Thoughthestandardbywhichcasuistsfrequentlydeterminewhatisrightorwronginhumanconduct，beitstendencytothewelfareordisorderofsociety，itdoesnotfollowthataregardtothewelfareofsocietyshouldbethesolevirtuousmotiveofaction，butonlythat，inanycompetition，itoughttocastthebalanceagainstallothermotives。
Benevolencemay，perhaps，bethesoleprincipleofactionintheDeity，andthereareseveral，notimprobable，argumentswhichtendtopersuadeusthatitisso。Itisnoteasytoconceivewhatothermotiveanindependentandall-perfectBeing，whostandsinneedofnothingexternal，andwhosehappinessiscompleteinhimself，canactfrom。ButwhatevermaybethecasewiththeDeity，soimperfectacreatureasman，thesupportofwhoseexistencerequiressomanythingsexternaltohim，mustoftenactfrommanyothermotives。Theconditionofhumannaturewerepeculiarlyhard，ifthoseaffections，which，bytheverynatureofourbeing，oughtfrequentlytoinfluenceourconduct，coulduponnooccasionappearvirtuous，ordeserveesteemandcommendationfromanybody。
Thosethreesystems，thatwhichplacesvirtueinpropriety，thatwhichplacesitinprudence，andthatwhichmakesitconsistinbenevolence，aretheprincipalaccountswhichhavebeengivenofthenatureofvirtue。Tooneorotherofthem，alltheotherdescriptionsofvirtue，howdifferentsoevertheymayappear，areeasilyreducible。
ThatsystemwhichplacesvirtueinobediencetothewilloftheDeity，maybecountedeitheramongthosewhichmakeitconsistinprudence，oramongthosewhichmakeitconsistinpropriety。Whenitisasked，whyweoughttoobeythewilloftheDeity，thisquestion，whichwouldbeimpiousandabsurdinthehighestdegree，ifaskedfromanydoubtthatweoughttoobeyhim，canadmitbutoftwodifferentanswers。ItmusteitherbesaidthatweoughttoobeythewilloftheDeitybecauseheisaBeingofinfinitepower，whowillrewarduseternallyifwedoso，andpunishuseternallyifwedootherwise:oritmustbesaid，thatindependentofanyregardtoourownhappiness，ortorewardsandpunishmentsofanykind，thereisacongruityandfitnessthatacreatureshouldobeyitscreator，thatalimitedandimperfectbeingshouldsubmittooneofinfiniteandincomprehensibleperfections。Besidesoneorotherofthesetwo，itisimpossibletoconceivethatanyotheranswercanbegiventothisquestion。Ifthefirstanswerbetheproperone，virtueconsistsinprudence，orintheproperpursuitofourownfinalinterestandhappiness；sinceitisuponthisaccountthatweareobligedtoobeythewilloftheDeity。Ifthesecondanswerbetheproperone，virtuemustconsistinpropriety，sincethegroundofourobligationtoobedienceisthesuitablenessorcongruityofthesentimentsofhumilityandsubmissiontothesuperiorityoftheobjectwhichexcitesthem。
Thatsystemwhichplacesvirtueinutility，coincidestoowiththatwhichmakesitconsistinpropriety。Accordingtothissystem，allthosequalitiesofthemindwhichareagreeableoradvantageous，eithertothepersonhimselfortoothers，areapprovedofasvirtuous，andthecontrarydisapprovedofasvicious。Buttheagreeablenessorutilityofanyaffectiondependsuponthedegreewhichitisallowedtosubsistin。Everyaffectionisusefulwhenitisconfinedtoacertaindegreeofmoderation；andeveryaffectionisdisadvantageouswhenitexceedstheproperbounds。Accordingtothissystemtherefore，virtueconsistsnotinanyoneaffection，butintheproperdegreeofalltheaffections。TheonlydifferencebetweenitandthatwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish，is，thatitmakesutility，andnotsympathy，orthecorrespondentaffectionofthespectator，thenaturalandoriginalmeasureofthisproperdegree。