thoughthereissomethingmuchmorecomplex，inthegrowthofasocietythaninthegrowthofanaturalspecies。Butasitsupposesachangeduetosomethingintheconstitutionofthemanhimself，nottomerely’externalcircumstances，’ithastoberejectedasmuchaspossible。Hencewegetouromnipotentsovereigncreatinglawsandcustomsandtobetakenasanultimatefact。
IneednotpointoutatlengththerelationoftheseviewstoUtilitarianismingeneral，andtothebeliefintheindefinitemodifiabilityofhumannatureandthetranscendentimportanceofpoliticalmachinery。ItisenoughtonotethatAustin’spositioninvolvesoneassumptionremarkableinaUtilitarian。TheempiricismoftheUtilitariansisinterpretedtomeanthateverythingmustbeexplainedbycircumstances，andconductthereforeby’external’sanctions。Austinfeelsthat，afterall，somebondmustberequiredtoholdmentogether。Thelegislativesanctionscannotbequiteultimate。Infact，wewant’morality’；
andhethereforeincludesthe’lawsofGod’amongthelawswhicharereally，notmetaphorically，laws。HethusacceptsthePaleyview，thoughwithacertainreserve。，Utility，isthesolecriterionor’index，’ashecallsit，tothemorallaw。Still，thelawrequiresasanction。Thesanctionisleftinjudiciousvagueness；butwearetoldthatGodmustbebenevolent，andmustthereforebeheldtoapprovetheconductwhichpromotesthehappinessofhiscreatures。This，itwouldseem，isessentialtoAustin’sposition。11*Whetherhewaspractisingsome’economy，’
andwhathisfellowUtilitarianswouldhavethoughtofit，andhowpreciselyhewouldhavejustifiedhispositionlogically，arequestionswhichIcannotdiscuss。
TheapplicationofAustin’sprinciplestothepurelylegalsphereliesbeyondmypurpose。Hisaimistoanalysetheprimaryconceptionsofjurisprudenceinaccordancewithhisprinciples，andtoobtainarationalclassificationoflawingeneral。