第77章

　　Iamnotnowconcernedtocriticiseit，——mypointisthatifweacceptthisviewofFreedomatall，itmustobviouslybeNeutralFreedom:itmustexpresstherelationofano&uuml；menonthatmanifestsitselfasascoundreltoaseriesofbadvolitions，inwhichthemorallawisviolated，nolessthantherelationofano&uuml；menonthatmanifestsitselfasasainttogoodorrationalvolitions，inwhichthemorallaworcategoricalimperativeisobeyed。And，asIbeforesaid，Kantinthispassage——beingespeciallyconcernedtoexplainthepossibilityofmoralimputation，andjustifythejudicialsentencesofconsciencespeciallytakesashisillustrationsno&uuml；menathatexhibitbadphenomena。Thequestionheexpresslyraisesis``Howamanwhocommitsatheft’’can``becalledquitefree’’atthemomentofcommittingit？andanswersthatitisinvirtueofhis``transcendentalfreedom’’that``therationalbeingcanjustlysayofeveryunlawfulactionthatheperformsthathecouldverywellhaveleftitundone’’，althoughasphenomenonitisdeterminedbyantecedents，andsonecessary；

　　``forit，withallthepastwhichdeterminesit，belongstotheonesinglephenomenonofhischaracterwhichhemakesforhimself，inconsequenceofwhichheimputestohimself’’thebadactionsthatresultnecessarilyfromhisbadcharactertakeninconjunctionwithothercauses。Hence，howeverhemayaccountforhiserrorfrombadhabitswhichhehasallowedtogrowonhim，whateverarthemayusetopainttohimselfanunlawfulactheremembersassomethinginwhichhewascarriedawaybythestreamofphysicalnecessity，thiscannotprotecthimfromself-reproach:——notevenifhehaveshowndepravitysoearlythathemayreasonablybethoughttohavebeenborninamorallyhopelesscondition——hewillstillberightlyjudged，andwilljudgehimself``justasresponsibleasanyotherman’’:sinceinrelationtohisno&uuml；menalselfhislifeasawhole，fromfirsttolast，istoberegardedasasinglephenomenonresultingfromanabsolutelyfreechoice。

　　Ineednotlabourthispointfurther；itisevidentthatthenecessitiesofKant’smetaphysicalexplanationofmoralresponsibilitymakehimexpresswithpeculiaremphasisandfulnessthenotionofwhatIhavecalledNeutralFreedom，akindofcausalitymanifestedinbadandirrationalvolitionsnolessthaninthegoodandrational。

　　Ontheotherhand，itisnolesseasytofindpassagesinwhichthetermFreedomseemstomemostdistinctlytostandforGoodorRationalFreedom。Indeed，suchpassagesare，Ithink，morefrequentthanthoseinwhichtheothermeaningisplainlyrequired。Thus，hetellsusthat``afreewillmustfinditsprincipleofdeterminationinthe[moral]`Law’’’，[3]andthat``freedom，whosecausalitycanbedeterminedonlybythelaw，consistsjustinthis，thatitrestrictsallinclinationsbytheconditionofobediencetopurelaw’’。[4]Whereas，intheargumentpreviouslyexamined，hiswholeeffortwastoprovethattheno&uuml；menonorsupersensiblebeing，ofwhicheachvolitionisaphenomenon，exercises``freecausality’’inunlawfulacts，hetellsuselsewhere，inthesametreatise，thatthe``supersensiblenature’’ofrationalbeings，whohavealsoa``sensiblenature’’，istheir``existenceaccordingtolawswhichareindependentofeveryempiricalcondition，andthereforebelongtotheautonomyofpure[practical]reason’’。[5]

　　Similarly，inanearlierwork，heexplainsthat``sincetheconceptionofcausalityinvolvesthatoflaws？thoughfreedomisnotapropertyofthewilldependingonphysicallaws，yetitisnotforthatreasonlawless；