§；1559。Thenextpoweristoreceiveambassadorsandotherpublic
ministers。Thishasbeenalreadyincidentallytouched。Asimilarpower
existedundertheconfederation；butitwasconfinedtoreceiving
\"ambassadors，\"whichword，inastrictsense，ashasbeenalready
started，comprehendsthehighestgradeonlyofministers，andnotthoseof
aninferiorcharacter。ThepolicyoftheUnitedStateswouldordinarily
prefertheemploymentoftheinferiorgrades；andthereforethedescription
isproperlyenlarged，soastoincludeallclassesofministers。3Whythe
receivingofconsuls
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1See1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。343，344，345；TheFederalist，No。78；
RawleonConst。ch。16，p。175。
2Id。ibid。
3TheFederalist，No。42。
CH。XXXVII。]EXECUTIVE——POWERS。415
wasnotalsoexpresslymentioned，astheappointmentofthemisinthe
precedingclause，isnoteasilytobeaccountedfor，especiallyasthe
defectoftheconfederationonthisheadwasfullyunderstood。1Thepower，
however，maybefairlyinferredfromotherpartsoftheconstitution；and
indeedseemsageneralincidenttotheexecutiveauthority。Ithas
constantlybeenexercisedwithoutobjection；andforeignconsulshavenever
beerallowedtodischargeanyfunctionsofoffice，untiltheyhavereceived
theexequaturofthepresident。2Consuls，indeed，arenotdiplomatic
functionaries，orpoliticalrepresentativesofaforeignnation；butare
treatedinthecharacterofmerecommercialagents。3
§；1560。Thepowertoreceiveambassadorsandministersisalwaysan
important，andsometimesaverydelicatefunction；sinceitconstitutesthe
onlyaccreditedmedium，throughwhichnegotiationsandfriendlyrelations
areordinarilycarriedonwithforeignpowers。Agovernmentmayinits
discretionlawfullyrefusetoreceiveanambassador，orotherminister，
withoutitsaffordinganyjustcauseofwar。Butitwouldgenerallybe
deemedanunfriendlyact，andmightprovokehostilities，unlessaccompanied
byconciliatoryexplanations。Arefusalissometimesmadeonthegroundof
thebadcharacteroftheminister，orhisformeroffensiveconduct，orof
thespecialsubjectoftheembassynotbeingproper，orconvenientfor
discussion。4This，however，israrelydone。Butamuchmoredelicate
occasionis，
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1TheFederalist，No。42。
2RawleonConst。ch。24，p。224，225。
3Ibid。；1Kent’sComm。Lect。2p。40to44；TheIndianChief，3Rob。R。
22；TheBelloCorunnes，6Wheat。R。152，168；Viveashv。Buker，3Maule&
Selw。R。284。
41Kent’sComm。Lect。2，p。89；Rutherforth’sInstit。B2，ch。9，？20，
Grotius，Lib。2，ch。8，§；1，3，4。
416CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
whenacivilwarbreaks—outinanation，andtwonationsareformed，ortwo
partiesinthesamenation，eachclaimingthesovereigntyofthewhole，and
thecontestremainsasyetundecided，flagrantebello。Insuchacasea
neutralnationmayveryproperlywithholditsrecognitionofthe。supremacy
ofeitherparty，oroftheexistenceoftwoindependentnations；andon
thataccountrefusetoreceiveanambassadorfromeither。1Itisobvious，
thatinsuchcasesthesimpleacknowledgmentoftheministerofeither
party，ornation，mightbedeemedtakingpartagainsttheother；andthus
asaffordingastrongcountenance，oropposition，torebellionandcivil
dismemberment。Onthisaccount，nations，placedinsuchapredicament，
havenothesitatedsometimestodeclarewaragainstneutrals，as
interposinginthewar；andhavemadethemthevictimsoftheirvengeance，
whentheyhavebeenanxioustoassumeaneutralposition。Theexerciseof
thisprerogativeofacknowledgingnewnations，orministers，is，therefore，
undersuchcircumstances，anexecutivefunctionofgreatdelicacy，which
requirestheutmostcautionanddeliberation。Iftheexecutivereceivesan
ambassador，orotherminister，astherepresentativeofanewnation，orof
apartyinacivilwarinanoldnation，itisanacknowledgmentofthe
sovereignauthoritydefactoofsuchnewnation，orparty。Ifsuch
recognitionismade，itisconclusiveuponthenation，unlessindeeditcan
bereversedbyanactofcongressrepudiatingit。If，ontheotherhand，
suchrecognitionhasbeenrefusedbytheexecutive，itissaid，that
congressmay，notwithstanding，solemnly
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11Kent’sComm。Lect。2，p。39；RawleonConst。ch。20，p。195；Gelston
v。Hoyt，3Wheat。R。324；UnitedStatesv。Palmer，3Wheat。R。630；Serg。
onConst。ch。28，p。324，325，2dedit。ch。30，p。336，337，338。
CH。XXXVII。]EXECUTIVE——POWERS。417
acknowledgethesovereigntyofthenation，orparty。1These，however，are
propositions，whichhavehithertoremained，asabstractstatements，under
theconstitution；and，therefore，canbepropounded，notasabsolutely
true，butasstillopentodiscussion，iftheyshouldeverariseinthe
courseofourforeigndiplomacy。Theconstitutionhasexpresslyinvested
theexecutivewithpowertoreceiveambassadors，andotherministers。It
hasnotexpresslyinvestedcongresswiththepower，eithertorepudiate，or
acknowledgethem。2Atallevents，inthecaseofarevolution，or
dismembermentofanation，thejudiciarycannottakenoticeofanynew
government，orsovereignty，untilithasbeendulyrecognisedbysomeother
departmentofthegovernment，towhomthepowerisconstitutionally
confided。3
§；1561。Thatapower，soextensiveinitsreachoverourforeign
relations，couldnotbeproperlyconferredonanyother，thantheexecutive
department，willadmitoflittledoubt。Thatitshouldbeexclusively
confidedtothatdepartment，withoutanyparticipationofthesenateinthe
functions，thatbodybeingconjointlyentrustedwiththetreaty—making
power，is
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1RawleonConstitution，ch。20，p。195，196。
2Itissurprising，thattheFederalistshouldhavetreatedthepowerof
receivingambassadorsandotherpublicministers，asanexecutivefunction
oflittleintrinsicimportance。Itslanguageis，\"This，thoughithasbeen
arichthemeofdeclamation，ismoreamatterofdignity，thanof
authority。Itisacircumstance，whichwillbewithoutconsequenceinthe
administrationofthegovernment。Anditwasfarmoreconvenient，thatit
shouldbearrangedinthismanner，thanthatthereshouldbeanecessityof
conveningthelegislature，oroneofitsbranches，uponeveryarrivalofa
foreignminister，thoughitweremerelytotaketheplaceofadeparted
predecessor。\"TheFederalist，No。69。
3UnitedStatesv。Palmer，3Wheat。R。610，634，643；Hoytv。Gelston，3
Wheat。R。246，323，324；Rosev。Himely，4Cranch，441；TheDivinaPastora，
4Wheat。R。599andnote65；TheNeustraSonoradelaCarldad，4Wheat。R。
497。
418CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
notsoobvious。Probablythecircumstance，thatinallforeign
governments1thepowerwasexclusivelyconfidedtotheexecutive
department，andtheutterimpracticabilityofkeepingthesenateconstantly
insession，andthesuddennessoftheemergencies，whichmightrequirethe
actionofthegovernment，conducedtotheestablishmentoftheauthorityin
itspresentform。2Itisnot，indeed，apowerlikelytobeabused；though
itispregnantwithconsequences，ofteninvolvingthequestionofpeaceand
war。And，inourownshortexperience，therevolutionsinFrance，andthe
revolutionsinSouthAmerica，havealreadyplacedusinsituations，tofeel
itscriticalcharacter，andthenecessityofhaving，attheheadofthe
government，anexecutiveofsoberjudgment，enlightenedviews，andfirmand
exaltedpatriotism。3
§；1562。Asincidentstothepowertoreceiveambassadorsand
foreign
ministers，thepresidentisunderstoodtopossessthepowertorefusethem，
andtodismissthosewho，havingbeenreceived，becomeobnoxiousto
censure，orunfittobeallowedtheprivilege，bytheirimproperconduct，
orbypoliticalevents。4While，however，theyarepermittedtoremain，as
publicfunctionaries，theyareentitledtoalltheimmunitiesandrights，
whichthelawofnationshasprovidedatoncefortheirdignity，their
independence，andtheirinviolability。5
§；1563。Thereareotherincidentalpowers，belongingtothe
executive
department，whicharenecessarilyimpliedfromthenatureofthefunctions，
whichare
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1See1Black。Comm。953。
2TheFederalist，No。69。
See5Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。6，p。398，399，404，405，411，
412；1TuckBlack。Comm。App。341。
4See5Marshall’sLifeofWashington：ch。6：p。443，444；7Wait’sState
Papers，282，283，302。
51Kent’sComm。Lect。2，p。37，38，39。
CH。XXXVII。]EXECUTIVE——INCIDENTALPOWERS。419
confidedtoit。Amongthese，mustnecessarilybeincludedthepowerto
performthem，withoutanyobstructionorimpedimentwhatsoever。The
presidentcannot，therefore，beliabletoarrest，imprisonment，or
detention，whileheisinthedischargeofthedutiesofhisoffice；and
forthispurposehispersonmustbedeemed，incivilcasesatleast，to
possessanofficialinviolability。Intheexerciseofhispoliticalpowers
heistousehisowndiscretion，andisaccountableonlytohiscountry，
andtohisownconscience。Hisdecision，inrelationtothesepowers，is
subjecttonocontrol；andhisdiscretion，whenexercised，isconclusive。
Buthehasnoauthoritytocontrolotherofficersofthegovernment，in
relationtothedutiesimposeduponthembylaw，incasesnottouchinghis
politicalpowers。1
§；1564。Intheyear1793，presidentWashingtonthoughtithis
dutyto
issueaproclamation，forbiddingthecitizensoftheUnitedStatestotake
anypartinthehostilities，thenexistingbetweenGreatBritainand
France；warningthemagainstcarryinggoods，contrabandofwar；and
enjoininguponthemanentireabstinencefromallacts，inconsistentwith
thedutiesofneutrality。2Thisproclamationhadtheunanimousapprobation
ofhiscabinet。3Being，however，atvariancewiththepopularpassions。
andprejudicesoftheday，thisexerciseofincidentalauthoritywas
assailedwithuncommonvehemence，andwasdeniedtobeconstitutional。It
seemswhollyunnecessarynowtoreview
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1Marburyv。Madison，1Cranch。137，S。C。；2Peters’sCond。R。276，
277。
21Wait’sAmericanStatePapers，44。
35Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。6，p。404，408。
420CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
thegroundsofthecontroversy，sincethedeliberatesenseof。thenation
hasgonealongwiththeexerciseofthepower，asoneproperlybelongingto
theexecutiveduties。1IfthePresidentisboundtoseetotheexecution
ofthelaws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；andifthedutiesof
neutrality，whenthenationhasnotassumedabelligerentattitude，areby
thelawofnationsobligatoryuponit，itseems。difficulttoperceiveany
solidobjectiontoaproclamation，statingthefacts，andadmonishingthe
citizensoftheirowndutiesandresponsibilities。2
§；1565。Wehaveseen，thatbylawthepresidentpossessesthe
rightto
requirethewrittenadviceandopinionsofhiscabinetministers；uponall
questionsconnectedwiththeirrespectivedepartments。But，hedoesnot
possessalikeauthority，inregardtothejudicialdepartment。That
branchofthegovernmentcanbecalledupononlytodecidecontroversies，
broughtbeforetheminalegalform；andthereforeareboundtoabstain
fromanyextra—judicialopinionsuponpointsoflaw，eventhoughsolemnly
requestedbytheexecutive。3
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1RawleonConst。ch。20，p。197。——Thelearnedreader，whowishesto
reviewthewholeground，willfindittreatedinamasterlymanner，inthe
lettersofPacificus，writtenbyMr。Hamiltoninfavourofthepower，and
inthelettersofHelvidius，writtenbyMr。Madisonagainstit。Theywill
bothbefoundintheeditionoftheFederalist，printedatWashington，in
1818，andinHallowell，in1826，intheAppendix。
21TuckersBlack。Comm。App。346。——BothhousesofCongress，intheir
answerstothePresident’sspeechattheensuingsession，approvedofhis
conduct，missuingtheproclamation。——1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。346。
35Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。6，p。433，441；Serg。Const。ch。
29，[ch。31。]SeealsoHayburn’scase，2Dall。R。409，410，andnote；
Marburyv。Madison，1Cranch。137，171。——PresidentWashington，in1793，
requestedtheopinionoftheJudgesoftheSupremeCourt，uponthe
constructionofthetreatywithFrance，of1778；buttheydeclined
CH。XXXVII。]EXECUTiVE——INCIDENTALPOWERS。421
§；1566。Theremainingsectionofthefourtharticle，declaring
thatthe
President，Vice—President，andallcivilofficersoftheUnitedStates
shallbeliabletoimpeachment，hasbeenalreadyfullyconsideredin
anotherplace。Andthusisclosedtheexaminationoftherights，powers，
anddutiesoftheexecutivedepartment。Unlessmyjudgmenthasbeenunduly
biassed，Ithinkitwillbefoundimpossibletoholdfromthispartofthe
constitutionatributeofprofoundrespect，ifnotoftheliveliest
admiration。All，thatseemsdesirableinordertogratifythehopes，
securethereverence，andsustainthedignityofthenation，is，thatit
shouldalwaysbeoccupiedbyamanofelevatedtalents，ofripevirtues，of
incorruptibleintegrity，andoftriedpatriotism；one，whoshallforgethis
owninterests，andremember，thatherepresentsnotaparty，butthewhole
nation；one，whosefamemayberestedwithposterity，notuponthefalse
eulogiesoffavourites，butuponthesolidmeritofhavingpreservedthe
glory，andenhancedtheprosperityofthecountry。1
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togiveanyopinion，uponthegroundstatedinthetext。5Marshall’sLife
ofWashington，ch。6，p。433，441。
1InconsequenceofPresidentJackson’sMessage，negativingtheBankof
theUnitedStates，July10，1832，inwhichbeadvancesthedoctrine，that
thedecisionsmadebyotherdepartmentsofthegovernment，includingthe
Judiciary，andevenbyhispredecessorsinofficeinapprovinglaws，are
notobligatoryonhim；thequestionhasbeenagooddealagitatedby
statesmenandconstitutionallawyers。Thefollowingextractfromaletter，
writtenbyMr。MadisontoMr。C。J。Ingersoll，on25thofJune，1831，
containsreasoningonthissubject，worthyofthejudgmentofthatgreat
man。
\"Thechargeofinconsistencybetweenmyobjectiontotheconstitutionality
ofsuchabank，in1791，andmyassent，in1817，turnstothequestionhow
farlegislativeprecedents，expoundingtheconstitution，oughttoguide
succeedinglegislatures，andtooverruleindividualopinions。
\"Someobscurityhasbeenthrownoverthequestion，byconfounding
422CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII
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itwiththerespectduefromonelegislature，tolawspassedbypreceding
legislatures。Butthetwocasesareessentiallydifferent。A
constitution，beingderivedfromasuperiorauthority，istobeexpounded
andobeyed，notcontrolledorvariedbythesubordinateauthorityofa
legislature。Alaw，ontheotherhand，restingonnohigherauthority，
thanthatpossessedbyeverysuccessivelegislature；itsexpediency，as
wellasitsmeaning，iswithinthescopeofthelatter。
\"Thecaseinquestionhasitstrueanalogy，intheobligationarisingfrom
judicialexpositionsofthelawonsucceedingjudges，theconstitution
beingalawtothelegislator，asthelawisaruleofdecisiontothe
judge。
\"Andwhyarejudicialprecedents，whenformedonduediscussionand
consideration，anddeliberatelysanctionedbyreviewsandrepetitions，regar
dedasofbindinginfluence，orratherofauthoritativeforce，insettling
themeaningofalaw？Itmustbeanswered，1st，becauseitisareasonable
andestablishedaxiom，andthegoodofsocietyrequires，thattherulesof
conductofitsmembers，shouldbecertainandknown，whichwouldnotbethe
caseifanyjudge，disregardingthedecisionsofhispredecessors，should
varytheruleoflaw，accordingtohisindividualinterpretationofit。
Miseraestservitusubijusautvagumautincognitum。2d，becausean
expositionofthelawpubliclymade，andrepeatedlyconfirmedbythe
constitutedauthority，carrieswithit，byfairinference，thesanctionof
those，who，havingmadethelawthroughtheirlegislativeorgan，appear
undersuchcircumstances，tohavedetermineditsmeaningthroughtheir
judiciaryorgan。
\"Canitbeoflessconsequence，thatthemeaningofaconstitutionshould
befixedandknown，thanthatthemeaningofalawshouldbeso？Can，
indeed，alawbefixedinitsmeaningandoperation，unlessthe
constitutionbeso？Onthecontrary，ifaparticularlegislature，
differingintheconstructionoftheconstitution，fromaseriesof
precedingconstructions，proceedtoactonthatdifference，theynotonly
introduceuncertaintyandinstabilityintheconstitution，butinthelaws
themselves；inasmuchasalllaws，precedingthenewconstruction，and
inconsistentwithit，arenotonlyannulledforthefuture，butvirtually
pronouncednullitiesfromthebeginning。
\"But，itissaid，thatthelegislator，havingsworntosupportthe
constitution，mustsupportitinhisownconstructionofit，however
differentfromthatputonbyhispredecessors，orwhateverbethe
consequencesoftheconstruction。Andisnotthejudgeunderthesameoath
tosupportthelaw？yet，hasiteverbeensupposed，thathewasrequired，
oratliberty，todisregardallprecedents，howeversolemnlyrepeatedand
regularlyobserved；andbygivingeffecttohisownabstractandindividual
opinions，todisturbtheestablishedcourseofpractice，inthebusinessof
thecommunity？Hasthewisestandmostconscientiousjudgeeverscrupledto
acquiesceindecisions，inwhichhe
CH。XXXVII。]EXECUTIVE——POWERS。423
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hasbeenoverruledbythematuredopinionsofthemajorityorhis
colleagues；andsubsequentlytoconformhimselfthereto，asto
authoritativeexpositionsofthelaw？Andisitnotreasonable，thatthe
sameviewoftheofficialoathshouldbetakenbyalegislator，acting
undertheconstitution，whichishisguide，as。istokenbyajudge，acting
underthelaw，whichishis？
\"Thereis，infactandincommonunderstanding，anecessityofregardinga
courseofpractice，asabovecharacterized，inthelightofalegalruleof
interpretingalaw：endthereisalikenecessityofconsideringita
constitutionalruleofinterpretingaconstitution。
\"Thattheremaybeextraordinaryandpeculiarcircumstancescontrolling
theruleinbothcases，maybeadmitted；butwithsuchexceptions，therule
willforceitselfonthepracticaljudgmentofthemostardenttheorist。
Hewillfinditimpossibletoadhereto，andactofficiallyuponhis
solitaryopinions，astothemeaningofthelaworconstitution，in
oppositiontoaconstructionreducedtopractice，duringareasonable
periodoftime；moreespecially，wherenoprospectexistedofachangeof
construction，bythepublicoritsagents。Andifareasonableperiodof
time，markedwiththeusualsanctions，wouldnotbartheindividual
prerogative，therecouldbenolimitationtoitsexercise，althoughthe
dangeroferrormustincreasewiththeincreasingoblivionofexplanatory
circumstances，andwiththecontinualchangesintheimportofwordsand
phrases。
\"Letitthenbelefttothedecisionofeveryintelligentandcandid
judge，which，onthewhole，ismosttobereliedonforthetrueandsafe
constructionofaconstitution；thatwhichhastheuniformsanctionof
successivelegislativebodiesthroughaperiodofyears，andunderthe
variedascendancyofparties；orthatwhichdependsupontheopinionsof
everynewlegislature，heatedasitmaybebythespiritofparty，eagerin
thepursuitorsomefavouriteobject，orledastraybytheeloquenceand
addressofpopularstatesmen，themselves，perhaps，undertheinfluenceof
thesamemisleadingcauses。
\"Itwasinconformitywiththeviewheretoken，oftherespectdueto
deliberateandreiteratedprecedents，thatthebankoftheUnitedStates，
thoughontheoriginalquestionheldtobeunconstitutional，receivedthe
executivesignatureintheyear1817。Theactoriginallyestablishinga
bank，hadundergoneamplediscussionsinitspassagethroughtheseveral
branchesofthegovernment。Ithadbeencarriedintoexecutionthroughout
aperiodoftwentyyears，withannuallegislativerecognitions；inone
instance，indeed，withapositiveramificationofitintoanewstate；and
withtheentireacquiescenceofallthelocalauthorities，aswellasof
thenationatlarge；toallofwhichmaybeaddedadecreasingprospectof
anychangeinthepublicopinion，adversetotheconstitutionalityofsuch
aninstitution。Avetofromtheexecutiveunderthesecircumstances；with
anadmissionof。theexpediencyandalmostnecessityofthemeasure，would
havebeena
424CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
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defianceofalltheobligationsderivedfromacourseofprecedents，
amountingtotherequisiteevidenceofthenationaljudgmentandintention。
\"Ithasbeencontendedthattheauthorityorprecedentswasinthatcase
invalidated，bytheconsideration，thattheyprovedonlyarespectforthe
stipulateddurationofthebank，withatolerationofit，untilthelaw
shouldexpire；andbythecastingvotegiveninthesenatebythe
Vice—President，in1811，againstabillforestablishingaNationalBank，
thevotebeingexpresslygivenonthegroundofunconstitutionality。Butif
thelawitselfwasunconstitutional，thestipulationwasvoid，andcould
notbeconstitutionallyfulfilledortolerated。Andastothenegativeor
thesenate，bythecastingvoteofthepresidingofficer；itisafactwell
understoodatthetime，thatitresultednotfromanequalityofopinions
inthatassembly，onthepowerorcongresstoestablishabank，butfroma
junctionofthose，whoadmittedthepower，butdisapprovedtheplan，with
thosewhodeniedthepower。Onasimplequestionofconstitutionality，
therewasadecidedmajorityinfavourofit\"
Thereisalsoaverycogentargument，onthesameside，inMr。Webster’s
Speechinthesenate，inJuly，1832，ontheVetoMessageofthePresident。
JosephStoryCommentariesontheU。S。Constitution—Judiciary—OrganizationandPowers[*3：425]CHAPTERXXXVIIIJUDICIARY—ORGANIZATIONANDPOWERS
Sec。1567。THEorderofthesubjectnextconductsustotheconsiderationofthethirdarticleoftheconstitution，whichembracestheorganizationandpowersofthejudicialdepartment。
Sec。1568。Theimportanceoftheestablishmentofajudicialdepartmentinthenationalgovernmenthasbeenalreadyincidentallydiscussedunderotherheads。Thewantofitconstitutedoneofthevitaldefectsoftheconfederation。Andeverygovernmentmust，initsessence，beunsafeandunfitforafreepeople，wheresuchadepartmentdoesnotexist，withpowerscoextensivewiththoseofthelegislativedepartment。*Wherethereisnojudicialdepartmenttointerpret，pronounce，andexecutethelaw，todecidecontroversies，andtoenforcerights，thegovernmentmusteitherperishbyitsownimbecility，ortheotherdepartmentsofgovernmentmustusurppowers，forthepurposeofcommandingobedience，tothedestructionofliberty。**Thewill[*3：426]ofthose，whogovern，willbecome，undersuchcircumstances，absoluteanddespotic；anditiswhollyimmaterial，whetherpowerisvestedinasingletyrant，orinanassemblyoftyrants。Noremarkisbetterfoundedinhumanexperience，thanthatofMontesquieu，that\"thereisnoliberty，ifthejudiciarypowerbenotseparatedfromthelegislativeandexecutivepowers。\"Anditisnolesstrue，thatpersonalsecurityandprivatepropertyrestentirelyuponthewisdom，thestability，andtheintegrityofthecourtsofjustice。Ifthatgovernmentcanbetrulysaidtobedespoticandintolerable，inwhichthelawisvagueanduncertain；
itcannotbutberenderedstillmoreoppressiveandmoremischievous，whentheactualadministrationofjusticeisdependentuponcaprice，orfavour，uponthewillofrulers，ortheinfluenceofpopularity。Whenpowerbecomesright，itisoflittleconsequence，whetherdecisionsrestuponcorruption，orweakness，upontheaccidentsofchance，orupondeliberatewrong。Ineverywellorganizedgovernment，therefore，withreferencetothesecuritybothofpublicrightsandprivaterights，itisindispensable，thatthereshouldbeajudicialdepartmenttoascertain，anddeciderights，topunishcrimes，toadministerjustice，andtoprotecttheinnocentfrominjuryandusurpation。*[*3：425]Mr。JusticeWilsonhastracedout，withmuchminutenessofdetail，thenatureandcharacterofthejudicialdepartmentinancient，aswellasmodernnations，andespeciallyinEngland；andaperusalofhisremarkswillbefoundfullofinstruction。**IthasbeenfinelyremarkedbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，that\"thejudicialdepartmenthasnowill，inanycase。Judicialpower，ascontradistinguishedfromthepowerof[*3：426]thelaws，hasnoexistence。Courtsarethemereinstrumentsofthelaw，andcanwillnothing。Whentheyaresaidtoexerciseadiscretion，itisamerelegaldiscretion，adiscretiontobeexercisedindiscerningthecourseprescribedbylaw；and，whenthatisdiscerned，itisthedutyofthecourttofellowit。Judicialpowerisneverexercisedforthepurposeofgivingeffecttothewillofthejudge；butalwaysforthepurposeofgivingeffecttothewillofthelegislature；or，inotherwords，tothewillofthelaw。\"[*3：427]Sec。1569。Inthenationalgovernmentthepowerisequallyasimportant，asinthestategovernments。Thelawsandtreaties，andeventheconstitution，oftheUnitedStates，wouldbecomeadeadletterwithoutit。Indeed，inacomplicatedgovernment，likeours，wherethereisanassemblageofrepublics，combinedunderacommonhead，thenecessityofsomecontrollingjudicialpower，toascertainandenforcethepowersoftheUnion，is，ifpossible，stillmorestriking。Thelawsofthewholewouldotherwisebeincontinualdangerofbeingcontravenedbythelawsoftheparts。Thenationalgovernmentwouldbereducedtoaserviledependenceuponthestates；
andthesamesceneswouldbeagainactedoverinsolemnmockery，whichbeganintheneglect，andendedintheruin，oftheconfederation。Power，withoutadequatemeanstoenforceit，islikeabodyinastateofsuspendedanimation。Forallpracticalpurposesitis，asifitsfacultieswereextinguished。
EveniftherewerenodangerofcollisionbetweenthelawsandpowersoftheUnion，andthoseofthestates，itisutterlyimpossible，that，withoutsomesuperintendingjudiciaryestablishment，therecouldbeanyuniformadministration，orinterpretationofthem。Theideaofuniformityofdecisionbythirteenindependentandcoordinatetribunalsandthenumberisnowadvancedtotwenty—fourisabsolutelyvisionary，ifnotabsurd。Theconsequencewouldnecessarilybe，thatneithertheconstitution，northelaws，neithertherightsandpowersoftheUnion，northoseofthestates，wouldbethesameinanytwostates。Andtherewouldbe[*3：428]perpetualfluctuationsandchanges，growingoutofthediversityofjudgment，aswellasoflocalinstitutions，interests，andhabitsofthought。
Sec。1570。Twoends，then，ofparamountimportance，andfundamentaltoafreegovernment，areproposedtobeattainedbytheestablishmentofanationaljudiciary。Thefirstisadueexecutionofthepowersofthegovernment；andthesecondisauniformityintheinterpretationandoperationofthosepowers，andofthelawsenactedinpursuanceofthem。
Thepowerofinterpretingthelawsinvolvesnecessarilythefunctiontoascertain，whethertheyareconformabletotheconstitution，ornot；andifnotsoconformable，todeclarethemvoidandinoperative。Astheconstitutionisthesupremelawoftheland，inaconflictbetweenthatandthelaws，eitherofcongress，orofthestates，itbecomesthedutyofthejudiciarytofollowthatonly，whichisofparamount，obligation。Thisresultsfromtheverytheoryofarepublicanconstitutionofgovernment；forotherwisetheactsofthelegislatureandexecutivewouldineffectbecomesupremeanduncontrollable，notwithstandinganyprohibitionsorlimitationscontainedintheconstitution；andusurpationsofthemostunequivocalanddangerouscharactermightbeassumed，withoutanyremedywithinthereachofthecitizens。*Thepeoplewouldthusbeatthemercyoftheirrulers[*3：429]
inthestateandnationalgovernments；andanomnipotencewouldpracticallyexist，likethatclaimedfortheBritishParliament。TheuniversalsenseofAmerica[*3：430]hasdecided，thatinthelastresortthejudiciarymustdecideupontheconstitutionalityoftheactsandlawsofthegeneralandstategovernments，sofarastheyare[*3：431]secureandcapableofbeingmadethesubjectofjudicialcontroversy。**Itfollows，that，whentheyaresubjectedtothecognizanceofthejudiciary，itsjudgmentsmustbeconclusive；forotherwisetheymaybedisregarded，andtheactsofthelegislatureandexecutiveenjoyan[*3：432]irresistibletriumph。Tothepeopleatlarge，therefore，suchaninstitutionispeculiarlyvaluable；
anditoughttobeeminentlycherishedbythem。Onitsfirmand[*3：433]
independentstructuretheymayreposewithsafety，whiletheyperceiveinitafaculty，whichisonlysetinmotion，whenappliedto；butwhich，whenthusbrought[*3：434]intoaction，mustproceedwithcompetentpower，ifrequiredtocorrecttheerror，orsubduetheoppressionoftheotherbranchesofthegovernment。Fortunately[*3：435]tooforthepeople，thefunctionsofthejudiciary，indecidingonconstitutionalquestions，isnotone，whichitisatlibertytodecline。Whileitisboundnottotakejurisdiction，ifitshouldnot，itisequallytrue，thatitmusttakejurisdiction，ifitshould。Itcannot，asthelegislaturemay，avoidameasure，becauseitapproachestheconfinesoftheconstitution。Itcannotpassitby，becauseitisdoubtful。Withwhateverdoubt，withwhateverdifficultiesacasemaybeattended，itmustdecideit，whenitarisesinjudgment。Ithasnomorerighttodeclinetheexerciseofajurisdiction，whichisgiven，thantousurpthat，whichisnotgiven。Theone，ortheotherwouldbetreasontotheconstitution。****[*3：428]ThissubjectisveryelaboratelydiscussedintheFederalist，No。78，from。whichthefollowingextractismade：\"Thecompleteindependenceofthecourtsofjusticeispeculiarlyessentialinalimitedconstitution。
Byalimitedconstitution，Iunderstandone，whichcontainscertainspecifiedexceptionstothelegislativeauthority；such，forinstance，asthatitshallpassnobillsofattainder，no[*3：429]expostfactolaws，andthelike。Limitationsofthiskindcanbepreservedinpracticenootherwaythanthroughthemediumofthecourtsofjustice；whosedutyitmustbetodeclareallactscontrarytothemanifesttenoroftheconstitutionvoid。Withoutthis，allthereservationsofparticularrightsorprivilegeswouldamounttonothing。
\"Someperplexityrespectingtherightsofthecourtstopronouncelegislativeactsvoid，becausecontrarytotheconstitution，hasarisenfromanimagination，thatthedoctrinewouldimplyasuperiorityofthejudiciarytothelegislativepower。Itisurged，thattheauthority，whichcandeclaretheactsofanothervoid，mustnecessarilybesuperiortotheone；whoseactsmaybedeclaredvoid。AsthisdoctrineisofgreatimportanceinalltheAmericanconstitutions，abriefdiscussionofthegrounds，onwhichitrests，cannotbeunacceptable。
\"Thereisnoposition，whichdependsonclearerprinciples，thanthateveryactofadelegatedauthority，contrarytothetenorofthecommission，underwhichitisexercised，isvoid。Nolegislativeact，therefore，contrarytotheconstitution，canhevalid。Todenythis，wouldbetoaffirm，thatthedeputyisgreaterthanhisprincipal；thattheservantisabovehismaster；thattherepresentativesofthepeoplearesuperiortothepeoplethemselves；thatmen，actingbyvirtueofpowers，maydo，notonlywhattheirpowersdonotauthorize，butwhattheyforbid。
\"Ifitbesaid，thatthelegislativebodyarethemselvestheconstitutionaljudgesoftheirownpowers，andthattheconstructiontheyputuponthemisconclusiveupontheotherdepartments，itmaybeanswered，thatthiscannotbethenaturalpresumption，whereitisnottobecollectedfromanyparticularprovisionsintheconstitution。Itisnototherwisetobesupposed，thattheconstitutioncouldintendtoenabletherepresentativesofthepeopletosubstitutetheirwilltothatoftheirconstituents。Itisfarmorerationaltosuppose，thatthecourtsweredesignedtobeanintermediatebodybetweenthepeopleandthelegislature，inorder，amongotherthings，tokeepthelatterwithinthelimitsassignedtotheirauthority。
Theinterpretationofthelawsistheproperandpeculiarprovinceofthecourts。Aconstitutionis，infact，andmustberegardedbythejudgesasafundamentallaw。Itmust，therefore，belongtothemtoascertainitsmeaning，aswellasthemeaningofanyparticularactproceedingfromthelegislativebody。Ifthereshouldhappentobeanirreconcilablevariancebetweenthetwo，thatwhichhasthesuperiorobligationandvalidityought，ofcourse，tobepreferred：inotherwords。theconstitutionoughttobepreferredtothestatute；theintentionofthepeopletotheintentionoftheiragents。
\"Nordoestheconclusionbyanymeanssupposeasuperiorityofthejudicialtothelegislativepower。Itonlysupposes，thatthepowerof[*3：430]
thepeopleissuperiortoboth；andthatwherethewillofthelegislaturedeclaredinitsstatutes，standsinoppositiontothatofthepeopledeclaredintheconstitution，thejudgesoughttobegovernedbythelatterratherthantheformer。Theyoughttoregulatetheirdecisionsbythefundamentallaws，ratherthanbythose，whicharenotfundamental。
\"Thisexerciseofjudicialdiscretion，indeterminingbetweentwocontradictorylaws，isexemplifiedinafamiliarinstance。Itnotuncommonlyhappens，thattherearetwostatutesexistingstonetime，clashinginwholeorinpartwitheachother，andneitherofthemcontaininganyrepealingclauseorexpression。Insuchacase，itistheprovinceofthecourtstoliquidateandfixtheirmeaningandoperation：sofarastheycan，byanyfairconstruction，bereconciledtoeachother，reasonandlawconspiretodictate，thatthisshouldbedone：wherethisisimpracticable，itbecomesamatterofnecessitytogiveeffecttoone，inexclusionoftheother。Therule，whichhasobtainedinthecourtsfordeterminingtheirrelativevalidityis，thatthelastinorderoftimeshallbepreferredtothefirst。Butthisisamereruleofconstruction，notderivedfromanypositivelaw，butfromthenatureandreasonofthething。Itisarulenotenjoineduponthecourtsbylegislativeprovision，butadoptedbythemselves，asconsonanttotruthandpropriety，forthedirectionoftheirconductasinterpretersofthelaw。Theythoughtitreasonable，thatbetweentheinterferingactsofanequalauthority，thatwhichwasthelastindicationofitswill，shouldhavethepreference。
\"Butinregardtotheinterferingactsofasuperiorandsubordinateauthority，ofanoriginalandderivativepower，thenatureandreasonofthethingindicatetheconverseofthatruleaspropertobefollowed。
Theyteachus，thattheprioractofasuperioroughttobepreferredtothesubsequentactofaninferiorandsubordinateauthority；andthataccordingly，wheneveraparticularstatutecontravenestheconstitution，itwillbethedutyofthejudicialtribunalstoadheretothelatter，anddisregardtheformer。
\"Itcanbeofnoweighttosay，thatthecourts，onthepretenceofarepugnancy，maysubstitutetheirownpleasuretotheconstitutionalintentionsofthelegislature。Thismightaswellhappeninthecaseoftwocontradictorystatutes；oritmightaswellhappenineveryadjudicationuponanysinglestatute。Thecourtsmustdeclarethesenseofthelaw；andiftheyshouldbedisposedtoexercisewillinsteadofjudgment，theconsequencewouldequallybethesubstitutionoftheirpleasuretothatofthelegislativebody。Theobservation，ifitprovedanything，wouldprove，thatthereoughttobenojudgesdistinctfromthatbody。\"
ThereasoningofMr。ChiefJusticeMarshallonthissubjectinCohens[*3：431]v。Virginia，hasbeenalreadycitedatlarge。SeealsotheFederalist，No。22onthesamesubject。**ThereasoningoftheSupremeCourtinMarburyv。Madisononthissubjectissoclearandconvincing，thatitisdeemedadvisabletociteitinthisplace，asacorrectivetothoselooseandextraordinarydoctrines，whichsometimesfindtheirwayintoopinionspossessingofficialinfluence。
\"Thequestion，whetheranact，repugnanttotheconstitution，canbecomethelawoftheland，isaquestiondeeplyinterestingtotheUnitedStates；
but，happily，notofanintricacyproportionedtoitsinterest。Itseemsonlynecessarytorecognisecertainprinciples，supposedtohavebeenlongandwellestablished，todecideit。Thatthepeoplehaveanoriginalrighttoestablish，fortheirfuturegovernment，suchprinciplesas，intheiropinion，shallmostconduceto，theirownhappiness，isthebasis，onwhichthewholeAmericanfabrichasbeenerected。Theexerciseofthisoriginalrightisaverygreatexertion；norcanit，noroughtittobefrequentlyrepeated。Theprinciples，therefore，soestablished，aredeemedfundamental。
Andastheauthority，fromwhichtheyproceed，issupreme，andcanseldomact，theyaredesignedtobepermanent。Thisoriginalandsupremewillorganisesthegovernment，andassignstodifferentdepartmentstheirrespectivepowers。Itmayeitherstophere，orestablishcertainlimits，nottobetranscendedbythosedepartments。
\"ThegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesisofthelatterdescription。Thepowersofthelegislaturearedefined，andlimited；andthatthoselimitsmaynotbemistaken，orforgotten，theconstitutioniswritten。Towhatpurposearepowerslimited，andtowhatpurposeisthatlimitationcommittedtowriting，iftheselimitsmay，atanytime，bepassedbythoseintendedtoberestrained？Thedistinction，betweenagovernmentwithlimitedandunlimitedpowers，isabolished，ifthoselimitsdonotconfinethepersons，onwhomtheyareimposed，andifactsprohibited，andactsallowed，areofequalobligation。Itisapropositiontooplaintobecontested，thattheconstitutioncontrolsanylegislativeactrepugnanttoit；or，thatthelegislaturemayaltertheconstitutionbyanordinaryactBetweenthesealternativesthereisnomiddleground。Theconstitutioniseitherasuperior，paramountlaw，unchangeableby[*3：432]ordinarymeans，oritisonalevelwithOrdinarylegislativeacts，andlikeotheracts，isalterable，whenthelegislatureshallpleasetoalterit。Iftheformerpartofthealternativebetrue，thenalegislativeactcontrarytotheconstitutionisnotlaw；
ifthelatterpartbetrue，thenwrittenconstitutionsareabsurdattempts，onthepartofthepeople，tolimitapower，initsownnatureillimitable。
\"Certainlyallthose，whohaveframed。writtenconstitutions，contemplatethemasformingthefundamentalandparamountlawofthenation，andconsequentlythetheoryofeverysuchgovernmentmustbe，thatanactofthelegislature，repugnanttotheconstitution，isvoid。Thistheoryisessentiallyattachedtoawrittenconstitution，andisconsequentlytobeconsideredbythiscourt，asoneofthefundamentalprinciplesofoursociety。Itisnot，therefore，tobelostsightofinthefurtherconsiderationofthissubject。
Ifanactofthelegislature，repugnanttotheconstitution，isvoid，doesit，notwithstandingitsinvalidity，bindthecourts，andobligethemtogiveiteffect？Or，inotherwords，thoughitbenotlaw，doesitconstitutearuleasoperative，asifitwasalaw？Thiswouldbetooverthrowinfact，whatwasestablishedintheory；andwouldseem，atfirstview，anabsurditytoogrosstobeinsistedon。Itshall，however，receiveamoreattentiveconsideration。
\"Itisemphaticallytheprovinceanddutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosay，whatthelawis。Those，whoapplytheruletoparticularcases，mustofnecessityexpoundandinterpretthatrule。Iftwolawsconflictwitheachother，thecourtsmustdecideontheoperationofeach。Soifalawbeinoppositiontotheconstitution；ifboththelawandtheconstitutionapplytoaparticularcase；sothatthecourtmusteitherdecidethatcaseconformablytothelaw，disregardingtheconstitution；orconformablytotheconstitution，disregardingthelaw；thecourtmustdetermine，whichoftheseconflictingrulesgovernsthecase。Thisisoftheveryessenceofjudicialduty。If，then，thecourtsaretoregardtheconstitution；
andtheconstitutionissuperiortoanyordinaryactofthelegislature；
theconstitution，andnotsuchordinaryact，mustgovernthecase，towhichtheybothapply。
\"Those，then，whocontroverttheprinciple，thattheconstitutionistoheconsidered，incourts，asaparamountlaw，arereducedtothenecessityofmaintaining，thatcourtsmustclosetheireyesontheconstitutionandseeonlythelaw。Thisdoctrinewouldsubverttheveryfoundation[*3：433]
ofallwrittenconstitutions。Itwoulddeclare，thatanact，which，accordingtotheprinciplesandtheoryofourgovernment，isentirelyvoid，isyet，inpractice，completelyobligatory。Itwoulddeclare，thatifthelegislatureshalldo，whatisexpresslyforbidden，suchact，notwithstandingtheexpressprohibition，isinrealityeffectual。Itwouldbegivingtothelegislatureapracticalandrealomnipotence，withthesamebreath，whichprofessestorestricttheirpowerswithinnarrowlimits。Itisprescribinglimits，anddeclaring，thatthoselimitsmaybepassedatpleasure。Thatitthusreducestonothing，whatwehavedeemedthegreatestimprovementonpoliticalinstitutions—awrittenconstitution—wouldofitselfbesufficient，inAmerica，wherewrittenconstitutionshavebeenviewedwithsomuchreverence，forrejectingtheconstruction。ButthepeculiarexpressionsoftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesfurnishadditionalargumentsinfavourofitsrejection。
\"ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesisextendedtoallcases，arisingundertheconstitution。Coulditbetheintentionofthose，whogavethispower，tosay，that，inusingit，theconstitutionshouldnotbelookedinto？Thatacasearisingundertheconstitutionshouldbedecidedwithoutexaminingtheinstrument，underwhichitarises？Thisistooextravaganttobemaintained。Insomecases，then，theconstitutionmustbelookedintobythejudges。Andiftheycanopenitatall，whatpartofitaretheyforbiddentoread，ortoobey？
\"Therearemanyotherpartsoftheconstitution，whichservetoillustratethissubject。Itisdeclared，that’notaxordutyshallbelaidonarticlesexportedfromanystate。’Supposeadutyontheexportofcotton，oftobacco，orofflour；andasuitinstitutedtorecoverit。Oughtjudgmenttoberenderedinsuchacase？oughtthejudgestoclosetheireyesontheconstitution，andonlyseethelaw？Theconstitutiondeclares，that’nobillofattainderorexpostfactolawshallbepassed。’If，however，suchabillshouldbepassed，andapersonshouldbeprosecutedunderit；mustthecourtcondemntodeaththosevictims，whomtheconstitutionendeavourstopreserve？’Noperson，’saystheconstitution，’shallbeconvictedoftreasonunlessonthetestimonyoftwowitnessestothesameovertact，oronconfessioninopencourt。’Herethelanguageoftheconstitutionisaddressedespeciallytothecourts。Itprescribes，directlyforthem，aruleofevidencenottobedepartedfrom。Ifthelegislatureshouldchangethatrule，anddeclareonewitness，oraconfessionoutofcourt，sufficientforconviction，musttheconstitutionalprincipleyieldtothelegislativeact？
\"Fromthese，andmanyotherselectious，whichmightbemade，itisapparent，thattheframersoftheconstitutioncontemplatedthat[*3：434]instrument，asaruleforthegovernmentofcourts，aswellasofthelegislature。
Whyotherwisedoesitdirectthejudgestotakeanoathtosupportit？
Thisoathcertainlyapplies，inanespecialmanner，totheirconductintheirofficialcharacter。Howimmoraltoimposeitonthem，iftheyweretobeusedastheinstruments，andtheknowinginstrumentsforviolatingwhattheysweartosupport！Theoathofoffice，too，imposedbythelegislature，iscompletelydemonstrativeofthelegislativeopiniononthissubject。
Itisinthesewords，’Idosolemnlyswear，thatIwilladministerjusticewithoutrespecttopersons，anddoequalrighttothepoorandtotherich；
andthatIwillfaithfullyandimpartiallydischargeallthedutiesincumbentonmeasaccordingtothebestofmyabilitiesandunderstanding，agreeablytotheconstitution，andlawsoftheUnitedStates。’WhydoesajudgesweartodischargehisdutiesagreeablytotheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，ifthatconstitutionformsnoruleforhisgovernment？ifitiscloseduponhim，andcannotbeinspectedbyhim？Ifsuchbetherealstateofthings，thisisworsethansolemnmockery。Toprescribe，ortotakethisoath，becomesequallyacrime。
\"Itisalsonotentirelyunworthyofobservation，thatindeclaring，whatshallbethesupremelawoftheland，theconstitutionitselfisfirstmentioned；andnotthelawsoftheUnited。Statesgenerally，butthoseonly，whichshallbemadeinpursuanceoftheconstitution，havethatrank。
Thus，theparticularphraseologyoftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesconfirmsandstrengthenstheprinciple，supposedtobeessentialtoallwrittenconstitutions，thatalawrepugnanttotheconstitutionisvoid；
andthatcourts，aswellasotherdepartments，arehoundbythatinstrument。\"
IntheVirginiaConvention，Mr。PatrickHenryamostdecidedopponentoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesexpressedastrongopinioninfavouroftherightofthejudiciarytodecideupontheconstitutionalityoflaws。Hisfearswere，thatthenationaljudiciarywasnotsoorganized，asthatitwouldpossessanindependencesufficientforthispurpose。Hislanguagewas：\"Thehonourablegentlemandidourjudiciaryhonourinsaying，thattheyhadfirmnessenoughtocounteractthelegislatureinsomecases。
Yes，sir，ourjudgesopposedtheactsofthelegislature。Wehavethislandmarktoguideus。Theyhadfortitudetodeclare，thattheywerethejudiciary，andwouldopposeunconstitutionalacts。Areyousure，thatyourfederaljudiciarywillactthus？[*3：435]Isthatjudiciarysowellconstituted，andsoindependentoftheotherbranches，asourstatejudiciary？Whereareyourlandmarksinthisgovernment？Iwillbeboldtosay，youcannotfindany。Itakeit，asthehighestencomiumonthiscountry，thattheactsofthelegislature，ifunconstitutional，areliabletobeopposedbythejudiciary。\"***Mr。JusticeJohnson，inFullertonv。BankofUnitedStates，says，\"Whatisthecourseofprudenceandduty，wherethesecasesofdifficultdistributionastopowerandrightpresentthemselves？Itistoyieldrather，thantoencroach。Thedutyisreciprocal，andwillnodoubtbemetinthespiritofmoderationandcomity。Intheconflictsofpowerandopinion，inseparablefromourmanypeculiarrelations，casesmayoccur，inwhichthemaintenanceofprincipleandtheconstitution，accordingtoitsinnateandinseparableattributes，mayrequireadifferentcourse；andwhensuchcasesdooccur，ourcourtsmustdotheirduty。\"Thisisaveryjustadmonition，whenaddressedtootherdepartmentsofthegovernment。Butthejudiciaryhasnoauthoritytoadoptanymiddlecourse。Itiscompelled，whencalledupon，to[*3：436]decide，whetheralawisconstitutional，ornot。Ifitdeclinestodeclareitunconstitutional，thatisanaffirmanceofitsconstitutionality。[*3：435]Sec。1571。Theframersoftheconstitution，havingthesegreatprinciplesinview，adoptedtwofundamentalruleswithentireunanimity；
first，thatanationaljudiciaryoughttobeestablished；secondly，thatthenationaljudiciaryoughttopossesspowerscoextensivewith[*3：436]
thoseofthelegislativedepartment。Indeed，thelatternecessarilyflowedfromtheformer，andwastreated，andmustalwaysbetreated，asanaxiomofpoliticalgovernment。Buttheseprovisionsalonewouldnotbesufficientto，ensureacompleteadministrationofpublicjustice，ortogivepermanencytotherepublic。Thejudiciarymustbesoorganized，astocarryintocompleteeffectallthepurposesofitsestablishment。Itmustpossesswisdom，learning，integrity，independence，andfirmness。Itmustatoncepossessthepowerandthemeanstocheckusurpation，andenforceexecutionofitsjudgments。
Mr。Burkehas，withsingularsagacityandpregnantbrevity，statedthedoctrine，whicheveryrepublicshouldsteadilysustain，andconscientiouslyinculcate。\"Whatever，\"sayshe，\"issupremeinastateoughttohave，asmuchaspossible，itsjudicialauthoritysoconstituted，asnotonlynottodependuponit，butinsomesorttobalanceit。Itoughttogivesecuritytoitsjusticeagainstitspower。Itoughttomakeitsjudicature，asitwere，somethingexteriortothestate。\"Thebestmanner，inwhichthisistobeaccomplished，mustmainlydependuponthemodeofappointment，thetenureofoffice，thecompensationofthejudges，andthejurisdictionconfidedtothedepartmentinitsvariousbranches。
Sec。1572。Letusproceed，then，totheconsiderationofthejudicialdepartment，asitisestablishedbythe[*3：437]constitution，andsee，howfaradequatemeansareprovidedforalltheseimportantpurposes。
Sec。1573。Thefirstsectionofthethirdarticleisasfollows：\"ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferiorcourts，asthecongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish。Thejudges，bothofthesupremeandinferiorcourts，shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour；andshallatstatedtimesreceivefortheirservicesacompensation，whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice。\"Tothismaybeaddedtheclauseintheenumerationofthepowersofcongressinthefirstarticle，whichisbutamererepetition，
thatcongressshallhavepower\"toconstitutetribunalsinferiortotheSupremeCourt。\"**Itismanifest，thattheconstitutioncontemplateddistinctappointmentsofthejudgesofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。ThejudgesoftheSupremeCourtareexpresslyrequiredtobeappointedbythepresident，byandwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenate。Theyare，therefore，expresslyappointedforthatcourt，andforthatcourtonly。Cantheybeconstitutionallyrequiredtoact，asjudgesofanyothercourt？ThisquestionitnowappearswaspresentedtothemindsofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourt，whowerefirstappointedundertheconstitution；andthechiefjusticeMr。Jayandsomeofhisassociateswereofopinion，andsostatedtoPresidentWashington，in1790，inaletter，whichwillbecitedbelowatlarge，thattheycouldnotconstitutionallybeappointedtoholdanyothercourt。Theywere，however，requiredtoperformthedutyofcircuitjudgesinthecircuitcourts，untiltheyear1801；andthenanewsystemwasestablished。Thelatterwasrepealedin1802；andthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtwereagainrequiredtoperformdutyinthecircuitcourts。In1803，thepointwasdirectlymadebeforetheSupremeCourt；butthecourtwerethenofopinion，thatthepracticeandacquiescence，forsuchaperiodofyears，commencingwiththeorganizationofthejudicialsystem，hadfixedtheconstruction，anditcouldnotthenbeshaken。Stuartv。Laird。Thattherehave，notwithstanding，beenmanyscruplesanddoubtsuponthesubject，inthemindsofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourt，sincethatperiod，iswellknown。
WehereinserttheletterofMr。ChiefJusticeJayandhisassociates，[*3：438]forwhichweareindebtedtotheeditorsofthatexcellentwork，theAmericanJurist。ItisinthenumberforOctober，1830。
\"Therepresentationalludedtowasinanswertoaletter，addressedbyGeneralWashingtontothecourtuponitsorganization，whichwehavethereforeprefixedtoit。UnitedSates，April3d，1790。
\"’Gentlemen：Ihavealwaysbeenpersuaded，thatthestabilityandsuccessofthenationalgovernment，andconsequentlythehappinessofthepeopleoftheUnitedStates，woulddepend，inaconsiderabledegree，ontheinterpretationofitslaws。Inmyopinion，therefore，itisimportant，thatthejudiciarysystemshouldnotonlybeindependentinitsoperations，butasperfect，aspossible，initsformation。
\"’Asyouareabouttocommenceyourfirstcircuit，andmanythingsmayoccurinsuchanunexploredfield，Whichitwouldbeusefulshouldbeknown，Ithinkitpropertoacquaintyou，thatitwillbeagreeabletometoreceivesuchinformationandremarksonthissubject，asyoushallfromtimetotimejudgeitexpedienttomake。’\"Geo。Washington。\"’TheChiefJusticeandAssociateJusticeoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。’
\"’Sir：We，theChiefJusticeandAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates，inpursuanceoftheletter，whichyoudidusthehonourtowrite，onthethirdofAprillast，takethelibertyofsubmittingtoyourconsiderationthefollowingremarksonthe\"ActtoestablishtheJudicialCourtsoftheUnitedStates。\"
\"’Itwoulddoubtlesshavebeensingular，ifasystemsonewanduntried，andwhichwasnecessarilyformedmoreonprinciplesoftheory，andprobableexpediency，thanformerexperience，had，inpractice，beenfoundentirelyfreefromdefects。
\"’Theparticularandcontinuedattention，whichourofficialdutiescalleduponustopaytothisact，hasproducedreflections，whichatthetimeitwasmadeandpassed，didnot，probably，occurintheirfullextenteithertousorothers。
\"’Oncomparingthisactwiththeconstitution，weperceivedeviations，which，inouropinions，areimportant。
\"’Thefirstsectionofthethirdarticleoftheconstitutiondeclares，that\"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferiorcourts，asthecongressmay，fromtimetotime，ordainandestablish。\"
[*3：439]\"’Thesecondsectionenumeratesthecases，towhichthejudicialpowershallextend。ItgivestotheSupremeCourtoriginaljurisdictioninonlytwocases，butinalltheothers，vestsitwithappellatejurisdiction；
andthatwithsuchexceptions，andundersuchregulations，asthecongressshallmake。
\"’Ithaslongandveryuniversallybeendeemedessentialtothedueadministrationofjustice，thatsomenationalcourt，orcouncilshouldbeinstituted，orauthorizedtoexaminetheactsoftheordinarytribunals，andultimately，toaffirmorreversetheirjudgmentsanddecrees；itbeingimportant，thatthesetribunalsshouldbeconfinedtothelimitsoftheirrespectivejurisdiction，andthattheyshoulduniformlyinterpretandapplythelawinthesamesenseandmanner。
\"’TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtenablesittoconfineinferiorcourtstotheirproperlimits，tocorrecttheirinvoluntaryerrors，and，ingeneral，toprovide，thatjusticebeadministeredaccurately，impartially，anduniformly。Thesecontrollingpowerswereunavoidablygreatandextensive；
andofsuchanature，astorendertheirbeingcombinedwithotherjudicialpowers，inthesamepersons，unadvisable。
\"’Tothenatural。aswellaslegalincompatibilityofultimateappellatejurisdiction，withoriginaljurisdiction，weascribetheexclusionoftheSupremeCourtfromthelatter，exceptintwocases。Haditnotbeenforthisexclusion，theunalterable，everbindingdecisionsofthisimportantcourt，wouldnothavebeensecuredagainsttheinfluencesofthosepredilectionsforindividualopinions，andofthosereluctancestorelinquishsentimentspublicly，though，perhaps，toohastilygiven，whichinsensiblyandnotunfrequentlyinfuseintothemindsofthemostuprightmen，somedegreeofpartialityfortheirofficialandpublicacts。
\"’Withoutsuchexclusion，nocourt，possessingthelastresortofjustice，wouldhaveacquiredandpreservedthatpublicconfidence，whichisreallynecessarytorenderthewisestinstitutionsuseful。Acelebratedwriterjustlyobserves，that\"nexttodoingright，thegreatobjectintheadministrationofpublicjusticeshouldbetogivepublicsatisfaction。\"
\"’HadtheconstitutionpermittedtheSupremeCourttositinjudgment，andfinallytodecideontheactsanderrors，doneandcommittedbyitsownmembers，asjudgesofinferiorandsubordinatecourts，muchroomwouldhavebeenleftformen，oncertainoccasions，tosuspect，that[*3：440]
anunwillingnesstobethoughtandfoundinthewrong，hadproducedanimproperadherencetoit；orthatmutualinteresthadgeneratedmutualcivilitiesandtendernessinjurioustoright。
\"’Ifroomhadbeenleft，forsuchsuspicions，therewouldhavebeenreasontoapprehend，thatthepublicconfidencewoulddiminishalmostinproportiontothenumberofcases，inwhichtheSupremeCourtmightaffirmtheactsofanyofitsmembers。
\"’Appealsareseldommade，butindoubtfulcases，andinwhichthereis，atleast，muchappearanceofreasononbothsides；insuchcases，therefore，notonlythelosingparty，hutothers，notimmediatelyinterested，wouldsometimesbeledtodoubt，whethertheaffirmancewasentirelyowingtothemerepreponderanceofright。
\"’These，wepresume，wereamongthereasons，whichinducedtheconventiontoconfinetheSupremeCourt，andconsequentlyitsjudges，toappellatejurisdiction。Wesay\"consequentlyitsjudges，\"becausethereasonsfortheoneapplyalsototheother。
\"’Weareawareofthedistinctionbetweenacourtanditsjudges；andarefarfrom。thinkingitillegalorunconstitutional，howeveritmaybeinexpedient，toemploythemforotherpurposes，providedthelatterpurposesbeconsistentandcompatiblewiththeformer。Butfromthisdistinctionitcannot，inouropinions，beinferred，thatthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtmayalsobejudgesofinferiorandsubordinatecourts，andbeatthesametimeboththecontrollersandthecontrolled。
\"’Theapplicationoftheseremarksisobvious。TheCircuitCourtsestablishedbytheactarecourtsinferiorandsubordinatetotheSupremeCourt。Theyarevestedwithoriginaljurisdictioninthecases，fromwhichtheSupremeCourtisexcluded；andtousitwouldappearverysingular，iftheconstitutionwascapableofbeingsoconstrued，astoexcludethecourt，butyetadmitthejudgesofthecourt。We，forourparts，considertheconstitution，asplainlyopposedtotheappointmentofthesamepersonstobothoffices；
norhaveweanydoubtsoftheirlegalincompatibility。
\"’Bacon，inhisAbridgment，says，that\"officesaresaidtobeincompatibleandinconsistent，soastobeexecutedbyoneperson，whenfromthemultiplicityofbusinessinthem，theycannotbeexecutedwithcareandability；orwhentheirbeingsubordinate，andinterferingwitheachother，itinducesapresumptiontheycannotbeexecutedwithimpartialityandhonesty；andthis，myLordCokesays，isofthatimportance，thatifalloffices，civilandecclesiastical，etc。wereonlyexecuted，eachbydifferentpersons，itwouldbeforthegoodofthecommonwealthand[*3：441]advancementofjustice，andprefermentofdeservingmen。Ifaforester，bypatentforhislife，ismadejusticeinEyreofthesameforest，hacvice，theforestershipisbecomevoid；fortheseofficesareincompatible，becausetheforesterisunderlitecorrectionofthejusticeinEyre，andhecannotjudgehimself。
Uponamandamustorestoreonetotheplaceoftownclerk，itwasreturned，thathewaselectedmayorandsworn，and，therefore，theychoseanothertownclerk；andthecourt。werestrongofopinion，thattheofficeswereincompatible，becauseofthesubordination。Acoroner，madeasheriff，ceasestobeacoroner；soaparson，madeabishop，andajudgeoftheCommonPleas，madeajudgeoftheKing’sBench，\"etc。
\"’Otherauthoritiesonthispointmightbeadded；butthereasons，onwhichtheyrest，seemtoustorequirelittleelucidation，orsupport。
\"’Thereisintheactanotherdeviationfromtheconstitution，whichwethinkitincumbentonustomention。\"’Thesecondsectionofthesecondarticleoftheconstitutiondeclares，thatthepresidentshallnominate，andbyandwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenate，\"shallappointjudgesoftheSupremeCourt，andallotherofficersoftheUnitedStates，whoseappointmentsarenotthereinotherwiseprovidedfor。\"
\"’Theconstitutionnothavingotherwiseprovidedfortheappointmentofthejudgesoftheinferiorcourts，weconceive，thattheappointmentofsomeofthem，viz。oftheCircuitCourts，byanactofthelegislature，isadeparturefromtheconstitution，andanexerciseofpowers，whichconstitutionallyandexclusivelybelongtothepresidentandsenate。
\"’Weshouldproceed，sir，totakenoticeofcertaindefectsintheactrelativetoexpediency，whichwethinkmerittheconsiderationofthecongress。
But，asthesearedoubtlessamongtheobjectsofthelatereference，madebythehouseofrepresentativestotheattorneygeneral，wethinkitmostpropertoforbearmakinganyremarksonthissubjectatpresent。\"’Wehavethehonourtobemostrespectfully，\"’Sir，yourobedientandhumbleservants。\"’ThePresidentoftheUnitedStates。’\"[*3：438]Sec。1574。Intheconvention，whichframedtheconstitution，nodiversityofopinionexisted，astotheestablishmentofasupremetribunal。
Theproposition[*3：439]wasunanimouslyadopted。Inrespecttotheestablishmentofinferiortribunals，somediversityofopinionwasintheearlystagesoftheproceedingsexhibited。[*3：440]Apropositiontoestablishthemwasatfirstadopted。Thiswasstruckoutbythevoteoffivestatesagainstfour，twobeingdivided；andapropositionwasthen[*3：441]adopted，\"thatthenationallegislaturebeempoweredtoappointinferiortribunals，\"bythevoteofsevenstatesagainstthree，onebeingdivided；andultimatelythispropositionreceivedtheunanimousapprobationoftheconvention。
[*3：442]Sec。1575。Totheestablishmentofonecourtofsupremeandfinaljurisdiction，theredonotseemtohaveSeenanystrenuousobjectionsgenerallyinsistedoninthestateconventions，thoughmanywereurgedagainstcertainportionsofthejurisdiction，proposedbytheconstitutiontobevestedinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Theprincipalquestionseemstohavebeenofadifferentnature，whetheritoughttobeadistinctcoordinatedepartment，orabranchofthelegislature。AndhereitwasremarkedbytheFederalist，thatthesamecontradictionofopinionwasobservableamongtheopponentsoftheconstitution，asinmanyothercases。
Manyofthose，whoobjectedtothesenate，asacourtofimpeachment，uponthegroundofanimproperintermixtureoflegislativeandjudicialfunctions，were，atleastbyimplication，advocatesfortheproprietyofvestingtheultimatedecisionofallcausesinthewhole，orinapartofthelegislativebody。
Sec。1576。Thearguments，orrathersuggestions，uponwhichthisschemewaspropounded，weretothefollowingeffect。TheauthorityoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates，asaseparateandindependentbody，willbesuperiortothatofthelegislature。Thepowerofconstruingthelawsaccordingtothespiritoftheconstitutionwillenablethatcourttomouldthemintowhatevershape，itmaythinkproper；especially，asitsdecisionswillnotbeinanymannersubjecttotherevisionandcorrectionofthelegislativebody。Thisisasunprecedented，asitisdangerous。InGreatBritainthejudicialpowerinthelastresortresidesinthehouseoflords，whichisabranchofthelegislature。AndthispartoftheBritishgovernmenthasbeen[*3：443]imitatedinthestateconstitutionsingeneral。TheparliamentofGreatBritain，andthelegislaturesoftheseveralstates，canatanytimerectifybylawtheexceptionabledecisionsoftheirrespectivecourts。
ButtheerrorsandusurpationsoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateswillbeuncontrollable，andremediless。**Thelearnedreaderwilltraceout，insubsequentperiodsofourhistory，thesameobjectionsrevived，inotherimposingformsunderthesanctionofmen，whohaveattainedhighascendancyanddistinctioninthestrugglesofparty。Sec。1577。Thefriendsoftheconstitution，inanswertothesesuggestions，replied，thattheywerefoundedinfalsereasoning，oramisconceptionoffact。Inthefirstplace，therewasnothingintheplan，whichdirectlyempoweredthenationalcourtstoconstruethelawsaccordingtothespiritoftheconstitution，orwhichgavethemanygreaterlatitudeinthisrespect，thanwhatwasclaimedandexercisedbythestatecourts。Theconstitution，indeed，oughttobethestandardofconstructionforthelaws；andwherevertherewasanopposition，thelawsoughttogiveplacetotheconstitution。
Butthisdoctrinewasnotdeduciblefromanycircumstancepeculiartothispartoftheconstitution，butfromthegeneraltheoryofalimitedconstitution；
and，asfarasitwastrue，itwasequallyapplicabletothestategovernments。
Sec。1578。SofarastheobjectionwenttotheorganizationoftheSupremeCourt，asadistinctandindependentdepartment，itadmittedofadifferentanswer。Itwasfoundeduponthegeneralmaximofrequiringaseparationofthedifferentdepartmentsofgovernment，asmostconducivetothepreservationofpubliclibertyandprivaterights。Itwouldnot，indeed，[*3：444]absolutelyviolatethatmaxim，toallowtheultimateappellatejurisdictiontobevestedinonebranchofthelegislativebody。Butthereweremanyurgentreasons，whytheproposedorganizationwouldbepreferable。Itwouldsecuregreaterindependence，impartiality，anduniformityintheadministrationofjustice。