Thereis，however，asimpleinterpretationoftheterm——whichiswidelymaintainedtobethetrueone——accordingtowhicheverythingwhichwejudgetobegoodisimplicitlyconceivedasameanstotheendofpleasure，evenwhenwedonotmakeinourjudgmentanyexplicitreferencetothisoranyotherulteriorend。
Onthisview，anycomparisonofthingsinrespectoftheir`goodness’wouldseemtobereallyacomparisonofthemassourcesofpleasure；sothatanyattempttosystematiseourintuitionsofgoodness，whetherinconductandcharacterorinotherthings，mustreasonablyleadusstraighttoHedonism。
Andnodoubt，ifweconsidertheapplicationoftheterm，outsidethesphereofcharacterandconduct，tothingsthatarenotdefinitelyregardedasmeanstotheattainmentofsomeulteriorobjectofdesire，wefindaclosecorrespondencebetweenourapprehensionofpleasurederivedfromanobject，andourrecognitionthattheobjectisinitself`good’。Thegoodthingsoflifearethingswhichgivepleasure，whethersensualoremotional:asgooddinners，wines，poems，pictures，music:andthisgivesaprimafaciesupporttotheinterpretationof`good’asequivalentto`pleasant’。
Ithink，however，thatifwereflectontheapplicationofthetermtothecasesmostanalogoustothatofconduct——i。e。towhatwemaycall`objectsoftaste’——weshallfindthatthisinterpretationofithasnotclearlythesupportofcommonsense。Inthefirstplace，allowingthatthejudgmentthatanyobjectisgoodofitskindiscloselyconnectedwiththeapprehensionofpleasurederivedfromit，wemustobservethatitisgenerallytoaspecifickindofpleasurethattheaffirmationofgoodnesscorresponds；andthatiftheobjecthappenstogiveuspleasureofadifferentkind，wedonotthereforecallitgood——atleastwithoutqualification。Forinstance，weshouldnotcallawinegoodsolelybecauseitwasverywholesome；norapoemonaccountofitsmorallessons。Andhencewhenwecometoconsiderthemeaningoftheterm`good’asappliedtoconduct，thereisnoreason，sofar，tosupposethatithasanyreferenceorcorrespondencetoallthepleasuresthatmayresultfromtheconduct。Rathertheperceptionofgoodnessorvirtueinactionswouldseemtobeanalogoustotheperceptionofbeautyinmaterialthings:whichisnormallyaccompaniedwithaspecificpleasurewhichwecall`aesthetic’，buthasoftennodiscoverablerelationtothegeneralusefulnessoragreeablenessofthethingdiscernedtobebeautiful:indeed，weoftenrecognisethiskindofexcellenceinthingshurtfulanddangerous。
Butfurther:asregardsaestheticpleasures，andthesourcesofsuchpleasuresthatwecommonlyjudgetobegood，itisthereceivedopinionthatsomepersonshavemoreandothersless`goodtaste’:anditisonlythejudgmentofpersonsofgoodtastethatwerecogniseasvalidinrespectoftherealgoodnessofthethingsenjoyed。Wethinkthatofhisownpleasureeachindividualisthefinaljudge，andthereisnoappealfromhisdecision，——atleastsofarasheiscomparingpleasureswithinhisactualexperience；buttheaffirmationofgoodnessinanyobjectinvolvestheassumptionofauniversallyvalidstandard，which，aswebelieve，thejudgmentofpersonstowhomweattributegoodtasteapproximatelyrepresents。