumanlanguage，thatnowordconveystothemind—inallsituationsonesingledefiniteidea；andnothingismorecommon，thantousewordsinafigurativesense。Almostallcompositionscontain。words，which，takenintheirrigoroussense，wouldconveyameaning，differentfromthat，whichisobviouslyintended。Itisessentialtojustinterpretation，thatmanywords，whichimportsomethingexcessive，shouldbeunderstoodinamoremitigatedsense；

　　inasense，whichcommonusagejustifies。Theword\"necessary\"isofthisdescription。Ithasnotafixedcharacterpeculiartoitself。Itadmitsofalldegreesofcomparison；andisoftenconnectedwithotherwords，whichincreaseordiminishtheimpression，whichthemindreceivesoftheurgencyitimports。Athingmaybenecessary，verynecessary，absolutelyorindispensablynecessary。Itmaybelittlenecessary，lessnecessary，orleastnecessary。Tonomindwouldthesameideabeconveyedbyanytwooftheseseveralphrases。Thetenthsectionofthefirstarticleoftheconstitutionfurnishesastrongillustrationofthisveryuseoftheword。

　　Itcontainsaprohibitionuponanystateto\"layanyimpostsorduties，&amp；c。exceptwhatmaybeabsolutelynecessaryforexecutingitsinspectionlaws。\"Noonecancomparethisclausewiththeother，onwhichwearecommenting，withoutbeingstruckwiththeconviction，thattheword\"absolutely，\"hereprefixedto\"necessary，\"wasintendedtodistinguishitfromthesense，inwhich，standingalone，itisusedintheother。26

　　&sect；1245。Thattherestrictiveinterpretationmustbeabandoned；inregardtocertainpowersofthegovernment，cannotbereasonablydoubted。Itisuniversallyconceded，thatthepowerofpunishmentappertainstosovereignty，andmaybeexercised，wheneverthesovereignhasarighttoact，asincidentaltohisconstitutionalpowers。Itisameansforcarryingintoexecutionallsovereignpowers，andmaybeused，althoughnotindispensablynecessary。If，then，therestrictiveinterpretationmustbeabandoned，inordertojustifytheconstitutionalexerciseofthepowertopunish；whenceistherulederived，whichwouldreinstateit，whenthegovernmentwouldcarryitspowersintooperation，bymeansnotvindictiveintheirnature？Iftheword，\"necessary\"meansneedful，requisite，essential，conduciveto，toletinthepowerofpunishment，whyisitnotequallycomprehensive，whenappliedtoothermeansusedtofacilitatetheexecutionofthepowersofthegovernment？27

　　&sect；1246。Therestrictiveinterpretationisalsocontrarytoasoundmaximofconstruction，generallyadmitted，namely，thatthepowerscontainedinaconstitutionofgovernment，？especiallythose，whichconcernthegeneraladministrationoftheaffairsofthecountry，suchasitsfinances，itstrade，anditsdefence，oughttobeliberallyexpoundedinadvancementofthepublicgood。Thisruledoesnotdependontheparticularformofagovernment，orontheparticulardemarcationsoftheboundariesofitspowers；butonthenatureandobjectsofgovernmentitself。Themeans，bywhichnationalexigenciesareprovidedfor，nationalinconveniencesobviated，andnationalprosperitypromoted，areofsuchinfinitevariety，extent，andcomplexity，thattheremustofnecessitybegreatlatitudeofdiscretionintheselection，andapplicationofthosemeans。Hence，consequently，thenecessityandproprietyofexercisingtheauthorities，entrustedtoagovernment，onprinciplesofliberalconstruction。28

　　&sect；1247。Itisnovalidobjectiontothisdoctrinetosay，thatitiscalculatedtoextendthepowersofthegovernmentthroughouttheentiresphereofstatelegislation。Thesamethingmaybesaid，andhasbeensaid，inregardtoeveryexerciseofpowerbyimplicationandconstruction。Thereisalwayssomechanceoferror，orabuseofeverypower；butthisfurnishesnogroundofobjectionagainstthepower；andcertainlynoreasonforanadherencetothemostrigidconstructionofitsterms，whichwouldatoncearrestthewholemovementsofthegovernment。29Theremedyforanyabuse，ormisconstructionofthepower，isthesame，asinsimilarabusesandmisconstructionsofthestategovernments。Itisbyanappealtotheotherdepartmentsofthegovernment；andfinallytothepeople，Intheexerciseoftheirelectivefranchises。30

　　&sect；1248。Thereareyetothergroundsagainsttherestrictiveinterpretationderivedfromthelanguage，andthecharacteroftheprovision。Thelanguageis，thatcongressshallhavepower\"tomakealllaws，which\"shallbenecessaryandproper。\"Iftheword\"necessary\"wereusedinthestrictandrigoroussensecontendedfor，itwouldbeanextraordinarydeparturefromtheusualcourseofthehumanmind，asexhibitedinsolemninstruments，toaddanotherword\"proper；\"

　　theonlypossibleeffectofwhichistoqualifythatstrictandrigorousmeaning，andtopresentclearlytheideaofachoiceofmeansinthecourseoflegislation。31Ifnomeanscanberesortedto，butsuchasareindispensablynecessary，therecanbeneithersense，norutilityinaddingtheotherword；forthenecessityshutsoutfromviewallconsiderationoftheproprietyofthemeans，ascontradistinguishedfromtheformer。Butiftheintentionwastousetheword\"necessary\"initsmoreliberalsense，thenthereisapeculiarfitnessintheotherword。

　　Ithasasenseatonceadmonitory，anddirectory。itrequires，thatthemeansshouldbe，bon&acirc；fide，appropriatetotheend。

　　&sect；1249。Thecharacteroftheclauseequallyforbidsanypresumptionofanintentiontousetherestrictiveinterpretation。

　　Inthefirstplace，theclauseisplacedamongthepowersofcongress，andnotamongthelimitationsonthosepowers。Inthenextplace，itstermspurporttoenlarge，andnottodiminish，thepowersvestedinthegovernment。

　　Itpurports，onitsface，tobeanadditionalpower，notarestrictiononthosealreadygranted。32Ifitdoesnot，infact，asseemsthetrueconstruction，giveanynewpowers，itaffirmstherighttouseallnecessaryandpropermeanstocarry’intoexecutiontheotherpowers，andthusmakesanexpresspower，whatwouldotherwisebemerelyanimpliedpower。Ineitheraspect，itisimpossibletoconstrueittobearestriction。Ifithaveanyeffect，itistoremovetheimplicationofanyrestriction。Ifarestrictionhadbeenintended，itisimpossible，thattheframersoftheconstitutionshouldhaveconcealeditunderphraseology，whichpurportstoenlarge，oratleastgivethemostamplescopetotheotherpowers。Therewaseverymotiveontheirparttogivepointandclearnesstoeveryrestrictionofnationalpower；fortheywellknew，thatthenationalgovernmentwouldbemoreendangeredinitsadoptionbyitssupposedstrength，thanbyitsweakness。Itisinconceivable，thattheyshouldhavedisguisedarestrictionuponitspowersundertheformofagrantofpower。Theywouldhavesoughtotherterms，andhaveimposedtherestraintbynegatives。33Andwhatisequallystrong，noone，inoroutofthestateconventions，atthetimewhentheconstitutionwasputuponitsdeliverancebeforethepeople，everdreamedoforsuggested，thatitcontainedarestrictionofpower。Thewholeargumentoneachside，ofattackandofdefence，gaveitthepositiveformofanexpresspower，andnotofanexpressrestriction。

　　&sect；1250。Uponthewhole，theresultofthemostcarefulexaminationofthisclauseis，that，ifitdoesnotenlarge，itcannotbeconstruedtorestrainthepowersofcongress，ortoimpairtherightofthelegislaturetoexerciseitsbestjudgment，intheselectionofmeasurestocarryintoexecutiontheconstitutionalpowersofthenationalgovernment。Themotiveforitsinsertiondoubtlesswas，thedesiretoremoveallpossibledoubtrespectingtherighttolegislateonthatvastmassofincidentalpowers，whichmustbeinvolvedintheconstitution，ifthatinstrumentbenotasplendidpageant，oradelusivephantomofsovereignty。

　　Lettheendbelegitimate；letitbewithinthescopeoftheconstitution；

　　andallmeans，whichareappropriate，whichareplainlyadaptedtotheend，andwhicharenotprohibited，butareconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheinstrument，areconstitutional。34

　　&sect；1251。Itmaybewell，inthisconnexion，tomentionanothersortofimpliedpower，whichhasbeencalledwithgreatproprietyaresultingpower，arisingfromtheaggregatepowersofthenationalgovernment。ItWillnotbedoubted，forinstance，that，iftheUnitedStatesshouldmakeaconquestofanyoftheterritoriesofitsneighbours，thenationalgovernmentwouldpossesssovereignjurisdictionovertheconqueredterritory。Thiswould，perhaps，ratherbearesultfromthewholemassofthepowersofthenationalgovernment，andfromthenatureofpoliticalsociety，thanaconsequenceorincidentofthepowersspeciallyenumerated。35Itmay，however，bedeemed，ifanincidenttoany，anincidenttothepowertomakewar。Otherinstancesorresultingpowerswilleasilysuggestthemselves。TheUnitedStatesarenowheredeclaredintheconstitutiontobeasovereigntyentitledtosue，thoughjurisdictionisgiventothenationalcourtsovercontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty。Itisanaturalincident，resultingfromthesovereigntyandcharacterofthenationalgovernment。36SotheUnitedStates，intheirpoliticalcapacity，havearighttoenterintoacontract，althoughitisnotexpresslyprovidedforbytheconstitution，foritisanincidenttotheirgeneralfightorsovereignty，sofarasitisappropriatetoanyoftheendsofthegovernment，andwithintheconstitutionalrangeofitspowers。37SocongresspossesspowertopunishoffencescommittedonboardofthepublicshipsofWarofthegovernmentbypersonsnotinthemilitaryornavalserviceoftheUnitedStates，whethertheyareinport，oratsea；forthejurisdictiononboardofpublicshipsisevery，wheredeemedexclusivelytobelongtothesovereign。38

　　&sect；1252。Andnotonlymayimpliedpowers，butimpliedexemptionsfromstateauthority，exist，althoughnotexpresslyprovidedforbylaw。Thecollectorsoftherevenue，thecarriersofthemail，themintestablishment，andallthoseinstitutions，whicharepublicintheirnature，areexamplesinpoint。Ithasneverbeendoubted，thatall，whoareemployedinthem，areprotected，whileinthelineoftheirduty，fromstatecontrol；andyetthisprotectionisnotexpressedinanyactofcongress。Itisincidentalto，andisimpliedin，theseveralacts，bywhichthoseinstitutionsarecreated；andispreservedtothembythejudicialdepartment，asapartofitsfunctions。39Acontractorforsupplyingamilitarypostwithprovisionscannotberestrainedfrommakingpurchaseswithinastate，orfromtransportingprovisionstotheplace，atwhichtroopsarestationed。Hecouldnotbetaxed，orfined，orlawfullyobstructed，insodoing。40TheseincidentsnecessarilyflowfromthesupremacyofthepowersoftheUnion，withintheirlegitimatesphereofaction。

　　&sect；1253。Itwouldbealmostimpracticable，ifitwerenotuseless，toenumeratethevariousinstances，inwhichcongress，intheprogressofthegovernment，havemadeuseofincidentalandimpliedmeanstoexecuteitspowers。Theyarealmostinfinitelyvariedintheirramificationsanddetails。Itisproposed，however，totakenoticeoftheprincipalmeasures，whichhavebeencontested，asnotwithinthescopeofthepowers。ofcongress，andwhichmaybedistinctlytracedintheoperationsofthegovernment，andinleadingpartydivisions。41

　　1。TheFederalist，No。33，44；1Elliot’sDeb。293，294，300；2Elliot’sDeb。196，342。

　　2。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。286，287；

　　4Elliot’sDeb。216，217，224，225。

　　3。TheFederalist，No。33；2Elliot’sDebates，196；HamiltononBank，2Hamilton’sWorks，121；M’Cullochv。

　　Maryland，4Wheaton’sR。419。

　　4。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。

　　R。409；4Elliot’sDebates，217，218，220，221。

　　5。TheFederalist，No。44。SeealsoPresidentMonroe’sExpositionandMessage，4thofMay，1822，p。47；3Elliot’sDeb。318。

　　6。TheFederalist，No。44。

　　7。SeeTheFederalist，No。38，44；4

　　Wheat。R。423；4Elliot’sDeb。218，219。

　　8。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。

　　R。406，407，423。

　　9。TheFederalist，No。44；2Elliot’sDeb。223。

　　10。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。407；4Elliot’sDeb。223，224；Andersonv。Dunn，6Wheat。

　　R。204，225，226。

　　11。TheFederalist，No。44。

　　12。TheFederalist，No。44。

　　13。TheFederalist，No。33，44。

　　14。Somefewstatesmenhavecontended，thattheclausegavefartherpowers，thanmereincidentalpowers。Buttheirreasoningdoesnotseemveryclearorsatisfactory。SeeGovernorRandolph’sRemarks，2Elliot’sDebates，342；Mr。Gerry’sSpeechinFebruary，1791，4Elliot’sDebates，295，227。TheseSpeechesare，however，valuableforsomestrikingviews，whichtheypresent，oftheproprietyofaliberalconstructionofthewords。

　　15。SeeVirginiaReportandResolutions，Jan。，1800，p。33，34；1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。287，288；PresidentMonroe’sExpositionandMessage，4thofMay，1822，p。47；5Marshall’sWash。App。

　　note3；1Hamilton’sWorks，117，121。

　　16。4Jefferson’sCorresp。525，526；

　　4Elliot’sDeb。216，217，224，225，267；M’Cullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。412，413。

　　17。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，119；5Marshall’sWash。App。note3，p。9；Mr。Madison，4Elliot’sDeb。

　　223。

　　18。UnitedStatesv。Fisher，2Cranch，358；1Peters’sCond。R。421；HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，119；5Marshall’sWash。note3，p。9，10；Mr。Madison，4Elliot’sDeb。223。

　　19。UnitedStatesv。Fisher，2Cranch。R。358；1Peters’sCondens。R。421。

　　20。See4Elliot’sDebates，265，280。

　　21。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，120。

　　22。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，112。

　　23。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，117；5Marshall’sWash。App。note3，p。8。

　　24。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，129，120；5Marshall’sWash。App。note3，p。9，10；M’Cullochv。Maryland，4Wheat。R。423。

　　25。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，118；5Marshall’sWash。App。note3，p。9。

　　26。M’CuIlochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheaton’sR。413to415。？Inthiscase4Wheaton’sR。411to425，thereisaveryelaborateargumentoftheSupremeCourtuponthewholeofthissubject，aportionofwhichhasbeenalreadyextractedintheprecedingCommentaries，ontherulesofinterpretationoftheconstitution。

　　27。M’CuIlochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。418。

　　28。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，120，121。

　　29。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，122。

　　30。TheFederalist，No。33，44。

　　31。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。418，419。

　　32。M’CuIlochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。419，420。

　　33。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。420。

　　34。M’Cullochv。Maryland，4

　　Wheat。R。420，421，423。Seealso4Elliot’sDebates，220，221，222，223，224，225；2Elliot’sDebates，196，342；5Marsh。Wash。App。No。3；2AmericanMuseum，536；Andersonv。Dunn，6Wheat。It。204，225，226；HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，111to123。

　　35。HamiltononBank，1Hamilton’sWorks，115。

　　36。SeeDuganv。UnitedStates，3Wheat。R。173，179，180。

　　37。UnitedStatesv。Tingey，5Peters’sR。115。

　　38。UnitedStatesv。Bevans，3Wheaton’sR。388；TheExchange，7Cranch，116；S。C。2Peters’sCond。

　　R。439。

　　39。Osbornv。BankofU。States，9Wheat。R。365，366。

　　40。Id。367。

　　41。Someminorpointswillbefoundinthedebatescollectedin4Elliot’sDebates，139，141，229，234，235，238，239，240，243，249，251，252，261，265，266，270，271，280。Thereisnoexpresspowergivenbytheconstitutiontoerectforts，ormagazines，orlight—houses，orpiers，orbuoys，orpublicbuildings，ortomakesurveysofthecoast；buttheyhavebeenconstantlydeemedincidentaltothegeneralpowers。Mr。Bayard’sSpeechin1807，4Elliot’sDebates，265；Mr。Pickering’sSpeech，1817，4Elliot’sDebates，280。

　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：

　　Book3Chapter25CHAPTERXXV。INCIDENTALPOWERS？NATIONALBANK。&sect；1254。ONEoftheearliestandmostimportantmeasures，whichgaverisetoaquestionofconstitutionalpower，wastheactcharteringthebankoftheUnitedStatesin1791。Thatquestionhasoftensincebeendiscussed；andthoughthemeasurehasbeenrepeatedlysanctionedbycongress，bytheexecutive，andbythejudiciary，andhasobtainedthelikefavourinagreatmajorityofthestates，yetitis，uptothisveryhour，stilldebateduponconstitutionalgrounds，asifitwerestillnew，anduntried。Itisimpossible，atthistime，totreatit，asanopenquestion，unlesstheconstitutionisforevertoremainanunsettledtext，possessingnopermanentattributes，andincapableofhavinganyascertainedsense；varyingwitheverychangeofdoctrine，andofparty；anddeliveredovertointerminabledoubts。Iftheconstitutionistobeonly，whattheadministrationofthedaymaywishittobe；andistoassumeany，andallshapes，whichmaysuittheopinionsandtheoriesofpublicmen，astheysuccessivelydirectthepubliccouncils，itwillbedifficult，indeed，toascertain，whatitsrealvalueis。Itcannotpossesseithercertainty，oruniformity，orsafety。Itwillbeonethingto—day，andanotherthingto—morrow，andagainanotherthingoneachsucceedingday。Thepastwillfurnishnoguide，andthefuturenosecurity。

　　Itwillbethereverseofalaw；andentailuponthecountrythecurseofthatmiserableservitude，somuchabhorredanddenounced，whereallisvagueanduncertaininthefundamentalsofgovernment。

　　&sect；1255。Thereasoning，uponwhichtheconstitutionalityofanationalbankisdenied，hasbeenalreadyinsomedegreestatedintheprecedingremarks。Itturnsuponthestrictinterpretationoftheclause，givingtheauxiliarypowersnecessary，andpropertoexecutetheotherenumeratedpowers。Itistothefollowingeffect：Thepowertoincorporateabankisnotamongthoseenumeratedintheconstitution。Itisknown，thattheverypower，thusproposed，asameans，wasrejected，asanend，bytheconvention，whichformedtheconstitution。Apropositionwasmadeinthatbody，toauthorizecongresstoopencanals，andanamendatoryonetoempowerthemtocreatecorporations。Butthewholewasrejected；

　　andoneofthereasonsoftherejectionurgedindebatewas，thattheythenwouldhaveapowertocreateabank，whichwouldrenderthegreatcities，wheretherewereprejudicesandjealousiesonthatsubject，adversetotheadoptionoftheconstitution。1Inthenextplace，alltheenumeratedpowerscanbecarriedintoexecutionwithoutabank。Abank，therefore，isnotnecessary，andconsequentlynotauthorizedbythisclauseoftheconstitution。Itisurged，thatabankwillgivegreatfacility，orconveniencetothecollectionoftaxes。

　　Ifthisweretrue，yettheconstitutionallowsonlythemeans，whicharenecessary，andnotmerelythose，whichareconvenientforeffectingtheenumeratedpowers。Ifsuchalatitudeofconstructionwereallowed，astoconsiderconvenience，asjustifyingtheuseofsuchmeans，itwouldswallowupalltheenumeratedpowers。2Therefore，theconstitutionrestrainscongresstothosemeans，withoutwhichthepowerwouldbenugatory。3

　　&sect；1256。Norcanitsconveniencebesatisfactorilyestablished。Bank—billsmaybeamoreconvenientvehicle，thantreasuryorders，forthepurposesofthatdepartment。Butalittledifferenceinthedegreeofconveniencecannotconstitutethenecessitycontemplatedbytheconstitution。Besides；thelocalandstatebanksnowinexistencearecompetent，andwouldbewillingtoundertakealltheagencyrequiredforthoseverypurposesbythegovernment。Andiftheyareableandwilling，thisestablishesclearly，thattherecanbenonecessityforestablishinganationalbank。4Iftherewouldeverbeasuperiorconveniencyinanationalbank，itdoesnotfollow，thatthereexistsapowertoestablishit，orthatthebusinessofthecountrycannotgoonverywellwithoutit。Canitbethought，thattheconstitutionintended，thatforashadeortwoofconvenience，moreorless，congressshouldbeauthorizedtobreakdownthemostancientandfundamentallawsofthestates，suchasthoseagainstmortmain，thelawsofalienage，therulesofdescent，theactsofdistribution，thelawsofescheatandforfeiture，andthelawsofmonopoly？Nothingbutanecessity，invinciblebyanyothermeans，canjustifysuchaprostrationoflaws，whichconstitutethepillarsofourwholesystemofjurisprudence。5Ifcongresshavethepowertocreateonecorporation，theymaycreateallsorts；forthepowerisnowherelimited；andmayevenestablishmonopolies。6Indeedthisverycharterisamonopoly。7

　　&sect；1257。Thereasoning，bywhichtheconstitutionalityofthenationalbankhasbeensustained，iscontainedinthefollowingsummary。Thepowersconfidedtothenationalgovernmentareunquestionably，sofarastheyexist，sovereignandsupreme。8Itisnot，andcannotbedisputed，thatthepowerofcreatingacorporationisonebelongingtosovereignty。Butsoareallotherlegislativepowers；

　　fortheoriginalpowerofgivingthelawonanysubjectwhateverisasovereignpower。Ifthenationalgovernmentcannotcreateacorporation，becauseitisanexerciseofsovereignpower，neithercanit，forthesamereason，exerciseanyotherlegislativepower。9Thisconsiderationaloneoughttoputanendtotheabstractinquiry，whetherthenationalgovernmenthaspowertoerectacorporation，thatis，togivealegalorartificialcapacitytooneormorepersons，distinctfromthenaturalcapacity。10For，ifitbeanincidenttosovereignty，anditisnotprohibited，itmustbelongtothenationalgovernmentinrelationtotheobjectsentrustedtoit。Thetruedifferenceisthis；wheretheauthorityofagovernmentisgeneral，itcancreatecorporationsinallcases；whereitisconfinedtocertainbranchesoflegislation，itcancreatecorporationsonlyastothosecases。11Itcannotbedenied，thatimpliedpowersmaybedelegated，aswellasexpress。Itfollows，thatapowertoerectcorporationsmayaswellbeimplied，asanyotherthing，ifitbeaninstrumentormeansofcarryingintoexecutionanyspecifiedpower。

　　Theonlyquestioninanycasemustbe，whetheritbesuchaninstrumentormeans，andhaveanaturalrelationtoanyoftheacknowledgedobjectsofgovernment。Thus，congressmaynoterectacorporationforsuperintendingthepoliceofthecityofPhiladelphia，becausetheyhavenoauthoritytoregulatethepoliceofthatcity。Butiftheypossessedtheauthoritytoregulatethepoliceofsuchcity，theymight，unquestionably，createacorporationforthatpurpose；becauseitisincidenttothesovereignlegislativepowertoregulateathing，toemployallthemeans，whichrelatetoitsregulation，tothebestandgreatestadvantage。12

　　&sect；1258。Astrangefallacyhascreptintothereasoningonthissubject。Ithasbeensupposed，thatacorporationissomegreat，independentthing；andthatthepowertoerectitisagreat，substantive，independentpower；whereas，intruth，acorporationisbutalegalcapacity，quality，ormeanstoanend；andthepowertoerectitis，ormaybe，animpliedandincidentalpower。Acorporationisnevertheend，forwhichotherpowersareexercised；butameans，bywhichotherobjectsareaccomplished。Nocontributionsaremadetocharityforthesakeofanincorporation；butacorporationiscreatedtoadministerthecharity。Noseminaryoflearningisinstitutedinordertobeincorporated；

　　butthecorporatecharacterisconferredtosubservethepurposesofeducation。

　　Nocitywaseverbuiltwiththesoleobjectofbeingincorporated；butitisincorporatedasaffordingthebestmeansofbeingwellgoverned。

　　Soamercantilecompanyisformedwithacertaincapitalforcarryingonaparticularbranchofbusiness。Here，thebusinesstobeprosecutedistheend。Theassociation，inordertoformtherequisitecapital，istheprimarymeans。Ifanincorporationisaddedtotheassociation，itonlygivesitanewquality，anartificialcapacity，bywhichitisenabledtoprosecutethebusinesswithmoreconvenienceandsafety。Intruth，thepowerofcreatingacorporationisneverusedforitsownsake；butforthepurposeofeffectingsomethingelse。Sothatthereisnotashadowofreasontosay，thatitmaynotpassasanincidenttopowersexpresslygiven，asamodeofexecutingthem。13

　　&sect；1259。Itistrue，thatamongtheenumeratedpowerswedonotfindthatofestablishingabank，orcreatingacorporation。

　　Butwedofindtherethegreatpowerstolayandcollecttaxes；toborrowmoney；toregulatecommerce；todeclareandconductwar；andtoraiseandsupportarmiesandnavies。Now，ifabankbeafitmeanstoexecuteanyorallofthesepowers，itisjustasmuchimplied，asanyothermeans。

　　Ifitbe\"necessaryandproper\"foranyofthem，howisitpossibletodenytheauthoritytocreateitforsuchpurposes？14Thereisnomoreproprietyingivingthispowerinexpressterms，thaningivinganyotherincidentalpowersormeansinexpressterms。Ifithadbeenintendedtograntthispowergenerally，andtomakeitadistinctandindependentpower，havingnorelationto，butreachingbeyondtheotherenumeratedpowers，therewouldthenhavebeenaproprietyingivingitinexpressterms，forotherwiseitwouldnotexist。Thus，itwasproposedintheconvention，togiveageneralpower\"tograntchartersofincorporation；\"？to\"grantchartersofincorporationincases，wherethepublicgoodmayrequirethem，andtheauthorityofasinglestatemaybeincompetent；\"15？and\"tograntlettersofincorporationforcanals，&amp；c。\"16Ifeitherofthesepropositionshadbeenadopted，therewouldhavebeenanobviousproprietyingivingthepowerinexpressterms；because，astothetwoformer，thepowerwasgeneralandunlimited，andreachingfarbeyondanyoftheotherenumeratedpowers；andastothelatter，itmightbefarmoreextensivethananyincidenttotheotherenumeratedpowers。17Buttherejectionofthesepropositionsdoesnotprove，thatcongressinnocase，asanincidenttotheenumeratedpowers，shoulderectacorporation；

　　butonly，thattheyshouldnothaveasubstantive，independentpowertoerectcorporationsbeyondthosepowers。

　　&sect；1260。Indeed，itismostmanifest，thatitnevercouldhavebeencontemplatedbytheconvention，thatcongressshould，innocase，possessthepowertoerectacorporation。Whatotherwisewouldbecomeoftheterritorialgovernments，allofwhicharecorporationscreatedbycongress？Thereisnowhereanexpresspowergiventocongresstoerectthem。Butundertheconfederation，congressdidprovidefortheirerection，asaresultingandimpliedrightofsovereignty，bythecelebratedordinanceof1787；andcongress，undertheconstitution，haveeversince，withoutquestion，andwiththeuniversalapprobationofthenation，fromtimetotimecreatedterritorialgovernments。Yetcongressderivethispoweronlybyimplication，orasnecessaryandproper，tocarryintoeffecttheexpresspowertoregulatetheterritoriesoftheUnitedStates。18Intheconvention，twopropositionsweremadeandreferredtoacommitteeatthesametimewiththepropositionsalreadystatedrespectinggrantingofcharters，\"todisposeoftheunappropriatedlandsoftheUnitedStates，\"

　　and\"toinstitutetemporarygovernmentsfornewstatesarisingtherein。\"

　　Boththesepropositionssharedthesamefate，asthoserespectingchartersofincorporation。Butwhatwouldbethoughtoftheargument，builtuponthisfoundation，thatcongressdidnotpossessthepowertoerectterritorialgovernments，becausethesepropositionsweresilentlyabandoned，orannulledintheconvention？

　　&sect；1261。Thisisnottheonlycase，inwhichcongressmayerectcorporations。Underthepowertoacceptacessionofterritoryfortheseatofgovernment，andtoexerciseexclusivelegislationtherein；noonecandoubt，thatcongressmayerectcorporationstherein，notonlypublic，butprivatecorporations。19Theyhaveconstantlyexercisedthepower；andithasneveryetbeenbreathed，thatitwasunconstitutional。Yetitcanbeexercisedonlyasanincidenttothepowerofgenerallegislation。Andifso，whymayitnotbeexercised，asanincidenttoanyspecificpoweroflegislation，ifitbeameanstoattaintheobjectsofsuchpower？

　　&sect；1262。Thatanationalbankisanappropriatemeanstocarryintoeffectsomeoftheenumeratedpowersofthegovernment，andthatthiscanbebestdonebyerectingitintoacorporation，maybeestablishedbythemostsatisfactoryreasoning。Ithasarelation，moreorlessdirect，tothepowerofcollectingtaxes，tothatofborrowingmoney，tothatofregulatingtradebetweenthestates，andtothoseofraisingandmaintainingfleetsandarmies。20Anditmaybeadded，thatithasamostimportantbearingupontheregulationofcurrencybetweenthestates。Itisaninstrument，whichhasbeenusuallyappliedbygovernmentsintheadministrationoftheirfiscalandfinancialoperations。21Andinthepresenttimesitcanhardlyrequireargumenttoprove，thatitisaconvenient，auseful，andanessentialinstrumentinthefiscaloperationsofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。22Thisissogenerallyadmittedbysoundandintelligentstatesmen，thatitwouldbeawasteoftimetoendeavourtoestablishthetruthbyanelaboratesurveyofthemode，inwhichittouchestheadministrationofallthevariousbranchesofthepowersofthegovernment。23

　　&sect；1263。Inregardtothesuggestion，thatapropositionwasmade，andrejectedintheconventiontoconferthisverypower，whatwastheprecisenatureorextentofthisproposition，orwhatwerethereasonsforrefusingit，cannotnowbeascertainedbyanyauthenticdocument，orevenbyanyaccuraterecollectionofthemembers。

　　Asfarasanydocumentexists，itspecifiesonlycanals。24Ifthisprovesanything，itprovesnomore，thanthatitwasthoughtinexpedienttogiveapowertoincorporateforthepurposeofopeningcanalsgenerally。

　　Butverydifferentaccountsaregivenoftheimportoftheproposition，andofthemotivesforrejectingit。Someaffirm，thatitwasconfinedtotheopeningofcanalsandobstructionsofrivers；others，thatitembracedbanks；andothers，thatitextendedtothepowerofincorporationsgenerally。

　　Some，again，allege，thatitwasdisagreedto，becauseitwasthoughtimpropertovestincongressapoweroferectingcorporations；others，becausetheythoughtitunnecessarytospecifythepower；andinexpedienttofurnishanadditionaltopicofobjectiontotheconstitution。Inthisstateofthematter，noinferencewhatevercanbedrawnfromit。25But，whatevermayhavebeentheprivateintentionsoftheframersoftheconstitution，whichcanrarelybeestablishedbythemerefactoftheirvotes，itiscertain，thatthetrueruleofinterpretationistoascertainthepublicandjustintentionfromthelanguageoftheinstrumentitself，accordingtothecommonrulesappliedtoalllaws。Thepeople，whoadoptedtheconstitution，couldknownothingoftheprivateintentionsoftheframers。

　　Theyadoptedituponitsownclearimport，uponitsownnakedtext。Nothingismorecommon，thanforalawtoeffectmoreorless，thantheintentionofthepersons，whoframedit；anditmustbejudgedofbyitswordsandsense，andnotbyanyprivateintentionsofmembersofthelegislature。26

　　&sect；1264。Inregardtothefacultiesofthebank，ifcongresscouldconstitutionallycreateit，theymightconferonitsuchfacultiesandpowers，aswerefittomakeitanappropriatemeansforfiscaloperations。Theyhadarighttoadaptitinthebestmannertoitsend。Noonecanpretend，thatitshavingthefacultyofholdingacapital；oflendinganddealinginmoney；ofissuingbanknotes；ofreceivingdeposits；andofappointingsuitableofficerstomanageitsaffairs；arenothighlyusefulandexpedient，andappropriatetothepurposesofabank。