第16章
加入书架 A- A+
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  Chap。II

  OftheNatureofObligationstobeperformed,inconsequenceofCreditgiven;andofwhatismeantbythetermsregorgingandstagnatingofmoneyWehavealreadysaid,thatallobligationscontractedwithaviewtobeperformedinfuturetime,consistindoingorgivingsomethinginconsiderationofsomethingdoneorgiven。

  Whenactionsonlyarestipulatedincontracts,creditinastrictacceptationofthetermislittleconcerned;becausenoadequatesecuritycanbegivenforperforminganaction:suchcontractsstandwhollyuponthewillingnessandcapacityofacting,whichdependmoreuponthepersonthanuponthefacultiesofthedebtor。Tosupplythisdefect,weseepenaltiesusuallystipulatedinsuchcases;whichreducethosecontractstoanalternativeobligationofeitherdoingorgiving。

  Weshallthereforethrowouttheconsiderationofthefirstaltogether,asbeingforeigntoourpurpose;andadheretothelater,whichisthetrueobjectofcredit。Again:

  Inallobligationstogiveanyparticularthing,thereisconstantlyimpliedanalternativealso;towit,eitherthethingstipulated,orthevalueidquodinterest,accordingtothelawyers:thismustberelativetomoney;whichisthecommonpriceofallthingsincommerceamongmen。

  Thuswehavebroughtcredittotheobjectunderwhichwearetoconsiderit,viz。theobligationtopaymoney,eitherforvaluereceived,orforsomeconsiderationrelativetotheparties,whichmaybethejustgroundofacontract。

  Creditanddebtsarethereforeinseparable,becausetheynecessarilyimplyeachother;andveryproperlycometobeexaminedtogetherinthisbook。

  Whenmoneyistobepaidatadistantperiodoftime,theobligationmayeitherbe,foroneprecisesum;orforthatsumwithinterest,duringtheintervalbetweencontractingandfulfillingtheobligation。

  Thelendingofmoneywithoutinterest,wasverycommonbeforetheintroductionoftradeandindustry。Moneythenwasconsideredasabarrenstock,incapableofproducingfruit;andwheneverthequantityofit,inanycountry,exceededtheusesofcirculation,theremainderwaslockedupintreasures:inwhichcase,theexactingofinterestforitappearedunreasonable。

  Thingsarenowchanged:nomoneyiseverlockedup;andwhenborrowed,theregularpaymentofinterestforit,isasessentialtotheobtainingofcredit,astheconfidenceofbeingrepaidthecapital。Theseperiodicalpaymentsareaconstantcorroborationofthisconfidence;sothatitmaybesaidwithtruth,thathewhocangivegoodsecurity,topaytoperpetuity,aregularinterestformoney,willobtaincreditforanysum,althoughitshouldappearevident,thathenevercanbeinacapacitytorefundthecapital。

  Thereasonofthismaybegatheredfromtheprinciplesalreadydeduced,andfromtheplanofourmodernoeconomy。

  Wehavesaidinthesecondbook,thatthecurrentmoneyofacountryisalwaysinproportiontothetrade,industry,consumption,andalienation,whichregularlytakeplaceinit;

  andwhenithappensthatthemoneyalreadyinthecountryisnotsufficientforcarryingonthesepurposes,apartofthesolidproperty,equaltothedeficiency,maybemelteddownaswehavecalleditandmadetocirculateinpaper:thatassoonagainasthispaperaugmentsbeyondthisproportion,apartofwhatwasbeforeincirculation,mustreturnuponthedebtorinthepaper,andberealizedanew。

  Letusnowconsiderwhatisunderstoodbyrealized。Bythistermismeant,thattheregorgingpaper,orthatquantityofcurrencywhichanationpossessesoverandabovewhatisnecessaryforitscirculation,mustbeturnedintosomeshapewherebyitmayproduceanincome;foritisnowamaxim,thatnomoneyistobesufferedtoremainuselesstotheproprietorofit。2*

  Whenthisregorgingorstagnatingpaperthencomesuponthedebtorinit,ifheshouldpaythevalueofitinhardspecie,howwouldtheconditionofthecreditorbeimproved?

  Wesupposethecreditofthepaperequaltothecreditofthecoinwithinthecountry。Wealsosupposethatthepaperhassostagnatedinthehandsofthebearer,thathecanneitherlendit,orpurchasewithitanyspeciesofsolidproperty,withinthecountry,capabletoproduceanincome:forifanywayofdisposingitusefullycanbefound,thiscircumstancewillprovethatcirculationisnotoverstockedatthattime;consequently,themoneydoesnotregorge。Butletussupposethatitdoesregorge:thenhemusteitherobligethedebtorinthepapertopayincoin,thathemaylockitupinhiscofferaswasthecaseofold;orhemustsendhiscointoothercountries,wherecirculationisnotfullystocked,andwhereanincomemaybeboughtwithit。Thisconstantlyhappenswhencirculationiseitheroverstocked,orwhenthequantityofcirculationbeginstodiminishinacountry。

  Letmenextsuppose,thatinacountryoverstockedwithmoney,asuddendemandforit,farbeyondtheordinaryrateofcirculation,shalloccur:supposeawartobreakout,whichabsorbs,inashorttime,moremoneythan,perhaps,allthecoinandallthepapercansupply。Thestateuponthisoccasionimposesatax,which,letmesuppose,mayproduceasumequaltotheinterestofthemoneyrequired。Isitnotverycertain,thatsuchpersonswhofoundadifficultyinplacingtheirregorgingcapitals,willbebetterpleasedtopurchaseapartofthisannualinterest,thantolendittoanypersonwhomightpayitbackinashorttime;bywhichrepaymentthelenderwouldagainbethrownintothesameinconvenienceasbefore,offindingaproperout-letforit?Thisisawayofrealizingsuperfluousmoney,moreeffectualthanturningitintogoldorsilver。

  WhenIspeak,therefore,ofrealizingpapermoney,I

  understandeithertheconvertingofitintogoldandsilver,whichisthemoneyoftheworld;ortheplacingofitinsuchawayastoproduceaperpetualfundofannualinterest。

  Werepublicborrowing,therefore,toworktheeffectofbringingthemoneyincirculationbelowtheproportionrequiredforcarryingonalienation,trade,etc。thenanobligationtorepaythecapitalwouldbenecessary,andcomplaintswouldbeheardagainstthestatefornotpayingofftheirdebts;becausetherebytheprogressofindustrywouldbeprevented。Butwhentheoperationsofcreditareallowedtointroduceamethodofcreatingmoneyanew,inproportionastradeandindustryshalldemandit,thenthestatehasnooccasiontopaybackthecapitals;becausethepubliccreditorsenjoyfarbetterconditionsintheirannualincome,thaniftheircapitalswererefunded。

  Letmeillustratethisbyanexample。

  Wemusttakeitforgranted,thatineverynationinEurope,thereisasumincirculation,nearlyequaltothealienation,trade,etc。whichgoesonactuallyatthetime。Wemustalsotakeitforgranted,thattheamountofalldebtswhatsoever,publicandprivate,payinginteresttotheclassofcreditors,iseverywhereaverygreatsum:nowletussuppose,thattheclassofdebtorsshouldbeenablednomatterbywhatmeanstopayoffwhattheyowe,incoinnewlyacquired;wouldnot,bythesupposition,asumoftheoldcurrencynearlyequaltothiscoinnewlyacquired,immediatelyfallintostagnation,andwoulditnotbeimpossibletodrawanyincomefromthisstagnatedcoin?

  Thiswasexactlythecaseofold。Thecoinfarexceededtheusesofcirculation,andstagnatedintreasures。Warsbroughtitout;

  becausethencirculationaugmented;peaceagaincuttingofftheseextraordinarydemands,thecoinstagnatedagain,andreturnedtothetreasures。

  Whatisthecaseatpresent?

  Moneyandcoinareneverfoundtosurpasstheusesofcirculationincommercialcountries。Whenwarcomes,whichdemandsanextraordinarysupply,recourseishadtoborrowinguponinterest;nottotreasures:andthedesireofpurchasingthisinterest,whichwecallanannuity,drawstreasuresevenfromtheenemiesofthosenationswhohavethebestcredit。

  Again,attheendofawar,inplaceofanemptytreasury,aswasthecaseofold,wefindahugesumofpublicdebts。Asoeconomyfilledthetreasurythen,sooeconomymustpayoffthedebtsnow。

  Fromwhathasbeensaid,itplainlyappears,thatinterestisnowbecomesoabsolutelyessentialtocredit,thatitmaybeconsideredastheprincipalrequisiteandbasisonwhichthewholefabricstands:weshallthereforebeginbyexaminingtheoriginandnatureofinterest,andalsotheprincipleswhichinfluencetherate,andregulatethefluctuationsofit。

  Chap。III

  OftheInterestofMoneyIshallleaveittodivinesandcausiststodeterminehowfartheexactingofinterestformoneyislawful,accordingtotheprinciplesofourreligion。

  ItwasforbiddentotheJews,bythelawsofMoses,tolendatinteresttotheirbrethren,butitwaspermittedtolendtostrangers。Deut。chap。xxiii,ver。19,20。Thisisoneofthewisestpoliticalinstitutionstobemetwithinsoremoteantiquity,asweshallhereafterexplain。

  Intheprimitiveagesofchristianity,thelendingofmoneyatinterestwascertainlyreputedtobeunlawfulonmostoccasions。Thatspiritofcharitytoallwhowereinwant,wassoworkedinwiththedoctrineofourreligion,thataborrowerwasconstantlyconsideredtobeinthatsituation。Tradewaslittleknown;tradingmenweregenerallyilllookedupon;andthosewhodebatedsofarfromthespiritofthetimes,astothinkofaccumulatingwealthbytheuseoftheirmoney,commonlydegeneratedintousurers。

  Inthemiddlecenturies,whenamistakenzealanimatedchristianitywithamostungodlythirstforthebloodofinfidels,theJewswere,ineverynationinEurope,almosttheonlymoney-lenders。Thiscircumstancestillmoreengagedthechurchtodartherthunderagainstthispractice;andtheloanuponinterestnevertookrootamongchristians,untilaspiritoftradeandindustrysprungupinItalyinthetimeoftheLombards,andfromthencespreaditself,throughthechanneloftheHans-towns,overseveralnations。

  Thenthechurchbegantoopenhereyesandsawtheexpediencyofintroducingmanymodifications,inordertolimitthegeneralanathemawhichshehaddenouncedagainstthewholeclassofmoney-lenders。Atonetimeitwasdeclaredlawfultolendatinterest,whenthecapitalsharedanyrisqueinthehandsoftheborrower;atanother,itwasfoundallowable,whenthecapitalwasnotdemandablefromthedebtor,whilehepaidtheinterest;

  again,itwaspermitted,whenthedebtorwasdeclaredbysentenceofajudge,tobeinmorainacquittinghisobligation:atlast,itwaspermittedonbillsofexchange。Inshort,inmostRomancatholiccountries,interestisnowpermittedineveryinterestforcasealmost,exceptinobligationsincludingastipulationofsumsdemandableatanytimeafterthetermofpayment;anditisasyetnowhereconsideredtobesoessentialtoloan,astobedueonalldebtswhatsoever;notevenuponobligationspayableondemand。

  Expediencyandthegoodofsocietypoliticallyspeakingaretheonlyruleforjudging,whentheloanuponinterestshouldbepermitted,whenforbidden。Whilepeopleborrowedinorderonlytoprocureacirculatingequivalentforprovidingtheirnecessaries,untiltheycouldhavetimetodisposeoftheireffects;andwhiletherewasseldomanycertainprofittobemadebytheuseofthemoneyborrowed,asnow,byturningitintotrade,itwasverynaturaltoconsiderthelenderinanunfavourablelight;becauseitwassupposedthathismoney,haditnotbeenlent,musthaveremainedlockedupinhiscoffers。Butatpresent,whenweseesomanypeopleemployedinprovidingstoresofnecessariesforothers,which,withoutmoney,cannotbedone;weretheloanuponinterestforbidden,itwouldhavetheeffectoflockinguptheveryinstrumentmoneywhichisnecessaryforsupplyingthewantsofthesociety。Theloan,therefore,uponinterest,associetynowstandscomposed,isestablished,notinfavourofthelenders,butofthewholecommunity;andtakingthematterinthislight,noone,Isuppose,willpretendthatwhatisbeneficialtoawholesocietyshouldbeforbidden,becauseofitsbeingproportionablyadvantageoustosomeparticularmembersofit。

  Ifitbethenallowed,thattheloanuponinterestisagoodpoliticalinstitution,relativelytothepresentsituationofEuropeansocieties,thenextquestionis,todetermineaproperstandardforit,soastoavoidtheoppressionofusurers,ononehand,andontheother,toallowsuchareasonableprofittothelender,asmayengagehimtothrowhismoneyintocirculationforthecommonadvantage。

  Thisquestionleadsusdirectlytotheexaminationoftheprincipleswhichregulatetherateofinterest;andifwecandiscoveracertainrule,arisingfromthenatureofthings,andfromtheprinciplesofcommerce,whichmaydirectastatesmanhowtoestablishaproperregulationinthismatter,wemayconcludewithcertaintyconcerningtheexactlimits,betweenunlawfulandpinchingusury,exactedbyavicioussetofmen,whoprofitofthedistressofindividuals;andthatreasonableequivalentwhichmenhavearighttoexpectfortheuseoftheirmoney,lentforcarryingonthecirculationoftrade,andtheemploymentofthelowerclassesofapeoplewhomustsubsistbytheirindustryorlabour。

  Chap。IV

  OfthePrincipleswhichregulatetheRateofInterestWemustnowrecaltomindtheprinciplesofdemandandcompetition,sofullydeducedinthesecondbook,inordertoanswerthefollowingquestion,viz。

  Whatistheprinciplewhichregulates,atalltimes,thejustandadequaterateofinterestformoney,inanyparticularstate?

  Ianswer,Thatatalltimes,thereisineverystateacertainnumberofpersonswhohaveoccasiontoborrowmoney,andacertainnumberofpersonswhodesiretolend:thereisalsoacertainsumofmoneydemandedbytheborrowers,andacertainsumofferedtobelent。Theborrowersdesiretofixtheinterestaslowastheycan;thelendersseek,fromalikeprincipleofself-interest,tocarrytherateofitashighastheycan。

  Fromthiscombinationofinterestsarisesadoublecompetition,whichfluctuatesbetweenthetwoparties。Ifmorebedemandedtobeborrowed,thanthereisfoundtobelent,thecompetitionwilltakeplaceamongtheborrowers。Suchamongthemashavethemostpressingoccasionformoney,willofferthehighestinterest,andwillbepreferred。If,onthecontrary,themoneytobelentexceedthedemandoftheborrowers,thecompetitionwillbeupontheotherside。Suchofthelenders,ashavethemostpressingoccasiontodrawaninterestfortheirmoney,willofferitatthelowestinterest,andthisofferwillbeaccepted。

  Ineednotlaunchoutintoarepetitionofwhathasbeensaidconcerningtheinfluenceofdoublecompetition,infixingthepriceofcommodities;asIsupposetheseprinciplestobenowwellunderstood,andwellretained,bythosewhoreadthischapter;Ishallthereforeconfinemyselfheretowhatispeculiartothedemandformoney。

  Thepriceofcommoditiesisextremelyfluctuating:theyareeveryonecalculatedforparticularuses;moneyserveseverypurpose。Commodities,thoughofthesamekind,differingoodness:moneyisall,oroughttobeallofthesamevalue,relativelytoitsdenominations。Hencethepriceofmoneywhichiswhatweexpressbytheterminterestissusceptibleofafargreaterstabilityanduniformity,thanthepriceofanyotherthing。

  Wehaveshewninthe28thchapterofthesecondbook,inexaminingtheprincipleswhichregulatethepriceofsubsistence,thattheonlythingwhichcanfixastandardforit,isfrequentandfamiliaralienation。Thesameholdstrueofmoney。Werewetosupposeastate,whereborrowingandlendingarenotcommon,andwherethelawsfixnodeterminateinterestformoney,itwouldhardlybepossibletoascertaintherateofitatanytime。Thiswasthecaseofold。

  BeforethereignofHenryVIIIofEngland,in1545,therewasnostatuteregulatingtherateofinterest,inthatkingdom。Thereasonisveryplain。Inthosedaystherewaslittlecirculation,andtheborrowingofmoneyuponinterestwasconsideredasamortalsin。Theconsequenceofthiswas,thatusurers,havingnothingbutconsciencetorestrainthem,carriedthepriceoftheirmoneytoalevelwiththepressingoccasionofspendthrifts,whileothers,fromfriendship,lentfornointerestatall。Henryfixedtherateofinterestat10percentandhiscontemporary,FrancisIofFrance,in1522,whowasthefirstwhoborrowedmoneyinaregularmanneruponthetownhouseofParisfixedtheinterestatthe12thpenny,thatis,at81/3

  percent。

  Inthosedays,itwasimpossibleforastatesmantodetermineanyjustrateforinterest;andaccordinglywefindhistoryfilledwiththeextortionofusurers,ononehand,andtheviolenceandinjusticeofprincesandministerstowardsthosewhohadlentthemmoney,ontheother:wasitthenanywonder,thatlendingatinterestwasuniversallycriedoutagainst?Itreallyproducedverylittlegood,andwasthecauseofmanifoldcalamitiestoastate。WhenthePrinceborrowed,itwasinthemosturgentdistress:thosewhohadmoney,foresawthedangerofbeingplunderediftheyrefusedtolendittohim,andofbeingdefraudedassoonasthepublicdistresswasover:forthisreasontheyexactedthemostexorbitantinterest:theconsequencewas,thatthepeoplewereloadedwiththemostgrievoustaxes,andthetax-gathererswerethePrince’screditors,towhomsuchtaxeswereassigned。

  Inourdays,trade,industry,andacallformoney,enabletheborrowertoenrichhimself,tosupplythewantsofthestate,andtopayhisinterestregularly。

  Ifwecomparethetwosituations,weshallfindeverydisadvantageattendingtheformer,andeveryadvantageconnectedwiththelatter。

  Withoutgoodfaiththeircanbenocredit;withoutcredittherecanbenoborrowingofmoney,notrade,noindustry,nocirculation,nobreadforthelowerclasses,noluxury,noteventheconveniencesoflife,fortherich。Underthesecircumstances,therecanbenorulefortherateofinterest;

  becauseborrowingcannotbefrequentandfamiliar。

  Inproportion,therefore,asborrowingbecomesfrequentandfamiliar,theruleforfixingtherateofalegalinterestbecomesmorepracticabletoastatesman。Letmemakeastepfarther。

  Wehavesaid,thatitisthefluctuationofthedoublecompetitionbetweenborrowersandlenders,whichoccasionstheriseandfalloftherateofinterest;Imustnowpointouttheprincipleswhichoccasionthisfluctuation。

  Weretheinterestsoftradeandindustrysoexactlyestablished,astoproducethesameprofitoneverybranchofthem,themoneyborrowedforcarryingthemon,wouldnaturallybetakenatthesamerate;butthisisnotthecase:somebranchesaffordmore,somelessprofit。Inproportion,therefore,totheadvantagestobereapedfromborrowedmoney,theborrowersmayoffermoreorlessfortheuseofit。

  Besidestheclassofmenwhoborrowinordertoprofitbytheloan,thereisanotherclass,whoborrowinordertodissipate。

  Thefirstclassnevercanofferaninterestwhichexceedstheproportionoftheirgains:thesecondclass,findingnothingbutwantofcredittolimittheirexpence,becomeapreytousurers。

  Wereitnotthenuponaccountoftheselast,therewouldbenooccasionforastatutetoregulatetherateofinterest。Theprofitsontradewouldstrikeanaverageamongtheindustriousclasses;andthisaveragewouldfallandrise,inproportiontotheflourishingordecayofcommerce。

  Letusnextexaminetheprincipleswhichpreventthemoniedmenfromcommittingextortions,andwhichobligethemtolendtheirmoneyforthatrateofinterestwhichisinproportiontotheprofitsupontradeandindustry。

  Ineverycountrythereisfoundasumofmoneythatis,ofcirculatingvalue,nomatterwhethercoinorpaperproportionedtothetradeandindustryofit。Howthissumisdetermined,andhowitismadetoaugmentanddiminishinproportiontoindustry,wehavealreadyexplainedinthe26thchapterofthesecondbook:

  wearenowtoexaminesomeoftheconsequenceswhichresultfromtheaccidentalstagnationofanypartofittotheprejudiceofalienation;andwemustshewhowtheloanuponinterestisthemeansofthrowingitagainintocirculation。

  Thereareineverystatesomewhospendmore,andsomewhospendlessthantheirincome。Whatisnotspentmuststagnate;ormustbelenttothosewhospendmorethantheproduceoftheirownfunds。Werethefirstclassfoundsotopreponderate,astorequiremoremoneytoborrowthanallthatistobelent,theconsequencewouldbe,topreventtheborrowingofmerchants;toraiseinterestsohighastoextinguishtrade;andtodestroyindustry;andtheseresourcescomingtofail,foreigncommoditieswouldbebroughtin,whileexportationwouldbestopped,moneywoulddisappear,andallwouldfallintodecay。

  This,Ibelieve,isacasewhichseldomhappens;becausetheriseofinterestasstatesarenowformedhassomuchtheeffectofdepreciatingthevalueofeveryspeciesofsolidproperty,thatspendthriftsarequicklystrippedofit,bythegrowingaccumulationofthatcankerworm,interest;theirruinterrifiesmanyfromfollowingsohurtfulanexample,andtheirpropertyfallingintothehandsoftheotherclass,whospendlessthantheirincome;thesenewpossessorsintroduce,bytheirexample,amorefrugalsetofmanners。Thismaybethecaseincountrieswheretradeandindustryhavebeenintroduced;andwheretheoperationsofcredithavebeenabletodrawintocirculationalargequantityofsolidproperty,accordingtotheprinciplesdeducedinthechapterabovereferredto。Butinnationsofidleness,whocirculatetheircoinonly,andwhoaredeprivedoftheresourceofcredit;highinterestpreventsthemfromemergingoutoftheirsloth,andthelittletradetheyhave,continuestoproducegreatprofits,whichareincompatiblewithforeigncommerce:thismay,indeed,makethecointheyhavetocirculateforhome-consumption,butitcanbringnoaugmentationofwealthfromabroad。

  Ontheotherhand,whentradeandindustryflourish,andwhenamoniedinterestisformed,inconsequenceofthemeltingdownofsolidproperty,andstillmoreinconsequenceofaState’scontractinggreatdebts;werethemoney-lenderstoattempttoraisetherateofinteresttothestandardofthespendthrift,thedemandsoftrade,etc,wouldsoonbecutoff:thestagnationwouldthenswellsofastintheirhands,thatitwouldinamannerchoakthem,andinalittletimeinterestwouldfalltonothing。Whereasbycontentingthemselveswiththestandardoftrade,thelargestsuppliesprovidedfortheborrowerseasilyfindavent,withoutraisingtherateofinterestsohighastobehurtfultoanyinterestwithinthestate。

  Addtothis,thattheadvantageofrealizing,intolands,sounstableapropertyasmoney,mustnaturallythrowtheproprietorsofthemoneyintoacompetitionforthelandswhichdissipationbringstomarket;thus,byrisingthevalueoflands,themoniedmen,withtheirownhands,defeattheconsequencesofthedissipationofspendthrifts,andhurttheirowninterest,towit,theriseofthepriceofmoney。Fromacombinationofthesecircumstances,lendersbecomeobligedtopartwiththeirmoneyatthatrateofinterestwhichisthemostconsistentwiththatgoodofcommerce。

  Wehavehithertopreservedourcombinationsassimpleaspossible。Wehavesuggestednoextrinsicobstacletoborrowingandlending。Ifmoneybetobelent,andifpeoplebefoundwhoinclinetoborrow,wehavetakenitforgranted,thatcirculationwillgoon;andthatthestagnationsinthehandsofthelenders,willfindareadyventbythedissipationoftheotherclass:wemustnowmakestillastepfarther。

  Thespendthriftsmusthavecredit;thatis,theymusthaveitintheirpowertorepaywithinterestwhattheyhaveborrowed:

  anyimpedimenttocredit,willhavetheeffecteitherofdiminishingthedemandformoney,andconsequentlyofloweringtherateofinterest,orofintroducingunlawfulusury。Ifwesupposetherateofinterestwelldetermined,andusurypreventedbyaregularexecutionofgoodlaws,itisverycertain,thatastatesmanbyhurtingthecreditofextravagantpeople,willkeeptherateofinterestwithinduebounds。

  If,therefore,thelawsofanycountry,inourdays,appeardefective,astotheregulationofsecuritiesformoneylentuponthemortgageofsolidproperty,whiletherateofintereststandshigherthanisconsistentwiththegoodoftrade,andwithpubliccredit;weshouldbeslowinfindingfaultwithsuchadefect。

  Themotivesofstatesmenlieverydeep;anditisnotalwayspropertoexplainthem。Anexampleofsuchdefectsareentailsuponlands,andthewantofproperregistersformortgages。

  Didthedissipationoflandedmentendtopromoteforeigntrade,suchclogswouldbepernicious:butifthetendencyofdissipationbetopromotedomesticluxuryonly,andtherebytoraisethepriceoflabourandindustry,thecaseiswidelydifferent。Thisobservationismerelyincidental:ourobjectatpresentextendsnofartherthantoshew,thatthedissipationoflandedmen,andthecredittheyhavetoborrowmoney,influence,notalittle,therateofinterestineverymodernstate。

  Thesearethegeneralprincipleswhich,arisingfromthingsthemselves,withouttheinterpositionofastatesman,tendtoregulatetherateofinterestincommercialnations。

  Chap。V

  OftheRegulationofInterestbyStatuteFromtheprinciplesdeducedtheprecedingchapter,wehaveseenhow,withouttheaidofanylaw,theinterestofmoney,inatradingnation,becomesdetermined,fromnaturalcauses,andfromtheirresistibleeffectsofcompetition。

  Butasthereisnocountryintheworldsoentirelygiventocommerce,asnottocontaingreatnumbersofpeople,whoaretotallyunacquaintedwithit,someregulationwithrespecttotherateofinterestbecomesnecessaryinordertorestrain,ononehand,thefrenzyofthose,who,listeningtonothingbuttheviolenceoftheirpassions,arewillingtoprocuremoneyatanyrateforthegratificationofthem,letthepoliticalconsequencesoftheirdissipationproveeversohurtfultothestate;andontheother,toprotectthosewho,fromnecessity,maybeobligedtosubmittotheheavyoppressionoftheirusuriouscreditors。

  Lawsrestrainingusury,aredirectlycalculatedforthesakeofthosetwoclasses,notengagedincommerce,andindirectlycalculatedforcommerceitself;whichotherwisemightreceiveawoundthroughtheirsides。

  Inenteringuponthesubjectmentionedinthetitleofthischapter,Ithinkwemayagreeinthis,thathithertoallregulationsmadeconcerninginterest,havebeencalculatedeitherforbringingitdown,orforpreventingitsrise。Thedistresswhichmaycomeuponastate,byitsfallingtoolow,isaphaenomenonwhichhasnotyetmanifesteditselfinanymodernstate,byanysymptomIcanatpresentrecollect。

  Nowifitbetrue,asIthinkithasbeenproved,thattheoperationsofdemandandcompetitionworkirresistibleeffectsindeterminingtherateofinterestincommercialstates;thestatesmanwhoisabouttomakearegulation,mustkeeptheseprinciplesconstantlyinhiseye。

  Ifweexaminethewritingsofthosewhohavetreatedofthissubjectwithintelligenceamongwhom,Ithink,SirJosiahChildhasarighttostandintheforemostrank,weshallfindverylittleattentionbestoweduponthatmostnecessaryandrulingprinciple,competition。

  Helaysitdownasanaxiom,thatlowinterestisthesouloftrade,inwhichheiscertainlyright;butheseemstothink,thatitisinthepowerofalegislature,bystatute,tobringinterestdowntothatlevelwhichismostadvantageoustotrade;

  andinthisIdifferfromhim。Imustdohimthejusticetosay,thathenowheredirectlyaffirmsthisproposition;butbysuggestingnoneoftheinconvenienceswhichmayfollowuponanarbitraryreductionofinterestbystatute,heleaveshisreaderatlibertytosuppose,thattheloweringofitissolelyinthehandsofastatesman。

  Itisveryplain,fromthehistoryhehasgivenusofthesuccessiveratesofinterestinEngland,from10to6percentthatwithouttheinterpositionofstatutes,suchdiminutionswouldnot,inthatperiod,havetakenplace,fromtheprincipleofcompetition:butIamnotsoclearthat,atthistime,whentradeissowellunderstood,andcreditsogenerallyestablishedinmanynationsofEurope,thatalikeadministrationwouldworkeffectsequallyadvantageous。

  ItiswithgreatdiffidenceIpresumetodifferfromChilduponthissubject;andIfindasensiblesatisfactioninperceivingthatuponthewhole,myprinciplesbringmesoveryneartohissentimentsonthismatter。

  ThestrongargumentsinfavourofChild’sopinion,aregroundeduponfacts。Hesays,thatwheninterestwasbroughtdownbystatute,1625,from10to8percentinsteadofproducinganybadeffect,ithadthatofbringingitstilllowerimmediatelyafterwards;andthesamethinghappened,anno1650,whenitwasreducedasecondtimebystatute,from8to6percent,atwhichrateitstoodatthetimehewrote。ThesefactsIgivecreditto,andshallnowaccountforthem,fromtheconsequencesofsuddenrevolutions。

  Whenalawismadeforthereductionofinterest,alldebtorsimmediatelyprofitbyit。Uponthis,thecreditorsmusteithersubmit,orcallintheircapitals。Iftheysubmit,landimmediatelyrisesinitsvalue。Iftheycallintheircapitals,theymusthaveanoutletforlendingthemagain,beyondthelimitsofthejurisdictionofthelegislature。Nowthisoutletwasnotthentobefound;becausecreditwasnowherewellestablished,exceptinHolland,whereinterestwasstilllower。

  Theywere,therefore,obligedtosubmit,andthusinterestwasviolentlybroughtdownbystatute;andagreatadvantageresultedfromittothecommercialinterestsofEngland。

  Thesubsequentfallofinterest,inthenaturalway,isthuseasilyaccountedfor。

  Theconsequenceofloweringtheinterest,was,thatthepriceoflandroseseveralyearsinpurchase:thelandedmen,whohadlonggroanedundertheheavyinterestof10percentfindingtheirlandsrisefrom12years’purchaseto15,uponreducingtheinterestto8percentsoldoffpartoftheirlands,andclearedthemselves。Thenaturalconsequenceofthiswas,tomakemoneyregorgeinthehandsofthemoniedmen;todiminishthenumberofborrowers;andconsequently,tobringtherateofintereststilllower。

  Onesuddenrevolutionproducesanother。Wheninterestisbroughtdownbystatute,thepriceoflandmustrisebyajerk;

  andlandedmenwillsuddenlyprofitofthechangeintheirfavour。Whenitfallsgently,byanaturalrevolutioninthestateofdemand,theeffectsaremoreinsensible;thesharpersightedonlyprofitofit;others,fromexpectationofastillgreaterriseinthepriceoftheirlands,neglecttosellintheproperpointoftime;andmayperhapsbedisappointedfromanewfluctuationinfavourofmoney。ThisisatpresentactuallythecaseinGreatBritain,sincethepeaceof1762。Iwritein1764。

  ThesefactsspeakstronglyinfavourofChild’sopinion,namely,thatitisexpedienttohaverecoursedirectlytothestatute,wheneverthereisaprospectofadvancingtheinterestsoftradebyareductionofinterest。

  Itisimpossibletoreplytomattersoffact:all,therefore,Ihavetoallegeinfavourofmyownopinion,is,thatitismoreconsistentwiththeveryprinciplesinwhichbothChildandI

  agree;itimpliesnosuddenrevolution,andwill,inashorttime,operatethesameeffect。

  Themethodofproceeding,accordingtomyprinciples,isshortlythis:

  Sinceitisagreedonallhands,thatlowinterestisthesouloftrade,andthefirmestbasisofpubliccredit;thatitrisesinproportiontothedemandofborrowers,andsinksinproportionasmoneyismadetoregorgeinthehandsofthemoniedinterest;

  Thestatesmanshouldsetoutbysuchstepsofadministrationaswilldiscourageborrowinginthosewhoemploytheirmoneyinprodigalityanddissipation,asfarasmaybeconsistentwiththeinterestofthelowerclassesemployedinsupplyinghomeconsumption,accordingtotheprincipleslaiddowninthesecondbook。Heshouldabstainfromborrowinghimself,andevenfromcreatingnewoutletsformoney,exceptfromthemostcogentmotives。Bythishewill,inashorttime,gentlyreducetherateofinterest。Thenbystatutehemaybringitdownalittle,butnotsoverylowastheforegoingoperationsmayhavereducedit;

  contentinghimselfwithhavingfartherrestrictedtheextentoftheordinaryfluctuations。

  Asforexample:letussupposeinterestlimitedbylawto5

  percent。andthatbygoodmanagementthestatemaybeenabledtoborroweasilyat3percent。Ibelievetherewouldresultanotableadvantage,inreducingthelegalrateto4percentandwereitbroughtdownto3percenttheremightfollowaverygreatinconveniencetolandedmen,incaseawarshouldsuddenlyoccasionarevolutioninfavourofmoney。

  ThedifferencethenbetweenChildandme,is,thatIammorescrupulousthanhe,inintroducingrestraintintopoliticaloeconomy;andmyonlyreasonagainstapplyingthestatute,asheproposes,isforfearoftheimmediatebadeffectswhichmightfollowinmanywaysimpossibletobeforeseenuponasuddenandviolentrevolution,inapointsoexcessivelydelicateaspubliccredit。

  Inhisdays,creditwasnotsowellestablished,norwasitstretchedasatpresent:itwasmoreaccustomedtoviolentshocks,andcouldbeararoughertreatment。Butinordertocomethebettertoathoroughknowledgeofthismatter,letusexaminewhatmightbetheconsequence,ifGreatBritainshould,atthistime,bringdown,bystatute,therateofinterestbelowthelevelofthestocks,whichItaketobethebestrulefordeterminingthepresentvalueofmoney;andthisisalsothebestmethodofexaminingtheexpediencyofChild’smethodofreducinginterest,underthepresentstateofallourpoliticalcircumstances。

  Chap。VI

  WhatwouldbetheConsequenceofreducing,byaBritishStatue,thelegalInterestofMoneybelowthepresentleveloftheStocks?

  WhenGreatBritainborrowsmoneyuponthepublicfaith,therateofinterestisalwaysstipulated,andthesestipulationsmustbereligiouslyfulfilled,orcreditwillbeatanend。

  Theregulationsthenproposedtobemade,mustrefertocontractsofloanenteredintobyprivatepartiesonly。

  Thecurrentvalueofmoney,Ithink,isbesttobedeterminedbythepriceofstocks。Ifa4percentsellsatpar,moneymaybesaidtobethenat4percent。Ifthesamestockfallto89,thenthevalueofmoneyrisestonear41/2:ifthesamestockriseto114,thenthevalueofmoneyfallstoabout31/2;andsoinproportion。

  According,therefore,asstockisfoundtorise,thepriceofmoneyfalls,andviceversa。

  Suppose,then,thepriceofmoneytobeat4percentandthatgovernmentshouldpassalaw,forbiddinganymantolendatabove3percentwhatwouldbetheconsequence?ThisisexactlytheexpedientproposedbyChild:moneythenwasat6percentandheproposes,byalaw,tobringit,allatonce,to4percentwithoutallegingthatmoneywasthencommonlygotbyprivateconventionatsolowarate。

  Wouldnottheconsequencebe,thatthecreditorsofprivatepeoplewoulddemandtheirmoney,inordertoget4percentinbuyingstock,andwouldnotthisadditionaldemandforstocksmakethemrise?Ianswerintheaffirmative,unlessmoneycouldbeemployedabroad,soastoproduceatleast4percenttothelenders,freeofallchargeofcommission,etc。Ifitcouldnot,Ihavelittledoubt,butthatmoneywouldsoonfalltothelegalinterestof3percentlandwouldriseto40yearspurchase;andlandedmenwouldprofitoftherise,asChildsayswasthecaseinhistime。Thewholeinconveniencewouldbelimitedtotheimmediateeffectsofthesuddenrevolution;whichwouldoccasionsogreatademanduponthelandedinterestforthecapitalsduebythemastoreducethemtoanutterincapacityofansweringit。

  Thismightbe,insomemeasure,prevented,byaclauseintheact,allowingacertaintimefortheliquidationoftheirdebts。

  Butwhowillpretendtoforetelltheimmediateconsequencesofsogreatastagnationofcredit,andborrowingonlandsecurity?Thepursesofallmoniedpeople,would,forsometimeatleast,befastshutagainsttheirdemand。Whatashockagain,wouldthisbetoallinlandtrade,whatadiscouragementtoallthemanufacturinginterest,whatdistressuponallcreditorsforaccountsfurnished,anduponthosewhosupplydailywants!I

  think,thatalthoughinayearortwo,thefirsteffectsmightcometodisappear,andanotableadvantageresult,inthemain,tothecommercialinterestofGreatBritain,yetthedistressintheintervalmightprovesohurtful,astorenderitquiteintolerable。Thecommonpeoplewholivebytheluxuryoftherich,inthecityofLondon,andwhoareconstantlyactuatedbytheimmediatefeelingsofpresentinconveniences,mightloseallpatience;andbeingblownintoaferment,bytheaddressofthemoniedinterestwhoseconditionwouldbemadetosufferbytheschememightthrowthestateintoconfusion,andevenimpressthenationwithabelief,thathighinterestformoney,insteadofbeinghurtful,wasessentialtotheirprosperity。

  Ihavesaidabove,thatifwesupposethatthemoneydrawnfromdebtors,couldnotbeplacedabroad,freeofalldeductions,atarateequaltothethenvalueofmoneysupposedforthesakeofanexample,tobeat4percent,thenmoneywouldfallto3

  percentandthestockswouldriseinproportion。

  Butletussupposewhatperhapsisthematteroffactthattheextensiveoperationsoftradeandcredit,doactuallyfixanaverageforthepriceofstocks,fromthevalueofmoneyinothernationsinEurope。Wouldnotthentheconsequenceofbringingdowntherateoflegalinterest,belowthislevel,be,tosendoutofthekingdomallthemoneynowcirculatingonprivatesecurity,realandpersonal?Wouldnotthisdestroyallprivatecreditatoneblow?Woulditnothavetheeffectofpreventing,amongindividuals,theloanuponinterestaltogether?WhatwouldbecomeofthebankofEngland,andallotherbanks,whosepaperincirculationisallinthehandsofprivatepeople?Isnoteverymanwhohasabanknote,acreditoronthebank?Andwouldnotthesameinterestwhichmovedothercreditorstoexacttheirdebts,undersuchcircumstances,alsomovemanyholdersofbanknotestodemandpaymentofthem?Wouldnotarunofthisnature,forafewweeksonly,throwthewholenationintothemostdreadfuldistress?Maywenotevensuppose,thatuponsuchanoccasion,themoniedinterestfromacertaintyofdisappointingtheintentionofgovernmentinmakingthelawmightformaconcertamongthemselvestolockuptheirmoney,evenalthoughitshouldremaindeadintheirhandsforafewmonths?Whatwouldthenbecomeoftheimprovementofland?Isthereanindustriousfarmeranywheretobemetwith,whodoesnotborrowmoney,whichhecansoprofitablyturntoaccountuponhisfarm,eventhoughhereceiveitatthehighestlegalinterest?Theseandmanymoreinconveniencesmightmanifestthemselves,weregovernmenttoforcedownthevalueofmoney,beyondtheordinaryoperationsofdemandandcompetition:andtowhatpurposehaverecoursetoauthority,whenitismostcertain,thatwithoutanysuchexpedientthesameendmaybecompassed?

  Ifitbetrue,asIbelieveitis,thatthefunds,orpublicdebtsofastatewherecreditiswellestablished,arecommonlynegotiatedabroad;theremust,fromsuchnegotiationsresultanaverageforthevalueofmoney,bytheoperationsofcreditoverthecommercialworld:andifitbetrue,thatnolawcanbeframedsoastorestrainmercantilepeople,andthosewhotradeinmoney,fromturningittothebestaccount;thenallthatshouldbeproposedbygovernment,is,topreservethevalueofitathome,withinthisstandard。Forwhichpurpose,nothingmoreisnecessarythantopreventthecompetitionofthedissipatingclassofinhabitants,fromdisturbingtheratewhichcommercemayestablishfromtimetotime。Thisisaccomplishedbythemethodsabovehintedat,andwhichinthenextchaptershallbemorelargelyinsistedon。If,byprudentmanagement,theconventionalrateofinterest,canthusbebroughtbelowthelegal,thentheremaybenoharmindiminishingthelatterbystatue,nothoweverquitesolowastheconventionalstandard;butsoastoleaveareasonablelatitudeforgentlefluctuationsaboveit。FromwhatI

  havesaid,IstillthinkIhadreasontoobjecttoChild’splanforforcingdowntheinterestofmoneybystatute:andhadhelivedtothepresenttime,Iampersuadedhewouldhavecomeintothisopinion。

  Chap。VII

  MethodsofbringingdowntheRateofInterest,inConsequenceofthePrinciplesofDemandandCompetitionIhopetheargumentsusedintheforegoingchapterwillnotbeconstruedasanapologyforthehighinterestofmoney。

  IentirelyagreewithSirJosiahChild,thatlowinterestisthesouloftrade;themostactiveprincipleforpromotingindustry,andtheimprovementofland;andarequisite,withoutwhichitishardlypossiblethatforeigncommercecanlongbesupported。

  ThispropositionItaketobeatthistimeuniversallyadmittedtobetrue;anddidthereremain,concerningit,theleastdoubtinthemindofanyone,thewritingsofmany,muchbetterqualifiedthanIcanpretendtobe,andamongtherestthoseoftheauthorjustnowcited,aresufficientlycapabletoremoveit。Ishallnotthereforetroublemyreaderwithachapteruponthishead,butonlyobserve,thatthetermshighandlowareconstantlyrelative。Heretherelationmustbeunderstoodtoregardotherstates,becausewhenwespeakofarateofinterest,wearesupposedtomeansomethinggeneralinthecountrywearespeakingof:accordingly,ifwecouldsupposethat,withinthesamestate,therateofinterestshouldbelowerinonecitythananywhereelse,thiscircumstancewouldgiveanadvantagetosuchacityinallitsmercantileoperations。

  Imustfartherobserve,forthesakeofconnectingthispartofoursubjectwithourgeneralplan,thatthelowinterestformoneyismostessentialtosuchstatesascarryonthemostextensiveforeigncommerce。

  Intheinfancyofindustry,andbeforetradecomestobeestablished,itisverynaturalthatthecoinofthecountryshouldbefoundinagreatmeasurelockedupintreasures:highinteresttendstobringitforth,andinthisrespectworksagoodeffect。

  Inproportionasalienationaugments,moneymaybemultiplied,bythemeltingdownofsolidproperty,ashasbeenexplained;andthenthebusinessofastatesmanwillbetocontriveexpedientsforbringingtherateofitaslowaspossible,inordertosupportforeigntrade,andtorivalallneighbouringnations,whereinterestishigher。Whenforeigntradeagaincomestodecline,fromthemultiplicationofabusesintroducedbyluxury,lowintereststillcontinuestobeuseful,forsupportingpubliccredit,sonecessaryfordefendinganationagainstherenemies。

  Ifmoneyconsistedmerelyinthepreciousmetals,whicharenottobefoundineverycountry,butmustbepurchasedwiththeproduceofindustry,andbroughtfromfar;andifnootherexpedientcouldbefallenupontosupplytheirplacefortheusesofcirculation;thenthepossessorsofthesemetalswouldinamannerbemasterstoestablishfortheuseofthemwhatrateofinteresttheythoughtfit。

  Butifthisbenotthecase,andifmoneycanbemadeofpaper,tothevalueofallthesolidpropertyofanation,asfarasoccasionisfoundforit,bytheownersofthatproperty,

  theuseofthemetalswillbeinamannerreducedtothatofservingasastandard,forascertainingthevalueofthedenominationsofmoneyofaccompt;perhapsforfacilitatingthecirculationofsmallsums,andforpayingabalanceoftradetoothernations。

  Whenthiscomestobethecase,astatesmanhasitinhispowertoincreaseordiminishtheextentofcreditandpapermoneyincirculation,byvariousexpedients,whichgreatlyinfluencetherateofinterest。

  Theprogressofcredithasbeenveryrapidsincethebeginningofthiscentury。Thishasbeenalmostentirelyowingtothemechanicalcontrivancesoftradingmen。Lawgivershavehithertohadbutimperfectnotionsconcerningthenatureofit;

  andtherestillremains,inthewombofnature,somemightygenius,borntogovernacommercialnation,whoalonewillbeabletosetitonitstrueprinciples。Letusinthemeantimespeculateconcerningthem。

  Wehavesaid,andeveryonefeels,thatinterestfallsinproportiontotheredundancyofmoneytobelent。

  Nowwhatisthismoneybutproperty,ofonekindorother,thrownintocirculation?Ispeakoftradingnations,whoarenotconfinedtothequantityoftheirspeciealone。

  Whenamanofpropertywantsmoney,mayhenotgotoabank,whichlendsuponmortgage,andbypledginghissecurity,receivemoney,whichisinthesameinstantcreatedforhisuse?Donotthosenotescirculateaslongastheyarefoundnecessaryforcarryingontheaffairsofthenation?thatistosay,theaccomptsofdebtorsandcreditorsofalldenominations;andassoonasthequantityofthemexceedsthisproportion,theystagnate,andreturnonthedebtorsinthem,thebank,whoisenabledtorealizethem,becausetheoriginalsecurityisstillintheirhands,whichwasatfirstpledgedwhenthenoteswereissued。Thisrealizationiscommonlymadeinthemetals;becausetheyarethemoneyoftheworld:theyarerealandtrueriches,asmuchasland;andtheyhavethisadvantageoverland,thattheyaretransportableeverywhere。

  Now,doesitnotappearevident,thatwhatwehavebeendescribingisaround-aboutoperation,whichitispossibletoshorten?

  Ibegofmyreader,toattendtoonething;namely,thatIamnotheretreatingof,orproposingaplan,butlabouringtodeduceprinciplesinanintricatesubject。

  Isay,whenlandedmengotosuchabank,andreceivepaperforalandsecurity,thatthisoperationmaybeshortened。

  Donotthenoteshegetsstandthoughthisbenotexpressed

  uponthesecurityofhisland?Now,cananymanassignanyotherreasonbutcustom,whyhisownnotes,caringexpresslyintheirbosomthesamesecurity,mightnotbeissued,withouthisbeingobligedtointerposethebankbetweenthepublicandhimself:Andforwhatdoeshepaythisinterest?Notbecausehehasgratuitouslyreceivedanyvaluefromthebank,sinceinhisobligationhehasgivenafullequivalentforthenotes;buttheobligationhehasgivencarriesinterest,andthenotescarrynone。Why?Becausetheonecirculateslikemoney,theotherdoesnot。Forthisadvantage,therefore,ofcirculation,notforanyadditionalvalue,doesthelandedmanpayinteresttothebank。

  Hadlandedmen,andnotmerchants,inventedthismethodofturningtheirpropertyintocirculation,andhadtheybeenallassembledinonebody,withalegislativeauthority,Iimaginetheywouldhavehadwitenoughtofindoutthatalandbankwasathingpracticableinitsnature。

  Supposetheyshouldagreethatalltheirlandsshouldbeletbytheacre,andthatlandpropertyshouldbeesteemedatacertainnumberofyearspurchase,inproportiontotherateofinterestatthetime,wherewouldbethegreatdifficultyinpayinginlands?

  Thisismerelyahint,towhichathousandobjectionsmaybemade,asmattersstand:allIsay,is,thatthereisnothinghereagainstprinciples;andthoughinconveniencesmightresulttothelandedinterest,ineverywaysuchaplancouldbelaiddown;yetstilltheseinconvenienceswouldhardlycounterbalancethatoflandedmen’sbeingobligedtopayinterestforeverypennytheyborrow。

  Itisdemanded,whatadvantagewouldresulttothenationfromsucharegulation?

  Ianswer,thatbyitalltheborrowingsoflandedmenwouldbestruckoutofthecompetitionatthemoney-market。Themoniedinterestalonewouldborrowamongthemselvesforthepurposesoftrade,formoniedmendonotborrowtosquander,andlandedmenwouldconsequentlypaywiththeirownpaper,ineverycase,wherenowtheyborrowinordertopay。Thusinterestwouldberegulatedbythedemandsoftrade,andtherateofitwouldnotbedisturbedbythecompetitionofspendthrifts。

  Whocansayhowfartheconsequencesofsuchaschememightreach?Mightnotlandedmenbeginintimetoissuenotesbywayofloan,ataveryinconsiderableinterest?ButIamnotdisposedtocarrymyspeculationsfarther:perhapswhathasbeensaidmayappearsufficientlyaerial。

  Ifastatesmanshallfindeverymodificationofthisideaimpracticable;eitherfromhisownwantofpower,orofskill,or,whichismoreprobable,fromtheoppositionofthemoniedinterest;hemusttakeothermeasuresforstrikingout,asmuchaspossible,thecompetitionofspendthriftsinthemoney-market。

  Entails,andlamesecurities,aregoodexpedients;thoughtheyareproductiveofmanyinconveniences。Hisownfrugaloeconomyinstateaffairswillgomuchfartherthananysuchtriflingexpedients。

  Didanationenjoyingpeace,althoughindebtedperhaps140

  millionssterling,beginbypayingoffbut2percentoftheircapitalyearly,besidesthecurrentinterest;whilenoneighbouringstatewasborrowingany;whatwouldinterestfalltoinashorttime!Itmaybeanswered,thattheconsequencewouldbe,toenrichothernations;becausethemoneyregorgingathome,wouldbesentabroad。TowhichIreply,byaskinghowanystatecanbeenrichedbytheirborrowing?Andinwhatdoessuchlendingtoforeignersdifferfromthenation’spayingofftheirforeigncreditors?Willnotthereturnofinterestfromabroadcompensate,protanto,thesumssentoutforthelikepurpose?

  Butifitbesaid,thattheconsequencewillbetoenableothernationstobringdowntheirownrateofinterest;Iallowittobeso;andsomuchthebetter,aslongasitremainsproportionallylowerwithus;whichitmustdo,aslongaswecanlendabroad。Wehavesaid,andIbelievewithtruth,thatascreditisnowextended,ageneralaverageisstruckeverywhereuponthevalueofmoneywellsecured,consequently,thelowerthatinterestisreducedabroad,thelowerstillwillitremainathome,aslongasmerchantsandexchangersdosubsist。

  Fromthiscircumstanceoftheaverageontherateofinterest,theDutchmust,Ithink,havelostthegreatadvantagetheyformerlyenjoyed,fromthelowrateofitinHolland,relativelytoothernations。

  InChild’stime,theDutchwerefamiliarlybuyingupsugarsinLondon,abovethepricepaidbyEnglishsugar-bakers;and,notwithstandingtheadditionalfreightandcharges,theygrewrichbytheirtrade,whiletheotherswerehardlymakinganyprofit。Thisheaccountsforfromthelowrateoftheirinterest。

  HesupposesbothDutchandEnglishtohavecarriedonthistradewithborrowedmoney;forwhichthefirstpaid3percentandtheother6percent。

  Butatpresent,wereitpossibletoget6percentformoneyinLondon,whatDutchmanwouldlendhisfatherashillingat3

  percent?TheEnglishstocksareascurrentlyboughtandsold,nay,allthestockjobbingtricksarepractisedwiththesamesubtletyatAmsterdamasinChange-Alley:fromwhichIconclude,thatagreatpartoftheadvantageoflowinterestisnowlosttothatnation;andIconcludefarther,thatitisthecommoninterestofalltradingnationstobringinterestaslowaspossibleeverywhere。

  Anothercauseofhighinterestproceedsfromcertainclogslaiduponcirculation,whichflowmerelyfromcustomandprejudice。Ofthisnatureistheobligationlaidupondebtorstopayinthemetals,nothingbutcoinbeingalegaltender。

  Theonlyreasonforsucharegulationwastheprecariousnessofcreditinformertimes。Wereallthecirculatingpaperinanationsecuredbylaw,eitheruponthelandsorrevenueofthecountryappropriatedforthatpurpose,therecouldbenoinjusticeorinconvenienceinmakingpapersosecuredalegaltenderinallpayments。Again,howextraordinarymustitappeartoanyreasonableman,thatthesamepaperwhichpassesononesideofariver,runningthroughthesamecountry,shouldnotpassonitsoppositebank?

  Thereasonofthisisindeedveryplain:thesubalternjurisdictionsoneachsidearedifferent;andthedebtorsinthepaperaredifferent:butifthepaperofbothstooduponasecurityequallygood,whatistohinderbothtobereceivedasalegaltenderinallpaymentsoverthekingdom?Shouldnotlittleprivateobjectsofprofitamongbankerswhoaretheservantsofthestate,andwhoaresowellpaidfortheirservicebeover-ruled,whentheconsequencesoftheirdisputesarefoundtobesohurtful?Butofthismore,whenwecometospeakofbanks。

  Theonlyoccasionwherealargequantityofcoinisnecessaryintheliquidationofpaper,isforpaymentofthebalanceoftradewithforeignnations。Ofthisalsoweshalltreatmoreatlarge,whenwecometothedoctrineofexchange。Butsurelynothingcanbesoilljudged,astocreateanimaginarybalancewithinthesamestate;orrather,topermitmoney-jobberstocreateit;attheexpenceofraisinginterest,andhurtingtrade,intheveryplaceswhereitstandsmostinneedofencouragement。

  Fromtheseprinciples,andotherswhichnaturallyflowfromthem,mayastatesmansteeraverycertaincourse,towardsbringingtherateofinterestaslowastheprosperityoftraderequires,ortheprinciplesofdoublecompetitionbetweenborrowersandlenderswillpermit。

  Chap。VIII

  IstheRateofInterestthecertainmeasureoftheStateofCommerce?

  Somepoliticalwritersarefondofeveryexpedienttoreducewithinanarrowcompassmanyquestions,whichbeinginvolvedincombinations,cannotbereducedtooneprinciple。ThisthrowsthemintowhatIcallsystems;ofwhichwehaveanexampleinthequestionnowbeforeus。

  Thereisnothingmoredifficultthantodeterminehowfarcommercerunsfavourably,andhowfarunfavourablyforanation。

  Thiswouldnotbethecase,weretherateofinterestthecertainmeasureofit。Ihavefoundithoweveradvanced,thatnothingmoreisnecessarytobeknown,inordertoestimatetherelativeprofitsupontheforeigntradeoftwonations,thantocomparethecommonrateofinterestinboth,andtodecidethepreferenceinfavourofthatnationwhereitisfoundtobelowest。

  Wemaysayconcerningthisproposition,asconcerningthecourseofexchange;thatthelownessofinterestandofthepriceofexchangearebothexceedinglyfavourabletotrade;buttheyarenoadequatemeasureoftheprofitsarisingfromit。

  Thebestargumentinfavourofthisopinionwithregardtointerestis,thatthenationwhichsellsthecheapestatforeignmarketsisconstantlypreferred;and,consequently,wheretheuseofmoneyisthelowest,themerchantcansellthecheapest。

  Ianswer,thatthisconsequencewouldbejust,werealltradecarriedonwithborrowedmoney,werethedifferenceofthepriceofthematerialsorfirstmatter,theeaseofprocuringthem,thepromptitudeofpayments,theindustryofthemanufacturer,andhisdexterity,allreckonedfornothing。Butsuchadvantagesarefrequentlyfoundinthesearticles,astobemorethansufficienttocounterbalancetheadditionalinterestwhichmaybepaidforthemoneyemployedintrade。Thisissotrue,thatweseethedexterityaloneoftheworkmanlivinginanexpensivecapital,wherethechargeoflivingmaybedoubleofwhatitisinthecountryenablinghimtoundersellhiscompetitorseverywhere:

  thesamemaybetruewithregardtotheotherarticles。Farther,howabsurdisittosay,thatalltradeiscarriedonwithborrowedmoney?Averyinconsiderablepartoftradeiscarriedonwithborrowedmoney,inanycountryinEurope;andthatpart,whichiscarriedonwithborrowedmoney,isnotsomuchcloggedbythehighrateofinterest,asbywantofpunctualityinpayments。Amerchantwhocanturnhismoneyinthreemonths,borrowsascheaplyat6percentasanotherwhoturnshisinsixmonths,whenheborrowsat3percent。

  Theobjectoftradeisproduceandmanufacture。Thesearepreparedforthemarketbyfarmersandtradesmen。Letuscomparethevalueofthem,whensoldatmarkettothemerchant,withtheinterestofthemoneyborrowedbythefarmersandtradesmen,inordertocarryontheirindustry,andweshallfindthattheinterestpaidbythem,bearshardlyanyproportionatall,tothevalueofwhattheyproduce。Example。Asheepborrowsnomoneyinordertoproducewool;spinnersandweaversborrownomoneyinordertoenablethemtospinandtoweave。Thusthewholemanufacturecomestomarketwithoutanychargeforinterest。

  Dowenotseeeveryday,thatingeniousworkmen,whoobtaincreditforverysmallsums,aresoonenabled,bythemeansoftheirownindustry,toproduceasurprisingvalueinmanufactures,andnotonlytosubsist,buttoincreaseinriches?

  Theinteresttheypayforthemoneyborrowedisinconsiderable,whencomparedwiththevalue,createdasitwerebytheproperemploymentoftheirtimeandtalents。

  Ifitbesaid,thatthisisavagueassertion,supportedbynoproof;Ianswer,thatthevalueofaman’sworkmaybeestimatedbytheproportionbetweenthemanufacturewhenbroughttomarket,andthefirstmatter。Nothingbutthefirstmatter,andtheinstrumentsofmanufacture,canbeconsideredastheobjectsofborrowedmoney;unlesswegosofarastoestimatethenourishment,andeveryexpenceofthemanufacturer,andsupposethatthesearealsosuppliedfromborrowedmoney。Toaffirmthis,wouldbeturningargumentsintocavil。

  Theobject,therefore,ofborrowedmoneyforcarryingontrade,ismorerelativetothemerchantthantothemanufacturer。

  Borrowingisnecessaryforcollectingallthisproductandmanufactureintothehandsofmerchants。This,nodoubt,isverycommonlytheoperationofcredit:interestofmoney,here,comesin,toindemnifythegiverofcredit,fortheuseofhismoney:

  butthisinterestisduefromthetimeonly,whentheborrowerpaysthosefromwhomhecollects,tothetimehereceivespaymentfromthosetowhomhesells。Thisintervalitisofthehighestimportancetothemerchanttoshorten。Inproportionasitislong,andinproportiontotherateofinterest,hemustraisehisprofits;andinproportionaspaymentsarequickandregular,andinterestlow,hemaydiminishthem。Whethermerchantsdoregulatetheirprofits,inallcommercialnations,accordingtotheexactproportionoftherespectiveratesofinterest,andpromptitudeofpaymentsamongthem;orwhetherthesearedeterminedbythecircumstancesofdemandandcompetitionintheseveralforeignmarketswherethetradeiscarriedon,Ileavetomerchantstodetermine。AllIshallremarkis,thatawellfoundedcredit,andpromptpayments,willdomoreservicetotrade,thananyadvantagetradingmencanreapfromthedifferentrateofinterestindifferentcountries。

  Itmustnotbeconcludedfromthis,thatlowinterestisnotaverygreatadvantagetotrade;allIcontendfor,is,thatitisnotthemeasureofit。

  Anothercircumstancewhichputsnations,inourdays,muchmoreonalevelthantheywereinformertimes,Ihavealreadyhintedat。Itisthatgeneralaveragewhichthegreatloadsofnationaldebts,andtheextensionofcredit,throughtheseveralnationsofEurope,whopayannuallylargesumsofinteresttotheircreditors,hasestablished。LetmesupposetheDutch,forexample,tohavefixed,byplacard,therateoftheirinterestat3percent。Isay,thatassoonasthegeneralaverageofinterestcomestostandabovethisrate,fromthepriceofpublicfundsinEnglandandFrance,wemaysafelyconclude,thattheirtradecannolongerbecarriedonwithanyveryconsiderablesumofmoneyborrowedat3percent。Theconsequencethenmustbe,tosendthemoneywhichregorgesinthehandsofthefrugalDutch,intoothercountries,whereitcanproduceabetterreturn,exclusiveofallexpencesofremittinganddrawing。WhattheconsequencesofthislendingtoforeignersmaybetoHolland,shallbeafterwardsexamined。

  Toconclude;Ireckonitwillbefound,thatwhathadledsometobelievethatlowinterestisthemeasureofcommerce,hasbeenowingtothis;thatinsomeofthemostcommercialcountriesandcitiesinteresthasbeenfoundtobelowerthaningreatkingdoms:butthis,Iimagine,isentirelyowingtothefrugalityoftheirmanners,whichcutsofftheborrowingoftherichforthesakeofdissipation。Whenthisisaccomplished,tradealonewillabsorbthestagnationsofthefrugal,andthepriceofinterestwillfalltothatratewhichisthebestproportionedtotheprofitsuponcommerce;butthisalsowillbelessandlessthecaseeveryday,inproportiontothecreditandcirculationofpublicfundsindifferentnations。

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