WemayconvenientlybeginbydefiningmoreexactlythenotionofVoluntaryaction，towhich，accordingtoallmethodsofEthicsalike，thepredicates`right’and`whatoughttobedone’——inthestrictestethicalsense——areexclusivelyapplicable。Inthefirstplace，Voluntaryactionisdistinguishedas`conscious’fromactionsormovementsofthehumanorganismwhichare`unconscious’or`mechanical’。
Thepersonwhoseorganismperformssuchmovementsonlybecomesawareofthem，ifatall，aftertheyhavebeenperformed；accordinglytheyarenotimputedtohimasaperson，orjudgedtobemorallywrongorimprudent；
thoughtheymaysometimesbejudgedtobegoodorbadinrespectoftheirconsequences，withtheimplicationthattheyoughttobeencouragedorcheckedasfarasthiscanbedoneindirectlybyconsciouseffort。
Soagain，inthecaseofconsciousactions，theagentisnotregardedasmorallyculpable，exceptinanindirectway，forentirelyunforeseeneffectsofhisvoluntaryactions。Nodoubtwhenaman’sactionhascausedsomeunforeseenharm，thepopularmoraljudgmentoftenblameshimforcarelessness；butitwouldbegenerallyadmittedbyreflectivepersonsthatinsuchcasesstrictlymoralblameonlyattachestotheagentinanindirectway，insofarashiscarelessnessistheresultofsomewilfulneglectofduty。Thustheproperimmediateobjectsofmoralapprovalordisapprovalwouldseemtobealwaystheresultsofaman’svolitionssofarastheywereintended——i。e。representedinthoughtascertainorprobableconsequencesofhisvolitions:——or，morestrictly，thevolitionsthemselvesinwhichsuchresultsweresointended，sincewedonotconsiderthatamanisrelievedfrommoralblamebecausehiswrongintentionremainsunrealisedthroughexternalcauses。
Thisviewseemsatfirstsighttodifferfromthecommonopinionthatthemoralityofactsdependsontheir`motives’；ifbymotivesareunderstoodthedesiresthatwefeelforsomeoftheforeseenconsequencesofouracts。ButIdonotthinkthatthosewhoholdthisopinionwoulddenythatweareblameworthyforanyprohibitedresultwhichweforesawinwilling，whetheritwastheobjectofdesireornot。Nodoubtitiscommonlyheldthatacts，similarasregardstheirforeseenresults，maybe`better’or`worse’throughthepresenceofcertaindesiresoraversions。Stillsofarasthesefeelingsarenotaltogetherunderthecontrolofthewill，thejudgmentof`right’and`wrong’——inthestrictestsenseoftheseterms——seemstobenotproperlyapplicabletothefeelingsthemselves，butrathertotheexertionoromissionofvoluntaryefforttocheckbadmotivesandencouragegoodones，ortotheconsciousadoptionofanobjectofdesireasanendtobeaimedat——whichisaspeciesofvolition。