noticed，astothechoicebetweenSubjectiveandObjectiverightnessintheexceptionalcaseinwhichalonethetwocanbepresentedasalternatives，——i。e。whenweareconsideringwhetherweshallinfluenceanothertoactcontrarytohisconvictionastowhatisright。Autilitarianwoulddecidethequestionbyweighingthefelicificconsequencesoftheparticularrightactagainsttheinfelicificresultstobeapprehendedhereafterfromthemoraldeteriorationofthepersonwhoseconscientiousconvictionswereoverbornebyothermotives:
unlesstheformereffectswereveryimportanthewouldreasonablyregardthedangertocharacterasthegreater:butiftheother’smistakensenseofdutythreatenedtocauseagravedisaster，hewouldnothesitatetooverbearitbyanymotiveswhichitwasinhispowertoapply。AndinpracticeIthinkthattheCommonSenseofmankindwouldcometosimilarconclusionsbymorevagueandsemi-consciousreasoningofthesamekind。
Inorder，however，toformapreciseestimateoftheextenttowhichUtilitarianismagreesordisagreeswithCommonSense，itseemsbesttoexaminethemoredefinitejudgmentsofrightandwronginconduct，undertheparticularheadsrepresentedbyourcommonnotionsofvirtuesandduties。Imaybeginbypointingoutoncemorethatsofarasanyadequatelyprecisedefinitionsofthesenotionsarefoundtoinvolve，implicitlyorexplicitly，thenotionof`good’orof`right’supposedalreadydeterminate，theycanaffordnogroundforopposingaUtilitarianinterpretationofthesefundamentalconceptions。Forexample，wesawthistobethecasewiththechiefoftheintellectualexcellencesdiscussedinBookiii。chap。
iii。Wisdom，ascommonlyconceived，isnotexactlythefacultyofchoosingtherightmeanstotheendofuniversalhappiness；rather，aswesaw，itsnotioninvolvesanuncriticalsynthesisofthedifferentendsandprinciplesthataredistinguishedandseparatelyexaminedinthepresenttreatise。
ButifitsimportisnotdistinctlyUtilitarian，itiscertainlynotanythingelseasdistinctfromUtilitarian:ifwecanonlydefineitasthefacultyorhabitofchoosingtherightorbestmeanstotherightorbestend，forthatveryreasonourdefinitionleavesitquiteopentoustogivethenotions`good’and`right’aUtilitarianimport。