WehaveseenthatthevirtueofPracticalWisdomcomprehendsallothers，sofarasvirtuousconductineachdepartmentnecessarilyresultsfromaclearknowledgeandchoiceofthetrueultimateendorendsofaction，andofthebestmeanstotheattainmentofsuchendorends。Fromthispointofviewwemayconsiderthenamesofthespecialvirtuesasdenotingspecialdepartmentsofthisknowledge；whichitisnowourbusinesstoexaminemoreclosely。
When，however，wecontemplatethese，wediscernthatthereareothervirtues，which，indifferentways，mayberegardedasnolesscomprehensivethanWisdom。Especiallyinmoderntimes，sincetherevivalofindependentethicalspeculation，therehavealwaysbeenthinkerswhohavemaintained，insomeform，theviewthatBenevolenceisasupremeandarchitectonicvirtue，
comprehendingandsummingupalltheothers，andfittedtoregulatethemanddeterminetheirproperlimitsandmutualrelations。ThiswidelysupportedclaimtosupremacyseemsanadequatereasonforgivingtoBenevolencethefirstplaceafterWisdom，inourexaminationofthecommonlyreceivedmaximsofDutyandVirtue。
ThegeneralmaximofBenevolencewouldbecommonlysaidtobe，``thatweoughttoloveallourfellow-men’’，or``allourfellow-creatures’’:but，aswehavealreadyseen，thereissomedoubtamongmoralistsastotheprecisemeaningoftheterm``love’’，inthisconnexion:since，accordingtoKantandothers，whatismorallyprescribedastheDutyofBenevolenceisnotstrictlytheaffectionofloveorkindness，sofarasthiscontainsanemotionalelement，butonlythedeterminationofthewilltoseekthegoodorhappinessofothers。
AndIagreethatitcannotbeastrictdutytofeelanemotion，sofarasitisnotdirectlywithinthepoweroftheWilltoproduceitatanygiventime。StillasIhavesaiditseemstomethatthisemotionalelementisincludedinourcommonnotionofCharityorPhilanthropy，regardedasaVirtue:andIthinkitparadoxicaltodenythatitraisesthemerebeneficentdispositionofthewilltoahigherdegreeofexcellence，andrendersitseffectsbetter。Ifthisbeso，itwillbeadutytocultivatetheaffectionsofarasitispossibletodoso:andindeedthiswouldseemnolessthanthepermanentdispositiontodogoodtobeanormaleffectofrepeatedbeneficentresolvesandactions:since，ashasoftenbeenobserved，abenefittendstoexciteloveintheagenttowardstherecipientofthebenefit，nolessthanintherecipienttowardstheagent。Itmustbeadmitted，however，thatthiseffectislesscertainthantheproductionofthebenevolentdisposition；andthatsomemenarenaturallysounattractivetoothersthatthelattercanfeelnoaffection，thoughtheymayentertainbenevolentdispositions，towardstheformer。Atanyrate，itwouldseemtobeadutygenerally，andtillwefindtheeffortfruitless，tocultivatekindaffectionstowardsthosewhomweoughttobenefit；notonlybydoingkindactions，butbyplacingourselvesunderanynaturalinfluenceswhichexperienceshowstohaveatendencytoproduceaffection。