第14章

　　&sect；436。\"Anentireconsolidationofthestatesintoonecompletenationalsovereignty，wouldimplyanentiresubordinationoftheparts；andwhateverpowersmightremaininthem，wouldbealtogetherdependentonthegeneralwill。Butastheplanoftheconventionaimsonlyatapartialunionorconsolidation，thestategovernmentswouldclearlyretainalltherightsofsovereignty，whichtheybeforehad，andwhichwerenot，bythatact，exclusivelydelegatedtotheUnitedStates。Thisexclusivedelegation，orratherthisalienationofstatesovereignty，wouldonlyexistinthreecases：wheretheconstitutioninexpresstermsgrantedanexclusiveauthoritytotheUnion；whereitgranted，inoneinstance，anauthoritytotheUnion，andinanother，prohibitedthestatesfromexercisingthelikeauthority；andwhereitgrantedanauthoritytotheUnion，towhichasimilarauthorityinthestateswouldbeabsolutelyandtotallycontradictoryandrepugnant。Iusethesetermstodistinguishthislastcasefromanother，whichmightappeartoresembleit；butwhichwould，infact，beessentiallydifferent：Imean，wheretheexerciseofaconcurrentjurisdictionmightbeproductiveofoccasionalinterferencesinthepolicyofanybranchofadministration，butwouldnotimplyanydirectcontradictionorrepugnancyinpointofconstitutionalauthority。Thesethreecasesofexclusivejurisdictioninthefederalgovernment，maybeexemplifiedbythefollowinginstances。Thelastclausebutoneintheeighthsectionofthefirstarticle，providesexpressly，thatcongressshallexercise’exclusivelegislation’overthedistricttobeappropriatedastheseatofgovernment。Thisanswerstothefirstcase。Thefirstclauseofthesamesectionempowerscongress’tolayandcollecttaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises；’andthesecondclauseofthetenthsectionofthesamearticledeclares，that’nostateshall，withouttheconsentofcongress，layanyimpostsordutiesonimportsorexports，exceptforthepurposeofexecutingitsinspectionlaws；’HencewouldresultanexclusivepowerintheUniontolaydutiesonimportsandexports，withtheparticularexceptionmentioned。

　　Butthispowerisabridgedbyanotherclause，whichdeclares，thatnotaxordutyshallbelaidonarticlesexportedfromanystate；inconsequenceofwhichqualification，itnowonlyextendstothedutiesonimports。Thisanswerstothesecondcase。Thethirdwillbefoundinthatclause，whichdeclares，thatcongressshallhavepower’toestablishanuniformruleofnaturalizationthroughouttheUnitedStates。’Thismustnecessarilybeexclusive；because，ifeachstatehadpowertoprescribeadistinctrule，therecouldbenouniform，rule。\"Thecorrectnessoftheserulesofinterpretationhasneverbeencontroverted；andtheyhavebeenoftenrecognisedbytheSupremeCourt。51

　　&sect；437。Thetwofirstrulesaresocompletelyselfevident，thateveryattempttoillustratethemwouldbevain，ifithadnotatendencytoperplexandconfuse。Thelastrule，viz。thatwhichdeclares，thatthepowerisexclusiveinthenationalgovernment，whereanauthorityisgrantedtotheUnion，towhichasimilarauthorityinthestateswouldbeabsolutelyandtotallycontradictoryandrepugnant，isthatalone，whichmaybethoughttorequirecomment。Thisruleseems，initsownnature，aslittlesusceptibleofdoubt，astheothersinreferencetotheconstitution。For，sincetheconstitutionhasdeclared，thattheconstitutionandlaws，andtreatiesinpursuanceofitshallbethesupremelawoftheland；itwouldbeabsurdtosay，thatastatelaw，repugnanttoit，mighthaveconcurrentoperationandvalidity；andespecially，asitisexpresslyadded，anythingintheconstitutionorlawsofanystatetothecontrarynotwithstanding。Therepugnancy，then，beingmadeout，itfollows，thatthestatelawisjustasmuchvoid，asthoughithadbeenexpresslydeclaredtobevoid；orthepowerincongresshadbeenexpresslydeclaredtobeexclusive。Everypowergiventocongressisbytheconstitutionnecessarilysupreme；andif，fromitsnature，orfromthewordsofthegrant，itisapparentlyintendedtobeexclusive，itisasmuchso，asifthestateswereexpresslyforbiddentoexerciseit。52

　　&sect；438。Theprincipaldifficultylies，notsomuchintherule，asinitsapplicationtoparticularcases。Here，thefieldfordiscussioniswide，andtheargumentuponconstructionissusceptibleofgreatmodifications，andofveryvariousforce。Butunless，fromthenatureofthepower，orfromtheobviousresultsofitsoperations，arepugnancymustexist，soastoleadtoanecessaryconclusion，thatthepowerwasintendedtobeexclusive，thetrueruleofinterpretationis，thatthepowerismerelyconcurrent。Thus，forinstance，anaffirmativepowerincongresstolaytaxes，isnotnecessarilyincompatiblewithalikepowerintheStates。Bothmayexistwithoutinterference；andifanyinterferenceshouldariseinaparticularcase，thequestionofsupremacywouldturn，notuponthenatureofthepower，butuponsupremacyofrightintheexerciseofthepowerinthatcase。53Inourcomplexsystem，presentingtherareanddifficultschemeofonegeneralgovernment，whoseactionextendsoverthewhole，butwhichpossessesonlyenumeratedpowers，andofnumerousstategovernments，whichretainandexercisemanypowersnotdelegatedtotheUnion，contestsrespectingpowermustarise。Wereitevenotherwise，themeasurestakenbytherespectivegovernmentstoexecutetheiracknowledgedpowerswouldbeoftenofthesamedescription，andmightsometimesinterfere。This，however，doesnotprove，thattheoneisexercising，orhasarighttoexercise，thepowersoftheother。54

　　&sect；439。Andthisleadsustoremark，thatintheexerciseofconcurrentpowers，iftherebeaconflictbetweenthelawsoftheUnionandthelawsofthestate，theformerbeingsupreme，thelattermustofcourseyield。Thepossibility，naytheprobability，ofsuchaconflictwasforeseenbytheframersoftheconstitution，andwasaccordinglyexpresslyprovidedfor。IfastatepassesalawinconsistentwiththeconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesitisamerenullity。Ifitpassesalawclearlywithinitsownconstitutionalpowers，stillifitconflictswiththeexerciseofapowergiventocongress，totheextentoftheinterferenceitsoperationissuspended；for，inaconflictoflaws，thatwhichissuprememustgovern。Therefore，ithasoftenbeenadjudged，thatifastatelawisinconflictwithatreaty，oranactofcongress，itbecomesipsofactoinoperativetotheextentoftheconflict。55