wemustthereforeconceive，asatleastideallypossible，apointoftransitioninconsciousnessatwhichwepassfromthepositivetothenegative。Itisnotabsolutelynecessarytoassumethatthisstrictlyindifferentorneutralfeelingeveractuallyoccurs。Stillexperienceseemstoshowthatastateatanyrateverynearlyapproximatingtoitisevencommon:andwecertainlyexperiencecontinualtransitionsfrompleasuretopainandviceversa，andthusunlessweconceiveallsuchtransitionstobeabruptwemustexistatleastmomentarily，inthisneutralstate。
InwhatIhavejustsaid，IhavebyimplicationdeniedtheparadoxofEpicurusthatthestateofpainlessnessisequivalenttothehighestpossiblepleasure；sothatifwecanobtainabsolutefreedomfrompain，thegoalofHedonismisreached，afterwhichwemayvary，butcannotincrease，ourpleasure。Thisdoctrineisopposedtocommonsenseandcommonexperience。Butitwould，Ithink，beequallyerroneous，ontheotherhand，toregardthisneutralfeeling——hedonisticzero，asIhavecalledit——asthenormalconditionofourconsciousness，outofwhichweoccasionallysinkintopain，andoccasionallyriseintopleasure。Naturehasnotbeensoniggardlytomanasthis:solongashealthisretained，andpainandirksometoilbanished，themereperformanceoftheordinaryhabitualfunctionsoflifeis，accordingtomyexperience，afrequentsourceofmoderatepleasures，alternatingrapidlywithstatesnearlyorquiteindifferent。Thuswemayventuretosaythatthe`apathy’
whichsolargeaproportionofGreekmoralistsinthepost-Aristotelianperiodregardedastheidealstateofexistence，wasnotreallyconceivedbythemas``withoutonepleasureandwithoutonepain’’；butratherasastateofplacidintellectualcontemplation，whichinphilosophicmindsmighteasilyreachahighdegreeofpleasure。
Wehaveyettogivetothenotionsofpleasureandpaintheprecisionrequiredforquantitativecomparison。Indealingwiththispoint，andintherestofthehedonisticdiscussion，itwillbeconvenientforthemostparttospeakofpleasureonly，assumingthatpainmayberegardedasthenegativequantityofpleasure，andthataccordinglyanystatementsmadewithrespecttopleasuremaybeatonceapplied，byobviouschangesofphrase，topain。
TheequivalentphraseforPleasure，accordingtoMr。Spencer，is``afeelingwhichweseektobringintoconsciousnessandretainthere’’；andsimilarly，Mr。Bainsaysthat``pleasureandpain，intheactualorrealexperience，aretobeheldasidenticalwithmotivepower’’。But——grantingthatpleasuresnormallyexcitedesire——itstilldoesnotseemtomethatIjudgepleasurestobegreaterandlessexactlyinproportionastheystimulatethewilltoactionstendingtosustainthem。OfcourseneitherMr。BainnorMr。Spencermustbeunderstoodtolaydownthatallpleasureswhenactuallyfeltactuallystimulatetoexertionofsomekind——sincethisisobviouslynottrueofthepleasuresofrepose，awarmbath，etc。Thestimulusmustinsuchcasesbeunderstoodtobelatentandpotential；onlybecomingactualwhenactionisrequiredtopreventthecessationordiminutionofthepleasure。Thusamanenjoyingrestafterfatigueisvaguelyconsciousofastrongclingingtohisactualcondition，andofalatentreadinesstoresistanyimpulsetochangeit。