Inthefirstplace，ithastobedecidedwhetherwearetoincludeinourlistofmotivestheMoralSentiments，orimpulsestowardsparticularkindsofvirtuousconductassuch，e。g。Candour，Veracity，Fortitude。Itseemsunwarrantabletoexcludethem，assuchsentimentsareobservableasdistinctandindependentimpulsesinmostwell-trainedminds，andwesometimesrecognisetheirexistenceinconsiderableintensity，aswhenwespeakofamanbeing`enthusiasticallybrave’，or`intenselyveracious’，oras`havingapassionforjustice’。
Atthesametimetheiradmissionplacesusinthefollowingdilemma。Eithertheobjectsoftheseimpulsesarerepresentedbytheverynotionsthatwehavebeenexamining——inwhichcase，afterwehavedecidedthatanyimpulseisbetterthanitsrival，alltheperplexitiessetforthinthepreviouschapterswillrecur，beforewecanactonourdecision；forwhatavailsittorecognisethesuperiorityoftheimpulsetodojustice，ifwedonotknowwhatitisjusttodo？——orifinanycasetheobjectwhichamoralsentimentpromptsustorealiseisconceivedmoresimply，withoutthequalificationswhichacompletereflectiononCommonSenseforcedustorecognise；then，asthepreviousinvestigationshows，weshallcertainlynotfindagreementastotherelationbetweenthisandotherimpulses。
Forexample，adispute，whethertheimpulsetospeakthetruthoughtoroughtnottobefollowed，willinevitablyarisewhenVeracityseemsopposedeithertothegeneralgood，ortotheinterestsofsomeparticularperson；
thatis，whenitconflictswith`particular’or`universal’benevolence。
Hutchesonexpresslyplacestheselatterimpulsesinahigherrankthan``candour，veracity，fortitude’’；reservingthehighestmoralapprobationfor``themostextensivebenevolence’’or``calm，stable，universalgoodwilltoall’’。[1]Butthisview，whichcoincidespracticallywithUtilitarianism，wouldcertainlybedisputedbymostIntuitionalmoralists。Again，someofthesemoralistsasKantregardallactionsasbad——ornotgood——whicharenotdonefrompureregardfordutyorchoiceofRightasRight:whileHutcheson，whorepresentstheoppositepoleofIntuitionalEthics，equallydistinguishestheloveofVirtueasaseparateimpulse；buttreatsitasatonceco-ordinateinrankandcoincidentinitseffectswithuniversalBenevolence。