ItischieflyontheLibertariansidethatIfindatendencytotheexaggerationofwhichIhavejustspoken。SomeLibertarianwritersmaintainthattheconceptionoftheFreedomoftheWill，alienasitmaybetopositivescience，isyetquiteindispensabletoEthicsandJurisprudence；sinceinjudgingthatI``ought’’todoanythingIimplythatI``can’’doit，andsimilarlyinpraisingorblamingtheactionsofothersIimplythatthey``could’’haveactedotherwise。Ifaman’sactionsaremerelinksinachainofcausationwhich，aswetraceitback，ultimatelycarriesustoeventsanteriortohispersonalexistence，hecannot，itissaid，reallyhaveeithermeritordemerit；andifhehasnotmeritordemerit，itisrepugnanttothecommonmoralsenseofmankindtorewardorpunish——eventopraiseorblame——him。Inconsideringthisargument，itwillbeconvenient——forclearnessofdiscussion——toassumeinthefirstinstancethatthereisnodoubtorconflictinourviewofwhatitisrighttodo，exceptsuchasmaybecausedbythepresentquestion。
ItwillalsobeconvenienttoseparatethediscussionoftheimportanceofFreeWillinrelationtomoralactiongenerallyfromthespecialquestionofitsimportanceinrelationtopunishingandrewarding；since，inthelatterspeciesofaction，whatchieflyclaimsattentionisnotthepresentFreedomoftheagent，butthepastFreedomofthepersonnowactedon。
Asregardsactiongenerally，theDeterministallowsthatamanisonlymorallyboundtodowhatis``inhispower’’；butheexplains``inhispower’’tomeanthattheresultinquestionwillbeproducedifthemanchoosetoproduceit。Andthisis，Ithink，thesenseinwhichtheproposition``whatIoughttodoIcando’’iscommonlyaccepted:itmeans``candoifIchoose’’，not``canchoosetodo’’。Stillthequestionremains``CanIchoosetodowhatinordinarythoughtIjudgetoberighttodo？’’Heremyownviewisthat——withinthelimitsaboveexplained——IinevitablyconceivethatIcanchoose；however，Icansupposemyselftoregardthisconceptionasillusory，andtojudge，inferringthefuturefromthepast，thatIcertainlyshallnotchoose，andaccordinglythatsuchchoiceisnotreallypossibletome。Thisbeingsupposed，itseemstomeundeniablethatthisjudgmentwillexcludeorweakentheoperationofthemoralmotiveinthecaseoftheactcontemplated:IeithershallnotjudgeitreasonabletochoosetodowhatIshouldotherwisesojudge，orifIdopassthejudgment，Ishallalsojudgetheconceptionofdutyappliedinittobeillusory，nolessthantheconceptionofFreedom。SofarIconcedetheLibertariancontentionastothedemoralisingeffectofDeterminism，ifheldwitharealforceofconviction。ButIthinkthecasesarerareinwhichitisevenonDeterministprincipleslegitimatetoconcludeittobecertain——andnotmerelyhighlyprobable——thatIshalldeliberatelychoosetodowhatIjudgetobeunwise。Ordinarilythelegitimateinferencefromaman’spastexperience，andfromhisgeneralknowledgeofhumannature，wouldnotgobeyondaverystrongprobabilitythathewouldchoosetodowrong:
andamereprobability——howeverstrong——thatIshallnotwilltodorightcannotberegardedbymeindeliberationasareasonfornotwilling:whileitcertainlysuppliesarationalgroundforwillingstrongly——justasastrongprobabilityofanyotherevilsuppliesarationalgroundforspecialexertionstoavoidit。Indeed，IdonotseewhyaLibertarianshouldnot——equallywithaDeterminist——acceptasvalid，andfinditinstructivetocontemplate，theconsiderationsthatrenderitprobablethathewillnotchoosetodorightinanyparticularcircumstances。Inallordinarycases，therefore，itdoesnotseemtomerelevanttoethicaldeliberationtodeterminethemetaphysicalvalidityofmyconsciousnessoffreedomtochoosewhateverImayconcludetobereasonable，unlesstheaffirmationornegationoftheFreedomoftheWillsomehowmodifiesmyviewofwhatitwouldbereasonabletochoosetodoifIcouldsochoose。
Idonotthinkthatanysuchmodificationofviewcanbemaintained，asregardstheultimateendsofrationalactionwhich，inchap。i。，Itookasbeingcommonlyaccepted。