Butif，saidhe，theindividualisliketheidea，mustnottheideaalsobeliketheindividual，insofarastheindividualisaresemblanceoftheidea？Thatwhichislike，cannotbeconceivedofasotherthanthelikeoflike。
Impossible。
Andwhentwothingsarealike，musttheynotpartakeofthesameidea？
Theymust。
Andwillnotthatofwhichthetwopartake，andwhichmakesthemalike，betheideaitself？
Certainly。
Thentheideacannotbeliketheindividual，ortheindividualliketheidea;foriftheyarealike，somefurtherideaoflikenesswillalwaysbecomingtolight，andifthatbelikeanythingelse，another;andnewideaswillbealwaysarising，iftheidearesemblesthatwhichpartakesofit？
Quitetrue。
Thetheory，thenthatotherthingsparticipateintheideasbyresemblance，hastobegivenup，andsomeothermodeofparticipationdevised？
Itwouldseemso。
Doyouseethen，Socrates，howgreatisthedifficultyofaffirmingtheideastobeabsolute？
Yes，indeed。
And，further，letmesaythatasyetyouonlyunderstandasmallpartofthedifficultywhichisinvolvedifyoumakeofeachthingasingleidea，partingitofffromotherthings。
Whatdifficulty？hesaid。
Therearemany，butthegreatestofallisthis:—Ifanopponentarguesthattheseideas，beingsuchaswesaytheyoughttobe，mustremainunknown，noonecanprovetohimthatheiswrong，unlesshewhodeniestheirexistencebeamanofgreatabilityandknowledge，andiswillingtofollowalongandlaboriousdemonstration;hewillremainunconvinced，andstillinsistthattheycannotbeknown。
Whatdoyoumean，Parmenides？saidSocrates。
Inthefirstplace，Ithink，Socrates，thatyou，oranyonewhomaintainstheexistenceofabsoluteessences，willadmitthattheycannotexistinus。
No，saidSocrates;forthentheywouldbenolongerabsolute。
True，hesaid;andthereforewhenideasarewhattheyareinrelationtooneanother，theiressenceisdeterminedbyarelationamongthemselves，andhasnothingtodowiththeresemblances，orwhatevertheyaretobetermed，whichareinoursphere，andfromwhichwereceivethisorthatnamewhenwepartakeofthem。Andthethingswhicharewithinoursphereandhavethesamenameswiththem，arelikewiseonlyrelativetooneanother，andnottotheideaswhichhavethesamenameswiththem，butbelongtothemselvesandnottothem。
Whatdoyoumean？saidSocrates。
Imayillustratemymeaninginthisway，saidParmenides:—Amasterhasaslave;nowthereisnothingabsoluteintherelationbetweenthem，whichissimplyarelationofonemantoanother。Butthereisalsoanideaofmastershipintheabstract，whichisrelativetotheideaofslaveryintheabstract。Thesenatureshavenothingtodowithus，norwewiththem;theyareconcernedwiththemselvesonly，andwewithourselves。Doyouseemymeaning？
Yes，saidSocrates，Iquiteseeyourmeaning。
Andwillnotknowledge—Imeanabsoluteknowledge—answertoabsolutetruth？
Certainly。
Andeachkindofabsoluteknowledgewillanswertoeachkindofabsolutebeing？
Yes。
Buttheknowledgewhichwehave，willanswertothetruthwhichwehave;andagain，eachkindofknowledgewhichwehave，willbeaknowledgeofeachkindofbeingwhichwehave？
Certainly。
Buttheideasthemselves，asyouadmit，wehavenot，andcannothave？
No，wecannot。
Andtheabsolutenaturesorkindsareknownseverallybytheabsoluteideaofknowledge？
Yes。
Andwehavenotgottheideaofknowledge？
No。
Thennoneoftheideasareknowntous，becausewehavenoshareinabsoluteknowledge？
Isupposenot。
Thenthenatureofthebeautifulinitself，andofthegoodinitself，andallotherideaswhichwesupposetoexistabsolutely，areunknowntous？
Itwouldseemso。
Ithinkthatthereisastrangerconsequencestill。
Whatisit？
Wouldyou，orwouldyounotsay，thatabsoluteknowledge，ifthereissuchathing，mustbeafarmoreexactknowledgethanourknowledge;andthesameofbeautyandoftherest？
Yes。
Andiftherebesuchathingasparticipationinabsoluteknowledge，nooneismorelikelythanGodtohavethismostexactknowledge？
Certainly。
Butthen，willGod，havingabsoluteknowledge，haveaknowledgeofhumanthings？
Whynot？
Because，Socrates，saidParmenides，wehaveadmittedthattheideasarenotvalidinrelationtohumanthings;norhumanthingsinrelationtothem;therelationsofeitherarelimitedtotheirrespectivespheres。
Yes，thathasbeenadmitted。
AndifGodhasthisperfectauthority，andperfectknowledge，hisauthoritycannotruleus，norhisknowledgeknowus，oranyhumanthing;justasourauthoritydoesnotextendtothegods，norourknowledgeknowanythingwhichisdivine，sobyparityofreasonthey，beinggods，arenotourmasters，neitherdotheyknowthethingsofmen。
Yet，surely，saidSocrates，todepriveGodofknowledgeismonstrous。
These，Socrates，saidParmenides，areafew，andonlyafewofthedifficultiesinwhichweareinvolvedifideasreallyareandwedetermineeachoneofthemtobeanabsoluteunity。Hewhohearswhatmaybesaidagainstthemwilldenytheveryexistenceofthem—andeveniftheydoexist，hewillsaythattheymustofnecessitybeunknowntoman;andhewillseemtohavereasononhisside，andaswewereremarkingjustnow，willbeverydifficulttoconvince;amanmustbegiftedwithveryconsiderableabilitybeforehecanlearnthateverythinghasaclassandanabsoluteessence;andstillmoreremarkablewillhebewhodiscoversallthesethingsforhimself，andhavingthoroughlyinvestigatedthemisabletoteachthemtoothers。