tomeannotmerelythatwhichispecuniary，butwhatevermayprocureuspleasureorwithdrawusfrompain，[_del’esprit_2，1，]says，[ib。2，2，]”thehumanemanishetowhomthesightofmisfortuneisinsupportable，andwhotorescuehimselffromthisspectacle，isforcedtosuccortheunfortunateobject。”Thisindeedistrue。Butitisonestepshortoftheultimatequestion。Thesegoodactsgiveuspleasure，buthowhappensitthattheygiveuspleasure?Becausenaturehathimplantedinourbreastsaloveofothers，asenseofdutytothem，amoralinstinct，inshort，whichpromptsusirresistiblytofeelandtosuccortheirdistresses，andprotestsagainstthelanguageofHelvetius，[ib。2，5，]”whatothermotivethanself-interestcoulddetermineamantogenerousactions?Itisasimpossibleforhimtolovewhatisgoodforthesakeofgood，astoloveevilforthesakeofevil。”TheCreatorwouldindeedhavebeenabunglingartist，hadheintendedmanforasocialanimal，withoutplantinginhimsocialdispositions。Itistruetheyarenotplantedineveryman，becausethereisnorulewithoutexceptions；
butitisfalsereasoningwhichconvertsexceptionsintothegeneralrule。Somemenarebornwithouttheorgansofsight，orofhearing，orwithouthands。Yetitwouldbewrongtosaythatmanisbornwithoutthesefaculties，andsight，hearing，andhandsmaywithtruthenterintothegeneraldefinitionofman。Thewantorimperfectionofthemoralsenseinsomemen，likethewantorimperfectionofthesensesofsightandhearinginothers，isnoproofthatitisageneralcharacteristicofthespecies。Whenitiswanting，weendeavortosupplythedefectbyeducation，byappealstoreasonandcalculation，bypresentingtothebeingsounhappilyconformed，othermotivestodogoodandtoeschewevil，suchasthelove，orthehatred，orrejectionofthoseamongwhomhelives，andwhosesocietyisnecessarytohishappinessandevenexistence；demonstrationsbysoundcalculationthathonestypromotesinterestinthelongrun；therewardsandpenaltiesestablishedbythelaws；andultimatelytheprospectsofafuturestateofretributionfortheevilaswellasthegooddonewhilehere。Thesearethecorrectiveswhicharesuppliedbyeducation，andwhichexercisethefunctionsofthemoralist，thepreacher，andlegislator；andtheyleadintoacourseofcorrectactionallthosewhosedisparityisnottooprofoundtobeeradicated。Somehavearguedagainsttheexistenceofamoralsense，bysayingthatifnaturehadgivenussuchasense，impellingustovirtuousactions，andwarningusagainstthosewhicharevicious，thennaturewouldalsohavedesignated，bysomeparticularear-marks，thetwosetsofactionswhichare，inthemselves，theonevirtuousandtheothervicious。Whereas，wefind，infact，thatthesameactionsaredeemedvirtuousinonecountryandviciousinanother。
Theansweristhatnaturehasconstituted_utility_tomanthestandardandbestofvirtue。Menlivingindifferentcountries，underdifferentcircumstances，differenthabitsandregimens，mayhavedifferentutilities；thesameact，therefore，maybeuseful，andconsequentlyvirtuousinonecountrywhichisinjuriousandviciousinanotherdifferentlycircumstanced。Isincerely，then，believewithyouinthegeneralexistenceofamoralinstinct。Ithinkitthebrightestgemwithwhichthehumancharacterisstudded，andthewantofitasmoredegradingthanthemosthideousofthebodilydeformities。Iamhappyinreviewingtherollofassociatesinthisprinciplewhichyoupresentinyoursecondletter，someofwhichI
hadnotbeforemetwith。TothesemightbeaddedLordKaims，oneoftheablestofouradvocates，whogoessofarastosay，inhisPrinciplesofNaturalReligion，thatamanowesnodutytowhichheisnoturgedbysomeimpulsivefeeling。Thisiscorrect，ifreferredtothestandardofgeneralfeelinginthegivencase，andnottothefeelingofasingleindividual。PerhapsImaymisquotehim，itbeingfiftyyearssinceIreadhisbook。
Theleisureandsolitudeofmysituationherehasledmetotheindiscretionoftaxingyouwithalongletteronasubjectwhereonnothingnewcanbeofferedyou。Iwillindulgemyselfnofartherthantorepeattheassurancesofmycontinuedesteemandrespect。