Theattempt，ifanyoneshouldmakeit，tosortexperienceintotwoabsolutelydiscretegroups，withnothingbutinertnessinoneofthemandnothingbutactivitiesintheother，wouldthusreceiveonecheck。Itwouldreceiveanotherassoonasweexaminedthemoredistinctivelymentalgroup;forthoughinthatgroupitbetruethatthingsdonotactononeanotherbytheirphysicalpropertiesdonotdenteachotherorsetfiretoeachother，theyyetactoneachotherinthemostenergeticwaybythoseverycharacterswhicharesoinertextracorporeally。Itisbytheinterestandimportancethatexperienceshaveforus，bytheemotionstheyexcite，andthepurposestheysubserve，bytheiraffectivevalues，inshort，thattheirconsecutioninourseveralconsciousstreams，as’thoughts’ofours，ismainlyruled。Desireintroducesthem;interest152
holdsthem;fitnessfixestheirorderandconnection。
Ineedonlyreferforthisaspectofourmentallife，toWundt’sarticle’UeberpsychischeCausalitat，’whichbeginsVolumeX。ofhis_Philosophische_Studien_。（1）
Itthusappearsthattheambiguousoramphibious_status_whichwefindourepithetsofvalueoccupyingisthemostnaturalthingintheworld。Itwould，however，beanunnaturalstatusifthepopularopinionwhichIcitedattheoutsetwerecorrect。If’physical’and’mental’meanttwodifferentkindsofintrinsicnature，immediately，intuitively，andinfalliblydiscernible，andeachfixedforeverinwhateverbitofexperienceitqualified，onedoesnotseehowtherecouldeverhavearisenanyroomfordoubtorambiguity。
Butif，onthecontrary，thesewordsarewordsofsorting，ambiguityisnatural。Forthen，assoonastherelationsofathingaresufficientlyvariousitcanbesortedvariously。