Aperfectlygoodwillwouldthereforebeequallysubjecttoobjectivelaws（viz。，lawsofgood），butcouldnotbeconceivedasobligedtherebytoactlawfully，becauseofitselffromitssubjectiveconstitutionitcanonlybedeterminedbytheconceptionofgood。
ThereforenoimperativesholdfortheDivinewill，oringeneralforaholywill；oughtishereoutofplace，becausethevolitionisalreadyofitselfnecessarilyinunisonwiththelaw。Thereforeimperativesareonlyformulaetoexpresstherelationofobjectivelawsofallvolitiontothesubjectiveimperfectionofthewillofthisorthatrationalbeing，e。g。，thehumanwill。
Nowallimperativescommandeitherhypotheticallyorcategorically。Theformerrepresentthepracticalnecessityofapossibleactionasmeanstosomethingelsethatiswilled（oratleastwhichonemightpossiblywill）。Thecategoricalimperativewouldbethatwhichrepresentedanactionasnecessaryofitselfwithoutreferencetoanotherend，i。e。，asobjectivelynecessary。
Sinceeverypracticallawrepresentsapossibleactionasgoodand，onthisaccount，forasubjectwhoispracticallydeterminablebyreason，necessary，allimperativesareformulaedetermininganactionwhichisnecessaryaccordingtotheprincipleofawillgoodinsomerespects。Ifnowtheactionisgoodonlyasameanstosomethingelse，thentheimperativeishypothetical；ifitisconceivedasgoodinitselfandconsequentlyasbeingnecessarilytheprincipleofawillwhichofitselfconformstoreason，thenitiscategorical。
Thustheimperativedeclareswhatactionpossiblebymewouldbegoodandpresentsthepracticalruleinrelationtoawillwhichdoesnotforthwithperformanactionsimplybecauseitisgood，whetherbecausethesubjectdoesnotalwaysknowthatitisgood，orbecause，evenifitknowthis，yetitsmaximsmightbeopposedtotheobjectiveprinciplesofpracticalreason。