InallourinterviewsIhaveurgedthatourfirstobjectwas，notRichmond，butthedefeatorscatteringofLee’sarmy，whichthreatenedWashingtonandthelineoftheupperPotomac。InowrecurtothesethingssimplytoremindyouofthegeneralviewswhichI
haveexpressed，andwhichIstillhold。
Thecircumstancesofthecase，however，havesomewhatchangedsincetheearlypartofNovember。Thechancesofanextendedlineofoperationsarenow，onaccountoftheadvancedseason，muchlessthanthen。ButthechancesarestillinourfavortomeetanddefeattheenemyontheRappahannock，ifwecaneffectacrossinginapositionwherewecanmeettheenemyonfavorableorevenequalterms。
Ithereforestilladviseamovementagainsthim。Thecharacterofthatmovement，however，mustdependuponcircumstanceswhichmaychangeanydayandalmostanyhour。Iftheenemyshouldconcentratehisforcesattheplaceyouhaveselectedforacrossing，makeitafeintandtryanotherplace。Again，thecircumstancesatthetimemaybesuchastorenderanattempttocrosstheentirearmynotadvisable。Inthatcase，theorysuggeststhat，whiletheenemyconcentratesatthatpoint，advantagescanbegainedbycrossingsmallerforcesatotherpointstocutoffhislines，destroyhiscommunication，andcapturehisrear—guards，outposts，etc。Thegreatobjectistooccupytheenemytopreventhismakinglargedetachmentsordistantraids，andtoinjurehimallyoucanwiththeleastinjurytoyourself。Ifthiscanbebestaccomplishedbyfeintsofageneralcrossinganddetachedrealcrossings，takethatcourse；ifbyanactualgeneralcrossing，withfeintsonotherpoints，adoptthatcourse。Thereseemtometobemanyreasonswhyacrossingatsomepointshouldbeattempted。Itwillnotdotokeepyourlargearmyinactive。Asyouyourselfadmit，itdevolvesonyoutodecideuponthetime，place，andcharacterofthecrossingwhichyoumayattempt。
Icanonlyadvisethatanattemptbemade，andasearlyaspossible。