\"Theapprobationwithwhichweviewatender，delicate，andhumanesentiment，isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat，daring，andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay，upondifferentoccasions，beperfectandentire；butwearesoftenedbytheoneandweareelevatedbytheother，andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。And，inthesameway，ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnoresemblancetoourcontemptformeannessofspirit。
ByhisowntheoryAdamSmiththinksthatthisdifferenceinthecharacterofapprobationismoreeasilyexplained。Itisbecausetheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveofaredifferentwhentheyarehumaneanddelicatefromwhattheyarewhentheyaregreatanddaring，andbecauseourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththesedifferentemotions，thatourfeelingofapprobationwithregardtotheonesentimentissodifferentfromwhatitiswithregardtotheother。
Moreover，notonlyarethedifferentpassionsandaffectionsofthehumanmindapprovedordisapprovedasmorallygoodorevil，buttheapprobationordisapprobationitselfismarkedwiththesamemoralattributes。Themoralsensetheorycannotaccountforthisfact；andtheonlyexplanationpossibleis，that，inthisinstanceatleast，thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentimentsbetweenthepersonjudgingandthepersonjudgedconstitutesmoralapprobationorthecontrary。Whentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofanotherpersoncoincideswithourown，weapproveofhisapprobationasinsomemeasuremorallygood；andso，onthecontrary，whenhissentimentsdifferfromourown，wedisapproveofthemasmorallywrong。
Ifapeculiarsentiment，distinctfromeveryother，werereallythesourceoftheprincipleofapprobation，itisstrangethatsuchasentiment\"shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeofasnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Theword`moralsense\'isofverylateformation，andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue……Theword`conscience\'doesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes，indeed，theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty，andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablytoitsdirections。Whenlove，hatred，joy，sorrow，gratitude，resentment，withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple，havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogetthemtitlestoknowthemby，isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheededthatafewphilosophersexceptednobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit？\"
Inoppositionthentothetheorywhichderivesmoralapprobationfromapeculiarsentiment，AdamSmithreducesithimselftofoursources，insomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。\"First，wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent；secondly，weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions；thirdly，weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact；andlastofall，whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety，theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutilitynotunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。\"