SewarddisapprovedofthecompositionoftheCabinetsomuchthat，almostatthelastmoment，hewithdrewhisacceptanceoftheStateDepartment。ItwasLincoln\'sgentlenessofargumentwhichovercamehisreluctancetoserve。Wemaybesure，however，thatSewardfailedtoobservethatLincoln\'stactlessnessinsocialmattersdidnotextendtohismanagementofmeninpolitics；wemayfeelsurethatwhatremainedinhismindwasLincoln\'sunwillingnesstoenterofficewithoutWilliamHenrySewardasSecretaryofState。
ThepromptnesswithwhichSewardassumedtheroleofprimeministerbearsoutthisinference。ThesamefactalsorevealsapuzzlingdetailofSeward\'scharacterwhichamountedtoobtuseness——hisforgetfulnessthatappointmenttocabinetofficeshadnottransformedhisoldpoliticalrivalsChaseandCameron，norsoftenedthefeelingsofaninveteratepoliticalenemy，Welles，theSecretaryoftheNavy。TheimpressionwhichSewardmadeonhiscolleaguesinthefirstdaysofthenewGovernmenthasbeenthussharplyrecordedbyWelles:\"TheSecretaryofStatewas，ofcourse，apprisedofeverymeeting[ofministers]andneverfailedinhisattendance，whateverwasthesubject-matter，andthoughentirelyoutofhisofficialprovince。HewasvigilantlyattentivetoeverymeasureandmovementinotherDepartments，howevertrivial——asmuchsoastohisown——watchedandscrutinizedeveryappointmentthatwasmade，orproposedtobemade，butwasnotcommunicativeinregardtothetransactionoftheStateDepartment。\"SoeagerwasSewardtokeepallthethreadsofaffairsinhisownhandsthathetriedtopersuadeLincolnnottoholdcabinetmeetingsbutmerelytoconsultwithparticularministers，andwiththeSecretaryofState，asoccasionmightdemand。AcombinedprotestfromtheotherSecretaries，however，causedtheregularholdingofCabinetmeetings。
WithregardtotheConfederacy，Seward\'spolicywasoneofnon-resistance。Forthishehadtworeasons。ThefirstofthesewashisrooteddelusionthatthebulkoftheSouthernerswereopposedtosecessionand，ifletalone，wouldforcetheirleaderstoreconsidertheiraction。Hemighthavequotedthenurseryrhyme，\"Letthemaloneandthey\'llcomehome\"；itwouldhavebeenlikehimandintunewithafrivoloussideofhisnature。HewasquiteasirresponsiblewhenhecomplacentlyassuredtheNorththatthetroublewouldallblowoverwithinninetydays。HealsobelievedthatanydisplayofforcewouldconvertthesehypotheticalUnionistsoftheSouthfromfriendstoenemiesandwouldconsolidateopinionintheConfederacytoproducewar。InjusticetoSewarditmustberememberedthatonthispointtimejustifiedhisfears。
HisdealingswiththeConfederatecommissionersshowthathewasplayingtogaintime，notwithintenttodeceivetheSouthernersbuttoacquirethatdominationoverLincolnwhichhefeltwashisbynaturalright。Intendingtoinstituteapeacepolicythemomenthegainedthisascendency，hefeltperfectlysafeinmakingpromisestothecommissionersthroughmutualfriends。HevirtuallytoldthemthatSumterwouldeventuallybegivenupandthatalltheyneeddowastowait。
SewardbroughttobearuponthePresidenttheopinionsofvariousmilitarymenwhothoughtthetimehadpassedwhenanyexpeditionforthereliefofSumtercouldsucceed。ForsometimeLincolnseemedabouttoconsent，thoughreluctantly，toSeward\'sleadinthematteroftheforts。Hewaspulledupstanding，however，bythethreatenedresignationofthePostmaster-General，Blair。