whereas，intheconnectionofcauseandeffect，homogeneitymayindeedlikewisebefound，butisnotnecessary;fortheconceptofcausality（bymeansofwhichsomethingispositedthroughsomethingelsequitedifferentfromit），atallevents，doesnotrequireit。Iftheobjectsoftheworldofsensearetakenforthingsinthemselves，andtheabovelawsofnatureforthelawsofthingsinthemselves，thecontradictionwouldbeunavoidable。Soalso，ifthesubjectoffreedomwere，likeotherobjects，representedasmereappearance，thecontradictionwouldbejustasunavoidable，forthesamepredicatewouldatoncebeaffirmedanddeniedofthesamekindofobjectinthesamesense。Butifnaturalnecessityisreferredmerelytoappearances，andfreedommerelytothingsinthemselves，nocontradictionarises，ifweatonceassume，oradmitbothkindsofcausality，howeverdifficultorimpossibleitmaybetomakethelatterkindconceivable。Asappearanceeveryeffectisanevent，orsomethingthathappensintime;
itmust，accordingtotheuniversallawofnature，beprecededbyadeterminationofthecausalityofitscause（astate），whichfollowsaccordingtoaconstantlaw。Butthisdeterminationofthecauseascausalitymustlikewisebesomethingthattakesplaceorhappens;thecausemusthavebeguntoact，otherwisenosuccessionbetweenitandtheeffectcouldbeconceived。Otherwisetheeffect，aswellasthecausalityofthecause，wouldhavealwaysexisted。
Thereforethedeterminationofthecausetoactmustalsohaveoriginatedamongappearances，andmustconsequently，aswellasitseffect，beanevent，whichmustagainhaveitscause，andsoon;hencenaturalnecessitymustbethecondition，onwhicheffectivecausesaredetermined。Whereasiffreedomistobeapropertyofcertaincausesofappearances，itmust，asregardsthese，whichareevents，beafacultyofstartingthemspontaneously，thatis，withoutthecausalityofthecauseitself，andhencewithoutrequiringanyothergroundtodetermineitsstart。Butthenthecause，astoitscausality，mustnotrankundertime—determinationsofitsstate，thatis，itcannotbeanappearance，andmustbeconsideredathinginitself，whileitseffectswouldbeonlyappearances。33Ifwithoutcontradictionwecanthinkofthebeingsofunderstanding[Verstandeswesen]asexercisingsuchaninfluenceonappearances，thennaturalnecessitywillattachtoallconnectionsofcauseandeffectinthe。sensuousworld，thoughontheotherhand，freedomcanbegrantedtosuchcause，asisitselfnotanappearance（butthefoundationofappearance）。Naturethereforeandfreedomcanwithoutcontradictionbeattributedtotheverysamething，butindifferentrelations—ononesideasaphenomenon，ontheotherasathinginitself。Wehaveinusafaculty，whichnotonlystandsinconnectionwithitssubjectivedetermininggroundsthatarethenaturalcausesofitsactions，andissofarthefacultyofabeingthatitselfbelongstoappearances，butisalsoreferredtoobjectivegrounds，thatareonlyideas，sofarastheycandeterminethisfaculty，aconnectionwhichisexpressedbythewordought。Thisfacultyiscalledreason，and，sofarasweconsiderabeing（man）entirelyaccordingtothisobjectivelydeterminablereason，hecannotbeconsideredasabeingofsense，butthispropertyisthatofathinginitself，ofwhichwecannotcomprehendthepossibility—Imeanhowtheought（whichhoweverhasneveryettakenplace）shoulddetermineitsactivity，andcanbecomethecauseofactions，whoseeffectisanappearanceinthesensibleworld。Yetthecausalityofreasonwouldbefreedomwithregardtotheeffectsinthesensuousworld，sofaraswecanconsiderobjectivegrounds，whicharethemselvesideas，astheirdeterminants。Foritsactioninthatcasewouldnotdependuponsubjectiveconditions，consequentlynotuponthoseoftime，andofcoursenotuponthelawofnature，whichservestodeterminethem，becausegroundsofreasongivetoactionstheruleuniversally，accordingtoprinciples，withouttheinfluenceofthecircumstancesofeithertimeorplace。WhatIadducehereismerelymeantasanexampletomakethethingintelligible，anddoesnotnecessarilybelongtoourproblem，whichmustbedecidedfrommereconcepts，independentlyofthepropertieswhichwemeetintheactualworld。NowImaysaywithoutcontradiction：thatalltheactionsofrationalbeings，sofarastheyareappearances（occurringinanyexperience），aresubjecttothenecessityofnature;butthesameactions，asregardsmerelytherationalsubjectanditsfacultyofactingaccordingtomerereason，arefree。Forwhatisrequiredforthenecessityofnature？Nothingmorethanthedeterminabilityofeveryeventintheworldofsenseaccordingtoconstantlaws，thatis，areferencetocauseintheappearance;inthisprocessthethinginitselfatitsfoundationanditscausalityremainunknown。
ButIsay，thatthelawofnatureremains，whethertherationalbeingisthecauseoftheeffectsinthesensuousworldfromreason，thatis，throughfreedom，orwhetheritdoesnotdeterminethemongroundsofreason。For，iftheformeristhecase，theactionisperformedaccordingtomaxims，theeffectofwhichasappearanceisalwaysconformabletoconstantlaws;
ifthelatteristhecase，andtheactionnotperformedonprinciplesofreason，itissubjectedtotheempiricallawsofthesensibility，andinbothcasestheeffectsareconnectedaccordingtoconstantlaws;morethanthiswedonotrequireorknowconcerningnaturalnecessity。Butintheformercasereasonisthecauseoftheselawsofnature，andthereforefree;inthelattertheeffectsfollowaccordingtomerenaturallawsofsensibility，becausereasondoesnotinfluenceit;butreasonitselfisnotdeterminedonthataccountbythesensibility，andisthereforefreeinthiscasetoo。Freedomisthereforenohindrancetonaturallawinappearance，neitherdoesthislawabrogatethefreedomofthepracticaluseofreason，whichisconnectedwiththingsinthemselves，asdetermininggrounds。Thuspracticalfreedom，viz。，thefreedominwhichreasonpossessescausalityaccordingtoobjectivelydetermininggrounds，isrescuedandyetnaturalnecessityisnotintheleastcurtailedwithregardtotheverysameeffects，asappearances。Thesameremarkswillservetoexplainwhatwehadtosayconcerningtranscendentalfreedomanditscompatibilitywithnaturalnecessity（inthesamesubject，butnottakeninthesamereference）。For，astothis，everybeginningoftheactionofabeingfromobjectivecausesregardedasdetermininggrounds，isalwaysafirststart，thoughthesameactionisintheseriesofappearancesonlyasubordinatestart，whichmustbeprecededbyastateofthecause，whichdeterminesit，andisitselfdeterminedinthesamemannerbyanotherimmediatelypreceding。Thusweareable，inrationalbeings，orinbeingsgenerally，sofarastheircausalityisdeterminedinthemasthingsinthemselves，toimagineafacultyofbeginningfromitselfaseriesofstates，withoutfallingintocontradictionwiththelawsofnature。Fortherelationoftheactiontoobjectivegroundsofreasonisnotatime—relation;inthiscasethatwhichdeterminesthecausalitydoesnotprecedeintimetheaction，becausesuchdetermininggroundsrepresentnotareferencetoobjectsofsense，e。g。，tocausesintheappearances，buttodeterminingcauses，asthingsinthemselves，whichdonotrankunderconditionsoftime。Andinthiswaytheaction，withregardtothecausalityofreason，canbeconsideredasafirststartinrespecttotheseriesofappearances，andyetalsoasamerelysubordinatebeginning。Wemaythereforewithoutcontradictionconsideritintheformeraspectasfree，butinthelatter（insofarasitismerelyappearance）