couldeveracquireany’experience’atall。SowhenMillsaysthattheburthenofproofrestswiththeintuitionist，heis，nodoubt，quiterightinthrowingtheburthenofproofuponthinkerswhosupposeparticulardoctrinestohavebeensomehowinsertedintothefabricofknowledgewithoutanyrelationtoothertruths；butitissurelynotagratuitousassumptionthatthemindwhichcombinesexperiencemusthavesomekindofpropertiesaswellasthethingscombined。Ifitknowsno’truths’exceptfromexperience，itisatleastpossiblethatitmayinsomewayreactuponthegivenexperience。This，atanyrate，shouldbeMill’sview，whotakes’mind’and’body’tobeunknowable，andallknowledgeoffacttobeacombinationof’sensations。’Heonlyrequirestoadmitthatknowledgemaybeincreasedeitherbyvaryingthedataorbyvaryingthemind’sactionuponfixeddata。
Inneithercasedowegetbeyond’experience。’Inmanyplaces，Millseemstointerprethisviewinconsistencywiththisdoctrine。Hisinvariablecandourleadshimtomakeadmissions，someofwhichIhavenoticed。Yethisprepossessionsleadhimtothesuperfluousparadoxeswhich，fortherest，hemaintainswithremarkablevigourandingenuity。
Oneotherdeviceoftheenemyraisedthetroublesomequestionofinconceivabilityasatestoftruth，whichbroughtMillintoconflictnotonlywithWhewellandHamilton，butwithMrHerbertSpencer。IwillonlynoticethecuriousillustrationwhichitaffordsofMill’stendencytoconfoundstatementsoffactwiththepurelylogicalassertionthattwomodesofstatingafactarepreciselyequivalent。TheexistenceofAntipodeans，inhisfavouriteillustration，55*wasdeclaredtobe’inconceivable。’
Disbeliefintheirexistenceinvolvedthestatementoffact：
gravityactshereandattheAntipodesinthesamedirection。