Itfurtherappearstomethatinthecaseofmanyimportantvirtueswedonotcommonlyconsidertheultimatespringofaction——whetheritbesomeemotionalimpulseortherationalchoiceofdutyasduty——inattributingaparticularvirtuetoparticularpersons:whatweregardasindispensableismerelyasettledresolvetowillacertainkindofexternaleffects。Thuswecallamanveraciousifhisspeechexhibits，inanoteworthydegree，asettledendeavourtoproduceinthemindsofothersimpressionsexactlycorrespondenttothefacts，whateverhismotivemaybeforsodoing:
whetherheismoved，solelyormainly，byaregardforvirtue，orasenseofthedegradationoffalsehood，oraconvictionthattruth-speakingisinthelongrunthebestpolicy，orasympatheticaversiontotheinconvenienceswhichmisleadingstatementscausetootherpeople。Idonotmeanthatweregardthesemotivesasofequalmoralvalue:butthatthepresenceorabsenceofanyoneorotherofthemisnotimpliedinourattributionofthevirtueofveracity。SimilarlyweattributeJustice，ifamanhasasettledhabitofweighingdiverseclaimsandfulfillingthemintheratiooftheirimportance；GoodFaithifhehasasettledhabitofstrictlykeepingexpressortacitengagements:andsoforth。Evenwhereweclearlytakemotivesintoaccount，injudgingofthedegreeofvirtueitisoftenrathertheforceofseductivemotivesresistedthantheparticularnatureoftheprevailingspringsofactionwhichweconsider。Thuswecertainlythinkvirtuehasbeenmanifestedinahigherdegreeinjustorveraciousconduct，whentheagenthadstrongtemptationstobeunjustorunveracious；andinthesamewaytherearecertaindispositionsorhabitstendingtogoodconductwhicharecalledvirtueswhentherearepowerfulseductivemotivesoperatingandnototherwise；e。g。whenweattributethevirtueoftemperancetoamanwhoeatsanddrinksaproperamount，itisbecausewealsoattributetohimappetitespromptingtoexcess。
AtthesametimeIadmitthatCommonSenseseemsliabletosomeperplexityastotherelationofvirtuetothemoraleffortrequiredforresistingunvirtuousimpulses。Ontheonehandageneralassentwouldbegiventothepropositionthatvirtueisespeciallydrawnoutandexhibitedinasuccessfulconflictwithnaturalinclination:andperhapseventothemoreextremestatementthatthereisnovirtueindoingwhatonelikes。OntheotherhandweshouldsurelyagreewithAristotlethatVirtueisimperfectsolongastheagentcannotdothevirtuousactionwithoutaconflictofimpulses；sinceitisfromawrongbentofnaturalimpulsethatwefindithardtodowhatisbest，anditseemsabsurdtosaythatthemorewecureourselvesofthiswrongbent，thelessvirtuouswegrow。PerhapswemaysolvethedifficultybyrecognisingthatourcommonideaofVirtueincludestwodistinctelements，theonebeingthemostperfectidealofmoralexcellencethatweareabletoconceiveforhumanbeings，whiletheotherismanifestedintheeffortofimperfectmentoattainthisideal。Thusinproportionasamancomestolikeanyparticularkindofgoodconductandtodoitwithoutmoraleffort，weshallnotsaythathisconductbecomeslessvirtuousbutrathermoreinconformitywithatruemoralideal；whileatthesametimeweshallrecognisethatinthisdepartmentofhislifehehaslessroomtoexhibitthatotherkindofvirtuewhichismanifestedinresistancetoseductiveimpulses，andintheenergeticstrivingofthewilltogetnearertoidealperfection。
SofarIhavebeenconsideringthemanifestationofvirtueinemotionsandvolitions，andhavenotexpresslyadvertedtotheintellectualconditionsofvirtuousacts:thoughinspeakingofsuchactsitisofcourseimpliedthatthevolitionisaccompaniedwithanintellectualrepresentationoftheparticulareffectswilled。Itisnot，however，impliedthatinwillingsucheffectswemustnecessarilythinkofthemasrightorgood:andIdonotmyselfthinkthat，intheviewofcommonsense，thisisanindispensableconditionofthevirtuousnessofanact；foritseemsthatsomekindsofvirtuousactsmaybedonesoentirelywithoutdeliberationthatnomoraljudgmentwaspassedonthembytheagent。Thismightbethecase，forinstance，withanactofheroiccourage，promptedbyanimpulseofsympathywithafellow-creatureinsuddenperil。Butitis，Iconceive，clearlynecessarythatsuchanactshouldnotbeevenvaguelythoughttobebad。AsIhavealreadysaid，itismoredoubtfulhowfaranactwhichisconceivedbytheagenttobegood，butwhichisreallybad，iseverjudgedbycommonsensetobevirtuous:butifweagreetorestrictthetermtoactswhichweregardasright，itisagainobviousthattherealisationofvirtuemaynotbeinthepowerofanygivenpersonatanygiventime，throughlackoftherequisiteintellectualconditions。
TosumuptheresultsofarathercomplicateddiscussionIconsiderVirtueasaqualitymanifestedintheperformanceofdutyorgoodactsgoingbeyondstrictduty:itisindeedprimarilyattributedtothemindorcharacteroftheagent；butitisonlyknowntousthroughitsmanifestationsinfeelingsandacts。Accordingly，inendeavouringtomakepreciseourconceptionsoftheparticularvirtues，wehavetoexaminethestatesofconsciousnessinwhichtheyaremanifested。Examiningthese，wefindthattheelementofvolitionisprimarilyimportant，andinsomecasesalmostofsoleimportance，butyetthattheelementofemotioncannotbealtogetherdiscardedwithoutpalpabledivergencefromcommonsense。