Onthevoluntaryassociationofmeninsufficientnumberstoformapoliticalcommunity，thefirststeptobetakenfortheirownsecurityandhappiness，istoagreeonthetermsonwhichtheyaretobeunitedandtoact。Theyformaconstitution，orplanofgovernmentsuitedtotheircharacter，theirexigencies，andtheirfutureprospects。Theyagreethatitshallbethesupremeruleofobligationamongthem。
Thisisthepureandgenuinesourceofaconstitutionintherepublicanform。Inothergovernmentstheoriginofconstitutionsisnotalwaysthesame。
Asuccessfulconquerorestablishessuchaformofgovernmentashethinksproper。Ifhedeignstogiveitthenameofaconstitution，thepeopleareinstructedtoconsideritasadonationfromhim；butthedangertohispower，generallyinduceshimtowithholdanappellation，ofwhich，inhisownapprehension，animproperusemightbemade。
Ingovernmentspurelydespotic，weneverhearofaconstitution。Thepeoplearesometimes，however，rousedtovindicatetheirrights，andwhentheirdiscontentsandtheirpowerbecomesogreatastoprovethenecessityofrelaxationonthepartofthegovernment，orwhenafavourablejuncturehappens，ofwhichtheyprudentlyavailthemselves，aconstitutionmaybeexacted，andthegovernmentcompelledtorecogniseprinciplesandconcederightsinfavourofthepeople。
Thedurationofthisreliefiswhollydependentuponpoliticalevents。
Insomecountriesthepeopleareabletoretainwhatisthusconceded；
inothers，theconcessionissweptawaybysomeabruptrevolutioninfavourofabsolutepower，andthecountryrelapsesintoitsformercondition。
Torectifyabuses，withoutalteringthegeneralframeofgovernment，isatask，whichthoughfoundmoredifficult，yetisoflessdignityandutility，thantheformationofacompleteconstitution。
Toalterandamend，tointroducenewpartsintotheancienttexture，andparticularlynewprinciplesofadifferentandcontrarynature，oftenproducesanirregularanddiscordantcomposition，whichitsownconfusionrendersdifficultofexecution。Theformationofaconstitutionfoundedonasingleprinciple，isthemorepracticablefromitsgreatersimplicity。
Whetherthisprincipleispuremonarchy，aristocracy，ordemocracy，ifitbesteadilykeptinview，thepartsmaybeallconformableandhomogeneous。
Inapuremonarchyallthepowerisvestedinasinglehead。Hemaybeauthorizedtomakeandexpound，andexecutethelaws。Ifthisbetheresultofgeneralconsent，suchcountriespossessaconstitution。Thesamemaybesaidofanaristocracyifthepeopleagreetodepositallpowerinthehandsofaselectnumber；andofademocracy，inwhichtheyretain，insuchmannerastheyholdmostconducivetotheirownsafety，allsovereigntywithintheirowncontrol。Thedifficultyineithercaseistoregulatethedivisionsoftheauthoritygranted，sothatnoportionofit，vestedinonebranchoronebodyofmen，shallbearanunduerelationtotheothers。
Eachmustbesufficienttosupportitself，yetallmustbemadetoharmonizeandco-operate。
Aconstitutionmaycombinetwooftheforegoingprinciples，likethoseofancientRome，someoftheGrecianRepublics，andinmodemtimes，GenevaandsomeofthesmallcommunitiesofItaly:or，likethepresentgovernmentofEngland，itmaycombinethethreeprinciples。
Thehighauthoritywhichhasbeenoftenquoted1infavourofthelastmentionedform，maybealloweditsfullweight，withoutimpugningtheobviousposition，thatthewholepowerwhichisconcededtoanhereditarymonarch，maybevestedbyademocraticrepublicinanelectivemagistrate，andallthebenefitsderivedfromit，enjoyedwithoutthedangersattendinghereditarysuccession。
Ifanhereditarymonarchabuseshispower，thepeopleseldomobtainreliefwithoutinsurrection；andthus，betweentheambitionofprincesontheoneside，andthesenseofinjuryontheother，thepeaceofthecountryisconstantlyendangered。Ifthemonarchbeelectedforlife，ayoungaspiringprincemaycontinuethegrievancesofthestateforalongtime，andunlesstherebeanexpressprovisionfordeposinghim，thechoiceofanotherinhisplace，wouldinvolvethewholebodyintumultanddisorder。
Thepowerofchoosinganothersuprememagistrateattheendofareasonabletime，obviatestheseobjections。Thesubstantialdifferencebetweenamixedmonarchyandarepublicformedonaproperdistributionofpowers，isthereforeconfinedtothetermofserviceofthesuprememagistrate。
Thepowersofeverygovernmentareonlyofthreekinds；thelegislative，executive，andjudicial。Thisnaturaldivision，foundeduponmoralorder，mustbepreservedbyacarefulseparationordistinctionofthepowersvestedindifferentbranches。Ifthethreepowersareinjudiciouslyblended；
ifforinstance，thelegislativeandexecutive，ortheexecutiveandjudicialpowersareunitedinthesamebody，greatdangersmayensue，andtheeffectwouldbethesame，whethersuchpowersaredevolvedonasinglemagistrateoronseveral。Inthewisedistributionofthesepowers，intheapplicationofsuitableaidsandcheckstoeach，wemayattaintheoptimeconstitutarespublica，whichistheobjectofgeneraldesireandadmiration。
IthasbeenreservedformoderntimesandforthissideoftheAtlantic，fullytoappreciateandsoundlytoapplytheprincipleofrepresentationingovernment。Theadvantages，whichoccasionallyarisetoanindividual，ofbeingabletocommithiscaresandconcernstoanother，whointheexerciseofsuchauthorityisconsideredastheprincipalhimself，areelevatedandennobledbybeingtransferredtotheconcernsofanentirecommunity。
Withouttherepresentativeprinciple，oneoftwoconsequencesmustfollow；
eitherthewholebodymustbeassembledandacttogether，orafew，whomayhavepossessedthemselvesofsufficientforce，willundertaketodictateandgivelawstothewhole。Butawisepeopleseesanddreadsitsowndangerinlargeassemblies。Experiencetellsthemthattheycannottrustthemselveswhenthuscollectedtogether；thatsuddenburstsoffeelingarelikelytopredominateovertheirownjudgment；thatfactsandcausesareoftenmisrepresentedormisunderstood，andthedeliberatejudgment，whichaloneoughttobesolelyexercised，isoverpoweredbyunaccountableexcitementandprecipitateimpulse。ItwasforciblysaidinreferencetothepopularassembliesofAthens，thatifeveryAthenianwereaSocrates，stilleveryAthenianassemblywouldbeamob。
Apeoplesagaciousenoughtodiscoverthisimperfectioninitself，avoidsthedangerbyselectingasuitablenumbertoactforit，uponfullconsiderationandwithduecaution；andwhileitauthorizesthemtoexpresswhataretobeconsidereditsownsentiments，itgivestothatexpressionthesameeffectasifitproceededimmediatelyfromitselfThevirtueofthissalutaryprincipleisimpairedifitbedivided。Ifitextendonlytoapartofthegovernment；ifthereareothercomponentpartswhichhaveanequalorsuperiorpower，independentoftherepresentativeprinciple，thebenefitispartial。
InEngland，ofthreeco-ordinateparts，oneonlyissupposedbytheconstitutiontorepresenttheauthorityofthepeople，andatwhattimethisrepresentationwasintroducedamongthem，isnotclearlysettledbytheirownjuristsandantiquarians。ThatitexistedbeforetheNormanConquestinsomeform，nownotexactlyascertained，isindeedagreed；butonthesubversionoftheSaxoninstitutions，effectedbyWilliam，thepracticewas，atleast，suspendeduntilthereignofHenryIII。TheprovincialconstitutionsofAmericawere，withtwoexceptions，modelledwithsomeconformitytotheEnglishtheory；butthecolonistsofRhodeIslandandProvidencePlantationswereempoweredtochoosealltheirofficers，legislative，executive，andjudicial；andaboutthesametimeasimilarcharterwasgrantedtoConnecticut。
\"Andthus，\"complainsChalmers，awriterdevotedtoregalprinciples，ameredemocracyorruleofthepeoplewasestablished。Everypowerdeliberativeandactivewasinvestedinthefreemenortheirdelegates，andthesupremeexecutivemagistrateoftheempire，byaninattentionwhichdoeslittlehonourtothestatesmenofthosedays，waswhollyexcluded。\"Heexpresseshisowndoubtswhetherthekinghadarighttograntsuchcharters。2
But，althoughinalltheotherprovinces，thecharterswereoriginallygrantedorsubsequentlymodifiedsoastoexcludetheprincipleofrepresentationfromtheexecutivedepartment，thesetwoprovinces，atthetime，ofourrevolution，retaineditundiminished。ThesuggestionofthefullunqualifiedextensionoftheprincipleofrepresentationmaythereforebejustlyattributedtotheexampleofRhodeIslandandConnecticut，which，whenconvertedintoStates，founditunnecessarytoalterthenatureoftheirgovernments，andcontinuedthesameforms，inallrespects，exceptthenominalrecognitionoftheking\'sauthority，until1818，whenConnecticutmadesomeminorchangesandadoptedaformalConstitution。RhodeIsland，however，isstillsatisfiedwiththecharterofCharlesII。fromwhichithasbeenfoundsufficienttoexpungethereservationofallegiance，therequiredconformityofitslegislativeactstothoseofGreatBritain，andtheroyalrighttoacertainportionofgoldandsilverores，whichhappilyforthatstate，haveneverbeenfoundwithinit。
Asrepresentationissometimespartialinrespecttotheproportionofthepowersofgovernmenttobeexercised，soitissometimesconfinedtoaportiononlyofthosegoverned。Inthisrespectitisperhapsstillmoreobjectionable。ThepowerofelectingthegreatofficersofthestatebelongedinVenicetoafewfamilies；thepeopleatlargehadnovoice，anditwasthereforeindifferenttotheVenetians，whethertheybecamethesubjectsofFrance，orwerecededbyhertoAustria，orwhethertheycontinuedtobegovernedbythoseinwhoseappointmentstheyhadnottheleastshare。Withus，representationisinitsnatureuniversal，butinpracticetherearesomeexceptionswhichwillbenoticedinasubsequentplace。Theyarefew，anddonotimpairtheprinciple。
Itisnotnecessarythataconstitutionshouldbeinwriting；butthesuperioradvantagesofonereducedtowritingoverthosewhichrestontraditionaryinformation，orwhicharetobecollectedfromtheactsandproceedingsofthegovernmentitselfaregreatandmanifest。Adependenceonthelatterisindeeddestructiveofonemainobjectofaconstitution，whichistocheckandrestraingovernors。Ifthepeoplecanonlyrefertotheactsandproceedingsofthegovernmenttoascertaintheirownrights，itisobvious，thataseverysuchactmayintroduceanewprinciple，therecanbenostabilityinthegovernment。Theorderofthingsisinverted；
whatoughttobetheinferior，isplacedabovethatwhichshouldbethesuperior，andthelegislatureisenabledtoaltertheconstitutionatitspleasure。
ThisisadmittedbyEnglishjuriststobethecaseinrespecttotheirownconstitution，whichinallitsvitalpartsmaybechangedbyanactofparliament；thatis，theking，lords，andcommonsmay，iftheythinkproper，abrogateandrepealanyexistinglaws，andpassanynewlawsindirectoppositiontothatwhichthepeoplecontemplateandrevereastheirancientconstitution。Nosuchlawscanberesistedordisobeyedbythesubject，nordeclaredvoidbytheircourtsofjusticeasunconstitutional。
Awrittenconstitutionwhichmaybeenforcedbythejudgesandappealedtobythepeople，isthereforemostconducivetotheirhappinessandsafety。
Vattel3justlyobserves，thattheperfectionofastate，anditsaptitudetofulfiltheendsproposedbysociety，dependonitsconstitution?thefirstdutytoitselfis，toformthebestconstitutionpossible，andonemostsuitedtoitscircumstances；
andthusitlaysthefoundationofitssafety，permanenceandhappiness。
Butthebestconstitutionwhichcanbeframedwiththemostanxiousdeliberationthatcanbebestoweduponit，may，inpractice，befoundimperfectandinadequatetothetrueinterestsofsociety。Alterationsandamendmentsthenbecomedesirable?thepeopleretains?thepeoplecannotperhapsdivestitself，ofthepowertomakesuchalterations。Amoralpowerequaltoandofthesamenaturewiththatwhichmade，alonecandestroy。Thelawsofonelegislaturemayberepealedbyanotherlegislature，andthepowertorepealthemcannotbewithheldbythepowerthatenactedthem。
Sothepeoplemay，onthesameprinciple，atanytimealterorabolishtheconstitutiontheyhaveformed。Thishasbeenfrequentlyandpeaceablydonebyseveralofthesestatessince1776。4Ifaparticularmodeofeffectingsuchalterationshasbeenagreedon，itismostconvenienttoadheretoit，butitisnotexclusivelybinding。
Weshallhereafterseethecarefulprovisioninthisrespect，containedintheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，andthecautiousandusefulmannerinwhichithashithertobeenexercised。Indeeditisapowerwhich，althoughitcannotbedenied，oughtnevertobeusedwithoutanurgentnecessity。
Agoodconstitutionisbetterunderstoodandmorehighlyvalued，thelongeritcontinues。Frequentchangestendtounsettlepublicopinion，andinproportiontothefacilitywithwhichtheyaremade，isthetemptationtomakethem。ThetransactionsinFrancesincetheyear1791supporttheseremarks。
Thehistoryofmandoesnotpresentamoreillustriousmonumentofhumaninvention，soundpoliticalprinciples，andjudiciouscombinations，thantheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates。Inmanyothercountries，theoriginofgovernmenthasbeenvaguelyattributedtoforce，orartificeoraccident，andtheobscuritiesofhistoryhavebeenlaboriouslydevelopedtotracetheresultofthesesupposedcauses。ButAmericahasdistinctlypresentedtoviewthedeliberateformationofanindependentgovernment，notundercompulsion，orbyartifice，orchance，butasameanofresistingexternalforce，andwithafullandaccurateknowledgeofherownrights，providingfor，andsecuringherownsafety。Itisnot，however，intendedtoassertthatthisinstrumentisperfect，althoughitisdeemedtoapproachasneartoperfectionasanythathaseverbeenformed。Ifdefectsareperceivedtheymayreadilybeaccountedfor。
Greatandpeculiardifficultiesattendeditsformation。Itwasnotthesimpleactofahomogeneousbodyofmen，eitherlargeorsmall。Itwastobetheactofmanyindependentstates，thoughinagreaterdegreetheactofthepeoplesetinmotionbythosestates；itwastobetheactofthepeopleofeachstate，andnotofthepeopleatlarge。Theinterests，thehabits，andtheprejudicesofthepeopleofthedifferentstateswereinmanyinstancesvariantanddissimilar。Someofthemwereaccustomedchieflytoagriculture，otherstocommerce；domesticslaverywasreprobatedbysome，byothersitwasheldlawfulinitself，andalmostnecessarytotheirexistence。Eachstatewasnaturallytenaciousofitsownsovereigntyandindependence，whichhadbeenexpresslyreservedintheirantecedentassociation，andofwhichitwasstillmeanttoretainallthatitdidnotbecomeunavoidablynecessarytosurrender。Differentlocalpositionsanddifferentinterestswerethereforethesourcesofmanyimpedimentstothecompletionofthisgreatwork，whichatlastresultedinthecombinationofmutualandmanlyconcessions:therepresentativesofeachstate，deeplyimpressedwiththenecessityofgivingstrengthandefficiencytotheirunion，yieldedthosepointswhichbythemweredeemedofinferiormagnitude。
Thateverystateshouldbefullysatisfiedwasscarcelytobeexpected；
buteverystatewasboundtoconsider，thatnotitsownpeculiarinterestsonly，butthoseofthewholeweretoberegarded，andthatwhatmightbesupposedtobeparticularsacrifices，werecompensatedbythegeneraladvantage，inwhichtheyweretoparticipate。
Theconstitutionthusbecametheresultofaliberalandnoblesacrificeofpartialandinferiorinterests，tothegeneralgood；andthepeople，formedintoonemass，ascitizensoftheUnion，yetstillremainingdistinct，ascitizensofthedifferentstates，createdanewgovernment，withoutdestroyingthosewhichexistedbefore，reservinginthelatter，whattheydidnotsurrendertotheformer，andintheveryactofretainingpart，conferringpoweranddignityonthewhole。
Itwillcontributetoaproperunderstandingofthenatureofthisgovernment，toconsiderthepoliticalsituationofthecountryanditscolonialdependenceonGreatBritain，beforethegreateventofitsfinalseparation。
Anexplanationofthelegalnatureofcoloniesingeneral，willnotonlyserveasanintroductioninthisview，butwillbeusefultothestudent，astheUnitedStates，possessingvasttractsofuncultivatedland，areintheconstanthabitofformingcoloniestherein，undertheappellationofterritorialgovernments。
Acolonyisaportionofthepopulationofacountry，eitherexpresslysentorpermittedtogotoadistantplaceforthepurposeofformingadependent，politicalbody。Dependancenecessarilyentersintothedescriptionofacolony，forabodyofmenmayemigrate，eitherwiththeviewofunitingthemselvestoaforeigncommunity，orofsettingupagovernmentoftheirown，inneitherofwhichcaseswouldtheparentcountrybeboundtoprotectthem，orbeentitledtointerferewiththeirinternalgovernmentorcontroltheirtrade。
TheGreeks，theCarthaginians，andtheRomans，establishednumerouscolonies，sometimesofamilitarynature，tosecuredistantconquests，butmoregenerallyofacivilkindandforcommercialpurposes，ortofurnishanoutletforasuperabundantpopulation。Intheformerinstance，theremovalwascompelled，inthetwolattervoluntary，butinall，theparentcountryretainedandexercisedcertainrightsoverhercolonists，foundedontheexpressorimpliedengagementtoprotectthem。Thecolonyalwayscontinuedsomuchapartoftheparentcountrythat，ifsheenteredintowar，thecolonywasrenderedapartytoit，andanattackuponthelatter，withoutanyhostiledeclarationagainsttheparent，washeldtobeanattackupontheparent。
Thisrelationproducedcertainconsequenceswhichwereconsideredbeneficialtoboth。Theinternaladministrationofthecolonywaseitherimmediatelydirectedbytheparentstateorsubjectedtoherrevision，anditstradewaseitherconfinedtotheirmutualintercourse，orsparinglyallowedtobesharedwithothercountries。
Wearenotclearlyinformed，inwhatmannerarevenueforthebenefitoftheparentstatewasextractedfromthem。Insomemodeitwasprobablyattained，sinceitisreasonablethatthosewhoreceiveprotectionoutofthepublicpurse，shouldproportionallycontributetothepublicexpense。
Oneimportantpoliticalfeatureintheseinstitutionsis，thatthemembersoftheparentstateareentitledtoparticipateinthecivilrightsofthecolony。AnAthenianwasreceivedasacitizenatCrotona，andaCorinthianatCorcyra；andviceversa，thecolonistcontinuesasubjectoracitizenoftheparentstate。AFrenchmanoranEnglishman，bornineitheroftheircolonies，isanaturalbornsubjectofthecountryfromwhichhisancestorsmigrated。5
TheRomansalonemadesomedistinctionsonthissubject，whichdidnotlongcontinue，andarenowmerelyinterestingasamatterofhistory。
Butastrangerwhojoinedacolony，gainedonlythoserightswhichwouldhaveappertainedtohimintheparentcountry，andhenceifanaliencannotholdlandsintheUnitedStates，hecannot，withoutanexpresslegislativedispensation，holdlandinanyofourterritorieswherethefeudaltenuresprevail。
Thereareinstancesinancienthistoryofcoloniesincreasinginpopulationandstrengthsoastosendoutnewcoloniestoadjacentterritories，whostillhowever，partookoftheoriginalrelationtotheparentcountry，andtherealsoareexamplesofGreekcolonies，whentheyhadbecomepopulousandstrong，throwingofftheirsubjugationtothestatesfromwhichtheysprung。
Withusitisastandingandasoundrule，toerectourcoloniesintostates，andreceivethemintotheUnionassoonastheyacquireasufficientpopulation；asubjecttowhichweshallagainhaveoccasiontoadvert。
ThediscoveriesmadeinAmericabyEuropeans，beingconsideredasconferringanexclusiverightofoccupancyonthesovereignunderwhoseauthoritytheyhadsailed，variouspartsofthiscontinentwereappropriatedbytheBritishcrowntotheestablishmentofcolonies；sometimesbyextensivegrantstofavouredindividuals，sometimesbyencouragingsettlersatlarge，reservingthegeneraldomaintothecrown。
Hencetwosortsofprovincialgovernmentsensued。1。ThosedenominatedRoyalGovernments，inwhichtheexecutiveofficerswereappointedbythecrown，butthelegislativepowerwasvestedinthepeople，subjecthowevertothecontrolofthekingincouncil。Thisformprevailedinthoseprovinceswherethegeneraldomaincontinuedinthecrownuntilitwas，fromtimetotime，grantedtothesettlers。2。ProprietaryGovernments，wherealargeterritorywasatoncegrantedbythecrowntooneormoreindividuals。
Ofthelatter，MarylandgrantedtoLordBaltimore，andPennsylvaniatoWilliamPenn，areinstances；itlikewiseembracestheprovincesofNewEngland，astheterritorywascollectivelytermed，whichwasafterwardssubdividedintoNewHampshire，Massachusetts，RhodeIslandandProvidencePlantations，andConnecticut。NewJersey，NorthandSouthCarolinawerealsograntedtoprivatecompanies。Chartersweregrantedbythedifferentmonarchs，moreorlessliberalintheirterms，butallfoundedonthegeneralrelationofsubjectiontothecrown，sometimesexpresslydeclared，butomittedinothersfromaconvictionthatitwasunnecessary。
Insomeofthemthepoweroflegislationwasuncontrolledbytheparentstate。Inothers，thelawsthatwerepassedweretobetransmittedtoEngland，andifdisallowedbythekingincouncil，theylosttheirforce；butuntilhisdisapprobationwasannounced，theywerebindingonthecolony，ifenactedaccordingtotheirrespectivecharters。Inmostofthecolonies，appealswereallowedtothesameauthority，fromthedecisionsofthehighestprovincialtribunals。Thereisnoreasontobelievethattheseappealswereingeneralotherwisedecidedthanthejusticeofthecaserequired；butthepowerofrejectingtheactsofthelegislature，wassometimescapriciouslyexercised。
ItmayperhapshavebeendeemedexpedientbytheEnglishministry，tokeepalivethesenseofcolonialdependencewheneverthecharteraffordedtheopportunity。
IngeneralthecourtsofViceAdmiraltywereretainedunderthedirectionofthecrown，whoappointedthejudgesofthemandexercisedexclusivejurisdictionaswellinrelationtothepropersubjectsofmaritimejurisdiction，asthecollectionofsomuchoftherevenueasarosefromtrade，theexclusivepowerofregulatingwhichwasuniformlyunderstoodtobereserved。LittledirectcommercialintercoursewasallowedbetweenthecoloniesandanyotherthantheBritishdominions:theirmutualorinternalcommerceandtheirmanufactures，wereseldominterferedwith，yetoneortworegulationscalculatedtopromotetheinterestsofEnglishmanufactures，werejustlycomplainedof，althoughtheywerepeaceablysubmittedto。
But，foralongtime，GreatBritainabstainedfromimposinginternaltaxation。Onsomegreatpublicexigencies，whentheirownsafetywasendangered，thecolonistsspontaneouslyrenderedassistancetotheextentoftheirability，andwiththesefilialefforts，andwiththerevenuederivedfromimpostsontrade，theparentcountryappearedtobesatisfied。Butatlengththeincreaseandprosperityofthecoloniessuggestedtotheministry，theideaofanewcontributoryfund，tobesubjecttotheirownpowerandnottobedependentonvoluntarygrants。Theprinciplethattherightoftaxationdependsonrepresentation，oneofthegreatestbeautiesintheancientconstitutionofEngland，thoughnowreducedalmosttoashadow，wasdisregarded，ortheBritishsubjectwassupposedtohavesuspendedhisclaimforit，byresidenceinadistantcolony。Thecharteredrights，whichinthereignoftheStuartshadbeenfrequentlytrampledon，wereagainsetatnought，andaschemeofinternaltaxationwasadopted，whichitwassupposedmightbeeasilyenforced，andwouldgraduallyintroduceasystematicextractionofinternalrevenue。Stampdutieswereimposedonmostoftheinstrumentsincommonuse，andweretobepaidtoofficersappointedbythecrown。ButthepeopleofAmericaweretoosagaciousnottoperceivethedangerofsubmittingtothefirstinroadsupontheirrights，andtoofirmnottoresistthem。Byasimultaneousimpulse，fromoneendofourcontinenttotheother，aconcertedabstinencefromtheuseofstampsandtheresignationofmanyoftheofficersemployed，themeasurewasrenderedimpracticable。
Thecommondangersuggestedtheideaofanunionforcommondefence。
Aprecedentforacongressoftheprovinceswasnotwanting。Intheyear1753，deputiesfromseveralofthemhadassembledatAlbanyforadifferentpurpose。TheapprehensionsofawarbetweenFranceandGreatBritain，inwhich，aswehavealreadyobserved，thecoloniesofeachwouldbenecessarilyinvolved，ledtothisassembly，theobjectofwhichwastoincreasethemeansofdefencebyforminganunionoftheprovinces。TheplanwasdisapprovedbytheBritishministry，becauseitwasapprehendedthatitmightproduceaconcertofmeasuresopposingthesupremacyofthemothercountry。6In1765，theobjectofacongresswasstilldefence，butagainstanenemyofadifferentdescription；againsttheinvasionofaministrysupportedbyactsofparliamentwhichtheycouldprocureatpleasure。Remonstranceandentreatywere，however，theonlyweaponswielded，andthese，combinedwiththepracticaloppositioneverywhereexperienced，producedachangeintheministryandanabandonmentofthemeasure。Butalthoughthelawwasrepealed，theministrythoughtitexpedienttoassertbyadeclaratoryact，therighttobindtheircolonies，byactsofparliament，inallcaseswhatever；adeclarationdisregardedbythecolonistswhonowbegantofeeltheirownpower，tillitwasendeavouredtobeenforcedbytheimpositionofadutyontea，glass，andafewotherarticles，expresslyforthepurposeofraisingarevenuetodefraypartofthecolonialexpenses。Thespiritwhichhadbeenraisedwasnothowevereasilyallayed。Thesameindicationsofresistancewerenowrenewed，butthemilitaryforceinthiscountrywasincreasedbydetachmentsfromtheregulararmyinGreatBritain?andtheministryavowedadeterminationtopersevere。Anothercongresswasconvened，andasecondcourseofcomplaintandsupplication，unavailinglypursued。Thelanguagewasstillthatoffaithful，thoughinjuredsubjects:
theirgrievanceswereimputednottothemonarch，buttohisministers?andintheardentexpressionsofhopethattheyshouldnotbedeprivedoftherightsenjoyedbytheirfellowsubjects，theyadmittedtheirownsubjection。EvenafterthefatalblowwasstruckatLexingtonin1775，andthewholecountrywasinarms，themostdutifullanguageofsubjectstowardsasovereignwasretained。Butthisincongruityceased，whenthepeople，perceivingnorelaxationoftheeffortstosubduethem，boldlyresolvedtothrowoffayoketooheavytobeborne，andnolongercontentingthemselveswithclaimingtherightsofBritishsubjects，assertedthoseofindependentman。
Bythisgreatmeasurethecongressofprovincesbecameatoncethecongressofsomanysovereignstates?entitledtoplacesinthecatalogueofnations；
andameetingofhumble，complainingcoloniststerminatedintheformationofanempire。
Itsoonwasfoundexpedienttodevisesomeexplicitformofassociation，bywhichthepowersgrantedtothecongressorretainedbythenewstates，shouldbedistinctlyascertained。Articlesofconfederationwerethereforeprepared，andwiththeexceptionofonestate，which，however，afterwardscameintothem，speedilyadopted，bywhichtheUnitedStateswereformedintoafederalbody，withanexpressreservationtoeachstate，ofitsfreedom，sovereigntyandindependence，andofeverypower，right，andjurisdiction，notexpresslydelegatedtotheUnitedStates，inCongressassembled。Thefederalpowersweredeclaredtobethoseofmakingwarandpeace，coiningmoneyandissuingbillsofcredit，establishingcourtsofadmiralty，buildingandequippinganavy，ascertainingthenumberofmentoberaisedforthearmy，makingrequisitionsoneachstateforitsquota，regulatingthetradeandmanagingallaffairswiththeIndians，establishingpost-offices，andsomeothermattersoflessimportancebutformanyofthese，evenforagreeingonthenumberofshipstobebuilt，andtheappointmentofacommanderinchiefofthearmyornavy，theconsentofatleastninestates，incongressassembled，wasrequisite。Fromthisoutlineitisobviousthatthecongressstillcontinuedinagreatdegreedependentontheindividualstates，whichalonepossessedthemeansofraisingsupplies。Thepowertocoinmoney，whenitdidnotpossessthebullion，toemitbillsofcreditwhenithadnofundstoredeemthem，waspurelynominal。Eventheexpensesofitsownmembers，weretobedefrayedbytherespectivestateswhichsentthem，andwhichretainedthedangerouspowertorecallthematpleasure。Yetsuchwasthefervouroffreemenengagedinacommoncause，that，whilethewarcontinued，themererecommendationsofcongresscarriedwiththemtheforceofmandates，anditwasnotuntilafterthepeaceof1783，thatthenecessityofgivingtotheheadoftheunionthemeansofsupportingitsowngovernmentwasuniversallyfeltandacknowledged。Aftersomeineffectualsubstituteshadbeenproposed，aconventionofdelegatesfromthedifferentstateswasassembledatPhiladelphiain1787。Thememberswereappointedbythelegislaturesoftherespectivestates。Theresultoftheirdeliberationswasagaintobecomeamatterofrecommendationwhichrequiredtheassentofthepeopletogiveiteffect。Itwascommunicatedbytheconventiontocongress，andbycongresstotheseverallegislatures，inordertobesubmittedtoaconventionofdelegateschosenineachstatebythepeople。
Thiscourse，whichhadbeenrecommendedbythegeneralconventionitself，eventuatedinitsfinaladoptionbyallthestates。Buttheassentofninewassufficientforitscommencement，andonthe2dofJuly，1788，congresswasinformed，thatninestateshadadoptedit。Onthe13thofSeptember，theyfixedthetimefortheappointmentandmeetingofelectors，and\"commencingproceedingsunderthenewconstitution。\"
1。Cicero，deRepublica。
2。PoliticalAnnalsoftheBritishColonies。
3。Vattel，Book1。ch。3。
4。NewHampshire，NewYork，Pennsylvania，Delaware，SouthCarolina，Georgia，andConnecticut，havealteredtheirconstitutionssincethatperiod。
5。Theonlyexceptionthatoccurswithusis，astotherightoftheinhabitantofaterritorytomaintainanactionagainstacitizenofoneofthestates，intheUnitedStates\'courts，butthisisowingtotheparticularstructureoftheJudicialsystemoftheUnitedStates。
6。Marshall\'sLifeofWashington，Vol。
I。p。300，Vol。II。p。90。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterICHAPTERI。THECONSTITUTIONOFTHEUNITEDSTATES。THEgovernment，formedundertheappellationoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica，isdeclaredinthesolemninstrumentwhichisdenominatedtheConstitution，tobe\"ordainedandestablishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates，inordertoformamoreperfectunion，establishjustice，insuredomestictranquillity，provideforthecommondefence，promotethegeneralwelfare，andsecuretheblessingsoflibertytothemselvesandtheirposterity。\"
Inthisdistinctexpositionofprinciples，mostofwhicharecommontoallfreemen，andsomepeculiartothesituationofourcountry，weperceivethemotives，andareguidedintheconstructionoftheinstrument。Wefindtheintentiontocreateanewpoliticalsociety；toformanewgovernmentwhichthenecessitiesanddangersofourcountryloudlyrequired。Theimperfectandinefficientconfederationof1779，isintendedtobeabandoned。Thestatesarenolongertobeknowntoeachothermerelyasstates。Thepeopleofthestatesunitewitheachother，withoutdestroyingtheirpreviousorganization。Theyvestinanewgovernment，allthepowersnecessaryfortheattainmentofthegreatobjectstowhichthestatesseparatelyorconfederated。
hadbeenfoundincompetent。Theyreservetothestategovernments，ortothemselves，onlywhatisnotnecessaryfortheattainmentofthoseobjects。
Inallotherrespectsthesovereigntyofthestatesisunaltered。Theobligationsofdutyandallegiancetothemarenotimpaired；butinallthoseinstanceswhicharewithinthesphereofthegeneralgovernment，thehigherobligationsofallegianceanddutytoit，supersedewhatwasduetothestategovernments，becausefromthenatureofthecasetheycannotbeco-equal。Twogovernmentsofconcurrentrightandpowercannotexistinonesociety。Superioritymust，therefore，beconferredonthegeneralgovernment，oritsformation，insteadofpromotingdomestictranquillity，wouldproduceperpetualdiscordanddisorder。
Theprinciplesofthisconstitutiontobethoroughlyunderstoodshouldbefrequentlycontemplated。Thecompositionofsuchagovernmentpresentsanovelandsublimespectacleinpoliticalhistory。Itisasociety，formednotonlyoutofthepeopleofothersocieties，butincertainparts，formedbythosesocietiesthemselves。ThestateisasmuchamemberoftheUnion，andformsasmuchapartofthegreatersocietyasthepeoplethemselves，yetthestatedoesnotenterintotheUnionuponfederateprinciples；itdoesnotsendrepresentativesinthenatureoffederaldelegates，orambassadors；
itcannot，atitsownpleasure，increaseordiminishtheirnumber。Whentheappointmentismade，thepersonappointedbecomesanofficeroftheUnitedStates，notofthestatewhichsendshim，andheisnotpoliticallyresponsibletohisimmediateconstituent。Inonecaseonlyisavotetakenbystates，andtheimmediaterepresentativesofthepeople，inthatcase，representthestate。
ItwillbeseenthatinsomecasesastatehastherighttoclaimtheaidofthejudicialpoweroftheUnion，andinall，itisboundtosupportthelegislativeandexecutiveactsofthegeneralgovernmentwhenconsistentwiththeconstitution。Asthereforeitisneitherastranger，norproperlyspeakingaconfederate，itseemstofollowthatitmustbeconsideredaspartofthegreaternation，aterm，whichinthecourseofthisworkweshallchieflyuseinreferencetotheUnitedStates，becausealthougheverypoliticalbody，governedonlybyitsownlawsorinternalregulations，maybedenominatedanation，yetthestates，notpossessingthatabsoluteindependence，cannotwithfullproprietybesodesignated。Butanameisoflittleimportanceifthesubstanceberetained；andifVirginiaorPennsylvaniaarenotknownabroadasnations，itdoesnotaffecttheirpowerathomeasstates。Inthisrelationeverystatemustbeviewedasentirelysovereigninallpointsnottransferredbythepeoplewhocomposeit，tothegovernmentoftheUnion:andeveryexpositionthatmaybegiventotheconstitution，inconsistentwiththisprinciple，mustbeunsound。ThesupremacyoftheUnioninallthosepointsthatarethustransferred，andthesovereigntyofthestateinallthosewhicharenottransferred，mustthereforebeconsideredastwoco-ordinatequalities，enablingustodecideonthetruemodeofgivingaconstructiontotheconstitution。Asdifferentviewshaveprevailed，differenttheoriesofconstructionhavebeenformed。Somehavecontendedthatitshouldbeconstruedstrictly；othershaveasserted，thatthemostliberalconstructionshouldbeallowed。Byconstructionwecanonlymeantheascertainingthetruemeaningofaninstrument，orotherformofwords，andbythisrulealoneoughtwetobegovernedinrespecttothisconstitution。Astrictconstruction，adheringtotheletter，withoutpursuingthesenseofthecomposition，couldonlyproceedfromaneedlessjealousy，orrancorousenmity。Ontheotherhand，aliberalconstructionmaybecarriedtoaninjuriousextreme；concessionsofpowermaybeconceived，orassumed，whichneverwereintended，andwhichtherefore，arenotnecessaryforitslegitimateeffect。Thetruerulethereforeseemstobenootherthanthatwhichisappliedinallcasesofimpartialandcorrectexposition；
whichistodeducethemeaningfromitsknownintentionanditsentiretext，andtogiveeffect，ifpossible，toeverypartofit，consistentlywiththeunity，andtheharmonyofthewhole。
Inmanyrespectswehavethebenefitofthelearnedelucidationsofjudicialtribunals，andwhereverthesupremecourtoftheUnitedStateshaspronounceditssolemndecisionuponconstitutionalpoints，theauthorhasgladlyavailedhimselfofthisirrefragableauthority；butwhereaguidesocertain，cannotbefound，recoursecanonlybehad，toananxiousandseriousendeavourtodisplayandexpound，withtruthandjustice，themainfeaturesofaconstitution，whichmustalwaysbemoreadmired，asitismoreconsidered，andbetterunderstood。Iftheseexaminationsproducethesameeffectuponthereader，thattheyhaveupontheauthor，theattachmenttoit，ofournativecitizens，anditsattractionstoforeignerswillbeincreased；andthosewhoarenowhere，andthosewhomayhereafterbehere，willconcurtovenerateandsupportagovernment，eminentaboveallothersinpromotingthefreedomandthehappinessofman。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterIICHAPTERII。OFTHELEGISLATIVEPOWER。THEcourseproposedtobepursued，isfirst，toconsiderthelegislativepowerasitresidesinthesenateandhouseofrepresentatives；towhatextentthepresidentparticipatesingenerallegislation，andhispowerinconjunctionwiththesenaterelativetomakingtreaties，withtheoperationandeffectoftreaties；weshallthenproceedtothosepowersofgenerallegislationwhichareimpliedbytheConstitution，orexpresslyenumerated，andconcludethisheadwithaviewoftherestraintsunderwhichboththeUnitedStatesandthestatesseverally，areconstitutionallyplaced。
ThelegislativepowerisvestedinthecongressoftheUnitedStates，consistingofthesenateandhouseofrepresentatives。Thefirstparagraphevincesthatitisalimitedgovernment。Theterm\"alllegislativepowershereingranted，\"remindboththecongressandthepeople，oftheexistenceofsomelimitation。Theintroductiondisplaysthegeneralobjects。TheConstitutionitselfenumeratessomeofthepowersofcongress，andexcludesotherswhichmightperhapsfallwithinthegeneralexpressionsoftheintroductorypart。TheseprohibitionsareinsomedegreeauxiliarytoadueconstructionoftheConstitution。Whenageneralpowerovercertainobjectsisgranted，accompaniedwithcertainexceptions，itmaybeconsideredasleavingthatgeneralpowerundiminishedinallthoserespectswhicharenotthusexcepted。
Thevalueandeffectofthispropositionmaybeadvertedtohereafter。
Thelegislativebodypossesseswithusagreatadvantageoverthatofthosecountrieswhereitmaybeadjournedordissolvedatthepleasureoftheexecutiveauthority。Itisself-movingandself-dependent。Althoughitmaybeconvenedbytheexecutive，itcannotbeadjournedordissolvedbyit。ThetimeofitsassemblingisfixedbytheConstitution，untilwhich，unlessalawhasbeenpassedappointinganearlierday，orthepresidentonextraordinaryoccasionshasthoughtpropertoconveneit，theactionofthelegislaturecannotcommence；butifintheiropinionthepublicgoodshallrequireit，theymaycontinueuninterruptedlyinsession，untiltheterminationoftheperiodforwhichthemembersofthehouseofrepresentativesareelected，andtheymayfixasearlyatimeforthemeetingofthenextcongressastheythinkproper。Asimilarprincipleprevailsinallthestateconstitutions，anditisonlywhereitexists，thatalegislatureistrulyindependent。Itisasinconsistentwithsoundprinciplesfortheexecutivetosuspend，atitspleasure，theactionofthelegislature，asforthelattertoundertaketodeprivetheexecutiveofitsconstitutionalfunctions。