Now，insofarasUtilitarianmoralitycoincideswiththatofCommonSense——aswehaveseenthatitdoesinthemain——thisinvestigationhasbeenpartlyperformedinchap。v。ofBookii。Itthereappearedthatwhileinanytolerablestateofsocietytheperformanceofdutiestowardsothersandtheexerciseofsocialvirtuesseemgenerallylikelytocoincidewiththeattainmentofthegreatestpossiblehappinessinthelongrunforthevirtuousagent，stilltheuniversalityandcompletenessofthiscoincidenceareatleastincapableofempiricalproof:andthat，indeed，themorecarefullyweanalyseandestimatethedifferentsanctions——Legal，Social，andConscientious——consideredasoperatingundertheactualconditionsofhumanlife，themoredifficultitseemstobelievethattheycanbealwaysadequatetoproducethiscoincidence。
ThenaturaleffectofthisargumentuponaconvincedUtilitarianismerelytomakehimanxioustoaltertheactualconditionsofhumanlife:anditwouldcertainlybeamostvaluablecontributiontotheactualhappinessofmankind，ifwecouldsoimprovetheadjustmentofthemachineofLawinanysociety，andsostimulateanddirectthecommonawardsofpraiseandblame，andsodevelopandtrainthemoralsenseofthemembersofthecommunity，astorenderitclearlyprudentforeveryindividualtopromoteasmuchaspossiblethegeneralgood。However，wearenotnowconsideringwhataconsistentUtilitarianwilltrytoeffectforthefuture，butwhataconsistentEgoististodointhepresent。Anditmustbeadmittedthat，asthingsare，whateverdifferenceexistsbetweenUtilitarianmoralityandthatofCommonSenseisofsuchakindastorenderthecoincidencewithEgoismstillmoreimprobableinthecaseoftheformer。ForwehaveseenthatUtilitarianismismorerigidthanCommonSenseinexactingthesacrificeoftheagent’sprivateinterestswheretheyareincompatiblewiththegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber:andofcourseinsofarastheUtilitarian’sprinciplesbringhimintoconflictwithanyofthecommonlyacceptedrulesofmorality，thewholeforceoftheSocialSanctionoperatestodeterhimfromwhatheconceivestobehisduty。
Thereare，however，writersoftheUtilitarianschoolwhoseemtomaintainorimply，thatbyduecontemplationoftheparamountimportanceofSympathyasanelementofhumanhappinessweshallbeledtoseethecoincidenceofthegoodofeachwiththegoodofall。Inopposingthisview，Iamasfaraspossiblefromanywishtodepreciatethevalueofsympathyasasourceofhappinesseventohumanbeingsasatpresentconstituted。IndeedIamofopinionthatitspleasuresandpainsreallyconstituteagreatpartofthatinternalrewardofsocialvirtue，andpunishmentofsocialmisconduct，whichinBookii。chap。v。Iroughlysetdownasduetothemoralsentiments。For，infact，thoughIcantosomeextentdistinguishsympatheticfromstrictlymoralfeelingsinintrospectiveanalysisofmyownconsciousness，Icannotsaypreciselyinwhatproportionthesetwoelementsarecombined。Forinstance:Iseemabletodistinguishthe``senseoftheignobilityofEgoism’’ofwhichIhavebeforespoken——which，inmyview，isthenormalemotionalconcomitantorexpressionofthemoralintuitionthattheGoodofthewholeisreasonablytobepreferredtotheGoodofapart——fromthejarofsympatheticdiscomfortwhichattendstheconsciouschoiceofmyownpleasureattheexpenseofpainorlosstoothers；
butIfinditimpossibletodeterminewhatforcetheformersentimentwouldhaveifactuallyseparatedfromthelatter，andIaminclinedtothinkthatthetwokindsoffeelingareveryvariouslycombinedindifferentindividuals。Perhaps，indeed，wemaytraceagenerallawofvariationintherelativeproportionofthesetwoelementsasexhibitedinthedevelopmentofthemoralconsciousnessbothintheraceandinindividuals；foritseemsthatatacertainstageofthisdevelopmentthemindismoresusceptibletoemotionsconnectedwithabstractmoralideasandrulespresentedasabsolute；whileafteremergingfromthisstageandbeforeenteringitthefeelingsthatbelongtopersonalrelationsarestronger。CertainlyinaUtilitarian’smindsympathytendstobecomeaprominentelementofallinstinctivemoralfeelingsthatrefertosocialconduct；asinhisviewtherationalbasisofthemoralimpulsemustultimatelylieinsomepleasurewonorpainsavedforhimselforforothers；sothatheneverhastosacrificehimselftoanImpersonalLaw，butalwaysforsomebeingorbeingswithwhomhehasatleastsomedegreeoffellow-feeling。
Butbesidesadmittingtheactualimportanceofsympatheticpleasurestothemajorityofmankind，Ishouldgofurtherandmaintainthat，onempiricalgroundsalone，enlightenedself-interestwoulddirectmostmentofosteranddeveloptheirsympatheticsusceptibilitiestoagreaterextentthanisnowcommonlyattained。TheeffectivenessofButler’sfamousargumentagainstthevulgarantithesisbetweenSelf-loveandBenevolenceisundeniable:anditseemsscarcelyextravaganttosaythat，amidalltheprofusewasteofthemeansofhappinesswhichmencommit，thereisnoimprudencemoreflagrantthanthatofSelfishnessintheordinarysenseoftheterm，——thatexcessiveconcentrationofattentionontheindividual’sownhappinesswhichrendersitimpossibleforhimtofeelanystronginterestinthepleasuresandpainsofothers。Theperpetualprominenceofselfthathenceresultstendstodepriveallenjoymentsoftheirkeennessandzest，andproducerapidsatietyandennui:theselfishmanmissesthesenseofelevationandenlargementgivenbywideinterests；hemissesthemoresecureandserenesatisfactionthatattendscontinuallyonactivitiesdirectedtowardsendsmorestableinprospectthananindividual’shappinesscanbe；hemissesthepeculiarrichsweetness，dependinguponasortofcomplexreverberationofsympathy，whichisalwaysfoundinservicesrenderedtothosewhomweloveandwhoaregrateful。Heismadetofeelinathousandvariousways，accordingtothedegreeofrefinementwhichhisnaturehasattained，thediscordbetweentherhythmsofhisownlifeandofthatlargerlifeofwhichhisownisbutaninsignificantfraction。