Thefourfollowingpropositionsformthebasisofthisconclusion。Ontheformationofsociety，priortopositivelaws，certainrulesofmoralactionnecessarilyarise，thefoundationofwhichistheobservanceofjusticeamongthemembersofthesociety。OntheformationoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，suchrulesarosewithoutbeingexpressed:thebreachofthemconstitutesoffencesagainsttheUnitedStates。IfnojudiciarypowerhadbeenintroducedintotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，thestatecourtscouldhavepunishedthosebreaches。Thecreationofsuchjudiciarypowerwasintendedtoconferjurisdictionoversuchandotheroffences，nottonegativeordestroyit。1。ItwasintendedbyDivineProvidencethatmenshouldliveinastateofsociety。Reasonandreflectionweregiventohimtobeusedandimproved。
Socialaffectionswerecreated，asnaturalimpulsestopromotetheiruseandimprovement，byleadingandkeepingmankindtogether。Whensocietiescommence，certainrulesofactionarenecessary。Menarenotequallyhonestandvirtuous；withoutsomerestraint，injusticeandviolencewouldsoonthrowtheassociation，howeversmall，intodisorderandconfusion。Hencearisesatoncealawoftacitconvention，foundedonafewplainprinciples。
Itrequiresnopositivelawtohaveitunderstood，thatoneshallnot，withoutcause，depriveanotherofhisproperty，ordoinjurytohisperson。
Whentheperiodarrivesfortheformationofpositivelaws，whichisaftertheformationoftheoriginalcompact，thelegislatureisemployed，notinthediscoverythattheseactsareunlawful，butintheapplicationOfpunishmentstopreventthem。Ineverycodewefindadistinctionbetweenthingsmalainse，thingsinthemselvesunlawful；andmalaprohibita，thingswhichbecomeunlawfulfrombeingprohibitedbythelegislature。
Butcircumstancesmaydelaytheformationortheactionofalegislativebody，oritsprovisionsmaybeinadequatetotheredressofexperiencedorexpectedevils。Inthisintervalcannorightstopropertybeacquiredorpreserved?cannobindingcontractsbemade?aretheft，robbery，murder，nocrimes?Opinionssomonstrouscanbeentertainedbynone。Onthecontrary，thehumanheart，theuniversalsenseandpracticeofmankind，theinternalconsciousnessoftheDivinewill，allconcurinpointingouttherulesandobligationsbywhichwearebound。
Emphaticallytermedthelawofnature，itisimplantedinusbynatureitself；itisfelt，notlearned；itisnevermisunderstood，andthoughnotalwaysobserved，neverisforgotten。CiceroinhisTreatisedeLegibus，remarksthatlaw，andheexplainsthathespeaksofgeneral，notpositivelaw，istheperfectionofreason，seatedinnature，commandingwhatisright，andprohibitingwhatiswrong。Itsbeginningistobetracedtotimesbeforeanylawwaswritten，oranyexpressformofgovernmentadopted。
Thispropositionisindeedtooplaintobecontradicted；andwethereforepassontothesecond，whichmayrequireacloserexamination。
2。WehaveseenthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswastheworkofthepeople。Itwastheformationofanewandpeculiarassociation，havingforitsobjectstheattainmentorsecurityofmanyimportantpoliticalrights，whichcouldnototherwisebefullyattainedorsecured；butnotembracinginitssphereofactionallthepoliticalrightstowhichitsmemberswereindividuallyentitled。Sofarasrelatedtothoseotherrights，thepeopleweresatisfiedwithotherassociations，ineachofwhichthelawofnature，undertheusualappellationofthecommonlaw，prevailed。
Sofarasrelatedtothenewrightsandduties，springingfromthenewpoliticalassociation，thesametacitcompactwhichisacknowledgedtoexistinallsociety，necessarilyaccompaniedthis。Nothingshortofexpressnegationcouldexcludeit。Everymemberofsocietyhasadirectinterestinthepreventionorpunishmentofeveryactcontrarytothewellbeingofthatsociety。BeforetheConstitutionwasadopted，everyactofsuchatendency，havingrelationtothestateassociation，waspunishablebythecommonlawofsuchstate，butwhenitwasadopted，certainactions，whetherconsideredinreferencetopersons，toparticularplaces，ortothesubjectitself，wereeitherexpresslyorbyimplicationwithdrawnfromtheimmediatecognizanceofthestates。ThepeopleoftheUnitedStatesdidnot，however，meanthatifthoseactionsamountedtooffencestheyshouldgounpunished。Therightofprosecutionandofpunishmentwasnotmeanttobesurrendered。Inthisinstance，theconvergeofthewellknownproposition，thatwhateverisnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesisreservedtothepeople，isthetrueconstruction。Thepeoplepossessedatthemomentthefullrighttothepunishmentofoffencesagainstthelawofnature，thoughtheymightnotbethesubjectofpositivelaw。TheydidnotsurrenderthisrightbyadoptingtheConstitution。Anoffenceagainsttheminastatecapacity，becameincertaincasesanoffenceagainsttheminrelationtotheUnitedStates。Infact，thereisnooffenceagainsttheUnitedStateswhichisnotanoffenceagainstthepeopleoftheUnitedStates。Theydidnot，perhapswemayevensay，thatwithoutbeinginsomedegreeguiltyofpoliticalsuicide，theycouldnotcedeorrelinquishtherighttopunishsuchacts。Iftheyhadsodone，thesystemitselfwouldsoondissolve。
Theygavenopowertocongresstopassanypenallawswhatever，exceptonthisbasis。Everyact，declaringacrimeandimposingapenalty，restsuponit。Itfollowsthatthissourceofthepowerofcongressmustbeadmitted。
Itmaybeattenuatedbypositivelaw，butitnevercanbeexhausted，unlesswecansupposethatpositivelawsmaymeetandprovideforalltheincalculablevarietiesofhumandepravity。Butinnocountryhasthisbeenfoundpracticable。
IntheverytermsmadeuseofintheConstitution，itismanifestthatanewanddistinctclassofdutiesweretoarisewhichwouldtendtoproduceanewanddistinct。classofoffences。Thewordsare，aswehavealreadyseen?thatthejudicialpower。shallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthisConstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStatesandtreaties。
Nojurisdictionovercrimesisgiven，exceptastheyareincludedintheantecedentwords，casesinlaw；butitisdeclaredthattheyshallbetriedonlybyjury。Wehavethusthreedivisionsofjudicialsubjects。
I。CasesincludingcrimesarisingundertheConstitution。
II。Casesincludingcrimesarisingunderactsofcongress。
III。Thosearisingundertreaties。
TheremaythenbecrimesarisingundertheConstitution，onwhichnoactofcongresshasbeenpassed；butifsuchanacthasbeenpassed，asinallcountriespositivelawscontrolthe，commonlaw，theactispunishableundersuchpositivelaw。
Ifonlytheinfractionoftreatiesandactsofcongresshadbeenconsideredascriminalacts，therewouldhavebeenamanifestimproprietyintheintroductionofthosewords\"arisingundertheConstitution。\"Buttheywerecertainlyusedwith。theintentionthattheyshouldhavethesameeffectincriminalasincivilcases。Theconstructionweventuretoaffix，appearstoustorenderthewholesystemharmonious，efficient，andcomplete。
3。Ournextpositionis，thatiftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateshadbeenwhollyunfurnishedwithajudicialpower，offencesofthisdescriptioncouldbepunishedthroughthemediumofthestatecourts。
Intheyear1779，oneCorneliusSweers，adeputycommissaryoftheUnitedStates，wasindictedinacourtofoyerandterminerthenheldbythejudgesoftheSupremeCourtofPennsylvania，forforgingandalteringtworeceiptsgiventohimbypersonsofwhomhehadpurchased，goodsfortheuseoftheUnitedStates。Theindictment，incompliancewithjudicialforms，waslaidtobeagainstthepeaceanddignityofthecommonwealthofPennsylvania，withintenttodefraudtheUnitedStates。McKean，C。J。afterhearingtheargumentsofcounsel，supportedtheindictment。6Itisamemorableinstanceofthepowerofthecommonlawtoaccommodateitselftotheattainmentofsubstantialjustice。Eventhearticlesofconfederationdidnotthenexist，butthecourtrecognisedtheUnitedStatesasacorporation。
ItwasanoffenceagainsttheUnitedStates，inwhichthestateofPennsylvaniahadnootherinterestthanasoneofthirteenstates。ButtheprosecutionwastechnicallysupportedasanoffenceagainstthestateofPennsylvania。
Anotherimportantconsiderationarisesfromthiscase。ThereexistedatthattimenoactofassemblyinPennsylvaniawhichrenderedsuchanactionacrime。BytheEnglishcommonlawitwasnotforgery。Thecourtmusthaveproceededthereforeonhigherground。Theprincipleslaiddowninoursecondpositionsupporttheirjudgment。Thesoundnessofthisdecision，aswellas，thatinthecaseofDeLongChamps，7hasneverbeenquestioned。Wemaythereforesafelyinfer，thatthestatejudicatureswould，ifitwerenecessary，affordaneasyandacertainremedyinallcasesofacriminalnature，arisingtindertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates。
4。Itonlyremainstoinquire，whethertheadditionofajudiciarysystemtotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesdiminishesthepowerofpunishingoffencesarisingunderit。Itiswellunderstoodthatthemotivesforannexingajudiciarypowerweretogiveforceandenergytothegovernment。ItwasapprehendedthatlessinterestintheconcernsoftheUnion，andlessuniformityofdecisionmightbefoundinthestatecourts；anditwasthoughtexpedientthatasuitablenumberoftribunalsundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStatesshouldbedispersedthroughthecountry，subjecttotherevisionofsuperiorcourts，andfinallycenteringinacommonhead，theSupremeCourt。Tothesetribunalswasimpartedthepowerwhichthestatecourtswould，itispresumed，haveotherwisecontinuedtoexercise，ofexpoundingandenforcingwhateverwasproperlycognizableasanoffenceagainsttheUnitedStates。Butitcannotbeconceived，thatasystemintendedtostrengthenandinvigoratethegovernmentoftheUnion，canimpairandenfeebleit。Itcannotbesupposed，thattheeffectofprovidingweaponsforitsdefence，istostripitofitsarmour。NeithercanitbesupposedthatitwasintendedtoestablishasystemsoincongruousastoconfinetheUnitedStatescourtstothetrialofoffencesagainstpositivelaw，andtorelyuponthestatecourtsforreliefagainstactsofanotherdescriptioninjurioustotheUnitedStates；
noryetthattheUnitedStates，havingsostronganinterestinbeingprotectedagainstsuchacts，meanttorelinquishandabandontheremediesagainstthemaltogether。
Inadditiontothesegeneralgrounds，weoughtnottoomitthepeculiarjurisdictiongivenbytheConstitutionoverdistrictscededbystatesforcertainpurposes，andalsoovertheterritoriesacquiredfromthestatesorfromforeignpowers。Aconstructionwhichimpliesthatinsuchplacesanyoffencenotexpresslyprohibitedbyanactofcongressmaybecommittedwithimpunity，cannotbeasoundone。
Letusalsoconsiderpersonsofacertaindescription。TheConstitution，aswehavealreadyseen，givestothecourtsoftheUnitedStatesjurisdictioninallcasesaffectingconsuls。Congress，increatingtheinteriorcourts，assignedtothemanexclusivejurisdictionincriminalcasesoverconsuls。
In1816，aforeignconsulwaschargedwiththecommissionofanatrociouscrimewithinthestateofPennsylvania，forwhichanindictmentwasfoundagainsthim。Hedeniedthejurisdictionofthestatecourt，andwasdischarged。
Hestillgoesuntried，labouringunderanunmeritedimputationifinnocent，andifguilty，unpunished，which，ifthedoctrinehereopposediscorrect，isanunavoidableconsequence。
Still，however，althoughthesepositionsmaybeconsideredassound，someseriousobjectionsremainfordiscussion。
1。Intheinquiry，whetherthecourtsoftheUnitedStatespossessjurisdictionofacriminalnatureinanycasenotprovidedforbyanactofcongress，ithasalwaysbeensupposedthatthecommonlawofEnglandwasalonetobeconsidered。Chase，J。says，\"IftheUnitedStatescanforamomentbesupposedtohaveacommonlaw，itmust，Ipresume，bethatofEngland。\"8
Thustheattentionhasbeenconfinedtoapartonlyofthegeneralquestion；
andifitisunderstoodbycourts，thattheyareonlytodecidewhetherthecommonlawofEnglandisinsuchcasestobethesoleruleofdecision，itiseasytoaccountforsomeoftheopinionsthathavebeengiven。BothChase，J。andJohnson，J。justlyobserve，thatthecommonlawofEnglandhasbeengraduallyvariedinthedifferentstates，andthatthereexistsnouniformrulebywhichtheUnitedStatescouldbegovernedinrespecttoit。Thelatter，withgreattruthandeffectremarks，thatifthepowerimpliedontheformationofanypoliticalbody，topreserveitsownexistenceandpromotetheendandobjectofitsowncreation，isapplicabletothepeculiarcharacterofourConstitution，whichhedeclinestoexamine，
itisaprinciplebynomeanspeculiartothecommonlaw[ofEngland。]
\"Itiscoevalprobablywiththefirstformationofalimitedgovernment，belongstoasystemofuniversallaw，andmayaswellsupporttheassumptionofmanyotherpowers，asthosepeculiarlyacknowledgedbythecommonlawofEngland。\"9
WemayaccountformostoftheoppositioninvariouspartsoftheUnionfromthequestionhavingbeenmisunderstood。ThatthecommonlawofEnglandwaskeptinview，toacertainextentbytheframersoftheConstitution，evenincriminalcases，andassuchadoptedbythepeople，cannotbedoubted。
Theinstancesarenumerous。Impeachment，treason，felony，breachofthepeace，habeascorpus，thetrialbyjury，andmanyotherphrasesandappellations，derivedfromthecommonlawofEngland，appearbothintheoriginaltextandtheamendments。Butthis，asjustlyobservedbyalearnedjurist，10wasnotintendedasasourceofjurisdiction，butasaruleormeanforitsexercise。Inthissensealonewearetoacceptthosetechnicalterms，andbynomeansasevidencethatifanycommonlawwasintendedbytheConstitutiontobeadoptedasaruleofaction，itwasthecommonlawofEngland。
2。Itisplausiblyurged，thatasystemoflawwhichdefinescrime，withoutappropriatingpunishment，possessesnoefficacyanddoesnotmeritadoption，anditisinquiredinwhatmannerareoffencesagainstthelawofnaturetobepunished。
Thequestionisnotwithoutitsintrinsicdifficulty，andananswercannotbeattemptedwithoutsomediffidence，butitishopedthatthefollowingviewwillbesatisfactory。
1。Wemaylayitdownasanaxiom，thatineverysystemoflaw，whetherexpressorimplied，crimeisheldtobeliabletopunishmentofsomesort。
Themeresenseofguilt，howeverunhappyitmayrendertheoffender，yieldsnocompensation，andaffordstosecuritytosociety。
2。Punishmentoughtalwaystobearajustrelationtothenatureanddegreeoftheoffence。Positivelawissometimesarbitraryandunreasonablysevere；buttheunitedsenseofthecommunity，someofwhommaycommit，andallofwhommaysufferfromthecommissionofcrimes，isgenerallyappositeandreasonable。Ifthereisanydeviationfromthestrictmeasureofpunishment，itisgenerallyonthesideofhumanity。
3。Recurring，asfaraswehavematerials，tothehistoryofancientlawinEurope，forwecannottakeAsiaorAfricaasourguides，wefindthatalthoughtheinjuredindividual，orhisnearestfriends，weresometimesheldtobeentitledtotakeredressintotheirownhands，andpursuetheoffenderbytheirownpower；apracticesodangerouswasgraduallyoverruled，andpunishment，renderedtheactofthewhole，affordedthroughthemediumofthewhole，satisfactionproportionedtotheoffence。11
4。Inremotetimes，andinmostcountries，thissatisfactionconsistedinheforfeitureofsomethingofvalue；wehavetothisaffecttheauthorityofHomer，Iliad，b。9，v。743。Thepriceofblooddischarged，themurdererlives。\"OfTacitus，inrespecttotheancientGermans，\"Luituretiamhomicidiumcertoarmentorumacpecorumnumero，\"&；c。
homicideisalsopunishedbytheforfeitureofacertainnumberofcattleorsheep；andheadds，thatthoseconvictedofothercrimeswerefinedinproportion，apartofwhichwaspaidtotheprince，andparttohimwhowaswronged，ortohisrelations。Imprisonmentwasaddedeithertocoercepayment，orasafurtherpunishment。
Therewasatime，saysBeccaria，whenallpunishmentswerepecuniary。12LordKaimeslaysdownthesameposition，anditisasettledprincipleintheancientlawofEngland，thatwhereanoffencehasbeencommittedtowhichnospecificpunishmentisaffixedbystatute，itispunishablebyfineandimprisonments。13Herethenwehavematerialswhichlaboriousinquirywouldprobablyincrease，forascertainingthenatureofthosepunishmentsthatbycommonconsentprecededpositivelaw。Theirmildnessoughtnottoleadustorejectthem。
Itwouldbeasorryargumenttosay，thatbecauseaseverepunishmentcannotbeinflicted，theoffendershallnotbepunishedatall。JudgeStorytrulyremarks，14thatitisasettledprinciple，thatwhenanoffenceexiststowhichnospecificpunishmentisaffixedbystatute，itispunishablebyfineandimprisonment，butwhenheadds，thatiftreasonhadbeenleftwithoutpunishmentbyanactofCongress，thepunishmentbyfineandimprisonmentmusthaveattachedtoit；wemustrecollectthatthepowertodeclarethepunishmentbeingexpresslygiventocongress，itseemstobetakenoutofthegeneralprinciplethatwouldotherwisebeapplicable。
Onthewhole，wearriveattheconclusion，thatcrimescommittedagainstsocietyhavebeenatalltimesthesubjectofpunishmentofsomesort；
thatindependentofpositivelaw，theforfeitureofproperty，orpersonalliberty，hasbeenthegeneral，thoughnotperhapstheuniversalcharacterofpunishment；foradifferenceofmannerswillalwayshaveastronginfluenceontheextentofpunishment，asthepeoplearemildandpeaceableorruggedandferocious；andthatthetribunalsofjusticeineverycasewithintheirjurisdiction，arethusprovidedwithaguide，whichiffoundinadequatetothesafetyofsociety，mayatanytimeberenderedmoreeffectualbythelegislativepower。
Ithasbeensaid，thattogiveiteffect，thecommonlawoughttohavebeenexpresslyenactedaspartoftheConstitution。Buthowcouldthishavebeendone?ShouldithavebeendescribedasthecommonlawofEngland?
Itwasnotcontemplated。ThecommonlawofanyparticularstateintheUnion?Thiswouldhavebeenequallyinadmissible。Itcouldhavebeenintroducedinnootherthansomephrasesasthefollowing:
\"Thelawofnature，orthejustandrationalobligationsofmeninastateofpoliticalsociety，shallbetheruleordecisioninallcasesnototherwiseprovidedfor。\"Andsurelyitwouldhavebeendeemedamostunnecessarydeclaration。Ithasbeenwellobservedthattheattempttoenumeratethepowersnecessaryandpropertocallthegeneralpowerintoeffect，wouldhaveinvolvedacompletedigestoflawsoneverysubjecttowhichtheConstitutionrelates?accommodatednotonlytotheexistingstateofthings，buttoallpossiblechanges；forineverynewapplicationofageneralpower，theparticularpowers，whicharethemeansofattainingtheobject，mustoftennecessarilyvary，althoughtheobjectremainsthesame。15
IndeliveringtheopinionoftheSupremeCourtintheUnitedStatesv。HudsonandGoodwin，JudgeJohnsonobserves，thatit\"isnotnecessarytoinquirewhetherthegeneralgovernmentpossessesthepowerofconferringonitscourtsajurisdiction，incasessimilartothepresent，itisenoughthatsuchjurisdictionhasnotbeenconferredbyanylegislativeact，ifitdoesnotresulttothesecourtsasaconsequenceoftheircreation。\"
Withgreatdeferencetoanauthoritysorespectable，itissubmittedthatiftheprecedingobservationsarecorrect，thatjurisdictionhasbeenexpresslygivenbytheactofSeptember24，1789，whichalthoughrepealedbytheactofFebruary13，1801，wasrevivedbytheactofMarch8，1802，andisnowinfullforce。Bythisactthecircuitcourtsareexpresslyinvestedwiththecognizance，theexclusivecognizancesaysthelaw，
ofallcrimesandoffencescognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，exceptwherethelawsoftheUnitedStatesshallotherwisedirect。Iftheoffencesofwhichwehavebeenspeaking，ariseundertheConstitution，theymustbecognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，andarethusrenderedcognizableinthecircuitcourts。
Thesamelearnedjudgeinasubsequentcase，whenhealsodeliveredtheopinionoftheSupremeCourt，mostcorrectlydrewfromtheConstitutionitself，certainprinciplesnecessarytosupporttheassertedjurisdictionofalegislativebodytopunishcontemptsagainstitself，whichhejustlyobservesinvolvestheinterestofthepeople。
\"Theinterestsanddignityofthosewhocreatedthepublicfunctionaries，requiretheexertionofthepowersindispensabletotheattainmentoftheendsoftheircreations。\"16
Thequestionbeforethecourtwasonlyonthejurisdictionofthehouse。
Theprecisenatureoftheoffencecommitted，didnotappearonthefaceofthepleadings。Itwasobservedbyhim，\"thatwearenottodecidethatthisjurisdictiondoesnotexist，becauseitisnotexpresslygiven。Itistrue，thatsuchapower，ifitexists，mustbederivedfromimplication，andthegeniusandspiritofourinstitutionsarehostiletotheexerciseofimpliedpowers。Hadthefacultiesofmanbeencompetenttotheframingofasysteminwhichnothingwouldhavebeenlefttoimplication，theeffortwouldundoubtedlyhavebeenmade。ButinthewholeofouradmirableConstitution，thereisnotagrantofpowers，whichdoesnotdrawafteritothersnotexpressed，butvitaltotheirexercise，notsubstantiveandindependent，butauxiliaryandsubordinate。\"
Nowwemaybepermittedtoremark，thatthejurisdictionthusraisedandsupportedbynecessaryimplication，couldinthiscase，haveoperatedonlyonthoseacts，which，byanimplicationequallynecessary，weretobeconsideredasoffences。Noactofcongresshasdeclaredwhatshallconstitutethoseoffences。Theymustthereforeessentiallybe，whataretermedcontempts，orbreachesofprivilegeatcommonlaw。ItwascompetentfortheSupremeCourt，wasitnotincumbentonthem?tonoticethatthenon-existenceofanylegislativeprovisionsonthesubject，rendereditimpossibletojustifyanimprisonmentbyvirtueofthespeaker\'swarrantforanon-existingoffence。Buttheobservationis，that\"thepowertoinstituteaprosecutionmustbedependentonthepowertopunish。Ifthehouseofrepresentativespossessednopowertopunishforcontempt，theinitiatoryprocessissuedintheoperationofthatauthority，musthavebeenillegal；therewasawantofjurisdictiontojustifyit。\"Andtheomissiontotakethisground，seemstosupporttheargumentexcludingthenecessityofastatutoryprovision。
Onthesamegroundwemayadverttotheexerciseofthepowerofimpeachment。
Inneitherofthecasesalreadymentioned，weretheactschargedonthepartiesaccused，statutoryoffences。Yetthedoctrineopposedinthisworkwouldrenderthepowerofimpeachmentanullity，inallcasesexceptthetwoexpresslymentionedintheConstitution，treasonandbribery；untilcongresspasslaws，declaringwhatshallconstitutetheother\"highcrimesandmisdemeanors。\"
Andthusthequestionseemstobeatrestinthecontemplationofboththesecourts，forsuchtheymustbetermed，whenactinginthosecapacities，andbothofthemarecourtsfromwhosedecisionthereisnoappeal。
1。ActofSeptember24，1789。
2。3Wheaton，222。Hobsonv。Campbell。
4Wheaton，414。UnitedStatesv。Howland。
3。3Wheaton，ubisupra，and3
Dallas，425。Sims\'slesseev。Irvine。
4。May8，1792。Thelanguageoftheactisgeneral。Itspeaksoftheprinciples，rules，andusages\"whichbelongtocourtsofequityascontra-distinguishedfromcourtsofcommonlaw。\"
5。Itdoesnotappearthatthisinterestingquestion，thoughoftendiscussed，hasyetbeendefinitivelysettledbythesupremecourtoftheUnitedStates。ItwasfirstraisedinthecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。Warrell，2Dall。297，whenJudgePetersdissentedfromJudgeChase。Theclearandmanly，thoughbriefexpositionoftheopinionoftheformer，meritsgreatattention。Inthefollowingyear，1799，inthecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。Williams，ChiefJusticeEllsworthheldthatthecommonlawofthiscountryremainedthesameasitwasbeforetherevolution。Otherdecisions，notreported，arebelievedtohavetakenplace。IntheUnitedStatesv。McGillJudgeWashingtonisrepresentedtohavesaid，thathehadoftensodecidedit，4Dall。429。ThecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。HudsonandGoodwin，cameintothesupremecourtin1812，itwasnotargued。In1816anothercasewasbroughtup。ThejudgeofthecircuitcourtforthedistrictofMassachusetts，maintainingacommonlawjurisdictioninoppositiontothedistrictjudge，thecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。Coolidge，wasremovedaccordingtotheprovisionsofthejudiciarybillintothesupremecourt。
Unfortunatelytheattorney-generalagaindeclinedtheargument。Threeofthesevenjudgesobservedthattheydidnotconsiderthequestionassettled，butthecourtdeclaredthatalthoughtheywouldhavebeenwillingtobearthequestiondiscussedinsolemnargument，yet，underthecircumstances，theywouldnotreviewtheirformerdecisionordrawitintodoubt。See1Wheaton，415，andfortheoriginalcase，1Gallison，488。Twocases，earlierthananyofthese，UnitedStatesv。Ravara，in1792，andUnitedStatesv。Henfield，in1793，arepassedover，becausethequestionwasnotdistinctlyraisedineither。AndforthesamereasonnorelianceisplacedontheUnitedStatesv。Pickering，onanimpeachmentbeforethesenatein1804，allthechargesinwhichwerepurelyatcommonlaw。
6。1Dallas，41。
7。ThecaseofDeLongChampsin1783，thoughnotequallystrong，wasofthesamenature。ThiswasafterthearticlesofconfederationinwhichtheintercoursewithforeignpowerswasexclusivelyreservedtotheUnitedStates。ThedefendanthadassaultedthesecretaryofthelegationfromFrance。Theindictmentherewasremarkable。
ItdescribedthepersonassaultedassecretaryofthelegationofFrance?consulgeneraltotheUnitedStates，andconsultotheStateofPennsylvania，anditconcluded?\"Inviolationofthelawofnations，againstthepeace，anddignityoftheUnitedStates，andofthecommonwealthofPennsylvania。\"
Itwaslearnedlyargued；butthecourtwithoutdifficultydecidedthattheyhadjurisdiction，andthatitwaspunishableasanoffenceagainstthelawofnations。?1Dallas，111。SomepartsoftheopinionofChiefJusticeKentinLynch\'scase，11Johnson，549，coincidewiththeseremarks。
8。2Dallas，384。
9。7Cranch，32。UnitedStatesv。
Hudson。Asthiscasewasnotarguedbycounsel，itdoesnotdistinctlyappearwhyitwasdeemedbythecourttodependonthecommonlawofEngland，andwhyitshouldnothavebeentakenuponthegeneralprinciplealludedtobyJudgeJohnson。Thisspontaneousassumptionofthegroundofdecisioninthecourtbelow，confinesthejudgmentofthesupremecourttothequestiononthecommonlawofEngland。
IntheUnitedStatesv。Burr，ChiefJusticeMarshallalsoreferstothat\"generallyrecognizedandlongestablishedlaw，whichformsthesubstratumofthelawsofeverystate。\"SeeRobertson\'sReportoftheTrialofAaronBurr。
TheChiefJusticeofPennsylvania，inacasein5Binney，558，trulyobserves，that\"everynationhasitscommonlaw。\"AndarenottheUnitedStatesanation?
10。Mr。DuponceauinhislateworkonthejurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。
11。SeetheelegantelucidationofthissubjectbyLordKaimesinhishistoricallawtracts。
12。C。17，§；46。
13。SeealsoGrotius，b。1，c。2。Puff。
b。viii。c。3，§；IItothesameeffect。
14。UnitedStatesv。Coolidge，1Gallison，488。
15。Federalist，No。44。
16。6Wheaton，204。Andersonv。Dunn。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXXCHAPTERXXX。OFCHECKSANDRESTRAINTSONTHEJUDICIALBRANCH。FROMthesegeneralviewsofthejudicialpower，wecollectthatitisinthenatureofaprincipleincorporatedforusefulpurposesintotheConstitution，vestedinvariousagents，someofwhomderivetheirauthorityfromtheUnitedStates，andsomefromthestates，andholdingtheiroffices，aswillappearbyreferencetothoseconstitutions，onvarioustenures，butallpossessingtherightofdecidingonthevalidityofalaw。
Ifthispowerisinitselfinordinate，ifitisnotconsistentwiththetrueinterestsofthepeople，itmighthavebeenexcludedfrom，orcarefullyqualifiedin，theConstitution；butithasbeenestablishedbythepeopleonfulldeliberation；andafewadditionalreflectionsonitsnatureandutilitymaybeadmitted。
Inthefirstplace，wemayobserve，thatajudicialpowerwithsuchextensiveattributes，isprobablypeculiartothiscountry。Wherethereisnotafixedandsettledconstitution，whetherwrittenorunwritten，whichcannotbealteredbythelegislature，thejudiciaryhasnopowertodeclarealawunconstitutional。Insuchcountries，thepeopleareatthemercyofthelegislature。Theappealswhichtheymaymaketotheirconstitutionsaredisregardediftheycannotbeenforced，andtheconstitutionpossessesmerelyanominalvalue。Ittendsindeedtoexcitediscontents，byexhibitingrightsthatcannotbeenjoyed，andpromisingrestraintsongovernmentthatmaybebrokenwithimpunity。
TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswasnotframed，inthisrespect，ongroundnewtous。Theprinciplehadbeenpreviouslyinsertedinallthestateconstitutionsthenformed。Ithasbeenpreservedinallthosesinceestablished，andnoneofthealterationswhichwehaveheretoforenoticed，havebeenextendedtothispoint。
Wemaytheninquire，inwhatmodeorformoflanguageitcouldhavebeenexcludedfromtheConstitution，andwhatwouldhavebeentheeffectofsuchexclusion。Beinginitselfanecessaryincidenttoaregularandcompletegovernment，itsexistenceisimpliedfromthemerefactofcreatingsuchagovernment；ititisintendedthatitshouldnotbecommensuratewithallthepowersandobligationsofthegovernment，orthatitshouldnotformanypartofitwhatever，expresstermsofqualificationorexclusionwouldcertainlyberequired。
Nowitwouldbedifficulttoreconcilethemindsoffreemen，towhomwassubmittedtheconsiderationofaschemeofgovernment，professingtocontainthoseprinciplesbywhichafuturelegislatureandexecutiveweretoberegulated，toanydeclarationsthatasubversionorabandonmentofthoseprinciples，byeitherbranch，andparticularlybythelegislature，shouldbeliabletonoresistanceorcontrol。Thejudicialpowerpotentiallyexistedbeforeanylawswerepassed；itcouldnotbewithoutanobject；
thatobject，isatfirsttheConstitution。Asthelegislatureproceedstoact，thejudicialpowerfollowstheirproceedings。ItisacorrectiveimposedbytheConstitutionontheiracts。Thelegislaturearenotdeceivedormisled。Nothingindicatesthattheyalonearetodecideontheconstitutionalityoftheirownacts，orthatthepeoplewhomaybeinjuredbysuchacts，areunprovidedwithanyotherdefencethanopenresistancetothem。Butwithoutanadequatepowerinthejudiciarytotheeffectrequired，thepeoplewouldeitherbedriventosuchresistance；obligedtowaittilltheycouldobtainredressthroughtheexerciseoftheirelectivepowers；
orbecompelledtopatientsubmission。
Therightsofthepeoplearebettersecuredbythegeneralundefinedjudicialpower，necessarilyinferredfromthegenerallanguageoftheConstitutionitself，pre-existingintheirownstateconstitutions，andneversurrenderedtotheUnitedStates。Inthelastmentionedaspect，itwouldappearsurprisingthatthosewhoweremostapprehensiveoftheself-increasingpowerofthegeneralgovernment，didnotperceivethebulwarkoftheirsafety。Thecourtsandthejudgesofeverystatepossess，asbeforeobserved，therighttodecideontheconstitutionalityofalawoftheirownstateandoftheUnitedStates。Theprincipleitself，andnotthemeretribunal，constitutesthepublicsecurity。Thatsuchdecisionsaresubjecttotheappellatejurisdictionheretoforespokenof，formsnoobjectiontotheirusefulness。Theobjectofthisjurisdictionistoproduceuniformity。Insteadofreducing，itenhancesthevalue，whileitprovestheuniversalbearingoftheprincipleitself。
Intheorganizationofthispowerthussalutary，thusnecessary，isfoundtheonlydifficulty。Torenderitwhollyindependentofthepeople，isobjectedtobymany:toaffectitsnecessaryindependencebythemodesofcreatingandappointingitsministers，isliabletoequalobjections。
Inthefirstcase，arbitraryanddespoticproceedingsareapprehended。
Itissupposedtobethenaturaldispositionofman，whenplacedabovecontrol，toabusehispower，or，ifnocorruptmotivesproducethisconsequence，theresometimesarefoundalaxity，acarelessness，awantofsufficientexertionanddeliberatejudgmentintheexerciseofit。Ontheotherhand，ifinsteadofavailinghimselfofhisownknowledgeandcapacity，thejudgesubmitstobegovernedbytheopinionsofothers；ifheallowsthedesiretoretainhisoffice，thefearofgivingoffence，ortheloveofpopularity，toformanypartoftheingredientsofhisjudgment，anequalviolationofhistrustisapparent。Itisthereforenotwithoutanxietythatthepatrioticmindendeavourssotoregulatetheorganizationofthisallessentialpower，thatitshallbesafelysteeredbetweenthetwoextremes。
Inallgovernmentsretainingasemblanceofthepreservationofpopularrights，itisbelievedthatthestructureofthejudicialpoweroughttobefoundedonitsindependence。Thetenureofofficeisthereforegenerallyduringgoodbehaviour。Butinsomeofourstategovernments，judgesareappointedforatermofyears。Insome，theappointmentsaremadebytheexecutive，insomebythelegislativepower。Themodeofappointmentisoflittleconsequenceastotheprinciple，if，whenithasbeenmade，themagistrateisindependentofthefurtherfavouroftheappointingpower。
Themoreimportantquestionistheconditionanddurationoftheappointment。
Theconditionofgoodbehaviournecessarilyaccompaniesalljudicialappointments，forwhatevertermtheymaybegranted。Therearenoneduringpleasureinthiscountry，althoughthecaseisotherwiseastosomehighjudicialstationsinEngland。1Casesofmisbehaviourarethereforetobeprovidedagainst。Honesterrorsinjudgmentdonotamounttomisbehavior。Thecourtofthelastresortistocorrectallthosewhichtakeplaceintheprevioustribunals。Ifthiscourtshallitselfbedeemedtohavecommittedanerror，therecanbenoredress，becausefromthenatureofthings，theremustbesomepointatwhichtostop:anditisbetterthatanindividualshouldsustainaninjury，thanthatthewholesystemshouldbethrownintodisorder。
Thislastresortmaybedifferentlyconstituted，buttheremustbesomefinalmodeofdeciding。
Onsomeoccasionsofdissatisfactionwiththedecisionsofthesupremecourt，differentmodesofrevisingeventheirdecisionshavebeensuggested。
Thelastoftheseknowntotheauthorhasbeentoconvertthesenateintothefinalcourtoferrorandappeal。
Oftheircompetencyinapracticalview，nodoubtcanbeentertained，butofthebenefitwhichthepublicwouldderivebytheirunavoidablesuspensionoflegislativebusiness，withotherhighfunctionsdevolvedonthem，whiletheirtimewasoccupiedinthetrialofcauses，therewouldbemuchroomfordoubt。
But，howeverthisultimatetribunalmaybeconstituted，itisstilltobethelastresort；and，sincehumaninfallibilitycannowherebefound，itmayalsopronounceerroneousjudgmentsforwhichtherewouldbenoredress。
Inalltheseinstitutionswemustthereforerecognisetheimperfectionofman，andcontentourselveswiththeintentiontoactrightly，althoughthedecision，intheapprehensionofmany，maybewrong。
Insomestates，apoweris，giventotheexecutiveauthorityontheapplicationofacertainproportionofthelegislaturetoremoveajudgefromoffice。Reasonswilloccurbothforandagainstsuchaprovision。
Ifajudgeshouldbeincapacitatedbyinfirmity。orage，orbeotherwise，withoutanyfaultofhisown，preventedfromperforminghisduties，hewouldnotbeapropersubjectforremovalbyimpeachment；yet，wheredutiescannotbeperformed，theofficershouldnotbecontinued。Theincapacityshould，however，beestablishedinthespecificcase，andtolaydownageneralrule，thatontheattainmentofacertainage，thejudgeshallnolongerbeadmittedtoact，maywithdrawfromtheserviceofthepublicapersoncapableofbeinghighlyusefultothem。InNewYorkthecommissionexpiresattheageofsixtyyears；inConnecticutatseventyyears；andthustheirconstitutionsseemtointendtoimposelawsonnatureitself，ortodrivefromtheirownservicemeninwhommaystillresidethemostusefulfaculties，improvedbytimeandexperience。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesabstainsfromthiserror。
Butthepowerofremovalintended，inthosestateswhereitisfound，tobeexercisedincasesofactualandnotimpliedincapacity，mayinpracticebecarriedfurther，andiftherepresentativesofthepeopleholdtheopinionthattheproceedingsofajudgearecontrarytothepublicinterests，anapplicationforhisremovalmaybemadetothegovernor。If，forinstance，hehasdecidedthatoneoftheirlawsisunconstitutional，andtheyretainadifferentopinion，orifhisconstructionsof，andproceedingsunderalawnotobjectionableinitself，differfromtheirownviewsofthesamesubject，dissatisfactionwithhisconductwhichmaybeveryhonestlyfelt，mayoccasionanaddressforhisremoval，notasamodeofavoidingorreversinghisdecisions，forthatcouldnotbetheeffect，butasanexampletoothers，andperhapsinsomedegree，itmightbecalculatedforapunishmenttohimself。
Now，layingasideallpartyconsiderationswhichsometimesmayoperate，perhapsunconsciously，withthebestmen，wemustinquireintotheprincipleonwhichsuchremovalwouldbefounded，andweshallfindittobethatofsettingupthejudgmentofthepeoplethroughtheirrepresentativestocorrectthejudgmentofthejudicialpower。
IftheConstitutionoftheparticularstatefairlyadmitsofthisconstruction，itisthewillofthepeople，andmustbeobeyed。Itisacontrolreservedtothemselvesoverthegeneralcharacterofthejudicialpower，andtothatextentimpairsitsabsoluteindependence。Intheabsenceofcorruptmotives，whichmightjustifyanimpeachment，itistheonlymodeofrectifyingacourseoferroneousjudgmentstendingtoproducepublicinjury。Butitisliabletotheobjectionthatthosewhothusundertaketodecide，areseldomsowellqualifiedforthetaskasthosewhosepeculiarstudiesandoccupationmaybeconsideredashavingenabledthemtojudge。Anotherobjectionis，thatremovalinthismannerbeingineverysenseanevil，afearofdispleasingthelegislaturemayalwayshoveroverthemindofthejudge，andpreventhisbeingtheimpartial\'andinflexiblemediatorbetweenthelegislatureandthepeople，whichthepeopleintendedheshouldbe。
TheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofthewholesubjectmusthavebeendulyconsideredbytheframersofourConstitution，andthepeopleatlargehaveconfirmedtheresultoftheirjudgment。
Thereis，however，onepowervestedinthelegislature，ofwhichtheycannotbedeprived。Theyareauthorized\"fromtimetotime\"toordainandestablishtribunalsinferiortothesupremecourt，andsuchcourtstheymayatanytimeabolish。Thus，asbeforenoticed，theactof1801，establishingcertaincircuitcourtswasrepealedin1802，andthecommissionsgrantedtothejudgeswereconsequentlyavoided。
Tothisinstancewemaybepermittedtorefer，forthepurposeofshowingthehighindependenceofallpartyconsiderations，thatappertainstothecharacterofajudge。Thesupremecourt，whichaffirmedadecisionbywhichthevalidityoftherepealingactwasestablished，2wasatthattimecomposedentirelyofmenpoliticallyadversetothatwhich，byasuddenrevolution，hadbecomethepredominantpartyinthelegislature。
Yetthedecisionwasunanimouslygiven，oneofthejudgesonlybeingabsentonaccountofill-health。Andsucharethetruenatureandspiritofajudicialinstitution，thattherecanbenodoubtthatthesameprinciple；
thesameentirerepudiationofpartyspirit，wouldgovernmenofallpoliticalimpressions，whenrequiredtoactonsimilaroccasionsbytheConstitutionandtheircountry。Partyspiritseldomcontaminatesjudicialfunctions。
Onthewhole，itseemsthatwiththerighttonewmodelalltheinferiortribunals，andtherebytovacate，thecommissionsoftheirjudges，andwiththepowertoimpeachalljudgeswhatever，asufficientcontrolisretainedoverthejudiciarypowerforeveryusefulpurpose；thatitisabranchofgovernmentwhichthepeoplehavethestrongestmotivestocherishandsupport，andthatiftheyvalueandwishtopreservetheirConstitution，theyoughtnevertosurrendertheindependenceoftheirjudges。
1。Thelordchancellor，thejudgesofthecourtsofadmiralty，vice-admiralty，&；c。
2。Stuartv。Laird，1Cranch，308。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXXICHAPTERXXXI。OFCHECKSANDCONTROLSONOTHERBRANCHESOFTHEGOVERNMENT。ISthereanyfoundationfortheposition，thatinarepublicthepeoplearenaturallybetrayedbythoseinwhomtheytrust?
Isittruethatpersonal，powerandindependenceinthemagistrate，beingtheimmediateconsequenceofthefavourofthepeople，theyareunderanunavoidablenecessityofbeingbetrayed?1
Werethisobjectionwellfounded，weshouldshrinkwithhorrorfromtheformationofarepublic。Letusexaminehowitisattemptedtobesupported。
Thefirstpostulateis，thatthosewhoareinpossessionofpower，generallystrivetoenlargeitfortheirownadvantageinpreferencetothepublicgood。Inthosegovernmentswherenorestraintontheconductofpublicofficersisprovided，weseetowhatanextentthispropensityhasbeensometimescarried。Romeisthefavouriteexampleadducedtosupporttheproposition。
Itwasfoundimpossibleforthepeopleofthatstate，ever，tohavefaithfuldefenders。Neitherthosewhomtheyexpresslychose，northosewhomsomepersonaladvantagesenabledtogoverntheassemblies，wereunitedtothembyanycommonfeelingofthesameconcern。Thetribunespursuedwithzealandperseverance，nogreaterobjectthantoprocureadmissiontoallthedifferentdignitiesintherepublic。Toadmittheplebeianstoparticipateinofficespreviouslyconfinedtopatricians，wasconsidersaitgreatvictoryoverthelatter。Theusetheymadeofthepowerofthepeoplewastoincreaseprerogatives，whichtheyfalselycalledtheprerogativesofall，butwhichthetribunesandtheirfriendsalonewerelikelytoenjoy。
Butitdoesnotappearthattheyeversetboundstotheterriblepowerofthemagistrates，orrepressedthatclassofcitizenswhoknewhowtomaketheircrimespassunpunished，ortoregulateandstrengthenthejudicialpower；precautionswithoutwhichmenmightstruggletotheendoftime，andneverattaintrueliberty。
Sucharetheviewstakenofthisgreat，butinternallyimperfectrepublic，andageneralpropositionisillogicallydeducedfromaparticularinstance。
IfaConstitutionissoframedthatofficialpowerbecomesatonceabsoluteandindependentoflaw；ifthemagistrateswhoaretoadministerthelawareauthorizedlikethepræ；tors，tomakeitfromtimetotimeastheythinkproper，andifacompetitionisadmittedamongthepublicofficers，astowhoshallexercisethemostauthority，andhewhosucceedsthebest，cannotbecompelledbythepeopleeithertosurrenderorreduceit；theveryappointment，insuchcase，tendstostimulatealltheevilpropensities，andcreateaderelictionofallthemoralobligationsofman。Butitisanerrortosuppose，ifitissupposed，thatthisisconfinedtorepublicanforms。Thedistinctionwouldonlybeinname。Createagovernmentofanykind，andinvestitsofficerswithpowerssoextensiveanduncontrollable，andtherewillbethesameabuses。Theonlydifferencewillbethatinonecaseweshallsaythepeopleareoppressed；intheotherthattheyarebetrayed。
Aknowledgeofhumannature，tooperspicaciousnottoperceivethedanger，andtoocautiousnottoprovideagainstit，dictatedinthecompositionofourConstitution，thosechecksandbalancesonwhichitspurityandcontinuancewerecalculatedtodepend。Whileallnecessarypowerwasgranted，everysoundprecautionwasadoptedtopreventitsabuse。
Wehavealreadyconsideredtheexpressrestrictionsonthelegislature，andhaveseenthatonsomepointstheycannotlegislateatall，andonmanyotherstheycanactonlytoalimitedextent；butawiderviewmaybenowtaken，andanexaminationoftheentirecontextwillfullyexhibitapervadingprinciple，which，whileitsecuresthedueperformanceofpublicduty，preventsitsabuse。
ThelegislatureisinthefirstplacerestrainedbyafixedandabsoluteConstitution，overwhichithasnosortofpower。Inwinecountries，andinoneofourownstates，2thelegislaturelayingtheirhandsontheConstitution，maysomoulditfromtimetotime，astogiveasanctiontomeasuresnotwithinitsoriginalcontemplation。
ButtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，theworkofthepeople，alterableonlybythepeople，possessesasacredandintangiblecharacterinrespecttothelegislature。Thisis，therefore，thegreatrestraint。WhenthelegislaturefeelsthatithasnopowerunlesstheConstitutionhasgivenit，themereshameofbeingdefeatedinanystepwhichcannotbesupported，compelsittolooktotheConstitutionforitsauthority，andifitcannotfinditthere，todesistfromthemeasure。
Secondly，asthismaynotalwaysbeasufficientrestraint，thejudicialpowerpresentsaneffectualbarrieragainstitsexcesses，theobservationsonwhichheadneednotbe，repeated。But，asobserved，thejudicialpowerpossessesnospontaneousmotion?itmustbecalledintoactionbytheapplicationofotherseitherindividuals，orconstitutedauthorities，?
andinthemeantime，theobnoxiouslawmaynotonlytakeitsplaceinthestatutebook，butbeinjuriouslyactedupon。Thethirdcorrectivetherefore，isthehandsofthepeople，whodonot，asdisingenuouslyremarked，3makenootheruseoftheirpowerthantogiveitaway。Thebiennialelectionofthehouseofrepresentatives，ofwhichthepeoplecanbynoartificebedeprived，securestothemthepowerofremovingeverymemberofthathousewhohasshown，eitheraninabilitytocomprehend，oranunwillingnesstoconformtothetranscendentobligationsoftheConstitution，whichhehassworntosupport。Here，then，wehavetheprotectionandsafetyunknowntothosecountrieswhere，eitherthelegislatureelectthemselves，orenjoyanhereditaryright，orwhere，althoughtherepresentativeprinciplemaybenominallykeptup，itsexercisemaybesuspendedorpostponedatthepleasureofanotherpartofthegovernment。
Itistrue，thatthismodeofreformingtheabuse，isnotatfirstfullandcomplete。Thesenate，whichmusthaveconcurredintheunconstitutionallaw，isnotrenewedatthesameperiod，buttheConstitution，whichforreasonsheretoforeassigned，conferredonthisbodyalongerdurationofoffice，hasregulatedthecontinuanceofeachsenator，sothatattheendofeverytwoyearsone-thirdofthewholemustbechosenanew。Thesenseofthepeople，indicatedbyafullchangeinthehouseofrepresentatives，andbythechangeofone-thirdofthesenate，couldnotbewithouteffect，andintwoyearsmoreitwouldbeimperiousandirresistible。
Afurtherrestraint，thoughlessdefinite，yetnotwithoutconsiderableweight，maybeconceivedintheinfluencearisingfromtheportionofsovereigntyremaininginthestates。
Although，tothefullextentestablishedbytheConstitution，thepowerofthelegislatureoftheUnitedStatesissuperiortothatofthestates，yetinthesmallestparticularinwhichtheypassbeyondthetrueline，thepowerofthestatesisinfulleffect。Thestateswillalwaysmaintainareasonablejealousyonthissubject。
Inallmattersnottransferredtothegeneralgovernment，therightsandinterestsofthepeopleareconfidedtothecareofthestategovernments，andananxietytosecureanddefendthemhasbeenuniformlyapparentinallthestates。Thedesireofpreservingharmonyandorder，nay，theveryloveofpower，alwaysmorevaluablewhereitisleastresisted，willoperatewithgreateffectonthenationallegislaturetopreventitsfallingintounnecessarycollisionswiththestates。Thisconsiderationwillhavethegreatestinfluencewiththemembersofthesenate，who，althoughtheydonotinanysensesitandactasstatesinafederativequality，andarenotboundbyinstructions?yetcannotbutlookwithmuchrespectto，andfeelacloseconnectionwiththelegislatureofthestatethatappointsthem。
2dly。Thefearsofthosetheoreticalwriters，whohavegratifiedthemselvesbylamentingtheinternaldangersofourrepublic，havebeenchieflydirectedagainstthetendencyoftheexecutiveauthoritytooverpowerthefreedomofthepeople。
Itissupposedthatmuchistobeapprehendedfromtheinfluenceofanofficerwhohasthepowerofappointingsomanyotherofficers，andwhoisentrustedwiththemanagementofthemilitaryforce。Itistrue，theyadmitthatashehasnotexclusivelytheappointmenttooffice，thisinfluenceistherebysomewhatdiminished，buttherecommendationsproceedingfromhimalone，andthepowerofdismissionbeingexclusivelywithhim，thehopeoftheone，andthefearoftheother，mustconferonhimanexcessiveandalarminginfluence。Alltheseconsiderationsmayhaveweight，yettheevilconsequencespredictedarenotlikelytoensue。
Themilitaryforce，aswehaveseen，iswellregulatednotonlybytheconstitutionalprohibitiontoprovideforitssupportforalongertermthantwoyears，butalsobythepowerthatcongresshavetoshorteneventhatperiod，andbythegreatimprobabilitythatanAmericanarmywouldconsenttosubstituteforregularsubsistenceandtheapprobationoftheircountrymen，thetumultuaryandprecariousexactionsofinternalwarfare，andconvulsions，personaldangerswhichmustbecertain，andeventualruinfromwhichtheycannotbeexempted。Theinfluencesupposedtoariseinrespecttotheappointmentsto，ordismissionsfromoffice，canoperateonlyinanarrowcircle，andhoweverfaritmightbecarried，wouldnottendtothesubversionofthegovernment，oreventoanymaterialalterationofit，sincethevalueoftheofficeswouldalwaysdependonthepreservationoftheConstitutionandthelaws，andtheiremolumentscouldnotbecarriedbeyondtheirlegallimits。
Nopersoniseligibletotheofficeofpresidentbeforeheattainstheageofthirty-fiveyears，norunlesshehasbeenaresidentwithintheUnitedStatesforfourteenyears。
Theobjectofthelatterprovisionis，thathishabitsandopinionsshallbeasmuchaspossiblepurelyAmerican，buttemporaryabsenceonpublicbusiness，andparticularlyonanembassytoaforeignnation，wouldnotbeaninterruptionofresidenceinthesensehereaffixedtoit。
Thesenatormusthaveattainedtheageofthirtyyears，andthemembersofthehouseofrepresentativestheageoftwentyfiveyears。
Insomeofthestates，thechiefexecutivemagistrateisnotagaineligible，untilanintervalhaselapsed，afterhavingservedacertaintime。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，onthecontrary，admitsthesameindividualtobecontinuedinofficebyre-electionduringhislife。
Theproprietyofarotationinoffice，hashadsomewarmadvocates。
Thechiefargumentsinitsfavourseemtobe，1。Thatitrendersthepeoplemoresecureintheirrightsagainstanartfulandambitiousman。Ifitwereimpossiblethatthechiefmagistrateshouldbere-electedafterservingforagiventime，itwouldbeinvainforhimtoconcertplansandcreateaninsidiousinfluenceforthepromotionofhisowncontinuanceinpower。
2。Onanoppositeprinciple，itissupposedthathewouldbemoreindependentintheexerciseofhisoffice:when，knowingthathecouldnotbere-electedtoit，hewouldnotbeunderthenecessityofcourtingthepopularfavour。