ThisdecisionIcausedtobeannulledbythecourtthathadrenderedit；andthepresentpoweroftheNationalGovernmenttodealeffectivelywiththetrustsisduesolelytothesuccessoftheAdministrationinsecuringthisreversalofitsformerdecisionbytheSupremeCourt。
TheConstitutionwasformedverylargelybecauseithadbecomeimperativetogivetosomecentralauthoritythepowertoregulateandcontrolinterstatecommerce。Atthattimewhencorporationswereintheirinfancyandbigcombinationsunknown，therewasnodifficultyinexercisingthepowergranted。Intheory，therightoftheNationtoexercisethispowercontinuedunquestioned。Butchangingconditionsobscuredthematterinthesightofthepeopleasawhole；andtheconsciousandtheunconsciousadvocatesofanunlimitedanduncontrollablecapitalismgraduallysecuredthewhittlingawayoftheNationalpowertoexercisethistheoreticalrightofcontroluntilitpracticallyvanished。AftertheCivilWar，withtheportentousgrowthofindustrialcombinationsinthiscountry，cameaperiodofreactionarydecisionsbythecourtswhich，asregardscorporations，culminatedinwhatisknownastheKnightcase。
TheShermanAnti-TrustLawwasenactedin1890becausetheformationoftheTobaccoTrustandtheSugarTrust，theonlytwogreattruststheninthecountryasidefromtheStandardOilTrust，whichwasagradualgrowth，hadawakenedapopulardemandforlegislationtodestroymonopolyandcurbindustrialcombinations。ThisdemandtheAnti-TrustLawwasintendedtosatisfy。TheAdministrationsofMr。
HarrisonandMr。Clevelandevidentlyconstruedthislawasprohibitingsuchcombinationsinthefuture，notascondemningthosewhichhadbeenformedpriortoitsenactment。In1895，however，theSugarTrust，whoseoutputoriginallywasaboutfifty-fivepercentofallsugarproducedintheUnitedStates，obtainedcontrolofthreeothercompaniesinPhiladelphiabyexchangingitsstockfortheirs，andthusincreaseditsbusinessuntilitcontrolledninety-eightpercentoftheentireproduct。UnderCleveland，theGovernmentbroughtproceedingsagainsttheSugarTrust，invokingtheAnti-TrustLaw，tosetasidetheacquisitionofthesecorporations。ThetestcasewasontheabsorptionoftheKnightCompany。TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates，withbutonedissentingvote，heldadverselytotheGovernment。TheytookthegroundthatthepowerconferredbytheConstitutiontoregulateandcontrolinterstatecommercedidnotextendtotheproductionormanufactureofcommoditieswithinaState，andthatnothingintheShermanAnti-TrustLawprohibitedacorporationfromacquiringallthestockofothercorporationsthroughexchangeofitsstockfortheirs，suchexchangenotbeing“commerce“
intheopinionoftheCourt，eventhoughbysuchacquisitionthecorporationwasenabledtocontroltheentireproductionofacommoditythatwasanecessaryoflife。TheeffectofthisdecisionwasnotmerelytheabsolutenullificationoftheAnti-TrustLaw，sofarasindustrialcorporationswereconcerned，butwasalsoineffectadeclarationthat，undertheConstitution，theNationalGovernmentcouldpassnolawreallyeffectiveforthedestructionorcontrolofsuchcombinations。