91。Somewriters，especiallyG。H。Lewes，havetriedtomaintainthatthestatementoftheuniformityofNatureisan’identicalproposition。’Theattemptisunsatisfactory，andcertainlydoesnotseemtohavefoundfavourwithlaterwriters；but，thoughI
amunabletodiscussthequestion，Iwillsuggestthatitseemstoindicatetheidealresultofreasoning。Weassumethat，ifourknowledgewerecomplete，wecouldstateallthelawsofactionandreactionofanyelementasnecessaryconsequencesofitsprimitiveconstitution，aswecandeduceallthepropertiesofnumberandspacefromprimaryprinciples。Thoughwecanneverattainsuchaconsummation，wecanrejectanytheorywhichcontradictsit，and，therefore，suchdoctrinesasthe’pluralityofcauses，’whichcometosupposingthatanidenticalprocessmaybeanalysedintwoinconsistentways。
92。E。g。，byMrF。H。BradleyinhisPrinciplesofLogic1883，pp。329-42。DrVenn，whoismuchmorefavourabletoMill，discussestheminhisEmpiricalorInductiveLogic1889，pp。
400-31，showsveryclearlyhowtheyassumewhathecallsthe’popular’，asdistinguishedfromthe’rigidlyscientific’，viewofcausation。Elsewherep。58heremarksthatthepopularmightbecalledthe’Brown-Herschel-Millview，’asthosewriterspopularisedthedoctrinefirstclearlysetforthbyHume。SeealsoSigwart’sLogik1889，ii。469-500。
93。Logic，p。284bk。iii。ch。ix。section6。