andexperienceseemstoshowusmanyexamplesofpersonswhoatleastapproximateascloselytothistypeasanyoneelsedoestotheidealoftheorthodoxmoralist。HenceiftheregulationofConsciencebedemonstrablythebestmeanstotheindividual’shappiness，itmustbebecausetheorderkeptbySelf-loveinvolvesasacrificeofpleasureonthewhole，ascomparedwiththeorderkeptbyConscience。Andifthisisthecase，itwouldseemthatitcanonlybeonaccountofthespecialemotionalpleasureattendingthesatisfactionofthemoralsentiments，orspecialpainorlossofhappinessconsequentontheirrepressionandviolation。
Before，however，weproceedfurther，afundamentaldifficultymustberemovedwhichhasprobablysometimesincesuggesteditselftothereader。Ifamanthinksitreasonabletoseekhisowninterest，itisclearthathecannothimselfdisapproveofanyconductthatcomesunderthisprincipleorapproveoftheopposite。AndhenceitmayappearthatthepleasuresandpainsofconsciencecannotenterintothecalculationwhetheracertaincourseofconductisorisnotinaccordancewithRationalEgoism，becausetheycannotattachthemselvesintheegoist’smindtoanymodesofactionwhichhavenotbeenalreadydecided，onothergrounds，tobereasonableorthereverse。Andthisistoacertainextenttrue；
butwemusthererecurtothedistinctionindicatedinBooki。chap。iii，§；1betweenthegeneralimpulsetodowhatwebelievetobereasonable，andspecialsentimentsoflikingoraversionforspecialkindsofconduct，independentoftheirreasonableness。Inthemoralsentimentsastheyexistinordinarymen，thesetwokindsoffeelingareindistinguishablyblended；
becauseitiscommonlybelievedthattherulesofconducttowhichthecommonmoralsentimentsareattachedareinsomewayorotherreasonable。
Wecan，however，conceivethetwoseparated:andinfact，aswasbeforesaid，wehaveexperienceofsuchseparationwheneveramanisledbyaprocessofthoughttoadoptadifferentviewofmoralityfromthatinwhichhehasbeentrained；forinsuchacasetherewillalwaysremaininhismindsomequasi-morallikingsandaversions，nolongersustainedbyhisdeliberatejudgmentofrightandwrong。Andthusthereiseveryreasontobelievethatmostmen，howeverfirmlytheymightadopttheprinciplesofEgoisticHedonism，wouldstillfeelsentimentspromptingtotheperformanceofsocialduty，ascommonlyrecognisedintheirsociety，independentlyofanyconclusionthattheactionspromptedbysuchsentimentswerereasonableandright。Forsuchsentimentswouldalwaysbepowerfullysupportedbythesympathyofothers，andtheirexpressionsofpraiseandblame，likingandaversion:andsinceitisagreedthattheconductcommonlyrecognisedasvirtuousisgenerallycoincidentwiththatwhichenlightenedself-lovewoulddictate，arationalegoist’shabitsofconductwillbesuchasnaturallyto，fostertheseforhim`quasi-moral’feelings。Thequestionthereforearises——notwhethertheegoistshouldcherishandindulgethesesentimentsuptoacertainpoint，whichallwouldadmit——butwhetherhecanconsistentlyencouragethemtogrowtosuchapitchthattheywillalwaysprevailoverthestrongestopposingconsiderations；or，toputitotherwise，whetherprudencerequireshimtogivethemthereinandletthemcarryhimwhithertheywill。WehavealreadyseengroundforbelievingthatRationalSelf-lovewillbestattainitsendbylimitingitsconsciousoperationandallowingfreeplaytodisinterestedimpulses:canweacceptthefurtherparadoxthatitisreasonableforittoabdicatealtogetheritssupremacyoversomeoftheseimpulses？