ontheotherhand，whenwetrytoascertainbyreasontheDivineWill，theconceptionseemstopresentitselfasacommonformunderwhichareligiousmindisdisposedtoxegardwhatevermethodofdeterminingconductitapprehendstoberational；sincewecannotknowanyacttobeinaccordancewiththeDivineWill，whichwedonotalso，bythesameexerciseofthought，knowtobedictatedbyreason。Thus，commonly，itiseitherassumedthatGoddesirestheHappinessofmen，inwhichcaseoureffortsshouldbeconcentratedonitsproduction:orthatHedesirestheirPerfection，andthatthatshouldbeourend:orthatwhateverHisendmaybeintowhichperhapswehavenorighttoinquireHisLawsareimmediatelycognisable，beinginfactthefirstprinciplesofIntuitionalMorality。OrperhapsitisexplainedthatGod’sWillistobelearntbyexaminingourownconstitutionorthatoftheworldwearein:sothat`ConformitytoGod’sWill’seemstoresolveitselfinto`Self-realisation’，or`Lifeaccordingtonature’。
Inanycase，thisconception，howeverimportantitmaybeinsupplyingnewmotivesfordoingwhatwebelievetoberight，doesnot——apartfromRevelation——suggestanyspecialcriterionofrightness。
Letuspasstoconsiderthenotions`Nature’，`Natural’，`ConformitytoNature’。Iassume——inordertoobtainaprincipledistinctfrom`Self-realisation’，——thatthe`Nature’towhichwearetoconformisnoteachone’sownindividualnature，buthumannaturegenerally，consideredeitherapartfromorinrelationtoitsenvironment:thatwearetofindthestandardofrightconductinacertaintypeofhumanexistencewhichwecansomehowabstractfromobservationofactualhumanlife。Nowinacertainsenseeveryrationalmanmust，ofcourse，``conformtonature’’；thatis，inaimingatanyends，hemustadapthiseffortstotheparticularconditionsofhisexistence，physicalandpsychical。Butifheistogobeyondthis，andconformto`Nature’
intheadoptionofanultimateendorparamountstandardofrightconduct，itmustbeonthebasis——ifnotofstrictlyTheologicalassumptions，atanyrate——ofthemoreorlessdefiniterecognitionofDesignexhibitedintheempiricallyknownworld。Ifwefindnodesigninnature，ifthecomplexprocessesoftheworldknowntousthroughexperienceareconceivedasanaimlessthoughorderlydriftofchange，theknowledgeoftheseprocessesandtheirlawsmayindeedlimittheaimsofrationalbeings，butIcannotconceivehowitcandeterminetheendsoftheiraction，orbeasourceofunconditionalrulesofduty。Andinfactthosewhouse`natural’asanethicalnotiondocommonlysupposethatbycontemplatingtheactualplayofhumanimpulses，orthephysicalconstitutionofman，orhissocialrelations，wemayfindprinciplesfordeterminingpositivelyandcompletelythekindoflifehewasdesignedtolive。Ithink，however，thateveryattemptthustoderive`whatoughttobe’from`whatis’palpablyfails，themomentitisfreedfromfundamentalconfusionsofthought。Forinstance，supposeweseekpracticalguidanceintheconceptionofhumannatureregardedasasystemofimpulsesanddispositions，wemustobviouslygiveaspecialprecisiontothemeaningof``natural’’；sinceinasense，asButlerobserves，anyimpulseisnatural，butitismanifestlyidletobidusfollowNatureinthissense:forthequestionofdutyisneverraisedexceptwhenweareconsciousofaconflictofimpulses，andwishtoknowwhichtofollow。
NordoesithelpustosaythatthesupremacyofReasonisNatural，aswehavestartedbyassumingthatwhatReasonprescribesisconformitytoNature，andthusourlineofthoughtwouldbecomecircular:theNaturethatwearetofollowmustbedistinguishedfromourPracticalReason，ifitistobecomeaguidetoit。Howthenarewetodistinguish`naturalimpulses’——inthesenseinwhichtheyaretoguiderationalchoice——fromtheunnatural？ThosewhohaveoccupiedthemselveswiththisdistinctionseemgenerallytohaveinterpretedtheNaturaltomeaneitherthecommonasopposedtotherareandexceptional，ortheoriginalasopposedtowhatislaterindevelopment；or，negatively，whatisnottheeffectofhumanvolition。ButIhaveneverseenanygroundforassumingbroadlythatNatureabhorstheexceptional，orpreferstheearlierintimetothelater；andwhenwetakearetrospectiveviewofthehistoryofthehumanrace，wefindthatsomeimpulseswhichalladmire，suchastheloveofknowledgeandenthusiasticphilanthropy，arebothrarerandlaterintheirappearancethanotherswhichalljudgetobelower。Again，itisobviouslyunwarrantabletoeschewasunnaturalandopposedtotheDivinedesignallsuchimpulsesashavebeenproducedinusbytheinstitutionsofsociety，orouruseofhumanarrangementsandcontrivances，orthatresultinanywayfromthedeliberateactionofourfellow-men:forthiswerearbitrarilytoexcludesocietyandhumanactionfromthescopeofNature’spurposes。